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A B S T R A C T
The thesis deals with one of the most important 
aspects of the optional compulsory jurisdiction system of 
the World Court which constitutes the last stage towards 
the achievement of an ideal, namely, the general and 
automatic jurisdiction over all legal disputes. In adher­
ing to this system States have made different types of 
reservations and conditions. The analysis of all these 
reservations and conditions, their scope, PRISON E*EIRE, 
effect on the Court's role in contributing to the develo­
pment of compulsory jurisdiction and peaceful settlement 
of disputes, and whether they serve the interests of 
States making them and of the system of compulsory juris­
diction, is the purpose of the study. In short, the 
thesis attempts to evaluate to what extent, if any, the 
reservations have affected the Court's role in promoting 
the rule of law in international relations through the 
compulsory jurisdiction system.
Organizationally, the thesis is divided into six 
chapters: the first deals with the history of reserva­
tions before the advent of the P. C. I. J. Thus it 
follows the development of the theory of reservations to 
obligatory arbitrations since the end of the last cen­
tury. Particular importance is given also to the examina­
tion of reservations during the drafting of the Statutes 
of the P. C. I. J. and the I. C. J. and in the case-law 
of both courts. The remaining five chapters are devoted 
to the analysis of the different kinds of conditions and 
reservations to the acceptance of the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction. These conditions and reservations ar grou­
ped under four categories: time limits and variation
conditions (the second chapter); reservations Rh TIONE 
TENPORIS; PERSON RE ('the -Third chapter), and' MRTERIRE 
which, owing to their importance, are divided into three 
chapters: unnecessary reservations (the fourth chapter), 
objective reservations (the fifth chapter) and subjective 
reservations (the sixth chapter), Particular importance 
is given to the last type of reservations, not only
2because of their character, but also because they consist 
of a gauge of the freedom of making reservations
In the general conclusions, the thesis seeks to 
illustrate the existing situation of compulsory jurisdic­
tion and the effect of reservations in practice. Many 
suggestions for improving the existing system are made 
and a model of a declaration of acceptance which might 
serve the interests of both the adhering parties and the 
compulsory jurisdiction, is recommended.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
It is well known that the jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice (I. C. J.) is based on the 
consent of States. One of the different ways of accept­
ing that jurisdiction is the possibility of making a 
declaration under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute 
of the court accepting as compulsory IPSO FQCTQ, and 
without special agreement, in relation to any other State 
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the 
Court. This system is known as the "Optional Clause", 1 
or compulsory jurisdiction. It is in fact an "optional 
compulsory jurisdiction". It is in this sense that the 
term compulsory jurisdiction will be used and not in the 
sense that the jurisdiction is automatically applicable 
to all States parties to the Statute as a result of that 
membership, nor in the sense that jurisdiction is compul­
sory only if it is not coupled with reservations which
keep the last word as to their application to the State
concerned.
The compulsory jurisdiction system occupies a 
special place in the problematic area of international 
adjudication. It is usually regarded as a gauge of the 
success or failure of the court. Thus at the San /rancis- 
co Conference in 1945, the Committee charged with draft­
ing the Statute of the Court predicted that the compul­
sory jurisdiction system would constitute a first step 
toward a general or automatic compulsory jurisdiction. 
Its hopes and expectations were formulated in the follow­
ing terms:
"[The First Committee] ventures to -foresee a significant 
role for the new Court in the international relations of the
future. The judicial process will have a central place in the
plans of the United Nations for the settlement of internation­
al disputes by peaceful means ... It is confidently anticipa­
ted that the jurisdiction of this tribunal will be extended as 
time goes on, and past experience warrants the expectation 
that its exercise of this jurisdiction will recommend a gene­
ral support".
The Conference also adopted unanimously a recommen­
dation asking the members of the United Nations "to make 
declarations recognising the obligatory jurisdiction of 
the International Court of Justice ... "
The Statute of the Court is almost silent on the
4
question of reservations and conditions. The possibil­
ity that declarations of acceptance " m b e  made uncondi­
tionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of 
several or certain States or for a certain time" [Article 
36 (2)] is the only provision dealing with this subject. 
Yet in practice a considerable number of reservations and 
conditions have been appended by States to their declar­
ations of acceptance.
This thesis seeks thus to evaluate to what extent, 
the expectations and hopes of the drafters of the Statute 
have been realised. It seeks to find out whether the 
reservations and conditions embodied by States in their 
declarations of acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction 
under Article 36 (2) have affected the Court's role in 
contributing to the development of compulsory jurisdic­
tion and the peaceful settlement of disputes and if so, 
to what extent? What is the scope of these reservations 
and conditions?' Are there any limits to the freedom of 
making reservations and conditions? What are the reasons 
behind, their inclusion? Is it desirable or practicable to 
eliminate the reservations altogether or only some of 
them? If only some are to be eliminated, what kind of 
reservations and conditions should be eliminated? Are any 
special steps desirable and practicable to ameliorate the 
others? It is proposed to deal with those questions while 
examining every reservation or condition.
For a complete picture on the question of reserva­
tions that might permit a more accurate picture of the 
situation it is deemed desirable to follow the develop­
ment of the theory of reservation to obligatory arbitra­
tion throughout the period starting from the end of the
t3
last century until the advent of the P. C. I. J.
The prevalence of the desire of those who drafted
the Statute of the present Court to maintain the greatest 
possible continuity between this Court and its predeces­
sor, the P. C. I. J., in order to preserve the progress 
already achieved, and the maintenance of Article 36 (2) 
of the Statute, with a slight change, necessitates a 
concentration on the development of reservations and 
conditions during the period of the P. C. I. J., in both 
State practice and the jurisprudence of the Court.
It is in this spirit that the reservations and
conditions to acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the present Court will be dealt with. They will be 
examined under four main headings: Time limits and varia­
tion conditions; Reservations RATIONE TEMPORIS/ PERSONAE,  
and ,NATERIAE.
It is hoped that this thesis will dispel the myths 
concerning reservations and conditions, and suggest means 
whereby more States will adhere to the compulsory juris­
diction system and the adhering parties will amend reser­
vations already made.
4NOTES
(1) Legally, the term "Optional Clause" is inaccurate because it was used 
originally as a description of a document which has disappeared. This document 
was a special protocol attached to the 1920 Protocol of Signature of the Statute 
of the P.C.I.J. which served as a form for declarations under Article 36 (2) of 
that Statute. See e.g. M.O. Hudson, the Permanent Court of International 
Justice 1920-1942. A Treatise, 1943 ; J.G. Merrills, "the Optional Clause 
Today", 50 B.Y.B.I.L. (1979), pp.87-116, at 88 ; D.J. Ende, Reaccepting the 
Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice : A Proposal for a 
New United States Declaration", 61 W ash.L.R . (1986), pp.1145-1183, at 
1149 note26, and L. Gross, "Compulsory Jurisdiction Under the Optional 
Clause :History and Practice", in L.F. Damrosch (ed.), the International Court 
of Justice at a Crossroads, 1987, pp.19-57, at 19 notel. However, it it is 
still widely used by writers, States and the Court to refer to Article 36 (2) . 
Thus it will used in this sense for convenience.
(2) U.N.C.I.O., vol.4, p.393(Doc. 913 IV/1/74(1), June 12, 1945).
(3 ) Ibid., pp.895,916, 919.
(4) It is to be noted that the word "reservations" in the title is used in its 
broadest sense including "conditions" though the latter will be dealt with 
separately.
CHAPTER I 
t il  STORY OR RESERVATI OISTS
SECTION (1) : RESERVATIONS TO OBLIGATORY ARBITRATION 
BEFORE 1920
The object of this section is to give a general 
idea ©n- the development of the theory of reservations. 
Therefore it may help for a better understanding of 
either the forms in which the reservations included in 
the declarations of states accepting the jurisdictions of 
the International Court of Justice are framed, and the 
determination of whether the reasons for making reserva­
tions are still the same or have been changed, and if so,
to what extent. For reservations to compulsory jurisdic-
i Ition of the I. C. J. consists of the last stage in the
development of that theory. In this context, and because 
of the similarities between the obligations assume^ under 
general treaties of obligatory arbitration and the Op­
tional Clause, 1 this section deals only with these 
treaties as distinguished from compromissory clauses.
It is to be understood that the term "Obligatory" 
arbitration is used here in its broad meaning, i.e. as 
was called at that time. In other words, arbitration is f 
obligatory when states agreed in advance to settle their 
future disputes by this means. Therefore, the difference 
between obligatory and voluntary arbitration was based 
mainly on the time at which the obligation to arbitrate 
was assumed, though it is generally agreed that that term 
had been misused, because from a legal point of view, the 
so called "Obligatory" arbitration was in fact a "Commit- 
ment to voluntary arbitration", since, as a general 
rule, no actual procedures were provided for rendering 
the obligation theoretically undertaken as a reality.! 
There was no obligatory arbitration in a sense that the 
obligation assumed in advance would insure the interven­
tion of international tribunals or would not be paralysed 
subsequently or excluded. States deemed it necessary to 
conclude a special agreement (C0NPR0MIS) each time a par­
ticular dispute arose, and as will be seen they kept for 
themselves the decision to determine the meaning of the 
broad reservations included. " Recourse to arbitration 
was, therefore, impossible by the initiation of one party 
only regardless of the consent of the other party to the 
dispute. ^
It is obvious that voluntary arbitration treaties
are excluded here since there is no need to include
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reservations in these treaties . The parties to a dis­
pute know exactly the nature of the dispute and its 
applications. They do not accept being brought before a 
tribunal unless both have considered the question in­
volved suitable for settlement by that means; agreed upon 
the constitution of the tribunal; the procedure to be 
followed; the rules to be applied; and defined the 
issues of the dispute . 6
For the purpose set above, the following points are 
to be discussed in this section: types of reservations
made until the close of the First World War; their scope 
and effect, and finally reasons for making them.
A - TYPES OF RESERVATIONS BEFORE 1920
Having taken into consideration the important 
discussion devoted to reservations during The Second 
Hague Conference, this period will be divided into three 
successive stages; before the Second Hague Conference, 
during that conference, and finally between 1907 and the 
end of the First World War.
(I) Reservations Before the Second Hague Conference
(i) Reservations before the First Hague Conference:
The contribution of Latin American States during 
the last century to the development of international 
arbitration has been recognised from voluntary arbitra—
tion to compromissory clauses Included mainly in treaties 
of commerce, alliance and peace relating to the inter­
pretation and application of these treaties, to general 
treaties devoted only to arbitration. However as far as 
reservations clauses are concerned, neither those States 
nor the European ones included any reservations before 
1890 , 7 except the reservation of previous recourse
through diplomatic channels, which was inserted earlier.
general arbitration treaties between Latin American
ficulties of any nature whatsoever were arbitrable if a 
solution had not been reached through diplomatic means. 
However they were not really obligatory because they did 
not contemplate a solution to the disagreement of these 
parties upon the nominations of subsequent arbitrators. 
The necessity of making a "special convention" (COMPROM- 
I S ) each time a dispute arose was maintained.
The First Conference of American States held in 
Washington from October 2, 1889 until April 19, 1890 is
usually cited as the starting point in the history iU of 
reservations. The importance of the arbitration treaty 
concluded at that conference did not lie only in the fact 
that it contained the first reservation, but also in the 
method envisaged for the settlement of disputes between 
the parties. The plan of arbitration was a new diversion 
from the usual method resorted to by the Latin American 
States in the determination of arbitrable disputes. 
Though all dispute were arbitrable, as before, only 
controversies over limited subjects were arbitrable 
without condition . ** The other disputes were, according 
to Article 3, arbitrable as far as they did not " in the 
judgment of any one of the nations involved in the con­
troversy" ,imperi1 its independence.
In fact, until 1890, there
States . 9 In all of them, all future disputes and dif-
The nature of the treaty as a multilateral one 
concluded between 18 States seems to be the main reason 
for making that reservation. This could be deduced from
8the fact that they had never inserted such a reservation 
before in their individual treaties. On the other hand, 
it was the first multilateral treaty devoted to interna­
tional arbitration. Thus, in objecting to the signature 
of that treaty Chile and Mexico expressed the view that 
it was very broad and it should have included other 
reservations. In the opinion of the Chilean delegate the 
application of arbitration as a principle of internation­
al law, should have corresponded to its nature, otherwise 
it could not be considered by any means a guaranty of 
peace. Voluntary arbitration had thus been preferred to 
the making of such a treaty. Its conclusion was possible 
only, in this view, if the reservations of sovereignty, 
indignity and honour had been included along with the 
reservation of independence. He said:
"ft nation whose dignity has been wounded, or whose honour 
has been attacked, will never seek in the arbitration the 
remedy -for the offence... The application of these principles 
has naturally to be left to the criterion and will of the 
nation which may be called upon to construe them, and which in 
a particular case will determine whether the case which has 
presented itself is, or is not included among them. And it 
cannot be otherwise, because if the decision is to be given by 
a third party, the interested nation would sustain a detriment 
to its sovereignty, which cannot be allowed. Otherwise the 
evil produced thereby would be undoubtedly still worse than 
the evil which it was attempting to correct." ^
Mexico also preferred the addition of the reserva­
tions of national honour and dignity. Thus they did 
not sign that treaty. Brazil and Argentine suggested in 
their resolutions presented to the conference the ex­
clusion of questions which might affect the national
sovereignty. The United States proposed the reservation
14of questions affecting territorial integrity. However 
the delegation of Guatemala regarded these suggestions as 
attempts to weaken the treaty. It was thought that their 
inclusion would be erasure "with one hand [of] what the 
other hand had written. There is no question whatever 
which in some way or another does not affect the national 
honour and dignity, and to allow a recourse to war for
these cases, could be tantamount to having accomplished
15nothing". J However that treaty was without effect in
practice. It was signed only by 11 States and ratified by
16one.
From that time, the Latin American States, influen­
ced by their first, conference changed their attitude 
towards obligatory arbitration. They became more cautio­
us, and started the inclusion of new reservations in 
their general arbitration treaties, as well as in com- 
promissory clauses included mainly in treaties of peace 
and friendship made with European States. The reservation
of sovereignty was included in two treaties between Spain
17 18and Columbia in 1894, and Spain and Peru in 1897.
The reservation of independence was made twice; once in
19the treaty between Salvador and Guatemala, and second­
ly in the treaty between The Netherlands and Portugal in 
1894, but this time with the reservation of autonomy. 
Another new reservation, i.e. the constitutional ques­
tions, was made in two treaties. The first was between
91
Argentina and Uruguay in June 1899, “ and the second
IPbetween Argentine and Paraguay in November 1899.
The trend of inserting reservations in treaties
also reached the parliaments of many States at that time.
They were the main reason for rejecting the Olney-
Pauncefote treaty of 1897 between the United States and
Great Britain, and the Italian - Argentine treaty of
1898. The first as signed did not contain any express
reservation. All disputes, as well as all questions of
principle of grave general importance affecting national
rights, were arbitrable in spite of the fact that the
questions of honour and integrity had arisen before the
2^
signature of that treaty. " According to Lord Salisbury, 
neither government was willing "to accept arbitration
upon issues in which national honour or integrity is
24involved". The majority of the Senators were opposed
to it on the grounds that it did not contain the reserva­
tions of honour, territorial integrity, foreign or domes­
tic policy, or claims against a state of the United
95
States." " The discussion of that treaty gave the
Senators the opportunity of stressing the necessity of
making a C0NPR0M1S each time a dispute arose, and of the
Senate consenting to the CQMPRQMIS. This was the starting
point to the policy to which the United States' Senate
26has clung since that time.
As to the second treaty, the Argentine Senate 
rejected it as it was signed because it deemed it neces­
sary to amend the treaty as to the extent that questions 
should be excluded "which might affect the independence, 
the sovereignty and the fundamental principles on which 
the political organization of the two countries rest". It 
was thought that these reservations were inherent in the 
treaty, so that amendment was simply an explanation of 
what was undoubtedly in the minds of the negotiators. 
However the Italian government rejected the ratification 
of the treaty because of the amendment, which was descri­
bed as introducing "a much too indefinite exception". 
Also "if reservations were to be included in the treaty,
Argentine should explicitly name those questions which
27she desired to withdraw from the action of the treaty".
It is to be mentioned that this new trend of in­
serting reservations in arbitration treaties was not a 
step backwards in the progress of obligatory arbitration. 
On the contrary, it reflected the willingness of States 
to observe their obligations when they were more limited 
or when their nature corresponded to their application 
rather than making a general statement that all dispute, 
of whatever nature without reservations are arbitrable 
then offending it in practice as the Chilean delegation
70
at the First American States Conference stated.  ^ Furth­
ermore, it can hardly be said that arbitration treaties 
made at that time contained any real obligations because
— as has been observed — they "were deprived of conse—
29
quence", or "were expressed aspirations of the states­
men rather than the working agreements". "U
(ii) Reservations during the First Hague Conference
The idea of making a general arbitration treaty 
without reservations was not conceived during the First 
Hague Conference. This was maybe due to the fact that the 
Latin American States, which had been the greatest prota­
gonists of obligatory arbitration, were not invited. Thus 
reservations were regarded as an essential element in 
making a universal obligatory arbitration treaty. The 
draft convention prepared by Russia, which called for the 
conference, showed the precautions taken as regard to 
such a treaty, by the inclusion of new reservations of a 
vaguer nature i.e. the reservations of "vital interests 
and national honour". ol A request for the determination 
of these undefined words was made by Asser. As a response 
to that request. Marten recognised that "the text of Art­
icle 8 is in fact new, but he fears that it will not be
32possible to find a better". " The vague character of 
these clauses had perplexed the delegate of Switzerland. 
He wondered whether they included questions of national 
constitution or not. He stated that he was under instruc­
tions from his Government to request "an addition to the 
words 'vital, interests and national honour' with refere­
nce to the constitution of the country - but if it is 
understood that the words written into the draft of these 
articles comprehend, A FQRTIodgy the national constitu- 
tion, he is able to declare himself as in accord with the
7 7
proposed text".
The reservation of questions belonging to the past 
or "disputes and differences arising prior to the con­
clusion of a treaty" was another new one introduced by 
34
Roumania. The United States suggested in her plan for
a permanent Court that all disputes should be referred to
that court, except those which involved States' "politi­
cscal independence" or territorial integrity.
On the other hand, the First Hague Conference had 
followed the First American States Conference in limiting
12
the scope of arbitrable disputes. However the method 
followed by the former could be regarded as a development 
of the idea introduced by the latter, whereas the latter 
limited arbitrable disputes to those included in the 
list, although an attempt had been made during the First 
Hague Conference to create a criterion for the determina­
tion of arbitrable and non-arbitrable disputes. This 
determination was based on legal questions as opposed to 
political ones. Therefore arbitrable disputes were only 
those, according to the Russian explanatory note, "which 
concern exclusively special points of law and which do 
not touch upon the vital interests or national honour of 
States". However no clear definition had been advanced 
for that purpose. Many formulae had been referred to. 
Among them it was conceived that the jurisdiction of 
arbitration extended to questions "of a legal nature and 
principally questions of the interpretation or applica­
tion of treaties". However "differences where the oppos­
ing claims of the parties cannot be stated as legal 
propositions are thus, to some extent, by their very 
nature, outside the jurisdiction of an institution called 
upon to 'speak the law' ". Conflicting interests, dif­
ferences of a political nature, do not belong, properly 
speaking to arbitration. "Opposing interests" were
also relied on for that determination. A treaty was of a 
political nature and therefore excluded from arbitration 
if the opposing interests were of a HEH10HRL CHRRRCTER. 
However treaties of a NORLB-NIBE CRh Rm C T E R , which formed 
a system of "international relationship" - international 
unions - to serve interests which were also internation­
al, were arbitrable, because in those treaties interests 
of all States were "common and identical". The determina­
tion of the nature of the dispute in such cases seems to 
be left to states concerned, which would not permit their 
hands to be tied or to be reduced to a passive state when 
dealing with questions upon which their security in a 
large part depended, i.e., questions of which none but 
the sovereign power can be the judge.
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In the same vein it was stated before the Third 
Commission that:
"States have never considered that arbitration is ap­
plicable indiscriminately to all the differences that may 
arise among them. There are controversies which seem to be 
exempt from arbitrable justice because the contentions of the 
parties cannot he formulated in a logical manner* Many politi­
cal differences are of this character.
Even in the province of law, States - the majority of 
them at any rate - do not consider that arbitration is ap­
plicable forthwith to every dispute of a legal nature. There 
are disputes affecting rights of so superior an order that the 
powers do not consider themselves authorised to submit them to 
arbitral justice. The formula covering these excepted cases 
may vary -’independence and autonomy' says the Dutch - Por­
tuguese declaration of July 5 1894; -’vital interests and
national^honour? says the Russian project which was submitted 
to us." 09 . .
It seems that according to the above formula a 
contention which could not be formulated in a legal 
manner did not mean necessarily that it was of a politi­
cal nature. According to the formula introduced by Rus­
sia, two categories of disputes were arbitrable within 
certain limits. The first included disputes concerning 
the interpretation or application of 12 enumerated con­
ventions as far as they did not involve the vital inter­
ests or national honour of the States in the controversy; 
and the second contained disputes concerning pecuniary 
claims with the same reservations, e.g. A dispute over 
unlawful injuries if it was concerning the bankruptcy of
a State and within the limits where the principle of
40
indemnity was recognised in practice. ' The failure of 
the conference to obtain an agreement upon arbitrable 
disputes was not due to this method. It had never been
objected to PER SE, but the main problem was as to what
41categories of controversies should be included. The 
United States delegates for example,"feIt obliged to 
insist upon the omission from the Russian list ... inter­
national conventions relating to rivers, to interoceanic
42canals and to monetary matters". Also Germany refused
even the proposition to reduce the list to four cases in
47:
which she had agreed to obligatory arbitration.
To conclude, the delegates to the Conference did 
not conceive the application of obligatory arbitration 
beyond secondary classes of disputes. Even to those 
classes, it was not limited only to questions of a legal 
nature, or those which had no bearing on what were called 
"vital interests", "national honour" or "inalienable 
possessions", but States were willing to pledge themsel­
ves to accept arbitration in a manner that they could at 
the same time escape this obligation when they considered 
it necessary. Therefore the result was, in this respect, 
no more than the recognition of arbitration in questions 
of a legal nature and especially in the interpretation of 
or application of international conventions "as the most 
effective and at the same time the most equitable means
of settling disputes which diplomacy has failed to set-
44tie". 4
(iii) The Second International Conference 
of American States
The Second International Conference of American 
States held at Mexico City from October 22, 1901, to 
January 31, 1902 followed the same procedure introduced 
by the First Conference in the determination of arbitra­
ble disputes. Article I of the treaty on compulsory 
arbitration provided for the arbitrability of all dis­
putes "provided that in the exclusive judgment of any of 
the interested Nations the said controversies do not 
affect either the independence or national honour". Also 
the Second Article enumerated the controversies with 
regard to which these reservations could not be invoked. 
Disputes were to be submitted to The Permanent Court of 
Arbitration created by the First Hague Conference 
(Art.3), which was invested with the power to decide all 
questions relating to its own jurisdiction (Art.4).
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The idea of submitting all disputes to arbitration 
without reservations was endorsed by some States. Peru, 
for example, regarded the inclusion of such reservations 
as a :
"return to ideas and sentiments developed in the -feudal 
times. However in the modern State which is based on living 
according to the law ... the so-called superior or vital 
interests could certainly not be an object -for precise defini­
tion. But it is to be believed that there is not for any
46
nation any interest of greater importance than peace."
However other States regarded the reservations 
necessary for the conclusion of the treaty. The Mexican 
Government was in favour of making the reservation of 
national honour, and ascribed the failure of the first 
treaty to the absence of that reservation. It laid stress 
strongly upon its maintenance, in spite of its recogni­
tion of the impossibility of defining the scope of that 
reservation, for the reason that:
"The weakest nations - history is full of lessons on this 
point - prefer to succumb rather than to sacrifice their 
honour. And because this sentiment, worthy of respect, al­
though sometimes exaggerated is irreducible, no nation can 
consent that a third party, be it whoever it may, should 
decide on the question, which may be called previous, whether 
the pending controversy with another Power affects or does not 
affect, its independence or its honour."
Argentine preferred the clause of the right of
sovereignty, as an ensemble of the essential condition to
the existence of a nation, because it could embrace all
47other reservations. The reservation of the constitu­
tional principles became more popular between Latin 
American States. It was made in the same year i.e. 1902 
in two treaties concluded by the Argentine with Bolivia 
and Chile. 48
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(iv) The Anglo — French Treaty of 1903
This treaty was very important in the history of 
the obligatory arbitration for two reasons. On the one 
hand it was among the early general arbitration treaties 
made by great powers which had been reluctant to enter 
into such treaties before. On the other hand it embraced 
all the widest reservations known at that time. It was 
influenced by the First Hague Conference in limiting its 
scope of application to disputes of a legal nature or 
relating to the interpretation of treaties existing 
between parties. These disputes were to be referred 
according to Article 1 to the Permanent Court of Arbitra­
tion if it had not been possible to settle them by diplo­
macy, provided that they did not affect "the vital inter­
ests, the independence, or the honour of the two con­
tracting States and do not concern the interests of third 
49parties." By the inclusion of these reservations, the 
parties were disinclined to accept arbitration over 
disputes which they considered important, while at the 
same time they were willing to cope with the movement of 
obligatory arbitration. The consent of the two parties, 
was therefore, necessary for the submission of any dis­
pute to the tribunal since the determination of whether 
the subject matter was affected by any reservations was
left to them, otherwise the whole treaty could be set
50
aside. ' The conclusion of a special agreement in each 
individual case before appealing to the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration was necessary according to Article 2.
The form of this treaty was followed in almost 
identically the same terms by a large number of subse­
quent treaties before 1919. It was included in about 80 
treaties throughout the period, half of them made by the 
United States and Brazil. About 36 of these treaties 
were concluded during the period until the end of the 
first half of the year 1908.
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(v) Other Treaties
The International American Conference and the First 
Hague Conference had a great influence on the behaviour 
of Latin American States and the European ones respec­
tively with regard to obligatory arbitration. The former 
States and Italy preferred the formula that all disputes 
were arbitrable except questions affecting the indepen­
dence and honour of the contracting States. However these
reservations could not be invoked with regard to ques­
tions listed in those treaties. The list was based mainly 
on the classes of matters included in the Second Inter­
national Conference of American States with the addition
5^or omission of other questions. “ The European States 
relied on the formula discussed during the First Hague 
Conference in many treaties. These treaties were more 
limited in scope in comparison with the former, but
contained more reservations such as the treaties con­
cluded by Russia or Belgium with the European States
which contained the reservations of independence, honour,
54vital interests and sovereignty.
Another reservation had been developed during that
period concerning the exclusion from arbitration of any
question which was within the jurisdiction of national
courts. This reservation was made in many forms: some
treaties provided for that disputes between citizens of
one of the contracting States and the other State were
55
exempted when the local courts were competent, " others
made these disputes arbitrable only in case of denial of
justice, ° or if questions of interpretation of treaties
57as well as denial of justice were involved, and final­
ly some treaties contained a suspensive condition accord­
ing to which recourse to arbitration was not possible
before there had been a definite decision by the munici—
58pal courts.
A new trend in the progress of obligatory arbitra­
tion had been marked by the inclusion of clauses accord-
18
ing to which controversies upon the nature of the dispute 
were to be referred to tribunals. Thus the decision, 
which had an obligatory character, whether a dispute was 
arbitrable or not, was given to the tribunal itself. 
Those clauses were included in Article 18 of the Treaty 
of Commerce between Italy and Switzerland of July 13, 
1904 and Article 15 of the treaty between Italy on the
59
one hand, and Austria, Hungry and Germany on the other. 
Moreover, Article I of the treaty between Italy and Peru 
dated April 18, 1905, which exempted questions concerning 
national independence and national honour provided that 
"in case there should be doubt regarding these two mat­
ters, the question shall also be settled by arbitral 
decision." 6U Article 2 of the treaty between Norway and 
Sweden of October 26, 1905, also empowered the tribunal
to decide, in case of divergence, whether or not the 
dispute involved vital interests of one or the other of 
the parties. However there was no mention of the reserva­
tions of "independence" and "integrity" which were in­
cluded in Article I beside the reservation of vital 
interests.61 It seems that the parties considered the 
former reservations more important, and therefore they 
upheld them from the decision of the tribunal.
(II) Reservations During the Second Hague Conference
Unlike the First, the Second Hague Conference saw 
many propositions being made. This was due mainly to the 
fact that more States were represented, and States had 
been influenced by their practice in making Arbitration 
treaties during that period. “ Table 1 summarises the 
propositions presented to the conference. In fact the
principle of obligatory arbitration was unanimously
67admitted in abstract, but for the determination of 
which method would lead to its transformation to a reali­
ty, unsurmountable difficulties arose. The methods en­
visaged could be divided into four: arbitration of all
disputes without reservations; the limitation of arbitra­
tion to enumerative subjects without reservation; its
19
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limitation to questions of a legal nature or to those 
relating to the interpretation or application of treaties 
with reservations; and finally to limit it as in the 
third formula with the addition of a listed subjects 
without reservations. 68
The first method included the proposals of the 
Dominican Republic and of the Danish Government. The 
former based its proposition on the recommendation of the 
Third International American Conference to the 19 States 
represented "to endeavour to collaborate in the making of
a general convention of arbitration" at the Second Hague
69conference. The latter relied on its obligatory ar­
bitration treaties concluded between the two conferences 
especially those with the Netherlands, Italy and Portugal 
which were without reservations. However these proposals, 
as well as the Serbian one classified in the second
category, did not obtain a long discussion because it was
thought that the Conference would not accept such a
proposal, in spite of the fact that many delegates criti­
cised the inclusion of reservations - as wi11 be seen. 
Thus, the president of the First Subcommission of the 
First Commission observed that:
"no member of the committee believes that any good would 
come from their discussing a proposition which would certainly 
be rejected by the conference; he declares that the committee 
does not accept the principle of general obligatory arbitra­
tion without reservation"
The most extensive discussion had been on the two last 
formulae. As to the third, two connected points arose: 
the determination of the nature of disputes, and which 
reservations should be included. Concerning the deter­
mination of legal and non-legal questions or justiciable
71and non—justiciable disputes the conference failed to 
create any criterion on which such a distinction should 
be made. Thus the delegates of Germany were in the lead 
in criticising this limitation. Marschall von Bieberstein 
asked:
"What is the meaning of this word? (legal). It has been 
said that it may exclude -’political matters7. Now it is ab­
solutely impossible, in a world treaty, to trace a line of 
demarcation between these two nations. A question may be legal 
in one country, and political in another one. There are even 
purely legal matters which become political at the time of a 
dispute. One of our most distinguished colleagues told us the 
other day, on another occasion, 7that politics is the realm of 
international law7. Do we desist to distinguish 7 legal7 ques­
tions from technical and economic questions? This would also 
be impossible. The result is that the word 'legal7 states
everything and states nothing, and in matters of interpreta­
tion the result is just the same. It has been asked: 7Who is
to decide in the case of some dispute, whether a question is
or whether it is not legal?7 So far we have had no answer.
Yet, this word 'legal7 is the nail on which we have hung the 
whole system of obligatory arbitration along with the list and 
with the table. If this nail is not solidly fastened, everyth­
ing hung on it will fall to the ground." 7“*
The attempt to refute the difficulties mentioned by 
the German delegate was based on the fact that they were 
applicable also to individual treaties since Germany 
preferred these treaties and was against any attempt to 
making an universal obligatory arbitration treaty. 7o 
However it had been recognised that it was difficult, if
not impossible, to determine either the questions of a
74 7
juridical nature nor those of a political character.
A solution to the problem was suggested by the Italian
delegate Guido Fusinato that the tribunal should decide
upon this preliminary question, 76 but it was rejected.
Leon Bourgeois declared that:
"It is we who are here present who must state, who must
decide whether or not a certain question is of a juridical
nature."
Marschall von Bieberstein also opposed strongly to
that idea. He thought that it was not possible "to leave
to the arbitrator the decision of a matter so grave that
in reality the future itself of the institution of ar—
78bitration is at stake". As to which reservations
should be included, it has never been conceived that a 
treaty could include all the reservations contained in
22
the different proposals, to wit, the reservations of: 
vital interests, honour, independence, interests of third 
parties, territorial integrity. Local institutions or 
internal laws, in addition to the reservations concerning 
specific disputes made in the list such as pecuniary 
claims and payment of indemnities if the local courts 
were competent, otherwise such a treaty would have no 
sense at all. For the elimination of some of these reser­
vations, the Brazilian proposition did not hold for a 
long time because it was regarded as too broad since it 
suggested the arbitration of political and legal ques­
tions on the one hand, and did contain more reservations, 
especially the reservation of Local institutions or 
internal laws and territorial integrity which were not
"70
made in the other propositions on the other hand. ' ' The 
"arbitrariness" and "indecisiveness" of the former reser­
vation, and the possibility offered by it for any State
interested in escaping being sued before a tribunal by
so
invoking its municipal law led to its elimination. ' As 
to the latter, it was criticised by Martens as being "so 
restrictive" that it excluded "most of the questions 
which have been the object of the fifty-five arbitral 
awards pronounced in the course of the nineteenth cen­
tury" . He even wondered if it was "easy to imagine cases 
to be submitted to arbitration which would touch neither 
the independence, nor the territorial integrity nor the 
institutions, nor the municipal laws of the States in 
controversy, especially if as stated in article 4 each 
State remains free to decide this matter in an exclusive
i
manner". Thus, Heinrich Lammasch pointed out that
"one could not state whether it (the Brazilian proposi­
tion) is going too far, or whether it is going far enoug-
R?
h" . For maintaining these reservations, the Brazilian
delegate argued that they were included in the reserva­
tions made in the other propositions, especially vital
DT
interests and national honour.
The most attractive reservations were those of in­
dependence, vital interests, national honour and the
23
interests of third States. However a divergence of opin­
ion had arisen with regard to which reservations should 
be maintained. Some delegates were against the idea of 
making any reservations. Others regarded them all as 
indispensible. While others preferred only some of them. 
The most comprehensive attitude was taken by the Urugua­
yan delegate Juan P. Castro who preferred the arbitration 
treaty to be made on the early Latin American treaties 
style, i.e. without reservations. He was against the 
inclusion of the national honour clause. For any dispute 
that reached a "certain degree of acuteness" involved, he 
thought, the honour of both parties. He opposed also the 
reservation of vital interests because "every exception 
is a gate opening to war", he pointed out. As to the 
independence clause, Castro regarded it included tacitly 
in every treaty, for "no country worthy of being a coun­
try will ever submit its existence to the opinion of 
84arbitrators". Asser (the Netherland delegate) also
proposed the inclusion of the reservation of vital inter­
ests and honour. In his opinion:
"This reservation seems indeed well calculated to disil­
lusion the friends of arbitration. By means of it we are 
taking back with one hand that which we seem to be giving with 
the other. Since each State is free to decide that which in 
its judgment should be classed among the VITRL 1 HT ERSTS, doubt 
is permitted... In truth we do not see that for a dispute 
involving the vital interests of a State one should wish to 
exclude its settlement by means of arbitration, even if there 
should result from it the danger or the need of war; that one 
should prefer ' to the reasoned decision of a tribunal composed 
of respectable and impartial judges, rendered after, a judicial 
discussion and a conscientious examination, a solution by 
arms, by blind force, by the good or evil chances on the 
battle-field.
„ VThe vital intersts concern the LIFE of the nations; war 
v the BERTH of millions of brave citizens.
The vital interests in our day are generally the inter­
ests of an economic nature; War is the destruction by millionsD c
and billions of the national capital."
The argument that the reservations were of no 
importance whatever in a world treaty was advanced by the 
German delegate Marschall von Bieberstein. He argued that 
the obligation asumed according to a treaty containing 
the clauses of independence, the honour and vital inter­
ests would be illusory, especially when each State would 
itself decide as to the exception which it had set forth. 
It is to be observed that Bieberstein was not in favour 
of making an arbitration treaty without reservations, but 
his argument was in fact a veil behind which he tried to
hide the real intention of Germany to destroy the idea of
87making a world treaty of arbitration. Among the advo­
cates of a general treaty of arbitration was the Serbian 
delegate Milovan Milovanovitch who was against the ex­
clusion of disputes of a political nature affecting the 
independence, the vital interests or the honour of States
because disputes of such a character had been in the past
88and would be in future the direct causes of wars.
tisans^of^ obiigatory arbitration, and the vagueness
elastic nature of the proposed reservations, the majority
of the delegates considered them indispensible. It had
been thought that between accepting a weak obligation to
resort to arbitration and compromising the very principle
of obligatory arbitration, the idea of reservations
89should prevail. For the maintenance of that idea the 
following reasons were relied on: the impossibility of
predicting the consequences of an unconditional world 
arbitration treaty or forming a judgment as to its scope; 
"the absence of an international practice of a certain 
duration" as a means for the determination of the clas­
ses for which recourse to arbitration would be without 
91reservations; the absence of reservations would en­
courage States to seek other means to denounce the oblig­
ations assumed according to that treaty, and finally 
these reservations had been included in treaties made 
before that conference especially on the Anglo - French 
model of 1903 and they had not led to ambiguous inter­
In spite of these arguments advanced by the
92
25
pretations, and therefore no State would "Invoke them 
without an absolute necessity". “ Accordingly, the First 
Committee maintained the reservation of vital interests 
and independence by fourteen votes against four, and the 
whole Article 16 (a) which contained these reservations 
in addition to the clauses of honour and the interests of 
other States not involved in the disputes by thirty-five 
votes against five (Germany, Austria - Hungary, Greece,
Roumania and Turkey), and four abstentions (Japan, Luxem-
94bourg, Montenegro and Switzerland). With regard to the 
first reservation, the president of the First Committee 
observed that:
"with great force this clause of the reservation of vital 
interests is criticised, but it is so only because it has been 
found too elastic, and because arbitration is not then suffi­
ciently obligatory. We but wish to follow, and it is through 
wisdom that we are not going further." J
The fourth and the last method envisaged was that 
of enumerating subject matters in regard to which recou­
rse to arbitration should be obligatory without reserva­
tions. The classes proposed by Portugal, Great Britain,
96the United States of America and Switzerland were 
based mainly on those included in the Russian Proposition 
during the First Hague Conference. The general feature of 
those classes was that they were of secondary importance, 
and even for these cases it was impossible for the deleg­
ates to determine in advance a large number of specific
97cases upon which obligatory arbitration might bear. 
However it was thought that a limited list of a meager 
subject was better than nothing, because it could con­
tribute to the establishment of peace, through the set­
tlement of the little disputes arising in the daily life
of nations, and would bring about the habit of resorting
98to arbitral justice. In spite of the efforts made by
the majority, the opposition of some States especially 
germany, Austria, Hungary, Belgium and Greece was the 
main obstacle to secure an absolute majority over a large 
number of cases. They based their refusal to the enumera-
26
tive method on the changeable character of the cases i.e.
a legal question might become a political one at the time
of the dispute; "the innocent nature of almost all of the
points", i.e. by their nature preclude any dispute; some
of them called for the intervention of the legislative
bodies, and the interpretation and application of certain
99
of them came solely within the national jurisdiction.
Thus from 24 cases voted upon out of 32, only 8 cases
obtained an absolute majority before the First Sub-com-
100mission.
The previous pages show clearly the importance that 
had been given to the theory of reservations during the 
Second Hague Conference, in spite of the failure to 
conclude a general obligatory arbitration treaty, by the 
eminent jurists who were at the same time representatives 
off their governments and, therefore, instructed to 
advocate their governments' views. The most remarkable 
point is that what was considered at the First Hague
Conference as "new reservations" i.e. honour, vital
interests and independence became at the Second "well- 
known reservations". iUi
III Reservations During the Period Between 
the Second Hague Conference and 1920
The failure of the Second Hague Conference to reach 
an agreement upon obligatory arbitration left no alterna­
tive for States but to conclude individual treaties. In 
general all formulae used before the Second Hague Con­
ference had been followed, i.e. The Anglo - French model,
which was the most attractive especially between great
1 r>2
powers; the limitation of arbitration to legal ques­
tions especially those relating to the interpretation or 
application of the treaties and pecuniary claims with 
reservations, and the enumerated formula which differed 
from the previous in making recourse to arbitration as 
regard to listed cases without reservations. lu'"’ The 
tendency towards making arbitration treaties without
27
reservations became an exception. States, even the Latin
American States, realised that their essential interests
104
had to be protected. ‘ The unratified Taft - Knox 
treaties of 1911, negotiated by the United States with 
Great Britain and France showed the reluctance of the 
great powers at that time, to conclude treaties without 
reservations. All differences "justiciable in their 
nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by the 
application of the principles of law or equity", except 
if it had been possible to settle them by diplomacy, were 
arbitrable without reservations. These treaties went 
farther in providing for that a joint commission composed 
of three nationals of each State, was to decide upon the 
nature of the dispute and whether or not it was justici­
able. The failure in ratifying these treaties was due to 
the modification introduced by the Senate concerning the 
omission of the clause relating to the determination of 
justiciable questions on the one hand, and the inclusion 
of some reservations such as the Monroe Doctrine, the in­
tegrity of the territory of the United States and of the
different States, and questions of immigration on the 
105other. Taft refused to ratify them, because, in his 
view, the adjudication of international arbitration 
courts should be abided by "in every issue which cannot 
be settled by negotiations no matter what it involves, 
whether honour, territory or money". 106
The number of treaties which empowered the tribunal 
to decide whether the previous questions were justiciable 
or whether a case touched upon one or more of the reser­
ved subjects had been increased. Professor N Pol itis has 
observed that up to 1914 there were 19 treaties, Italy 
was a party to 11 of them, which contained such provisi­
ons among 139 treaties in force. However they con­
sisted of an exception from the general rule that such 
decision was left to each State. Concerning the number of
reservations, it had varied generally from one to five
108
reservations ‘ without taking into consideration the 
stipulation of previous recourse to diplomatic means. The
most desirable reservations were; honour, independence,
vital interests and third parties interests. They were
109
included in about 107, 104, 94 and 87 treaties respe­
ctively. The reservation of sovereignty was included in 
about 17 treaties; constitutional questions in about 16;
nationality questions in 2 and past disputes in one trea-
. 1 1 0  
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B - SCOPE AND EFFECTS OF RESERVATIONS
The broad terms in which reservations had been 
phrased throughout the period considered here raised the 
question of the necessity to qualify them. For this pur­
pose no attempt succeeded. As has been seen, it was not 
possible to determine the meaning of reservations during 
the First Hague Conference, nor during the Second, and the 
suggestion of Asser to define the phrase "0IT8L INTERESTS 
OR NATIONAL HONOUR" was rejected. To illustrate the
difficulties which arose during those conferences, the ig­
norance of the delegates to answer Odier's question of 
whether or not questions of national constitution were 
included in the reservations of vital interests and honour 
is worthy of mention. The view taken by Ruy Barbosa in 
advocating the Brazilian proposed reservations offers the 
best example. For retaining the reservations of territor­
ial integrity and municipal institutions and laws, he 
argues that the former was implicitly contained in the 
terms of "ESSENTIAL INTERESTS" and almost always concerns 
the honour of the State. Explaining the vagueness of these 
terms Barbosa said: "let him who may state where ends the 
point of honour and where begins the juridical phase. 
Whatever may be said in connection with this matter, it is 
certain that if you admit the reservation of the questions 
affecting the honour of the peoples (and every one admits 
it), the Governments will not fail, if necessary, to 
include in it territorial integrity." The second was also 
connected with national honour since he considered the 
recognition of the denial of jus-tice hypothesis as a 
stain laid upon national judges. ii"'
29
Other attempts to define "national honour" and 
"vital interests" were made before the Institute of 
International Law but they failed. It was proposed to use 
the general words "DROIT INALIENABLE" instead of those
expressions. The difficulties of defining the word "in-
114dependence" was also remarked on. The impossibility
of defining these reservations has been recognised by 
almost all writers on international law. They have been 
described as being "abstract", "vague" and general terms 
of an all"embarrassing elasticity". The loopholes in 
arbitration treaties were thus big enough to allow a 
signatory State to adopt a different interpretation 
whenever in its judgment the arbitral decision could be
against it, claiming that its vital interests or national
11*^
honour or independence would be imperilled. ' This is 
why the nature of the objections assumed according to 
treaties which contained such clauses has been regarded 
as obligatory in name only, but in fact no obligation was 
assumed, or at least was undertaken on a voluntary basis, 
since the decision whether or not those reservations were 
involved was left to each party.
The confusion created by the inclusion of these
abstract terms and the diverse combinations made in 
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treaties, such as the combination of independence and
integrity of the territory; independence and autonomy, or 
independence, vital interests, national honour, sovereig­
nty and interests of third States etc, led to different 
views as to the justiciability of matters covered by 
those reservations, il-/ and to different approaches in 
order to reduce the number of reservations to an ir­
recusable minimum. For some writers the reservations of 
vital interests and national honour were large enough as 
to eliminate all other reservations, especially since
they were usually not made alone, but along with other
11 R
reservations. ~ However this view did not solve the 
problem as long as no clear definition was made to the 
term vital interests. Some considered the independence as
30
the only acceptable reservation either because it could
involve all other clauses if it is relied on by the State
which was "hindered in doing or not doing anything that
119
an independent State may do or abstain from doing",
or because reservation should not be invoked except when
12nthe existence of a State is at stake. ' Others sought a
solution through the substitution of more precise terms
for the general ones. Thus Sir Thomas Barclay suggested
the substitution of the phrase "all difficulties which it
has not been possible to settle by diplomatic methods,
and affecting neither the independence nor territorial
integrity nor the internal laws or institutions of any
such H. C. P.,nor matters involving prior arrangements of
121any H. C. P. with third parties." for the words
"vital interests".
This proposition is more qualified than that sug­
gested by the Interparliamentary Union concerning the 
"national honour" clause because the latter contained the 
words "vital interest". According to it "national honour" 
was to cover disputes which;
"do not affect either their independence or vital inter­
ests, or the sovereign authority the respective countries, 
or the interest of Third Powers"
It is clear that according to the last suggestion the 
reservation of national honour was considered larger in 
scope than that of vital interests.
These difficulties had not arisen in practice
12~\
since, as it has been observed, “ reservations had not
been relied on in the cases referred to International
tribunals or the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the 
124
Hague. However the condition of previous recourse to
diplomatic channels was relied on three times before the
Central American Court in the case concerning the revolu—
125tion which broke out in Honduras,  ^ and the two cases 
brought against Nicaragua by Costa Rica and El Salvador
respectively in regard to its treaty of Bryan-Chamorro 
with the United States. In all these cases the court 
rejected the preliminary objection to its competence and 
held that these cases fell within its jurisdiction.
In spite of the fact that the court competence was 
unlimited, Nicaragua considered the clauses of indepen­
dence and national honour as implied in the treaty which 
established it. Nicaragua claimed that the conclusion of 
that treaty was a sovereign act that could not be an­
nulled, and that "no nation on earth would submit to the 
arbitrament of strangers its security and preservation." 1 
It was observed that the refusal of Nicaragua to abide 
the court’s decision in these cases was not due to the 
fact that its rights were affected, but because it was 
"in a very embarrassing position. It had to choose bet­
ween offending the United States (as a powerful State) or
its neighbours, and evidently its fear of the former was
127greater than the fear of the latter". Whatever the 
reasons for that refusal, there is no doubt that these 
cases were the main cause for the downfall of that court 
as the only body before which a case could be brought 
unilaterally.
C - REASONS FOR MAKING RESERVATIONS TO OBLIGATORY 
ARBITRATION
The object of this study - as has been said - is to 
point out briefly the main reasons which were behind the 
inclusion of reservations during the period considered 
here, i.e. the period between the last decade of the 
nineteenth century and the establishment of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice in order to compare later 
whether those reasons are still the same for making 
reservations to the competence of the International Court 
of Justice.
In sticking to the theory of reservations many 
reasons had been relied on; some of them were of a gene-
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ral character or at least concerned a large group of 
States, and others were of a special character and con­
cerned special treaties between limited States. Concer­
ning the former, it is observed that the conception of
absolute sovereignty was the main cause for the insertion
1 98
of reservations. States were used to referring their
disputes to arbitration on a voluntary basis. This method 
did not give rise to real problems for States accepting 
it since all the circumstances surrounding the dispute 
were known to the parties and therefore, they had the 
opportunity to decide whether or not it was suitable to 
resolve it by arbitration. According to this method 
national sovereignty was not diminished. However the 
unfamiliarity of States with the obligatory arbitration 
method as a new one, on the one hand, and the unforseen 
consequences in the future on the other, led them to 
think twice before accepting it. It was not easy for
especially the great powers to accept being deprived of
i ^9
their "absolute rights" of choice of action. The 
solution to the hesitation between accepting this new 
method and at the same time preserving those rights was 
therefore founded in the inclusion of escape clauses. For 
these reasons the Only - Pauncefote Treaty, which provi­
ded for the arbitrability of territorial claims and 
questions of principle of grave general importance af- 
.fecting the national rights, was rejected. ^  The minor­
ity report of the Committee on Foreign Relations read:
"There are very -few (treaties), it any, that relate to or 
declare certain fixed principles or policies, or lines of 
action by which the nations surrender to each other any of 
their sovereign powers or permit one nation to participate in 
the control of the action of another in the future and unfor­
seen events. Such agreements when they exist are made between 
nations that are not independent and those that exercise over 
them suzerainty or acknowledged right of control. In all this 
mass of treaty engagements we have heard of none that resemb­
les this treaty."
The theory of sovereignty was supported by other 
factors such as the colonial movement and the national
33
industry which required new raw material and vast marke- 
132ts. " The fear that arbitrators might neglect to take 
into considerations these factors increased States' 
clinging to the theory of reservations.
Taking into consideration the increasing size of 
armament, the absence of an organization to take the 
responsibility of collective security, and that recourse 
to war was not outlawed. States preferred using all their 
elements of strength and resistance, if other peaceful 
means failed, rather than appealing to arbitral tribuna­
ls. lo" In such circumstances appeal to arbitration was 
regarded sometimes as a sign of weakness, because - as 
the minority report cited above stated "without this 
unqualified right of appeal to arms no nation can be 
independent". This explains why great powers had been 
reluctant to accept obligatory arbitration without reser­
vations whereas small States were more prepared to accept 
it. The history of the arbitration treaties concluded
between Latin American States and the existence of the
134central American Court of Justice _ confirm this idea. 
In fact most of the treaties which contained reservations 
clauses, especially vital interests and national honour, 
were between great powers or at least one of them and a 
small State. Thus the existence of some reservations,
such as independence, autonomy, territorial integrity and 
constitutional questions, in treaties between small 
States could be understood as an imitation of the model 
made in treaties concluded between great States on the 
one hand, and as an emphasis on the importance of these 
subjects for those States rather than being exclusions on 
the other. "tJ The fact that special relations between 
States circumscribed by a series of concrete and familiar 
factors, such as the geographical situation of the two 
countries, their financial and economic relations, and 
the historic tradition, which had grown up between them 
could not be observed in treaties between a large number 
of States, was another reason for making reservations,
especially if it is noted that the conferences held at
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the end of the last century, i.e. the two Pan - American 
and the two Hague Conferences, helped in the creation, 
and the development of the theory of reservations.
States had been influenced also by the distin­
guished authors who thought that questions affecting 
vital interests, their honour, independence and ter­
ritorial integrity were not arbitrable, and that arbitra­
tion should be confined to legal questions only. 1’"6 The 
failure in finding a criterion for the distinction bet­
ween legal and political or non-legal, or justiciable and
non-justiciable disputes helped towards the inclusion of
137
these reservations as a criterion in itself. " Thus 
arbitration had been limited generally to disputes of 
secondary importance, whereas diplomacy backed by force 
was regarded as the most desirable method for the settle­
ment of important disputes.
The LfiCUNftE in international law or its uncertainty
with regard to many points had been admitted by States as
138well as by many writers. This conception was due
mainly to the domination of the positivist doctrine 
according to which a tribunal was to apply only the 
existing rules of positive law recognised by the dis­
putant parties. Therefore international law that con-
139
tained "so many gaps" was considered "too weak to
deal with questions involving the important interests of 
140
parties". ' The absence of a legislative body to lay
down the law by which a tribunal could be guided was
141advanced as a support for that conception, though
States were not prepared to accept such a body even if it
142emanated from a conference. This reason reflected in 
fact the lack of confidence in the arbitrators which was 
the real obstacle in the path of obligatory arbitration. 
In his letter to the American delegates at the Second 
Hague Conference the American Secretary of State, Elihu 
Root wrote:
"There can be no doubt that the principal objection to 
arbitration rests, not upon the unwillingness of nations to 
submit their controversies to impartial arbitration, but upon 
an apprehension that the arbitrations to which they submit may 
not be impartial. It has been a very general practice -for 
arbitrators to act, not as judges deciding questions of fact 
and law upon the record before them under a sense of judicial 
responsibility, but as negotiators effecting settlements of 
the questions brought before them in accordance with the 
traditions and usages and subject to all the considerations 
and influences which affect diplomatic agents ... It very 
often happens that a nation which would be very willing to 
submit its differences to an impartial judicial determination 
is unwilling to subject them to this kind of diplomatic proce­
ss. "
For maintaining the idea that a "FOREIGNER" or
"STRANGER" should not be trusted to solve questions of a
great importance, the capacity of arbitrators to render
ideal judgment and the ability to distinguish between
vital and non-vital interests was doubted. Consequently,
States were not expected to put their interests at the
144mercy of arbitrators. As a support to that idea, the 
obligatory nature of the decisions of arbitral tribunals 
and the impossibility of appealing against them, even if 
they were unjust, had been advanced. These elements were 
pointed out in Salisbury's letter to Bayard. He wrote:
"By whatever plan the tribunal selected, the end of it 
must be that issues in which the litigant States are most 
deeply interested will be decided by the vote of one man, and 
that man a foreigner. He has no jury to find his facts, he has
no Court of Appeal to correct his law, and he is sure to be
credited, justly or not, with a leaning tD one litigant or the 
other. Nations cannot afford to run such risks in deciding 
controversies by which their national position may be affected
or a number of their fellow - subjects transferred to a fore-
; i » 145 ign rule."
The lack of confidence in arbitration caused also
by the absence of a permanent court that could contribute
to the development of international law through its juri —
146sprudence, and hence obtain the confidence of states.
In fact the lack of confidence in the impartiality of
tribunals - as it is observed - was not due to the non­
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eligibility of judges or arbitrators, but to the unwill­
ingness of States to submit themselves to a body over
147which they had no control.
In addition to the above general reasons were also 
some specific ones. The most notable is the position 
taken by some parliaments, such as, the United States 
Senate's insistence upon the necessity of excluding
questions relating to the Monroe Doctrine, immigration
148and the foreign policy of the United States, and that
of the Argentine Senate as regard to constitutional
149questions, sovereignty and independence. There is no 
doubt that each State had in mind special reasons for 
making reservations, e.g. questions concerning interna­
tional rivers and interoceanic canals for the United
States during the First Hague Conference; 'jJ Alsace-
151Lorraine for Germany; the obligations undertaken and
subsequently broken by Russia with respect to the Baltic
152Sea and the port of Batoum, and Tacna in Africa for 
Chile at the First International American Conference.
It was hoped that states would define the subjects which 
they considered important as to be adjudicated instead of 
using vague and elastic formulae. This hope had been 
achieved mostly after 1919. The effects of the First 
World War, the creation of the League of Nations and the 
establishment of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (P. C. I. J.) helped the substitution of the old 
formulae by more definite ones.
SECTION (2) : RESERVATIONS TO THE COMPULSORY 
JURISDICTION OF THE PERMANENT COURT 
OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
Article 36, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Statute of 
the P. C. I. J. reads:
" (2) The Members o-f the League of Nations and the States
mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant may. Either when sign­
ing or ratifying the protocol to which the present Statute is 
adjoined, or at a later moment declare that they recognise as 
compulsory IPSO FfiCTO and without special agreement, in rela­
tion to any other Member or State accepting the same obliga­
tion, the jurisdiction of the Court in all or any of the 
classes of legal dispute concerning:
(a) The interpretation of a treaty;
(b) any question of international law;
(c) The existence of any fact which, if established,
would constitute a breach of an international
obligation;
(d) The nature and extent of the reparation to be 
made for the breach of an international obligat­
ion.
(3) The declarations referred to above may be made 
unconditionally on condition of reciprocity on the part of 
several or certain Members or State, or for a certain time."
According to the letter of this Article, States in 
accepting the Court's jurisdiction under the Optional 
Clause, could only limit their declarations to one or 
more of the classes enumerated in paragraph 2 , or to a 
certain time, or finally they could make them "on condi­
tion of reciprocity on the part of several or certain
Members or States".
Taking into account that neither Article 14 of the 
Covenant according to which the Court was established, 
nor the Protocol of Signature or the Optional Clause 
attached to it, did contain any mention -%■©—reservation 
clauses, this Article alone falls short of the explana­
tion of reservations included in States' declarations
throughout the period of that court, nor did it provide 
for any explanation to what sort of reservations are
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invalid, if any. Recourse to the history of the drafting 
of this Article and the actions taken subsequently,
especially by the Assembly, seems therefore indispensable
for answering these questions.
A - RESERVATIONS DURING THE DRAFTING OF ARTICLE 36 (2)
OF THE STATUTE OF THE P. C. I. J.
This Article in its final form embodied in the 
Statute was the result of efforts made by three bodies; 
The Advisory Committee of Jurists; the Council of the 
League of Nations and the assembly.
(I) The Advisory Committee of Jurists
It was the duty of the Council to "formulate and
submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans
for the establishment of a Permanent Court of Interna-
154tional Justice". Accordingly the Council formulated
on February 13, 1920 an Advisory Committee of 10 Jurists
to draft a scheme for the Court. This Committee, which
was in session from June 16 to July 24, 1920 had before
it almost all the previous schemes for a world court
including the draft of 1907 for a court of Arbitral
Justice, the Central American Court Convention, drafts of
the Interparliamentary Union, the International Law
Union, the collective draft of the Five Neutral Powers,
in addition to the official plans submitted by other 
1 55
States.
As far as compulsory jurisdiction is concerned, the
Covenant contained no reference more than the provision
that "the Court shall be competent to hear and determine
any dispute of an international character which the
156parties thereto submit to it". Thus the question was 
raised in the Committee whether the Court's jurisdiction 
should be extended as to cover questions referred to it 
by unilateral application, or should be limited to cases 
presented by the consent of both parties.
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At the beginning, the odd conception of arbitral 
jurisdiction was raised with regard to both the jurisdic­
tion of the Court and reservation clauses. As to the 
former, it was suggested that the Court's jurisdiction 
should be limited to disputes referred to it by treaties 
in force or by future conventions. Therefore, the Court 
could be endowed with jurisdiction over cases referred by 
unilateral application only if these conventions provided 
for such jurisdiction, as did certain sections in the
Peace Treaties, otherwise the consent of all parties
157involved was necessary. The major obstacle in the way 
of adopting compulsory jurisdiction was due to the actual 
wording of Article 14 of the Covenant which seemed to
some members of the committee to exclude that possibili-
158ty. However the Committee found in Articles 12 and 13 
of the Covenant a counterbalancing argument for overcom­
ing this difficulty and the desire of modifying that
159Article. In rejecting the view that the Committee 
would go beyond its mandate by adopting compulsory juris­
diction, the majority of the Committee held that:
"not only is it obvious that the constituent Statute of 
the Court can confer upon it the degree of competence, which 
the States drawing up the Statute, wish to give it, but also 
... the grant of such powers, though perhaps not strictly in 
accordance with the letter of the Covenant, follows its spirit 
so exactly that it would seem a great pity, now that the Court 
is being definitely organized^ not to complete the progress 
made by this last provision"
Thus the jurists relied on Article 13 of the Coven­
ant which, in their opinion, laid down cases in which 
States were bound to submit to arbitration though they 
recognised that the words "in their opinion" and "genera­
lly" seemed to weaken and diminish the force of the 
provision. In fact the Committee, in recommending a 
compulsory jurisdiction system according to which one 
party could summon the other party to the dispute even 
without its consent, did not dispense with the idea of 
previous consent totally, but it intended to eliminate 
the conception of making a C0MPR0N1S each time a dispute
40
might arise. Thus it made it clear that;
"There is no question of binding States to submit to 
arbitration without their consent. The competence of arbitral 
jurisdiction is dependent upon the existence of a convention.
In this case the convention establishing compulsory arbitra­
tion is the constituent Statute of the court."
Concerning reservation clauses, it was proposed
at one time to insert in the draft the old reservations
in a new formula, i.e. ”INALIENABLE RIGHTS" of States.
Thus reservation, which was limited to one member of the
Committee, was regarded as a term which appears to be
164more exact than that of "vital interests". In arguing 
for the retention of this reservation Descamps declared 
that:
"There exist cases which can neither be stated nor de­
cided legally, such as conflicts of interest and political 
disputes.
There exist cases even of legal character, in which the 
adoption of legal methods would imply, according to certain 
States' view, the abandonment of right considered rightly or 
wrongly inalienable.
The question therefore which arises in practice is to 
ascertain to what extent it is possible in a body of provisi­
ons providing for a general agreement on compulsory Jurisdic­
tion to give such jurisdiction all the scope to which it is 
entitled, considering in an appropriate degree reserves which 
if they may not be made, may threaten to jeopardise a general 
International understanding." J
Consequently he suggested that the four categories 
of a legal character enumerated in Article 36, paragraph 
2, could be accepted with "A POSSIBLE RESERVATION", and a 
separate consideration could be given to controversies
even of a legal character which involved inalienable
■ . 166 rights.
Bearing in mind that the task of the Committee was
167not "to duplicate the Court of Arbitration", but to
make a step forward by establishing a Permanent Court of
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168Justice with a special character as a necessary
condition of any treaty which is to be compulsory in the 
true sense of the word, the jurists were able to overcome 
the difficulties encountered by the application of the 
so-called obligatory arbitration treaties, especially the 
necessity of an agreement upon the COHPROMIS in each 
particular case, and the unlimited freedom of escaping 
the obligation undertook by means of including elastic 
reservations. There were many factors which helped in 
achieving that end. Above all it should not be forgotten 
that the jurists, unlike those in the Hague Peace Con­
ferences, were not representing their governments but
they acted in their individual capacity as independent
169jurists. In other words they were trying to find the
best way of extending the application of the rule of law 
in the life of nations and not what must be done in their 
governments' views. Thus, the President of the Committee 
stressed that "it must not be forgotten that the only in­
struction to the Committee is to find a best solution". 17u 
This factor, coupled with the factor of the fresh effects 
of the First World War, encouraged the jurists to con­
centrate on the positive results achieved during the 
past. Thus they emphasized upon the fact that the Con­
ference of the Hague or 1907 was unanimous "in admitting 
the principle of obligatory arbitration [and] in declar­
ing that certain disputes ... be submitted to obligatory 
arbitration without restrictions", 171 though the Con­
ference failed to agree upon the draft of the treaty of 
universal arbitration.
In this spirit the proposition of Descamps concern­
ing "inalienable rights" was rejected: Ricci-Busatti
considered it a delicate question. He thought that if 
"the phrase 'inalienable rights’ were considered ... this 
would give rise to the same objections and difficulties 
as such expressions as 'vital interests', 'honour' etc.,
172m  the place of which the former was to be substituted". 
Consequently Descamps abandoned that idea in order to 
make "an advance in the matter of international jurisdic-
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tion" and "to satisfy most of the members of the Commit-
17"tee". " Therefore, the new project, which he had worked 
out in conjunction with Lord Phillimore, contained two 
conditions only: exhaustion of "QLL diplomatic means" to 
settle the case before resorting to the Court and "provi­
ded that no agreement has been made to choose a Court of 
arbitration". 174
Even as regard to these reservations the jurists 
tried to limit their scope as far as possible and to 
secure the competence of the Court when they invoked. The 
first question with respect to the exhaustion of diploma­
tic means of settlement was the determination of its 
necessity and limits. Loder doubted its necessity. In his 
view its existence in the project was an adaption of "a
system of negative proof, a system which was always
175liable to cause difficulties". However, this view was
rejected on the ground that this condition was frequently
used in international affairs, and that it had never
given rise to any difficulties. 1/6 The question was then
raised as to the determination of its meaning. Root
explained that "the eventuality referred to by this cause
arises when one party requests the other party to state
its views in writing and the other party refuses to do
so". 177 However Altamira desired to have this clause
covering "all peaceful means of obtaining a solution",
and not limited to its narrow meaning, i.e. "to negotia-
178tions between diplomatic representatives". The latter 
view seemed to the other member unacceptable for many 
reasons. Firstly, it was thought that "pacific means" 
might go so far as to include all violent means generally 
looked upon as compatible with a state of peace, which 
would hardly be admissible. Secondly it was too broad. It 
opens to a party acting in bad faith the possibility of 
creating difficulties by applying, for the settlement of 
a given conflict, to conciliation, to mediation etc., and 
therefore render compulsory jurisdiction illusory. Final­
ly, it would create delays which might better be avoided." 
Fernandes believed that these criticisms were also ap­
179
43
plicable to the expression "all diplomatic means", and 
consequently asked for its modification. The Committee 
found that his arguments were well founded. Thus, the 
wording of the Hague Conference of 1907 and the Covenant,
i.e. "International difference which it has not been
1 SOpossible to settle by diplomacy ..." was adopted.
The second reservation concerning the previous
agreement to choose another jurisdiction did not pose any
difficulties. The only question was whether it should be
for the court to decide whether a party had agreed to
have recourse to a tribunal. The question was decided in
181the affirmative.
The result of the work of the committee was - as
far as compulsory jurisdiction is concerned - the draft-
182
ing of Articles 33 and 34. The first laid down that 
the Court shall, first of all, decide whether the two 
conditions discussed above had been complied with; if so, 
it shall proceed to the next stage, i.e. "to hear and 
determine the dispute according to" Article 34, which 
established the real compulsory jurisdiction. According 
to the latter Article the court was to decide any dispute 
of a legal nature concerning the five points enumerated 
therein without any special convention or declaration 
giving it jurisdiction, since the previous consent was
c
considered as established by the constituent Statute of 
the Court.
With reference to the last point it may be worth 
mentioning that the report of the Committee seem to con­
tradict the proceedings of that committee with regard to 
the exhaustion of diplomatic means. As stated above the
jurists agreed to confine this clause, in the words of
18"^Descamps, to "the ordinary sense of these words" ~ in 
order to close the door to the possibility of contesting 
the competence of the court by stating that the whole 
series of diplomatic means - negotiation, good offices, 
mediation, conciliation etc. — which as Fernandes ob—
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184served "are not equally suitable to all disputes",
had not been exhausted. For this reason and the ones
cited above the Committee agreed upon the proposition of
Fernandes to eliminate the word "QLL" which he considered 
185dangerous. However the report of the Committee con­
tained the expression "all means of friendly settlement". 
The existence of this word; in that report had thus, in 
the light of what has been said, probably no explanation 
but to be considered as an error.
In explaining Article 33 the report of the Commit­
tee stated after referring to the provisions of 1899 and 
1907 which limited the international jurisdiction of 
arbitration to disputes which diplomacy had failed to 
settle:
"This provision which is a dominating -factor in the or­
ganization of Jurisdiction by Arbitration must also be the 
main factor in the organization of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. It would not be wise that a State 
should be subject to an unforseen summons before the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, even in virtue of a previous 
Convention of Arbitration. Such a proceeding would fail in the 
respect which States owe to each other. Appeal to the Court 
should not be made until ALL means of friendly settlement have 
been tried. But the Committee did not intend to enable a party 
to avoid the jurisdiction of the Court by alleging that there 
was still some ,more hope of settlement by diplomatic means.
In such case it is for the Court to decide whether it has 
jurisdiction. On the other hand, supposing that the parties, 
though they have agreed to submit their case to an interna­
tional jurisdiction, have in a previous convention selected 
another Court or any other jurisdiction of the nature of a 
tribunal of arbitration, it also falls tD the defendant party 
to dispute the competence of the Court; in this case also it 
is for the Court to decide whether the obiection is to be
, i , „ 186
upheld."
The conclusion that could be drawn from the procee­
dings of the Advisory Committee is that the jurists 
intended to eliminate reservation clauses except the 
exhaustion of diplomatic means and the agreement to 
choose another jurisdiction in the limits set above.
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(II) The Council and the Assembly of the League Of 
Nations
' When the draft scheme of the Advisory Committee of 
Jurists was referred to the Council for approval, the 
latter opposed strongly to both Articles (33 and 34) 
concerning the Court's jurisdiction , not because they 
did not contemplate the possibility of making other 
reservations, but for other reasons. In fact adoption of 
the compulsory jurisdiction system was the major element 
in rejecting those Articles. It was pointed out from the 
beginning that the unilateral citation of one party to 
another before the Court without its consent and the 
possibility of condemning it by default was unprece­
dented. Such a procedure would in practice only be toler-
187ated by the smaller countries, it was pointed out. 
However, the report represented by the French representa­
tive Leon Bourgeois and adopted by the Council at its 
meeting in Brussels on October 27, 1920, though it recog­
nized that the draft of the jurists constituted a con­
siderable advance in the administration of international 
justice and the development of the Court's authority, 
mentioned the following reasons for rejecting compulsory 
jurisdiction: the scheme ran against the Covenant and its
adoption would constitute a modification of Article 12 of
188
the Covenant; the Permanent Court was substituted for 
the Council decision whether or not diplomatic means of 
settlement were exhausted; it was also substituted for 
the free choice given to the parties by Article 12 of the 
Covenant to have recourse to another international tribu­
nal or the Council; the refusal of several countries to 
admitting that the Court's competence would cover "any 
point of international law", and finally the objection of
some States to the principle of "retrospective competence
189of the Court". The last point which has been develo­
ped later in States' declarations accepting the Council's 
jurisdiction, was explained by Leon Bourgeois as follows:
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"If we are to establish the principle of non-retrospec­
tion we should be obliged to introduce a distinction between 
Treaties concluded prior to the Court and subsequently to this 
document, between events which occurred before or after its 
entry into force. We should be obliged to establish a criter­
ion to determine whether any particular dispute was already 
pending or not at the moment in question. Neither the Conven­
tion nor the draft scheme of the Hague draws such a distinc-
190
tion nor do they establish such a criterion".
The reservation of disputes belonging to the past
191was proposed by Argentine in addition to the reserva­
tion of "questions which affect the political Constitu-
192tion of the contesting States".  ^ However the last 
reservation was not discussed.
The result was therefore the preference of volun­
tary jurisdiction based on individual treaties between
19^
States according to the two new Articles " which were 
substituted for those proposed by the Advisory Committee 
of Jurists.
The draft was then referred to the Assembly at its 
first meeting, and sent to the Third Committee for dis­
cussion, then to the Sub-committee of the Third commit­
tee. Before the Sub-committee reservation clauses did not 
receive any consideration except the suggestion that 
general treaties which contained the reservations of 
"vital interests" and "honour" could not be brought
before the Court unless a C0NPR0M1S had been made between
194the parties to the dispute. However, when the project 
was referred to the Third Committee, Lord Robert Cecil 
(South africa) stated that:
"he had always thought that the distinction between 
questions suitable for arbitration and other questions was to 
be drawn between questions which did and those which did not 
involve vital interests. But this distinction did not tally 
with that provided for in the Hague Scheme, according to which 
the Court had to decide only whether a given question fell 
within the scope of Article 34. It was, indeed, not certain 
that all questions covered by that Article did not involve 
vital interest; he mentioned the interpretation of such treat­
ies as that of Versailles. No Great Power, he said, would be
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imposed to submit to the Court of Justice a dispute relating 
to this treaty."
Consequently he believed that the Court should decide 
only on matters which the parties had agreed to refer to 
such decisions, whereas questions involving vital inter­
ests should be left to the Council. However Lafontaine 
(Belgium) was against any mention of these reservations. 
In his opinion the opposition to the principle of compul­
sory jurisdiction as proposed by the Committee of Jurists 
"was due to the two fetishes of unanimity and sovereign­
ty" . He thought that "the only admissible sovereignty was 
that of justice", and that though the authors of the 
Covenant were inspired by the fetishes of vital interests
and honour, their absence in the Covenant constituted an
196element of progress.
For the same purpose, i.e. the elimination of any 
possibility of making the reservation of vital interests, 
Costa (Portugal) suggested the suppression of the words 
"par ... Pacte" at the outset of the proposed paragraph 
dealing with the Court's jurisdiction as well as the 
words " TOUT OU PRRTIE"f which, in his opinion, opened the
door to that reservation. For this reason his proposition
^  4.  ^ 197was adopted.
Before that Committee Fernandes had the opportunity 
of insisting again upon a new paragraph concerning the 
condition of "reciprocity on the part of a certain number 
of Members, or of certain Members, or, again, of a
number of Members including such and such specified
198Members". For explaining this condition he stated "it
was inadmissible for a State to accept the principle of
compulsory jurisdiction without knowing exactly towards
199whom it accepted such obligation". This addition
seemed to create some confusion between the condition of
reciprocity embodied in the words "vis-a-vis ... obliga­
tor)tion" and the new condition proposed by Firmanders. 
However the Drafting Committee took Huber's view in 
combining these two conditions: reciprocity RQTIONE
4 6
NATERIAE and reciprocity RATIONE PERSONAE. The adop­
tion of Fernandes' proposition combined with that propo­
sed by Hagerup, concerning the possibility of accepting
202the Court's jurisdiction "for a certain time", con­
stituted paragraph 3 of Article 36. Thus, in its final 
report to the Assembly, the Third Committee did not refer 
to the question of reservations except the statement 
that:
"The effect of this provision is as follows: It gives
power to choose compulsory jurisdiction either in all the 
questions enumerated in the Article or only in certain of 
these questions. Further, it makes it possible to specify the 
States (or Members of the League of Nations) in relation to 
which each Government is willing to agree to a more extended 
jurisdiction."
In the First Assembly, the debate on compulsory
jurisdiction was again very heated. However in order to
obtain unanimity. Article 36 was retained as proposed by
204the Third Committee. ’ In fact this Article was a 
compromise reached by the Third Committee between the
views of the Committee of Jurists and those of the Coun-
205
cil. ’ It was proposed by Fernandes as an alternative 
text. With regard to reservations clauses the debate
was limited to those of vital interests, honour and 
constitutional questions. Many of the delegates expressed 
themselves against the inclusion or even any mention of 
those reservations. Lafontaine, for example, declared 
that:
"I was astonished to hear those who once defended the 
principle of compulsory arbitration utter the words 7 vital 
interests7. I heard proclaimed the absolute sovereignty of 
States. We were told that only the nations themselves were 
judges of their vital interests and that to recognise the 
right of a State to arraign another was a grave encroachment 
upon the sovereignty of States. This is not the moment to 
discuss these principles again. They are condemned by the 
general opinion of the world of jurists.
When I heard these arguments it seemed to me that a 
shadow haunted the room in which we sat, the shadow of a 
broad-shouldered cavalryman, of a tall Junker, who was the 
cause of Dur failure at the Hague in 1907 ... We must reply to
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those who spoke of vital interests and absolute sovereignty.
The voice of peoples tells you that there is only one vital 
interest, which is that all should bow before the sovereignty 
of justice. The nations entreat you and appeal to you that you 
may suffer justice to be done."
Blanco of Uruguay expressed himself in the same 
vein. He thought that reservations which could diminish 
the scope of the "principle of arbitration were inadmis­
sible" and therefore, "neither the reservations regarding 
honour and vital interests nor those which concern con­
stitution" were acceptable. "Arbitration must be free and 
108unlimited". ' In comparing the competence of the Court 
of Arbitration of 1899, to which these reservations were 
admissible, to that of the P. C. I. J. Negulesco said:
"To day, even in the most serious conflicts, that is to 
say those that affect the honour and dignity of the State, 
they are obliged [States] to have recourse to peaceful means.
They must choose between arbitration, the Permanent Court or 
the Council.
In the case of international treaties, we cannot speak of 
the honour or of the vital interests of the States; in these 
affairs there is only one point of honour - that of keeping 
the engagement one has made."
It is now clear that all bodies which contributed 
to the framing of Article 36 intended to eliminate the 
broad reservations especially those concerning vital 
interests and honour. However neither the proceedings of 
the First Assembly nor those of the Third Committee and 
its Sub-committee give any indication as to whether the 
two conditions included in Article 33 of the Committee of 
jurists (the exhaustion of diplomatic means and the 
exception of disputes in regard to which the parties have 
agreed or have recourse to another jurisdiction) were 
permissible. That Article was deleted without explana­
tion. On the other hand, there is no room for doubt that 
they had not contemplated the inclusion of other reserva­
tions than those mentioned above.
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B - THE ASSEMBLY'S INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 36 (2 & 3)
The Assembly of the League of Nations had the 
occasion of interpreting paragraph 2 of Article 36 in 
1924 while drafting the Protocol for Pacific Settlement 
of International Disputes. Having taken into considera­
tion the fact that a small number of States were bound by
2in
the Optional Clause, ' the Assembly had taken a liberal 
view with respect to the meaning of that paragraph. Two 
questions were raised before the First Committee, which 
was entrusted with the study of the limits within which 
the terms of paragraph 2 could be clearly defined in 
order to facilitate the adherence to the Optional Clause. 
The first concerned who would decide which reservations 
were compatible with the Statute, and the second was the 
extent of those reservations. As to the first question it 
was agreed that according to Article 36 The Court was 
competent to decide upon its proper competence, concern­
ing the second it was thought that in adhering to the 
Statute a State could make any reservations. This con­
clusion was based on the assumption that, since States 
were allowed to limit their declarations to certain
categories of those enumerated in paragraph 2, they could
211make any reservation. Thus the resolution of the
Assembly of October 2, 1924 regarded the terms of that
paragraph as they were sufficiently wide to permit States
to adhere to the Optional Clause "with the reservations
912
which they regarded as indispensible".
This resolution had little affect on States posi­
tion towards the Optional Clause. From 1924 until 1928
21^only six new declarations " were made. Three of which 
contained a new reservation limiting the Court's juris­
diction to "disputes arising after the ratification of
the ... declaration with regard to situations and facts
914
subsequent to (that) ratification". “ Thus in 1928 the 
Ninth Assembly, which drafted the General Act for Pacific 
Settlement of Disputes, and for the same purpose, i.e. 
"to diminish the obstacles which prevent States from
51 .
Committing Themselves", declared in its resolution of 
September 28, 1928 that States might accept the jurisdic­
tion of the Court with "appropriate reservations limiting 
the extent of their commitment, both as regards duration 
and as regards scope", and that "the reservation conceiv­
able may relate, either generally to certain aspects of 
any kind of disputes, or specially to certain classes or
1 cr
lists of disputes". u
C - RESERVATIONS IN THE DECLARATIONS MADE UNDER THE 
STATUTE OF THE P. C. I. J.
Most of the declarations made during the period 
from 1920 to 1924 were without reservations. Three types 
of reservations were made during that period: Reciprocity 
RATIONE PERSONAE which was made only by Brazil; disputes 
in regard to which the parties had agreed to have recou­
rse to other means of friendly settlement, and the limit-
216ation of the Court's jurisdiction to future disputes.
The first was in conformity with the letter and the 
spirit of paragraph 3 of Article 36. The second was in 
conformity with Article 33 of the Committee of Jurists 
which was deleted by the Third Committee. The last was 
not in conformity with both Articles, but it reflected 
the intention of some States before the Council of the
?17
League during its discussion - as has been said - to 
except disputes belonging to the past.
However the views taken by the Assembly as regard 
to the interpretation of paragraph 2 of Article 36 had 
twofold effects. On the one hand, the number of declara­
tions had increased noticeably. 19 States accepted the
OID
Court's jurisdiction in 1929 and 1930.  ^ On the other
hand, it caused a multiplication of the types of the 
reservations and rendered the forms of reservations more 
complicated.
The following reservations were made to the com­
petence of the Permanent Court according to paragraph 2
52
of Article 36:
1. Reciprocity RATIONS NATERIAE 219
220
2. Time Limits:
a. for a limited period,
b. without limit,
c. for as limited period "and thereafter until 
such time as notice may be given to termin­
ate the acceptance".
3. Recourse to the Council of the League;
a. Suspension of the proceedings in the Court 
"in respect of any dispute which has been 
submitted to and is under consideration by 
the Council",
b. right to recourse to the Council before re­
sorting to the Court,
c. disputes not settled by the conciliation of 
the Council.
4. Disputes in regard to which the parties have ag­
reed or shall agree to another method of friendly
29 ^
settlement.
5. Disputes for which a solution has been reached 
through diplomatic channels.
6. Domestic questions according to international law
7. Disputes with a specific group of States ( British 
Commonwealth of Nations or Arab States).
8. Disputes in time of war or hostilities.
9. Reciprocity RATIONS PERSONAE: "as soon as (the 
jurisdiction of the court) has likewise been rec­
ognised as such by two at least of the Powers per­
manently represented on the Council of the League 
of Nations".
10. Right of Sovereignty.
11. Territorial status (including disputed right of 
sovereignty over islands, ports, waters and lines 
of communications).
12. Questions which belong to the constitutional reg—
222ime.
13. Pecuniary claims.
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14. Disputes concerning a special treaty of peace.
15. Past disputes.
16. The limitation of the jurisdiction recognised to 
future disputes arising with regard to situations 
or facts subsequent to a given date.
17. Questions already settled.
18. Disputes with "States which refuse to establish or 
maintain normal diplomatic relations with" the 
declarant State.
Table 2 on pages 54 and 55 illustrates the number 
of reservations made by each State according to the above 
numeration of reservations.
This table shows the diversity of reservations made 
to compulsory jurisdiction of the P. C. I. J. It shows 
also that the majority of declarations regarded the 
condition of reciprocity as embodied in the words "in 
relation to any other State accepting the same obliga- 
tion. It was, therefore, - as will be seen - included 
in every declaration even in those which did not mention 
it or were made expressly without condition, since they 
were made according to paragraph 2 of Article 36. The 
most desirable reservations were those concerning ques­
tions in regard to which the parties had agreed to have 
recourse to another method of pacific settlement and the 
limitation of the Court's jurisdiction to future disputes 
arising with regard to situations or facts subsequent to
the ratification or signature, or to a given date.
In spite of the fact that paragraph 2 allowed
States to accept the jurisdiction of the Court in certain
classes of legal disputes enumerated therein, they did 
not benefit from that provision, except Iran which limi­
ted its acceptance to disputes "with regard to situations
or facts relating directly or indirectly to the applica-
924tion of treaties or conventions accepted by [Iran]".
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SECTION (3) : RESERVATIONS DURING THE DRAFTING OF THE
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE
The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals provided for that 
"there should be an International Court of Justice which 
should constitute the principal judicial organ of the
Organization" and that its Statute "should be annexed to
225and be part of the Charter of the Organization". 
Accordingly the United Nations delegated a Committee of 
Jurists which met in Washington from April 9, to 20, 1945 
for the purpose of preparing and submitting to the San 
Francisco Conference a Draft Statute on the International 
Court of Justice.
The Committee of Jurists faced the same arguments 
and positions taken during the drafting of the Statute of
the P. C. I. J. with respect to which system should be
2^6adopted; compulsory or optional j u r i s d i c t i o n . A t  that 
stage the question of reservations did not obtain a 
lengthy discussion but it was raised occasionally. In 
spite of the fact that the majority of the delegates 
favoured compulsory jurisdiction, many of them favoured 
it with the possibility of making defined reservations. 
Gomez-Ruiz (Adviser of Venezuela) stated that compulsory 
jurisdiction should be "with the exception of cases which 
are in a process of settlement by other means". He thou­
ght that:
"In case all States were not in agreement as to the scope 
of compulsory jurisdiction ... reservations should be limited 
to two categories; first, cases which refer to events taking 
place prior to a certain date, and second, reservations as to 
States not regarded as submitting to the iurisdiction of the0 0 7  - -
Court." ^
The idea that recourse to the Court's jurisdiction should 
be limited to disputes in regard to which the parties did 
not agree on another mode of settlement was shared by 
many States. The major importance of some declara­
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tions which excepted questions arising out of the Second 
World War was also pointed out. ^  Concerning domestic 
questions, the general opinion was that they were ex­
cluded from the Court's jurisdiction since they were 
excluded for the jurisdiction of the United Nations 
Organization according to Chapter VIII, Section A17 of 
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. However it was emphasised that
the Court should determine whether or not a dispute
270
involved domestic matters.
As a solution to the sharp division between the 
majority who favoured Compulsory jurisdiction and those 
who preferred the return to the Optional Clause, Ramadan 
Pacha (Egypt) proposed the adoption of compulsory juris­
diction with the possibility of allowing the inclusion of 
reservations and thereafter withdrawing or waiving them. 
However his proposition was rejected by a vote of 10
27, \
against 4. Thus no solution was left before the
Committee except to propose two alternative texts of Ar­
ticle 36. One leaving the acceptance of the Court's 
jurisdiction to the option of each State. The other text 
providing for the immediate acceptance of such compulsory 
jurisdiction by all parties to the Statute. For that 
purpose two Sub-committees were created; the first was to 
draw up a draft on compulsory jurisdiction, and the 
second to draw up a draft of the Optional Clause. The 
final decision was left to the San Francisco Conference. 
The Committee decided also that that Conference would 
decide in the case of opting for compulsory jurisdiction, 
whether reservations would be required, though it was 
pointed out that paragraph 3 contained many gaps and the 
task of filling those gaps was of that Committee and not 
of the San Francisco Conference, and that a further
consideration should have been given to the subject of 
reservations.
At the San Francisco Conference the First Committee 
of the Fourth Commission (Judicial Organization) had been 
charged with the drafting of the Statute of the Interna­
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tional Court of Justice. Its main task was to provide 
solutions to the problems that the Committee of Jurists 
was unable to resolve. Concerning the problem of reserva­
tions, two delegates expressed their desire to have the 
scope of reservations reduced as much as possible. The 
Australian delegate thought that "general reservations 
are likely to create confusion with respect to the juris­
diction of the Court". He referred to Article 39 of the 
General Act of 1928 allowing reservations in limited 
number of cases expressly stated, and proposed that that
27A
Article should be taken into consideration. The
Canadian delegate preferred also the New Zealand proposal 
of a standard schedule of reservations, i‘"~' but he wanted 
reservations "to be more flexible" by adding to that 
proposal "the possibility of adding, withdrawing or 
modifying them". J"'’ The New Zealand delegate thought 
that allowing reservations "would produce substantially 
the same result as the Optional Clause". He pointed out,
however, that he "would accept a formula of compulsory
2^7jurisdiction with reservations as a compromise" 
between the two Washington texts. \
The Sub-committee D was then created by Committee 
IV/1 to seek an acceptable formula between opposing views 
with respect to the competence of the Court. It rejected 
the New Zealand proposal by a vote of 7 against 5, as a 
basis of its further discussion. In its report the Sub­
committee observed:
"It was pointed out that the Optional Clause with reser­
vations is not -from a practical point of view, very different 
from the system of compulsory jurisdiction with reservations."
The conclusion reached by the Sub-committee was that "the 
system of optional jurisdiction at this time would be 
more likely to secure general agreement." However, it 
made two changes on Article 36 as proposed by the Commit­
tee of Jurists. The word "any" in the end of paragraph 2 
(in all or any disputes) was deleted, and a new paragraph
59
(5 now) was introduced concerning the continuity of 
declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the 
Permanent Court.
Concerning the explanation given to paragraph 2, 
the report of the Sub-committee stated:
"The question of reservation calls for an explanation. As 
is well known, the Article has consistently been interpreted 
in the past as allowing States accepting the jurisdiction of 
the Court to subject their declarations to reservations. The 
Sub-committee has considered such interpretation as being 
henceforth established. It has therefore been considered 
unnecessary to modify paragraph 3 in order to make express 
reference to the right of States to make such reservations,1
The New Zealand delegate stressed again before the 
Committee IV/1 that "all disputes would be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Court and reservations would be 
specified in the Statute" hoping that "the opponents of 
compulsory jurisdiction would accept any decision of the 
Committee, in the spirit of 'give and take' which had
240
prevailed". ' His proposition as well as the idea of
compulsory jurisdiction were rejected by that Committee. 
In the report of the Raporteur [Nasrat A1 - Farsy- 
(Iraq)] it was observed:
"in an endeavour to reconcile the two points of view 
represented by the alternative texts proposed by the Committee 
of Jurists, much support was given to the third draft 
providing for immediate acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction 
subject to stated reservations. Some of the delegates support­
ing optional jurisdiction were, however, unable to accept this 
compromise. Other suggestions were mads for amending the text 
of Article 36 in the optional form by incorporating permitted 
r e s e r • v a t i o n s , .  w i t h  o r  w i t h o l i t  ^  1^i b e r t y  t o  a d d  o t \ \ e r s , T h e s e  
suggestions were also-rejected."
Then, the above mentioned statement of Sub— commit­
tee D was referred to in the report. When the report of 
Committee IV/1 was referred to Commission IV it was 
accepted without modification and no reference was made 
to the question of reservations either in the Commis­
60
sion's discussion of that report or in its own report. ^4’J
Thus another ground of legitimacy of the power of 
making reservations and conditions other than those 
mentioned in Article 36 (2 and 3) of the Statute was
added to the liberal interpretation of this Article 
adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations; the 
unbroken practice of States in inserting reservations in 
their declarations, and the recognition of that power by 
the P. C. I. J. by upholding - as will be seen - objec­
tions based on reservations and rejecting others as ill- 
founded. Furthermore the validity of all types of reser­
vations made under the Statute of the P. C. I. J. is 
recognised explicitly by paragraph 5 of Article 36 of the 
present Statute. According to this paragraph, declara­
tions made under the P. C. I. J. are deemed to be accep­
tances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the present 
Court "IN QCCQRUQNCE NITH THEIR TERMS", The power of 
attaching reservations and conditions to declarations of 
acceptance has also been admitted expressly by the pres­
ent Court. In Military and Parliamentary Activities in
and against Nicaragua the Court said:
"Declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdic­
tion of the Court are facultative, unilateral engagements, 
that States are absolutely free to make or not to make. IN 
MAKING THE DECLARATION A STATE IS EQUALLY FREE EITHER TO DO SO 
UNCONDITIONALLY AND MITHOUT LIMIT OF TIME FOR ITS D UR AT IO N, OR 
TO QUALIFY IT NITH CONDITIONS OR RESERVA TI ON S", 244
It is not surprising thus that the discussion 
concerning the validity or reservations is now concentra­
ted on the question whether or not the freedom of making
reservations is limited instead of whether there exists
245such a freedom. Views are divided in regard to this 
question. Many publicists, including some judicial autho­
rities, seem to take the view that Article 36 (2 and 3)
permits the inclusion of conditions and reservations of
246"any kind". “ However in the opinion of the majority 
that freedom is limited by the requirement that such
61
reservations or conditions must be compatible with the
247Statute. This view had been taken also by some gover­
nments before the Court, even though the validity of
their reservations or condition was challenged by the
248other party to the case. The rule laid down by the
249Court in the RESERVATIONS case, that in order to be
permissible a reservation must be "compatible with the 
object and purpose of the convention", is considered by 
some authors as another limitation. Accordingly a reser­
vation frustrating the object of compulsory jurisdiction
250
or contrary to its purpose is inadmissible.  ^ ' However, 
States' freedom of inserting reservations will be ex­
amined in detail while examining the validity of the
951subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction.
It is to be noted, finally, that from a purely 
legal point of view, the wording of paragraphs 2 and 3 of 
Article 36 of the Statute is not perfect. Firstly, it is 
doubtful whether the omission of the word "any" from 
paragraph 2 has had any effect at all since the pos­
sibility of limiting the Court’s jurisdiction to one or 
more of the points seems to be maintained by the reten­
tion of declarations made under the Statute of the P. C. 
I. J. such as the Iranian declaration, which was limited 
to the interpretation of treaties.  ^  ^ Secondly, the 
existence of a paragraph allowing the insertion of two 
conditions only while the validity of a large number of 
reservations is recognised seems to be unjustified. 
Thirdly, the fact that paragraph 3 of Article 36 did not 
give rise to problems of interpretation during the period 
of the P. C. I. J. does not mean necessarily that such 
problems are not likely to arise in the future, nor does 
it appear to be a reasonable justification for not ame­
liorating the wording of the paragraph. Therefore, it 
should have been provided for clearly in paragraph 3 that 
all reservations not incompatible with the Statute are 
permissible, or that paragraph should have been omitted.
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(5) This does not apply to the condition of previous recourse to other means of 
peaceful settlement which had been included in most arbitration treaties whether 
obligatory or voluntary. See R.R.Wilson, International Agreements for 
Obligatory Arbitration,thesis, (1927), at 207 and "Reservations Clauses in 
Agreements for Obligatory Arbitration", 23 A.J.I.L. (1929), pp.68-93, at 75.
(6) Ibid.; E. Borel and N. Politis, supra note 1, pp. 672-673, and C.G. Fenwick, 
"National Security and International Arbitration ", 18 A .J .I.L .  (1924), 
pp.777-781, at 777-778.
(7) See e.g.R.R. Wilson, Reservation..., supra 5, pp.75-79, and H. Kory, supra note 
3, pp.3-11.
(8) See note 5 supra and the series of treaties concluded between Siam and some 
European countries : the treaty of Commerce and Navigation (may 1868), 69 
British and Foreign State Paper,p. 1135; the treaty with Belgium (August 29, 
1868), 59 ibid., p.413; with Austria (May 17 ,1869) 61 ibid.,1317, and with 
Italy (October 3,1868),60 ibid., p.779.
(9) These were between Colombia and Salvador (Dec. 24, 1880), Dominican 
Republic and Salvador (July 3, 1882), and Uruguay and Salvador (Feb. 7, 
1883), W.R. Manning, Arbitration Treaties Among American Nations to the 
Close of the Year 1910, 1924, pp. 118 -119 , 128 -129 , 131 -132
respectively .
(10) See e.g. H. Cory, supra note 3, p.16 and R.R. Wilson's Thesis , supra note 5, 
p,208. N.Politis observed that the first general treaty of arbitration was made in 
1876 when Salvador concluded a treaty with Costa Rica , Guatemala Honduras 
Nicaragua, supra note 3,p.197. For the text of this treaty see W.R.Manning, 
supra note 9, pp.109-110.
63
(1 1 ) These subjects were diplomatic and consular privileges;boundary of 
territories; indemnities;the right of navigation , and the validity .construction 
and enforcement of treaties. For the text the treaty see J.S. Scott, the 
international Conferences of American States, 1889-1928, 1931,pp. 40-43.
(12) H. Cory, supra note 3, p. 17.
(1 3 ) Ibid., p .18.
(14) See R.R. Wilson's Thesis, supra note 5, p.209.
(15) H. Cory, supra note,3, p.18.
(16) Ibid., p .19, and J.B. Scott, the international Conferences..., supra note 11 
p.41. It is to be observed that the fact that the first reservation was introduced 
in the First Pan American Conference does not mean that the view of inserting 
reservations had not been expressed by statesmen before. Thus Mr.Rolin 
favoured excluding questions affecting honour or the existence of a state from the 
scope of arbitration. See T. Barclay, "the Hague Court and Vital Interests ", 21 
L Q  R (1 905), p. 109.
(17 ) Treaty of Commerce and Friendship, Fr. de Martens, Nouveaux Recueil 
General des Traites, vol.33(ll), p.575.
(18) Treaty of Peace, 89 British and Foreign States Paper (B.F.S.P.), p.598.
(19) Nov. 15, 1890, (Art.8), Martens, supra note 17, vol.17 (II), p.591.
(20) Treaty of Commerce (Art.7), ibid., vol.22, p.591. C. Cory observes that this 
treaty was the only one in force between two European states before the First 
Hague Conference, supra note 3, p.25.
(21) Traites Generaux d Arbitrage Communiques au bureau International de la 
Coure Permanente d 'Arbitrage, 1st. Series, p.1.
(22) 92 B.F.S.P. supra note 8, p.485.
(2 3 ) See H. Cory, supra note 3, pp.28-37 and T. Barclay, New Methods of 
Adjusting International Disputes and the Future, 1917, at 179-184.
(24) C. Cory, ibid., p.31.
(2 5 ) Ibid., p.35.
(26) R.R. Wilson's Thesis, supra note 5, p.215.
(27) H. Cory, supra note 3, pp.38-39.
(2 8 ) Ibid., pp.16-17.
(29) N. Politis, supra note 3; p.197, C.G. Fenwick, "the Elimination of Loopholes in 
Arbitration Treaties ", 21 A .J .I.L .( 1927), pp.499-500, and H. Lauterpacht, 
"the Doctrine of Non -Justiciable Disputes in International Law", 8 Economica 
(1928), pp.277_317, at302.
(30) R.R. Wilson's Thesis,supra note 5, p.207.
(31) See Art. 7 of the "Outlines for the Preparation of a Draft Convention to be 
Concluded between the Powers Taking Part in the Hague Conference", in the 
Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 (Act and Documents),1920, 
p.798.
(3 2 ) Ibid., pp.700-701.
(3 3 )  Ibid.
(3 4 ) Ibid., p .122.
(3 5 )  Ibid.
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(3 6 ) Ibid., p .123.
(3 7 ) Ibid., p.119.
(3 8 ) Ibid., 176.
(3 9 ) Ibid., p.596.
(40) For the list of the conventions enumerated therein see ibid., pp.124-125.
(4 1 ) See W .l. Hull, "Obligatory Arbitration and the Hague Conference ”, 2 
A.J./.JL.(1908), pp. 731-742, at 732.
(42) See J.B. Scott, Instructions to the American Delegates to the Peace conferences 
and their Official Reports, 1916, p.24.
(43) The Proceedings..., supra note 31 p. 769.
(44) Art.16 of the Convention of the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
ibid p.238.
(45) It contained the same classes of disputes which were introduced in the First 
Conference of American States , see note 11, below.
(46) H. Cory, supra note3, p.60.
(47) This convention,as the first, did not enter into force. It was signed by 9 states 
only. Ibid.
(48)See W.R. Manning, supra note 9, pp.316,329.
(49) See the texts in Traites Generaux..., Ist.series, supra note 21, p.33.
(50) R.R. Wilson's Thesis, supra note16, p.115.
(51)This number is based on H. Cory's survey, supra note 3, pp.52-57. The United 
States concluded during Dec.1904 and Jan.1905 a series of treaties on the same 
model with Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Switzerland, 
Austria, Hungary, Sweden,Norway and Mexico. In 1905, the Senate advised and 
consented to the ratification of these treaties but with the substitution of the 
word "treaty" for the word "agreement" in order to necessitate the consent of the 
Senate before referring any dispute to arbitration. This amendment was the 
cause which prevented the ratification of these conventions. See J.B. Scott, 
Instructions..., supra note 42, p.79. For the list of treaties concluded by the 
United States see H. Cory supra note 3, pp. 55-57.
(52) See the treaties included under number (3) in "Treaties of Arbitration Since 
the First Hague Conference" , 2 A J./.L (1908),pp . 823-830, at 824-827.
(53 ) According to H. Cory's list about, 16 treaties were modelled on the 1903 
treaty, 10 of which were concluded by Italy, supra note 3, pp.63-64.
(54) For the list of treaties which contained this formula , see ibid., p.65.
(55) This clause was included in the treaty between Denmark and the Netherlands of 
Feb. 12, 1904..Traites Generaux..., supra note 21, p.42. It was included in 
other treaties concluded by Russia, Belgium and Denmark. For their list see H. 
Cory, supra note 3, p.66.
(56) Ibid. See also R.R. Wilson's Thesis supra note 5, p.213.
(57) The treaty between Italy and Denmark of Dec. 16, 1905, Traites Generaux..., 
Ist.Series, supra note 21, p.218, and that between Denmark and Portugal of 
March 20, 1907, ibid., p.67.
(58) See H. Cory, supra note 3, p.67.
(59) The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences,the Conference of 1907, (Acts 
and Documents), vol. 2, p.436.
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(60) For the text of the treaty see ibid., Annex 66,pp967-970.
(61) Ibid., p.258. See also R.R. Wilson, Clauses ..., supra note 2, p.477.
(62) The President of the First Commission stated that 33 treaties of obligatory 
arbitration had been concluded during the interval between the two Hague 
Conferences, the Proceedings ..., supra note 59, p.88
(67) See J.B. Scott, Instructions ..., supra note 42 , p.129.
(68) W.l. Hull divided them into three categories : "universal"(all disputes without 
reservation), "inclusive"(list of subjects without reservations), and"exclusive" 
(all disputes with reservation ), supra note 41, pp.731-741.
(69) See Annex 24, in the Proceedings of 1907, supra note 59, pp.879-880.
(7 0 ) Ibid ., pp.61, 406.
(71 ) For further details on legal and political or justiciable and non- justiciable 
disputes see Section 3, Chapter 4 infra.
(72)The Proceeding of (1907),vol. 2, p.50.
(73) See for example the response of the American delegate Mr. Choate ,ibid., p.815. 
See also N. P. Politis , supra note 3, pp.205-211.
(74) see the opinion of Clean Rizo Rangabe, ibid., p.72.
(75) Marshall von Bieberstein described the word "political" as"elastic". Ibid., p. 
434, and Mr. Martens called attention to the danger lurking in vague formulae 
which could be interpreted in a contradictory sense, ibid., p.435.
(7 6 ) Ibid., p. 433.
(7 7 ) Ibid., p. 435.
(7 8 ) Ibid., p. 434.
(79) See the view expressed by H. Lammasch with regard the differences between 
the Brazilian proposition and the other proposals, ibid., p .407.
(80) See the opinion of M. Milovanovitch, ibid., p408.
(8 1 ) Ibid., pp. 408-409.
(8 2 ) Ibid., p.410.
(83) See the views expressed by Ruy Barboza, ibid., pp. 407, 409-410,430.
(8 4 ) Ibid., 267.
(85) Ibid., p. 233. Leon bourgeois was of the same opinion. He stated that questions 
of purely legal nature should be referred to the Permanent Court of arbitration 
without reservations of any kind . He agreed with B. Marschall in rejecting the 
so-called case of "the honour and vital interests". L.Bourgeois stated that "all 
jurists will agree in believing that these words introduce into the conventions a 
'potestative condition' which deprives them of every shred of judicial necessity 
and makes the engagement of no value whatever. In those cases .where obligation 
is possible , it must be made a reality". Ibid., p.351.
(86 )lb id .,p . 50.
(87) Mr. Kriege, a German delegate , regarded these conventions as indispensable 
.Ibid., pp.418-419. The same view was expressed by Biebestein himself on a 
previous occasion.Ibid., p.287.
(8 8 ) Ibid., p.79.
(89) See the statement of G. Streit, ibid., p.255.
(90) See the opinion expressed by Max Huber, ibid., p.66.
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(91) See the view expressed by G. Sreit , ibid., p.253.
(92) See the statement of C. Rizo Rangabi, ibid., p72.
(9 3 ) In his reply to the arguments advanced by Bieberstein with regard to the 
limitation of obligatory arbitration to disputes of a legal nature and the illusory 
obligation assumed according to Article (16a), which began with the expression 
"thou shalt" and finished with "if thou wilt",Louis Renault said: "we calculate to 
bind ourselves to the extent which our vital interests are not at stake. However
the obligation seems to be reduced, it still exists, and a country will look twice
before claiming that there is vital question where there there is none." Ibid., p. 
68.
(9 4 ) Ibid., p. 88-89, 92.
(95) Views have been sharply divided with respect to which reservations should be 
maintained or omitted. Thus, M. Lange asked for the omission of the reservation 
of national honour, whereas it seemed to him "utopian to endeavor to eliminate" 
that of vital interests, ibid., p.257. Also the Belgium delegate stated that his 
government preferred certain reservations of "public nature ", ibid., p.61, and 
the delegate of Uruguay referred to the reservation of "internal affairs of any 
country ", ibid., p.415.
(96) For the subjects included in these propositions see the Annexes19, 27, 28, 31, 
32, 34, , and 37, ibid., pp.875, 881, 882, 886, 887, 889, and 892-893
respectively.
(97) See for example the opinion expressed by L.M. Drago, p.54.
(98) See the view expressed by L. Renault, ibid., p.68.
(99) For further details see the view expressed by Bieberstein, ibid., pp.51-52.
(1 0 0 ) Ibid., pp.566-567. It might be worth noting that Germany and Austria- 
Hungary voted against every class, and Belgium and Greece voted against every 
one or abstained from voting, while only 5 states (France, Norway, Serbia, the 
Netherlands and Portugal) voted for these classes. See W.M.I. hull, supra note 
41, p. 736. For further detail see A.P. Higgins, the Hague Peace Conferences, 
1909; J.B. Scott, "the Work of the Second Hague Peace Conference", 2 
A .J .f .L .(  1908), p ..1-28; A.S. Hershey, "Convention for the Peaceful
Adjustment of international Differences ", ibid., pp.29-49; H. Lammasch, 
"Compulsory Arbitration at the Second Hague Conference", 4 ibid., (1910), pp 
.83-95, and T. Barclay, the Problems of International Practice and Diplomacy, 
1907.
(101) the Proceedings ..., supra note 59, p.72
(102) See pp.16 above, and R.R. Wilson's Thesis supra note 5, pp.107-109, 112.
(102) The Proceedings ..., supra note 59, p.72.
(103) For a list of enumerative treaties see H. Cory, supra note 3 pp.63-65.
(104 ) N. Politis has observed that up to the outbreak of the First Word War, 35
treaties were concluded, without counting the attempted experiences made by the 
Central American states, supra note 3 p.226.
(1 0 5 ) For the Taft-Knox Treaties see, ibid., pp. 224-225 ; C.G. Fenwick, the 
Elimination ..., supra note 29, p.500, R.R. Wilson's Thesis, supra note 5, pp. 
217-219, and T. Barclay, New Methods ...,supra note 23, pp.193-197.
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(106) See his statement before the American Society for Judicial Settlement of 
International Disputes quoted by Sir Edward Grey in Pari. Debates, vol.22, 
Series 5, p.1988.
(107) N. Politis, supra note 3, p.228, and his report with M. Brown to the Institute 
of International Law, "la Classification des Conflits Comportant un Reglement 
Judiciaire ",29 Annuaire I.D .I. (1922), pp.23-59, at 37. The Institute 
proposed at its sessions in 1911 and 1912, to resort to an impartial agency(a 
joint commission) in case of a dispute between the parties as to whether national 
honour or vital interests were involved . 24 ibid., pp. 224-230, and 25 ibid., 
p.411.
(1 0 8 ) H.Wehberg, "Restrictive Clauses in International Arbitration Treaties", 7 
A .J .I.L .(1913), pp.301-314, at 303-366, and A. Calvalcanty, "Restrictive 
Clauses in International Arbitration Treaties", 8 A.J.I.L. (1914), pp .723- 
737, at 724-725. Note that the letter has taken into account the reservation of 
disputes of legal nature, and that his study is limited to treaties to which Brazil 
was a party.
(1 0 9 ) 8 of these treaties contained the reservation of third parties interests in 
different terms. They provided for that "differences which may arise with 
regard to the interpretation or application of a convention concluded or to be 
concluded between the High Contracting Parties and in which third powers have 
participated or to which they have adhered shall be excluded from settlement by 
arbitration ". See Treaties of Arbitration ..., supra note 52, p.827.
(110) These numbers are based mainly on the surveys contacted by H. Cory, supra 
note 3, pp. 12-68; H. Wehberg, supra note 108, pp.301-314; A Calvancanty, 
supra note 108, pp.723-737, and that of the A.J.I.L. ,supra note 52, pp.823- 
830. It is to be noted that 5 treaties are repeated in the last survey : that 
between France, Norway and Sweden (July 9, 1904), p.825; that between Italy 
and Portugal (May 11, 1905), ibid., that between Portugal and Great Britain 
(Nov.16, 1904), p.826, that betwen Portugal and the Netherlands (Oct.1, 
1904), ibid., and that between Portugal and Spain (May 31, 1904), ibid.
(111) The delegate of Germany gave to that phraseology a great importance. To his 
mind it had formed an essential guaranty, a sine qoa none of the adhesion of his 
government to the decisions of the Conference. On the other hand, Martens 
admitted that it was not possible to find better terms . See the Proceedings of 
1899, supra note 31, pp.407-410.
(112) See p. 11 above.
(113) See the Proceedings of 1907, supra note 59, pp.407-410.
(114) For these attempts see 10 Annuaire I.D .I.( 1903), pp.181 seq. and 14 ibid., 
(1911), pp.225 seq. See also T. Barclay, New Methods ..., supra note 23, p.59.
(115) See e.g. T. Barclay, ibid., p.61; H. Lauterpacht, the Function of Law in the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o m m u n i t y ,  1933,pp.46-48 and the Doctrine of Non- 
Justiciability ..., supra note 29, p. 302; J. Weslake, International Law, vol. i, 
1904, p.339; H. Wehberg, supra note 108, p. 727 ; A. Cavalcanty, supra note 
108, p .727, and J. Makowski, TO rganisation Actuelle de I'Arbitrage 
International", 36 R.C.A.D.I.{ 1931), pp.267-380, at 355-367.
(116) H. Wehberg observes that at least 15 combinations were made in arbitration
68
treaties , ibid., p.306.
(117 ) A. Merignhac listed 16 authors who thought that questions touching upon 
sovereignty, honour, independence and integrity were not arbitrable, Traite 
Theorique et Pratique de I’Arbitrage International, 1895, p.184. See also J.L. 
Brierly, "Vital Interests and the Law", 11 B.Y.B.I.L.( 1944), pp.51-57, and 
J.H. Ralston, "Some Suggestions as to the Permanent Court of Arbitration", 1
A.J.I.L. (1907), pp .321-329, at 329.
(118) See h. Wehberg, supra note 108, pp .306-314.
(119) J. Westlake, supra note 115, p. 339.
(120) See A. Cavalcanty, supra note 108, pp. 727 seq.
(121) New Methods ...,supra note 23, p.61. See also his book Problems ..., supra 
note 100, p.148.
(122) T. Barclay, New Methods ..., ibid.
(123) H. Cory, supra note 3, pp.99-104.
(124) In the North Atlantic Fisheries case between the U.S.A.and G.B. the question of 
sovereignty was involved but it was not invoked .though the treaty according to 
which the dispute was brought before the Court contained the reservations of 
vital interests, national honour and independence. See N. Politis, supra note 3, 
pp.1 01 -1 03.
(125) See ibid., pp.142-144 ; and H. Cory, supra note 3, p.92.
(126) For these cases see ibid., pp.143-155 and 93-98 respectively, and "Judicial 
Decisions Involving Questions of International Law" 11 A.J.I.L. (1917), 
p p .1 8 1 -2 2 9 .
(127) H. Cory, supra note 3, p.97.
(128) See J.L. Brierly, supra note 117, p.52 ; R.R. Wilson's Thesis supra note 5, 
p.193, and H. Lauterpacht, the Doctrine ..., supra note 29, p.293. At the Second 
Hague Conference R. Barboza stated that "the submission to an inevitable court 
would imply, with sovereign nations, a flagrant abdication of sovereignty", the 
Proceedings of 1907, supra note 59 at 284.
(129) R.R. Wilson, ibid., and A. Merignhac, supra note 117, p.186.
(130) See pp. 9-10 above.
(131) See H. Cory, supra note 3, pp.36-37.
(132) See C.G. Fenwick, National Security ....supra note 6, p.780 and A. Cavalcanty, 
supra note 108, p.731
(133) See the declaration made by Chile in its opposition to the general arbitration 
treaty concluded at the First Pan-American Conference ,see p.8 above.
(134) For treaties concluded between the American states until the close of the year 
1910 see W.R. Manning, supra note 9.
(135) For discussion on whether or not arbitration was in the benefit of small states 
see the Proceedings of 1907, supra note 59, pp.266-267, 421- 424.
(136) See pp.20-24 and 28-31 above.
(137) See pp.20-24 above ;H. Lauterpacht, the Function ....supra note 115, p.19,
and R.R. Wilson's thesis, supra note 5, p.71.
(138) See J. Makowski, supra note 115, p.355; H. Lauterpacht the Function ..., 
supra note 115, pp.70-84.
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(139) See the Explanatory Note Concerning Article 10 of the Russian Draft , in the 
Proceedings of 1899, supra note 31, p.173.
(140) H. Lauterpacht, the Doctrine ...,supra note 29, p.302.
(1 4 1 ) See the view expressed by Salisbury in 317 Hansard's Parliamentary 
Debates, p..1830-1834.
(142) H. Lauterpacht, the Doctrine ..., supra note 29, p.302.
(143) J.B. scott, Instructions ..., supra note 42, p.79.
In his letter to Mr. Bayard concerning the Olney- Pauncefote treaty , Lord 
Salisbury referred also to the question of arbitrators . He wrote : "It would be 
too indivious to specify the various forms of bias by which , in any important 
controversy between two Great Powers, the other members of the Commonwealth 
of nations are visibly affected. In the existing conditions of international 
sentiment, each Great Power could point to nations whose admission to any jury 
by whom its interests were to be bound to challenge , and in a litigation between 
two Great Powers the rival challenges would pretty well exhaust the catalogue of 
the nation from whom competent and suitable arbiters could be drawn . It would 
be easy but scarely decorous to illustrate this statement by examples . They will 
occur to anyone's mind who attempts to construct a panel of nations capable of 
providing competent arbitrators , and will consider how many of them would 
command equal confidence from any two litigating Poweres. This is the difficulty 
which stands in the way of unrestricted arbitration ...",see T. Barclay , New 
Methods ..., supra note 23, pp.56-58.
(144) See H. Wehberg, supra note 108, p.308, and T. Barclay, the Hague Court 
...,supra note 16, p.113.
(145) See note 16 supra . The idea of the "stranger" was relied on by Nicaragua in 
rejecting the last two decisions of the Central Court, see p.31 above, the anxiety 
about the application of foreign rules was stressed upon by the American 
delegates to the Hague . they pointed out in their Report that "in view of the fact 
that a large majority of the members of the Court must necessarily be Europeans 
trained in the principles of the Roman Law, it has been deemed important from 
the first to secure all possible guaranties against practice or procedure which 
would put nations having the Common Law as the basis of their jurisprudence at a 
disadvantage. It is believed that this end has been successfully accomplished ." 
See J.B. Scott,Instructions ..., supra note 42, p.57.
(146) It is well known that the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague was 
neither a court nor consisted of permanent judges. See e. g. A.P. Higgins, supra 
note 100, pp.510-511. in his instruction to the American delegates to the Hague 
E. Root ascribed the lack of confidence in judicial settlement to that reason. See 
J.B. Scott, Instruction ..., supra note 42, pp. 79-80.
(147 ) See H. lauterpacht, the doctrine ..., supra note 29, p.311.
(148) See p.9-10 above.
(1 4 9 )  Ibid.
(150) See J.B. Scott Instructions ..., supra note 42, p.733.
(151) See H. Cory, supra note 3, p.25.
(152) See H. Lauterpacht, the Doctrine ..., supra note 29, p.303.
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(153) See A. Calvancanty, supra note 108, p.737.
(154) Article 14 of the Covenant: "The Council shall formulate and submit to the 
Members of the league for adoption plans for the establishment of the Permanent 
Court of Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute 
of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court 
may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by 
the Council or the Assembly."
(155) These plans were presented by Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Italy, Germany, and Austria. For the documents presented to the 
Committee see P.C.I.J., Advisory Committee of Jurists-Documents Presented to 
the Committee Relating to the Existing Plans for the Establishment of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice .
(156) Art. 14 supra note 155.
(1 5 7) This was the opinion of Lord Philimore. See Perm anent Court of 
international Justice, Committee o f Jurists, Proces- Verbaux of the 
Proceedings of the Committee, June 16th-July 24th, 1920, pp.225-226.
(158) Ibid., pp.228, 231, 233 seq., 541-543. For an extensive discussion on this 
point see B.C.J. Loder, "the Permanent Court of International Justice and 
Compulsory Jurisdiction", 2 B.Y.B.I.L.(1921-22), pp.6-26 and P.J. Baker, 
"the Obligatory Jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice", 6 
ibid., (1925), pp.68-102.
(159) For proposals to modify Art. 14, see the Proceedings of the Committee of 
Jurists ..., supra note 157,esp. pp.240-243, 286, 309, 619.
(160) This was the opinion of M. Adatci (Japan), ibid., pp.651,727.
(1 6 1 ) Ibid., p.729.
(162) Ibid., p.727. For further discussion on compulsory jurisdiction of the P.C.I.J. 
during the works of the Committee of Jurists see ibid., pp.219-281, 289 seq.,
727-729 ;P.J. Baker, supra note 158 ; A. Giustini, "Compulsory Adjudication in
International Law : the Past, the Present and prospects for the Future",9 
F o rJ .L .J .{  1986), pp. 213-256, at 217-235, and B.C.J. Loder, supra 
note158, L. Lloyd, "A springboard for the Future : A Historical Examination of 
Britain's Role in Shaping the Optional Clause of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice", 79 A.J.I.L(1985), pp.28-51, at 28-34, and H. Cory, 
suprs note 3, pp.120-123.
(163) It is to be observed that the question of reservation clauses in the proceedings 
of the Committee of Jurists has been ignored in studies devoted reservations to 
the competence of the two Courts :the P.C.I.J.and the I.C.J.,except in B. Maus' 
study, les Reserves dans les Declarations d'Acceptation de la Juricditon 
Obligatoire de la Cour Internationale de Justice, who points out that this 
question had not been discussed by the Committee of Jurists!,thesis (Universite 
de Geneve, Faculte de Droit), p.12.
(164) the Proceedings of the Committee of Jurists, supra note 157, p.243. In fact, 
the substitution of the "inalienable rights" for reservations of vital interests and 
honour was proposed by D. Descamps himself before the Institute of International 
Law in 1904, 20 Annuaire I.D.I.{ 1904), pp.186-187.
(165) The Proceedings of the Committee of Jurists ..., ibid., pp.254-255.
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(166) Ibid., pp.243, 255.
(167) See B.C.J. Loder's opinion, supra note 158, 250.
(168) See the speech delivered by L. Bourgeois, the Proceedings of the Committee of 
Jurists, ..., supra note 157, p.8.
(169) The members of the Committee were :M. Adatci (Japan), R. Altamira (Spain),
B. Descams (Belgium), F. Hegerup (Norway), A. De La Pradelle (France), Loder 
(the Netherlands), Lord Phillimore (U.K.), A. Ricci-Basatti (Italy), E. Root 
(U.S.A.), C. Bevilaqua (Brazil)who was replaced by his adviser R. Fernandes. 
Ibid., p.lll.
(1 7 0 )  Ibid., p.233.
(1 7 1 ) Ibid., 726-727. In this context the jurists studied other plans submitted to 
them without taking into consideration the reservations included in those plans. 
For example the Austrian plan contained the reservation of vital interests ; that 
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DEFINITIONS 
AND CLASSIFICATION
The permissibility of making reservations and 
conditions other than those provided for in paragraph 3 
of Article 36 is now - as has been pointed out - an 
established question. States have attached different 
kinds. of reservations and conditions to their 
declarations accepting the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction. Although the terms "reservations" and 
"conditions" are usually used interchangeably, yet they 
should not be confused. "Reservations" delineate the 
bounds of the area of disputes over which, subject to 
reciprocity, a State has accepted the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction. Reservations, in this sense, relate to the 
scope and substance of the obligation assumed by a State 
under Article 36 (2) of the Statute. They may limit the 
time during which the Court is vested with jurisdiction 
(reservations RAT10NE TEMPORIS), the material scope of 
that jurisdiction (reservations RATIONE MATERIAE), or the 
States in regard to which the objection is assumed 
(reservations RATIONE PERSONAE). In contrast, conditions 
concern the legal force of the declaration itself as an 
instrument. They relate to the formal stipulations of its 
entry into force (whether, for example, it is subject to 
ratification), duration, variation and extinction. 1 This 
distinction is not theoretical but it has an important 
affect in so far as the principle of reciprocity applies 
only to the reservations. Thus in the MILITARY AND 
PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IES  IN  AND AGAINST NICARAGUA case, 
the Court held that a State cannot rely upon a condition 
in its opponent's declaration.
Reservations in the above sense must also be 
distinguished from reservations to treaties. According to 
Articles 19 - 23 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, reservations to treaties are intended to 
exclude or modify the legal effect of some provisions of 
the treaty in its application to that State. They assume
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therefore the existence of a prior agreement from which 
they derogate. Reservations to declarations of 
acceptance, on the other hand, constitute simply an 
integral part of the act which constitutes the agreement. 
In other words there is no prior agreement. 
Furthermore, reservations to declarations cannot exclude 
or vary the legal effect of some existing provisions in 
relation to the declarant State. On the contrary, their 
function is to delineate - as has been said - the scope 
of the obligation assumed under Article 36 (2) of the
Statute. The declarant State can accordingly lodge 
preliminary objections based on the reservations included 
in its declaration if it believes that the concrete case
does not come within the scope of the obligation
4undertaken. Another difference is that while
reservations to treaties might only be made on accession 
otherwise they will be treated as denunciations, unless
5
excepted by other States parties to the treaty, 
reservations to declarations might be made at any time- 
as will be seen - if the right to do so is reserved, or 
through terminating the declaration and making a new one 
with new reservations. These differences are of 
significance in so far as the general rules concerning 
treaty reservations are not applicable en bloc to 
reservations to declarations. 6
However, the different types of reservations and 
conditions which have been attached by States to their 
declarations of acceptance will be examined in five 
chapters according to the above classification, 7 viz, 
time limits and variation conditions; reservation RATIONE 
TENPORIS and PERSONAE; and reservations RATIONE NATERIAE 
which, owing to their diversity and importance, will be 
divided into three chapters; unnecessary, objective and 
subjective reservations.
The following list and table indicate all kinds of 
reservations and conditions which have been inserted in 
the declarations of acceptance, including those made
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under the Statute of the P. C. I. J. and deemed to be 
acceptances of the I. C. J.'s jurisdiction by virtue of 
paragraph 5 of Article 36 of the Statute.
1. Reciprocity (RGTIONE MQTERIAE) .
2. Time-Limits Condition,
a) acceptance for a fixed period.
b) acceptance for a limited period and 
thereafter terminable by a simple notice,
c) for a limited period and thereafter 
terminable by notice of a determined 
period;
d) without time limits;
e) unlimited period terminable by a simple 
notification;
f) unlimited period revocable after notice 
of a determined period.
3. Ratification
4. Recourse to the Security Council.
5. Domestic jurisdiction according to international 
1 aw.
6. Domestic jurisdiction as understood by the
declarant State.
7. Disputes in regard to which States agreed to other 
means of settlement.
8. Disputes arising during or out of hostilities.
9. Territorial disputes.
10. Pecuniary disputes.
11. Disputes concerning constitutional regime.
12. Multilateral treaties.
13. The Portuguese Third Condition
14. National defence or national security.
15. RfiTIQNE TEMPQR1S reservations.
a) past disputes;
b) past disputes or arising out of facts or 
situations prior to a given date.
16. Legal disputes.
17. Israel reservations.
18. Disputes relating to any matter excluded from
judicial settlement or compulsory arbitration by
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virtue of any treaty or convention.
19. Disputes concerning special treaties.
20. Reciprocity RATIONE PERSONAE (the Brazilian 
condition).
21. Disputes between a specified group of States.
22. Non-recognition.
23. Disputes with States which have not accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court before a limited period.
24. Disputes with States which have not accepted 
jurisdiction when the dispute was referred to 
arbitration.
25. Disputes with a specific State over a specific 
subject.
26. Disputes with non-sovereign States or territories.
27. Disputes occurring during a determined period of 
t i m e .
Table 3 on pages 81, 82 and 83 indicates the number 
of reservations and conditions made by each state 
according to the above numeration.
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CHAPTER X X 
TIME-LIMITS AJSTD VARIATION 
CONDITIONS
States have interpreted in practice the provision 
that declarations may be made "for a fixed period" in 
different ways. Many time-limits formulae have been 
adopted. Some States have also reserved the right to vary 
their declaration whenever they wish. In fact, these 
conditions proved to be more harmful than reservations.
SECTION 1 : TIME-LIMITS CONDITIONS
Three major points concerning time-limits condi­
tions have been given extensive consideration in the 
doctrine as well as in the Court's jurisprudence: the 
entry into force of the declarations of acceptance; their 
termination, and the applicability of reciprocity to 
these conditions. The discussion of these points seems to 
require a previous examination of the different forms in 
which these conditions are made.
A - FORMS OF TIME-LIMITS CONDITIONS
Paragraph 3 of Article 36 provides that declara­
tions can be made "unconditionally" (in French PURENENT 
ET SINPLENENT) or "for a certain time" (in French POUR UN 
DELftl DETERMINE) . Until 1929, this provision had been 
understood as an indication that declarations should be 
made for a fixed period of time or for an indefinite 
term, but since then, this provision has been understood 
differently. Six forms of qualifications can be found in 
the declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the present Court.
(I) Declarations for a Fixed Period
A comparison between the declarations accepting the 
jurisdiction,of the present Court and those made during
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the period of its predecessor shows a drastic change in
8State practice. Whereas 33 declarations out of 56 (i.e.
58%) of the declarations made during the period of the P.
9C. I. J. were made for a fixed period, only 10 declar­
ations out of 57 (i.e. 17%) made under the Statute of the 
present Court had been at one time or another for a fixed 
period. In renewing their declarations, four States 
(Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden) abandoned this form. 
The number was thus reduced to 6 States, (i.e. about 
10%). The situation is now worse. All the declarations
currently in force, except that of El Salvador, are not
for a fixed period. The declaration of El Salvador of 
November 26, 1978 was renewed for a period of ten years
from that date.
(II) Declarations for Indefinite Term
Surprisingly, the number of declarations which do
not mention any time limitation in their texts, has
increased. Twelve declarations out of 46 currently in
force are made for an indefinite term, (i.e. 21% of all
declarations and 26% of declarations in force), six of
which were made under the Optional Clause of the P. C. I. 
11J. The declarations of Bulgaria and Portugal lapsed on
12the date of the dissolution of the P. C. I. J. Three 
declarations (of Costa Rica, Guatemala and Liberia) did 
not enter into force because of lack of ratification. The 
declaration of Paraguay was terminated in 1938, and El 
Salvador modified its declaration in 1973. The other
six declarations currently effective have been made since
141957. These are the declarations of Botswana (1970), 
Egypt (1959), Malawi (1966), Nigeria (1965), Senegal 
(1985), Togo (1979), and Uganda (1963). The declaration 
of Togo is typical. It is made "for an unlimited period 
subject to the power of denunciation and modification
attached to any obligation assumed by a sovereign State
1 ^in its international relations".
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(III) Declarations for a Fixed Period Terminable 
after the Expiration of Six Months' Notice
Declarations in this category are either made for a 
fixed period, and thereafter are renewable for the same 
period unless denounced by a notice of not less than six 
months before the expiration of that period, or for a 
fixed period terminable after the expiration of six 
months' notice. It is obvious that the first formula is 
more favorable for the Court's jurisdiction and creates 
more stability between States accepting that jurisdic­
tion. A State making such a declaration cannot terminate 
it except at the end of the period for which it was made, 
whereas this possibility is open, according to the second 
formula, at any time after the expiration of the initial
period and, of course, on the condition that the proviso
of notice is complied with.
Six declarations now in force include the first 
formula. It was made first in the declaration of Luxem­
bourg of 1930 then followed by Denmark, Finland, Nether­
lands, Norway and Sweden. The declarations of Mexico and
16New Zealand contain the second formula.
(IV) Declarations for Unlimited Period Revocable After
One Year's Notice
This form had never been used during the period of
the P. C. I. J. It is limited to the declarations of
Liechtenstein and Switzerland. However, there is no 
difference in practice between this form and the second 
of the third category above, except that the former gives 
the other declarants a more extended period to sue the 
State making it, in case it decides to terminate its 
declaration.
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(V) Declarations for a Fixed Period and Thereafter 
Terminable by a Simple Notification
The United Kingdom is the first responsible for
introducing this form. 17 It was made for the first time
in its declaration deposited February 5, 1930, then it
was copied by the Commonwealth countries (Australia,
Canada, India, New Zealand, and South Africa), and by
Iran, Iraq and Latvia. It is said that this formula
18appeared as an inadvertant result of drafting. The 
ten years' period for which Great Britain and the Common­
wealth countries accepted the Court's jurisdiction sup­
ports this view. In fact, if the principle of good faith 
is taken into consideration there would be no doubt that 
this form was more favorable for the Court’s jurisdic­
tion, because there was no need to renew it every time it 
expired. Thus, in 1930, Sir J F Williams said that " It 
must be supposed that no British Government after the end 
of 10 years would suddenly terminate its acceptance of
the clause when threatened by unwelcome reference to the 
19
Court". However State practice - as will be seen - has
proved the fallacy of that prediction. None of the States
mentioned above accepts the Court's compulsory jurisdic-
20
tion in this form. ' They have generally abandoned it in 
favour of the next category.
Six of the declarations currently in force contain 
21this formula. The fixed period in all these declara­
tions has expired and, therefore, they are terminable by 
a simple notification to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations.
(VI) Declarations for Unlimited Period 
Terminable with Immediate Effect
The previous category opened the door for making 
declarations terminable immediately. When renewing its 
declaration, ratified April 7, 1930, South Africa made 
its declaration of April 7, 1940 "until such time as
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notice may be given to terminate the acceptance" ^  of 
the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. This was the only 
precedent during the period of the P. C. I. J., but it 
had a draconic effect on State practice thereafter to 
such an extent that this formula has become the most 
attractive one. 15 of the 46 effective declarations (i.e. 
almost one third) are made in the same terms. By adding 
the seven of the previous category, the number of the 
declarations terminable at any time is now 22 (i.e. 
almost one half).
This unfortunate development raises the question 
whether this form and the previous one are in conformity 
with the Statute. It is generally agreed that declara­
tions made for a fixed period and thereafter terminable 
upon six or twelve months' notice do not violate the 
spirit of the Statute, but although not strictly conform- 
ing to it, are therefore considered as valid. Can this 
view be generated to cover declarations that are made 
terminable immediately by a simple notice? This question 
will be dealt with later while discussing the termination 
of declarations made in this form.
It is to be noted, finally, that if the form and 
the period for which the Court's jurisdiction is accepted 
are considered as an indicator of the degree of con­
fidence in the Court, the result would be, unfortunately, 
drastic in comparison with the situation during the era
of the P. C. I. J. Seventeen declarations were made
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during that period for a period of 10 years, one for
20 years (that of Ireland of 1930), one for 15 years 
(that of Belgium of 1925) and five declarations for 5
years. Also, whereas the period of eight declarations has
25risen from 5 years to 10 years, the time-limits of
o /
five declarations only were diminished.
On the other hand, since 1945, only 8 declarations
27
were made for 10 years, two of which have expired
[those of Brazil (1948) and Thailand (1950) respectively;
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one has become terminable at any time (that of Democratic 
Kampuchea of 1957) and the period of the others, except 
that of El Salvador, is reduced.
The drawback can be illustrated also by the aban­
doning by many States of the fixed period formula, for
28that of termination at any time.  ^ In contrast, the only 
apparent improvement is to be found in the declaration of 
New Zealand of 1977, which abandoned the immediate ter­
mination form for the fixed period (5 years), and there­
after until the expiration of six months after notice has 
been given to terminate the declaration. This is, of 
course, in addition to the Scandinavian declarations 
which have been modified in the same form as mentioned 
above.
B - ENTRY INTO FORCE OF DECLARATIONS
(I) The Date Of Entry Into Force
The entry into force of a declaration has a legal 
importance in determining the date when the obligation
?9
accepting compulsory jurisdiction produces its effect.
It may indicate also the "exclusion date" or the "criti­
cal date" oU of the reservation RQTIQNE TEMPQR1S. This 
happens where the obligation is assumed only with regard 
to disputes subsequent to the entry into force of the 
declaration. Finally, it may determine, though not neces­
sarily, the commencement date, and hence, the terminal 
date of the period for which the obligation is valid.
The Statute of the P. C. I. J. did not contain any 
indication as to the entry into force of a declaration, 
but the "Optional Clause" referred to the acceptance of 
jurisdiction "from this date" (French BES fi PRESENT). For 
determining the date of entry into force, Hudson relied 
on this provision in addition to the French version of 
Article 36 (2) to reach the conclusion that "the declara­
tion was intended to take effect at the time of signa—
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ture". The P. C. I. J. had no opportunity to pronounce 
on this point, but declarations were deposited with the 
Secretary-General of the League of Nations. This action 
of States seems to have found its basis in the provision 
of the Protocol of Signature which stipulated that "each 
Power shall send its ratification of the Protocol to the 
Secretary-General of the League of Nations", who was to 
take the necessary action to notify such ratification to 
other signatory States. Accordingly, the ratification 
of the Protocol of Signature was a necessary stage for 
the entry into force of a declaration, even if it was 
previously ratified and, even if the Protocol was signed.
A new improvement was introduced into the Statute 
of the present Court by the addition of paragraph 4 to 
Article 36 at the San Francisco Conference, by Committee 
IV/1. It provides: "such declarations shall be deposited 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who 
shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to the 
Statute and to the Registrar of the Court". Since no
explanation is recorded in the Committee's Report as to
7:4
that addition, the question arose as to whether this 
provision constitutes 88 V8LIB1T8TEM for the entry into 
force of a declaration. Two views have been expressed 
before 1957. According to Hudson, the date of signature 
is the date of entry into force. Thus, he considered the 
insertion of the provision into the Statute as a "detail
of house keeping", though he admitted that it could be
T,5
useful in the view of surrounding uncertainties. ' Salo 
Engel took the same view. After examining in detail the 
four dates of the American declaration, namely the date 
of the Senate resolution according to which the declara­
tion was made; the date of its signature by the Presi­
dent; the date of its deposit with the Secretary-General, 
and that of its registration by the Secretariat, he 
reached the conclusion that it entered into force at the 
date of its signature, though he believed that the con­
sideration of the date of deposit "would be in harmony 
with the general rule of International Law according to
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which mere ratification is not enough". Hambro, on the 
other hand, considers the deposit as a "part of the legal 
act and the declaration is not complete without it". J/
-?g
This view is now largely accepted.
The I. C. J. confirmed Hambro's view in the RIGHT 
OF PASSAGE OVER INDIAN TERRITORY case. '9 Here, India 
contended that a State cannot validly file an application 
until the lapse of such brief period as in the normal 
course of events would enable the Secretary-General's
40
communications of the Declarations to reach the States.
In rejecting this contention the Court declared that just 
by the deposit of its declaration with the Secretary- 
General, "the accepting State becomes a party to the 
system of the Optional Clause in relation to the other 
declarant States, with all the rights and obligations 
deriving from Article 36. The contractual relation bet­
ween the parties and the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court resulting therefrom are established ' IPSO FACTO'
and without special agreement by the fact of the making
41of the declaration".
The Court observed that the Indian argument con­
fused between two distinct provisions of paragraph 4: the 
requirement that declarations should be deposited with 
the Secretary-General, and the duty incumbent on the 
latter to communicate them to the other parties to the 
Statute. It declared:
11... However, it is only the first of these requirements 
that concerns the State making the declaration. The latter is 
not concerned with the duty of the Secretary-General or the 
manner of its fulfillment. The legal effect of a declaration 
does not depend upon subsequent action or inaction of the 
Secretary-General. Moreover, unlike some other instruments, 
Article 36 provides for no additional requirement, for in­
stance, that the information transmitted by the Secretary- 
General must reach the parties to the Statute, or that some 
period must elapse subsequent to the deposit of the declara­
tion before it can become effective".
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Two judges expressed their disagreement with this 
holding. Judge Badawi relied on the theory of offer and 
acceptance, as the consensual bond formed between the 
declarant States, to find that the procedure envisaged in 
paragraph 4 was merely intended "to take the place of 
direct negotiation", and therefore, speaking in a legal 
terminology, the system of declarations "constitutes a 
contract of correspondence between the declarant State 
and the other States through the agency of the Secretary-
General as an intermediary who, in these cases, con-
45
stitutes a stage in the transmission". “ Accordingly, 
since the application was filed against India before it 
received the declaration of Portugal, he thought that no 
contract had resulted and the position was the same as if 
the declaration had not been made.
Judge QD HOC Chegla found it difficult "to under­
stand if the first part of Article 36 (4) was mandatory,
why the second part was not equally mandatory". He was 
not able also to accept the argument that the second part 
was purely administrative or procedural. Why should such 
an unimportant provision have found a place in so solemn 
a document as the Statute of the Court. "There must have 
been some reason why the framers of the Statute inserted 
this provision in Article 36 (4) and the obvious reason
was that some time should elapse between the making of
44the declaration and the filing of an application". Yet
both judges did not indicate how much time should elapse.
The Court, however, confirmed its view in the
MILITARY QNB PQRQHILITGRY QC TIV IT IES  IN  8ND OGQINST
45NICPROGUO case (jurisdiction and admissibility). The 
date of entry into force of a declaration is therefore 
the date of its deposit with the Secretary-General, 
unless otherwise indicated (e.g. requiring the ratifica­
tion of the declaration). Thus, the declarations are 
dated by the secretariat of the United Nations and the 
Registry of the Court according to the date of their
deposit, regardless of the date of signature; the date
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from which a declaration is considered by the declarant
t
47
46
to be binding, or hat on which the declaratory condi­
tion was fulfilled.
(II) Entry Into Force and Article 102 of the Charter
Some commentators have found in Article 102 of the 
Charter of the United Nations an additional argument to 
support the view that the date of entry into force is 
that of the deposit with the Secretary-General. The 
second paragraph of that Article provides:
No party to any treaty or International agreement which 
has not been registered in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph I of this Article may invoke that treaty nr agrea­
rn e n t b e f o r e a n y o r g a n o f t h e LI n i t e d N a t i o n 51 =
Hambro argues that:
'111 i s c1ear t ha t these dec1 ar ations t a11 wit hi n the ter m 
’treaty- in this Article; and that the International Court of 
Justice is an organ of the United Nations, It would then be 
natural to say that these declarations are valid from the 
moment when they are deposited, and not before. It is believed 
that these declarations, which are registered £7 OFFICIO by 
the Secretariat of .the United Nations, will be registered at 
once so that there will be no discrepancy between the date of 
deposit and the date of registration. It is possible, however,
that a declaration may be valid from the date of deposit,
although it cannot be invoked before it has been registered."
A N Farmanfarma also believes that the date of 
deposit, as a date of entry into force, is substantiated 
by the above provision of Article 102. However the valid­
ity of declarations begins, in his view, from the date
/l O
of their signature rather than from the date of deposit. '
It seems that these arguments are erroneous, or at 
least paragraph (2) of Article 102 has no relevance what­
soever in determining the date of entry into force of a 
declaration for many reasons. Firstly, assuming that 
declarations fall within the term "treaty" - though they
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5<">are not as will be seen ' - the date of deposit of a 
declaration and the date of registration do not neces­
sarily coincide, but in fact a long period of discrepancy 
might be observed. As an example the declaration of the 
United States was deposited with the Secretary-General on 
August 26,1946 - i.e. before Hambro1s article was written
51- but registered by the Secretariat on December 14, 1946. 
Secondly, the I. C. J. made it clear in the RIGHT OF 
PASSAGE case and MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IE S  
case - as has been seen - that the very essential date 
for the entry force is that of deposit, though it ad­
mitted in the former case that there may exist some 
element of uncertainty, "which is inherent in the opera­
tion of the system of the Optional Clause", during the 
interval between the date of notification to the Secret­
ary-General and its receipt by the parties to the Statu­
s'?
te. *■ Consequently, the Court observed that :
"A State accepting the jurisdiction of the Court must
accept that an Application may be filed against it before the 
Court by a new declarant State on the same day on which that 
State deposits with the Secretary-General its declaration of 
acceptance. For it is on that very date that the consensual 
bond, which is the basis of the Optional Clause, comes into 
being between the States concerned." 'J'~
Thus Portugal in that case could have filed its
application on December 19, 1955, the date of deposit,
before it was registered EX OFFICIO on December 21,1955.
Thirdly, what does the open statement of Farmanfar­
ma, that the validity of a declaration begins from the 
date of its deposit, mean? His consideration of declara­
tions as "treaties", and his references to Article 102,
and that the Court is an organ of the United Nations,
leave no doubt that he intends to make a comparison 
between the validity of declarations before their deposit 
and treaties before their registration. It is obvious 
that treaties can produce their effects between the 
parties from the date of signature according to Article
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12 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In 
fact. Article 102 presupposes a legally valid instrument. 
The non-fulfillment of the obligation provided in that 
paragraph has no effect but to preclude the parties to a 
non-registered treaty from invoking it before any organ 
of the United Nations. What effect can a declaration have 
before being deposited? Can it be relied on by other 
States before the Court? It is not possible, it is belie­
ved, since the deposit - as has been seen - is an essen­
tial element in the legal act. It may be argued that in 
the MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IE S (jurisdiction 
and admissibility) case the Court considered the declara­
tion of Nicaragua made under the Optional Clause of the 
P. C. I. J. as a valid instrument, though, Nicaragua did
trcr
not ratify the protocol of signature, V"J and therefore it 
was immune to be sued by other signatories. The issue 
here is not quite the same, because, at least all the 
requirements of making a declaration were fulfilled by 
Nicaragua in that case. According to Article 36 (2) of 
the P. C. I. J., a State member of the League of Nations 
or mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant could "either 
when signing or ratifying the Protocol [of Signature] ... 
or at a later moment" declare its acceptance of compul­
sory jurisdiction, i.e. a State could make a declaration 
though it had not ratified that Protocol, but only signed 
it. Although this condition was fulfilled by Nicaragua on 
September,24 1929, the Court observed that Nicaragua's
declaration was "VALID FROM THE MOMENT I T  NAS received by
c r /
the Secretary-General of the League of Nations". “ The 
fact of deposit of that declaration coupled with its 
special characteristics, namely, being made "uncondition­
ally" or for unlimited period, gave it a "potential
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effect" J pending on the ratification of the Protocol 
Signature. In other words, its deposit transferred it 
into an international solemn obligation the effect of 
which was pending on the ratification of another distinct 
act, namely the Protocol Signature.
Five judges believed that the declaration of
Nicaragua was not valid because of its failure to ratify 
the Protocol Signature. The qualification of that declar­
ation as certainly valid, but not binding, seemed to 
judge Mosler "a misconstruction of a legal act which was 
subject to a suspensive condition. Moreover the use of 
this terminology may indicate that the 'certainly valid' 
declaration has an intrinsic validity which has only to 
be completed by ratification in order to become binding". 
Judge Ago also observed that the signature of the Proto­
col of Signature "never took shape as an act producing 
legal effects at international level". Therefore, "the 
so-called potential effect could not, in any event, be 
binding in character". tJ
However, they all agreed that Nicaragua had never 
become a party to the Protocol Signature and, hence never 
party to the Statute or the Optional Clause
Nevertheless, it is clear that the circumstances in 
which Nicaragua's declaration was made do not apply to 
any other declaration made pursuant to Article 36 (2) of
the I. C. J., and therefore they are not valid before
62their deposit.
Lastly, if Hambro and Farmanfarma's views could be 
regarded as doctrinal arguments expressed before the 
RIGHT OF PASSAGE case (preliminary objections), the 
reference to Article 102 by some later commentators as 
a further argument to support the Court's view in that 
case, seems to contradict that view, and may lead to the 
impression that unless declarations are REGISTERED by the 
Secretariat they cannot be invoked before the Court.
(Ill) A New Precedent
In the MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IE S  IN  AND 
AGAINST NICARAGUA case (jurisdiction and admissibility)
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the Court created a precedent, though limited to Nicarag­
ua's declaration, as to the entry into force of a decl­
aration made under the Optional Clause of the P. C. I. J. 
without ratifying the Protocol Signature. Here Nicaragua 
relied on its declaration of September 24, 1929, and 
Article XXIV (2) of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce 
and Navigation of May 24, 1958 between itself and the
64United States for bringing the dispute before the Court.
It argued that its declaration was valid and binding
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court by
6 l=ivirtue of Article 36 (5). " Nicaragua contended that,
though the ratification of the Protocol of Signature was 
not deposited, its declaration was included among declar­
ations deemed to be acceptance of the Court’s jurisdic­
tion by virtue of the phrase "which are still in force" 
(the French version "POUR UNE BUREE GUI N'EST PAS ENCORE 
EXPIREE") because that phrase " was designed to exclude 
from the operation of the Article only declarations that 
have already expired, and has no bearing whatever on a 
declaration, like Nicaragua's" As a support for this 
argument, Nicaragua relied also on the Yearbooks of the
International Court of Justice; the publications of the
United Nations Secretariat, which included it amongst 
States "which have recognised the compulsory jurisdiction 
... of the International Court of Justice or which are
still bound by the acceptance of the Optional Clause of
the Permanent Court of International Justice" or amongst 
States with regard to which there were "in force declara­
tions", and on the attitude of the parties to that case 
and that of Honduras in the case of ARBITRAL ANARB NABE
BY THE KING OF SPAIN ON BECENBER 2 3 ,  1 906 ,  b/
The United States, on the other hand, argued that 
Nicaragua never became a party to the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice and accordingly, 
it could not make an effective acceptance of the compul­
sory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court. The U. S. 
interpreted the expression "still in force" and its
corresponding French version in a different manner. Both
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these expressions required, in its opinion, that a
declaration must be "binding" to be deemed an acceptance
68of the jurisdiction of the present Court.
After observing the novelty of the issue involved 
in the case, the Court rejected the American interpreta­
tion of the expression "still in force". The Court found 
that it had to interpret paragraph 5 of Article 36 on the 
basis of the actual terms used, which do not include the 
word binding. It said:
"According to the TRAOAUX PREPARATORIES the word "bind­
ing" was never suggested; and if it had been suggested for the 
English text, there is no doubt that the drafters would never 
have let the French texts stand as finally worded. Further­
more, the Court does not consider the French text to imply 
that LA BUREE NOR EXPIREE (the unexpired period) is that of a 
commitment of a binding character. It may be granted that, for 
a period to continue or expire, it is necessary for some legal 
effect to have come into existence. But this effect does not 
necessarily have to be of a binding nature. A declaration 
validly made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent 
Court had a certain validity which could be preserved or 
destroyed, and it is perfectly possible to read the French 
text as implying on this validity".
The Court found that the following facts confirm 
the above interpretation: the deliberate choice of the 
expression "POUR UNE BUREE GUI N'EST PfiS ENCORE EXPIREE";  
the intention to maintain the greatest possible con­
tinuity between it and its predecessor by those who draf­
ted its Statute, to maintain as far as possible the 
progress towards compulsory jurisdiction; 70 the par­
ticular weight that must be ascribed to certain official 
publications, namely, the I. C. J. and the United Nations 
Publications; 71 the silence of Nicaragua over the period 
since 1929; the conduct of the other States by not chal­
lenging the inclusion of Nicaragua among States bound by 
compulsory jurisdiction; the reliance of Honduras INTER 
OLIO on Nicaragua's declaration in the case of THE OR— 
BITROL ONORB MODE BY THE KING OF SPOIN ON DECEMBER 2 3 ,  
1 9 06 , and finally the United States letter of April 6,
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1984 which implied, in the Court's view, that the United
States believed that Nicaragua was bound by the Court's
72jurisdiction.
Bearing in mind that Nicaragua was represented at 
the San Francisco Conference and duly signed and ratified 
the Charter of the United Nations, on the one hand, and 
the particular characteristics of its declaration being 
made for an unlimited period, on the other, the Court 
ruled that Nicaragua's declaration "was valid at the 
moment when Nicaragua became a party to the Statute of 
the new Court: it had contained its potential effect
because Nicaragua, which could have limited the duration 
of that effect, had expressly refrained form doing so". 
Therefore, the consent which had been given by Nicaragua 
in 1929 to the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court "had 
not become fully effective" in the absence of ratifica­
tion of the Protocol of Signature. Yet, the ratification 
of the Charter of the United Nations, by a State represe­
nted at the San Francisco Conference presupposes that 
"the consent to transfer to the International Court of 
Justice a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the 
Permanent Court may be regarded as effectively given", as
the Court ruled also in the QERIQL INCIDENT OF JULY 2 7 ,
741955 (preliminary objections case).
(IV) Entry Into Force in Practice
A small number of declarations indicate the date of 
their entry into force. Among the 46 declarations cur­
rently effective, three declarations provide for that the
date of deposit with the Secretary-General is the date of
75entry into force. Although the Statute does not re­
quire ratification, three declarations have been made 
subject to ratification. 7  ^ Therefore the date of the 
deposit of ratification is the date of their entry into 
force. Liechtenstein and Switzerland stipulated that 
their declarations "shall take effect from the date on 
which they became parties to the Statute". 77 Egypt and
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Mexico made their declarations effective from a specified 
date prior to the date of their deposit. This stipulation 
has no effect, as Briggs observes, on the date of entry 
into force, but it has the effect of diminishing the 
period for which the Mexican declaration was made, and 
rendering the Egyptian one, being made for unlimited
period, expressly applicable to disputes arising prior to
78the date of entry into force. The other declarations
are silent on the issue. Consequently the date of deposit 
is the determinant date.
Thus, the date of entry into force coincides with 
the "commencement" date where a declaration indicates 
only the former date, or where neither dates are indi­
cated, or finally where only the latter is indicated and 
coincides with the date of deposit. On the other hand, it 
coincides with the "commencement date" and "exclusion 
date" RQTIONE TENPORIS if a declaration specifies a
single date for their operation, or where the declaration
79is made with regard to future disputes only.
If these three dates are borne in mind, it might be 
easier to interpret a declaration made in terms so am-
8t") 81biguous ' such as those of the Mexican declaration.
It confers jurisdiction over disputes "that may in future
arise ... out of events subsequent to the date of this
declaration". The declaration which is dated October 23,
1947, was deposited with the Secretary-General on October
28, 1947, and by its terms "shall be binding as from 1
on
March 1947"  ^ Accordingly, October 23, 1947 is the
e'xclusion date; October 28, 1947 is the entry into force 
date; and March 1, 1947 is the commencement date of the 
period for which the declaration was made.
It is observed, finally that, although Article 36 
(4) refers only to the deposit of declarations, it ap­
plies also to alterations, withdrawals and denunciations, 
as the Court observed in the RIGHT OF POSSRGE 00 ER INI) I  ON
o-t;
TERRITORY case (preliminary objections).
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C - TERMINATION OF DECLARATIONS
The question of the termination of the obligation 
assumed under Article 36 (2) was ignored by the drafters 
of the Statute of the P. C. I. J. It might be fair to 
assume that they did not conceive that it would give rise 
to any problem in practice. It was also ignored by the 
framers of the present Statute, though some new prece­
dents emerged after 1929.
Normally, a declaration can be terminated according 
to its terms inasmuch as they are not inconsistent with 
the Statute. Therefore, the expiration of the period for 
which a declaration is made, or the expiration of the 
period notice indicated in it, are the normal ways for 
its termination, in addition to the way to terminate an 
obligation assumed for indefinite term. However, the 
development brought about in practice had not left any 
method without contestation.
(I) The rule in the Nottebohm case
It is to be observed at the outset, that whatever
the method provided for in a declaration, its termination
in some circumstances is governed by the rule in the
NOTTEBOHM case. In this case Guatemala's declaration was
made for a period of five years from January 27,1947. 
Liechtenstein's declaration, on the other hand, was 
revocable on twelve months notice. On December 17, 1951, 
i.e., less than four weeks before Guatemala’s declaration 
was due to expire, Liechtenstein filed an application 
against Guatemala. The latter, in a preliminary objec­
tion, contended that the Court was without jurisdiction, 
although it did not dispute that at the date when Liech­
tenstein's application was filed, the Court became regul­
arised by the jurisdiction over the case. It claimed that 
the Court had no power to hear the case because its 
declaration must be understood as relating generally to 
the administration of justice by the Court, not merely to
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the seizing of the Court with jurisdiction to administer 
justice.
The Court unanimously rejected that objection 
ruling that:
"The seizing of the Court is one thing, the administra­
tion of justice is another. The latter is governed by the 
Statute, and by the Rules which , the Court has drawn up by 
virtue of the powers conferred upon it by Article 30 of the 
Statute, Once the Court had been regularly seised, the Court 
must exercise its power, as these are defined in the Statute,
After that, the expiry of the period fixed for one of the 
Declarations on which the Application was founded is an event 
which is unrelated to the exercise of the powers conferred on 
the Court by the Statute, which the Court exercises whenever 
it has been regularly seised and whenever it has not been 
shown, on some other ground, that it lacks jurisdiction or 
that the claim is inadmissible,"
This rule had been confirmed in the RIGHT OF P8SS-  
OGE case 85 and MI L I  TORY ON1J P8R8MILIT8RY A C T IV IT IE S case. 86
(II) Termination of Declarations made for a Fixed Period 
or Terminable upon a Fixed Period Notice
The lapse of the period for which declarations were 
made was the only method which was followed for the
termination of declarations made according to the Option­
al 'Clause of the P. C. I. J., except the termination of
rj~r
the declarations of Paraguay and Brazil. “/ No protest 
whatsoever was made against that method of termination. 
But, can a declaration made for a fixed period or ter­
minable upon a fixed period notice be abrogated or modif­
ied before the lapse of that period? This question has 
never been given any importance in the doctrine except by 
Waldock. In his discussion of the inequality between 
States making their declarations terminable immediately
by a simple notice and States whose declarations are for 
a fixed period, he argued for the possibility of denounc­
ing the declarations of the latter 0 1 3 - 0 - 0 1 8 the former
R,q
on the basis of reciprocity. “ However, attempts to
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modify declarations before the expiration of the period 
of their validity were made during the Second World War.
On September 7,1939, the United Kingdom, whose 
declaration was made for an initial period of ten years 
and then until notice would be given to terminate it, 
notified the Secretary-General of the League of Nations 
that it would not regard its "acceptance of the Optional
Clause as governing disputes arising out of events oc-
89curring during the present hostilities". The same
action was taken by the Commonwealth Nations (New Zeala­
nd, the Union of South Africa, Australia, India and
90
Canada). ' Similarly France which on April 7, 1936 had
made a declaration for a five years period, sent to the
Secretary-General on September 10, 1939 a letter by which
it regarded such disputes as excluded from the Court's 
91jurisdiction. The grounds on which they justified
their actions appeared strongly to imply that they were 
invoking the CLOU SO REBUS/STONT1BUS. They alleged that /jr>e 
the conditions which prevailed at the time of their 
acceptance of the Optional Clause ceased to exist. Their 
justification seems also to indicate that they "did not 
consider themselves to have the right unilaterally to 
modify or terminate their declarations except according
to principles analogous to those governing the termina-
92tion or modification of treaties".
Eleven neutral States made reservations in regard
93to the legal effect of the action taken by these States.
It might be worth noting that Norway and Sweden drew atten­
tion to the fact that, by virtue of Article 36 of the 
Statute and the declarations relating thereto, it rests 
with the Court itself to decide questions as to its own 
jurisdiction and, "should the case arise, to pronounce upon
the validity and if necessary, the scope of the acts of
94denunciation referred to".
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The validity of these actions have been open to
95discussion, and the Court did not have an opportunity to 
consider the question until 1984 in the MILITARY AND PARAM­
IL ITARY A CT IV IT IE S  IN  AND AGAINST NICARAGUA case (jurisdic­
tion and admissibility). The United States deposited on 
April 6, 1984 with the Secretary-General a notification 
stating that:
"Not withstanding the terms of the aforesaid declaration, 
this proviso shall take effect immediately and shall remain in 
force for two years, so as to foster the continuing regional 
dispute settlement process which seeks a negotiated solution 
to the interrelated political, economic and security problems 
of Central America."
This was in spite of the fact that its declaration was 
made for a fixed period and thereafter until the expira­
tion of the sixth months after notice having been given 
to terminate it.
Nicaragua contested the validity of this notifica­
tion on the grounds that international law did not prov­
ide a basis for unilateral modification of a declaration
made under Article 36 (2) of the Statute unless the right
97to do so has been expressly reserved.
On the other hand the modification was regarded by 
the United States as suspending temporarily its consent 
to the adjudication of the claims of Nicaragua, and not a 
termination of its 1946 declaration, and therefore, the 
six months notice proviso was not applicable to the 
notification. It contended also that States have the 
sovereign extra-statutory right to modify at any time 
declarations made under Article 36 in a manner not incon­
sistent with the Statute. For declarations are neither 
treaties nor governed by the law of treaties, but are SUI  
GENERIS. Furthermore it was "inequitable and unjustified 
to hold the United States to its declaration made 38 
years before and to ignore the fundamental change oc­
curred in State practice under the Optional Clause, the
105
98United States argued.
Rebutting the United States arguments Nicaragua 
argued that the United States notification was without 
effect on the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the case. 
For that notification could have two interpretations: the 
first was to consider it as a modification of the 1946 
declaration. In such a case the modification was contrary 
to the 1946 declaration which reserved the right to 
terminate and not to modify. Moreover, the six months' 
proviso was introduced to have "the effect of a renuncia­
tion of any intention to withdraw [the] obligation in the
99face of a threatened legal proceedings". Accordingly 
the attempt to modify that declaration was nullified. The 
second was to consider that notification as a termination 
to the declaration, and it was in fact, Nicaragua argued, 
an attempt to terminate the acceptance VIS-/9-VIS a cer­
tain number of identifiable States. In such an hypothesis 
the notification was likewise ineffective before the 
expiration of six months, i.e. before October 6, 1984. 100
The Court found that the arguments between the 
parties as to whether the negotiation should be con­
sidered as a modification or as a termination were with­
out consequence for the purpose of its judgment. Yet the 
truth, in its view, was that the notification "intended 
to secure a partial and temporary termination, namely to 
exempt, with immediate effect, the United States from the 
obligation to subject itself to the Court's jurisdiction 
with regard to any application concerning disputes with 
American States". ^  However, as far as the validity of 
the United States' notification is concerned, the Court 
said:
"The most important question relating to the effect of 
the 1984 notification is whether the United States was free to 
disregard the clause of six months7 notice which, freely and 
by its own choice, it had appended to its 1946 Declaration, In 
so doing the United States entered into an obligation which is 
binding upon it vis-a-vis other States parties to the Optional 
Clause system. Although the United States retained the right
106
to modify the contents of the 1946 Declaration or to terminate
it, a power which is inherent in any unilateral act of a
State, it has, nevertheless assumed an inescapable obligation
towards other States accepting the Optional Clause, by stating
formally and solemnly that any such change should take effect“ I o'
only after six months have elapsed as from the date of notice,"
The significance of this judgment is that States 
will, in future, be on notice that any self-imposed 
requirement relating to time-limits embodied in declara­
tions must be observed as regards both modification and 
termination.
(III) Termination of Declarations made Unconditionally
On May 27, 1938, Paraguay sent the Secretary-gene­
ral of the League of Nations the text of the decree 
withdrawing its declaration ratified on May 11, 1933 
recognising the jurisdiction of the P. C. I. J. uncondi-
10A
tionally. " Paraguay based its action, INTER QLlfi on 
the fact that it ceased to be a member of the League of 
Nations and on the absence of any rule that could prevent 
it from withdrawing from the Optional Clause system. In 
fact the real cause for its action was to prevent Bolivia 
from referring its disputes with Paraguay over the fron­
tiers to the Permanent Court. 1UlJ Six States made reser­
vations as to the legal effect of that withdrawal. "'Ju 
Czechoslovakia and the Netherlands observed that in the 
absence of any provision in the Statute regarding the 
denunciation of declarations, the matter should be regu­
lated by the general rules of international law concern­
ing the termination of international undertakings. Brazil 
expressed the view that, unless a reservation to that 
effect was made, it could not accept such a withdrawal. 
The Swedish government thought that the decision as to 
the legal effect of that withdrawal should be left to the 
Court. iU/ However, Paraguay's declaration had been 
maintained in the list of operative declarations in the 
Yearbook of the International Court of Justice until 
1959-60 with a note drawing attention to Paraguay’s 
notice of cancellation and the reservations made by
107
108States mentioned above.
On November 1973, El Salvador also terminated its 
declaration of 1930, which did not contain any provision 
for its termination. As a justification for this act, El 
Salvador relied indirectly on the doctrine of REBUS SIC 
STANTIBUS. The preamble of the new declaration, which 
revoked and replaced the new one, referred to change in 
circumstances such as the promulgation of new political 
constitutions; the adoption of the Charter of the United 
Nations; the revision of the Charter of the Organization 
of American States, and the changes brought about in the
texts of the declarations of acceptance made by other
109
States. However in its response to Honduras’ com­
munication to the United Nations Secretariat challenging 
El Salvador’s act of termination and considering it as 
"completely lacking in validity", J El Salvador relied 
heavily on the unilateral character of the declaration of 
acceptance as a "free act in which no other State can 
interfere". ***
These precedents have been the object of a long 
debate in the literature. Most of the writers, who have 
attempted to answer the question of the legitimacy of 
terminating a declaration made unconditionally connected 
it with another complicated point, V I Z ,  the nature of the
declarations accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdic-
.. 112 t ion.
It seems natural that views have been sharply 
divided with regard to the qualification of these declar­
ations. It cannot be denied, on the one hand, that the 
making of a declaration belongs to the free discretion of 
the declarant as regards both the time of making it and 
its terms, as long as they are kept within the framework 
of the Statute. On the other hand, declarations are made 
according to the Statute, which is a multilateral treaty, 
and create reciprocal obligations between the declarants.
108
The Court's guidance has offered another element 
which has contributed to the depth of that difference. In 
the PHOSPHATES IN  MOROCCO (preliminary objections) case 
and the CERTAIN NORNE&IAN LOANS case declarations were 
referred to as an unilateral act. In rejecting the
British view in the ANGLO—IRANIAN OIL COMPANY case, that 
the Iranian declaration should be interpreted as to give 
meaning to all the words in the declaration, the Court 
said:
"The text of the Iranian Declaration is not a treaty text
resulting from negotiations between two or more States. It is
the result of unilateral drafting by the Government of Iran 
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In the ELECTRICITY COMPANY OF SOFIA AND BULGARIA case the 
Court stated that as a result of the two declarations:
"an agreement came into existence between these two 
States accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. ...
This agreement, hereinafter referred to as the declarations, 
came into force on March 10th,1926, the date of the Bulgarian 
ratification." 115
Again in the RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER INDIAN TERRITORY 
(preliminary objections) case the Court qualified the
relations between the parties and compulsory jurisdiction 
as "contractual". It held that, at the date of deposit of 
declarations "the CONSENSUAL BOND, which is the basis of 
the Optional Clause, comes into being between the States
concerned". Furthermore, the Court had used technical
terms taken from the Law of Treaties, such as "adherence"
117or "accession" to the Optional Clause.
Thus the determination of the nature of declara­
tions depended very much on which element (i.e. the 
unilateral making of the declaration or the relations 
established by the combination of declarations) and case 
amongst the aforesaid cases have been taken into con­
sideration. Some commentators have concentrated on the
unilateral drafting of the declaration and on the ANGLO-
109
IRANIAN OIL COMPANY case to reach the conclusion that
declarations are unilateral acts and, therefore, they
excluded the application of the general principles gov-
118erning the interpretation of treaties. Some have
taken into consideration both elements: the unilateral 
character and the consensual and bilateral obligations
established between States through their declarations.
119Accordingly declarations are SUI GENERIS and the
general rules governing the termination of treaties could
1^ 0
be applied to them by analogy. Others concentrate on 
the effect of joining declarations together. According to 
this view, declarations are unilateral in form, but con­
tractual in substance. They are governed by the same
121rules applying to international treaties. Consequent­
ly, declarations made for indefinite term continue in 
force indefinitely, unless terminated by the consent of 
all other parties or according to the CLAUSA REBUS SIC  
STANTIBUS.
It has been pointed out that the question whether a 
declaration made unconditionally can be denounced "is 
never likely to arise" before the Court. For, INTER A L IA, 
"once a State has denounced a title of jurisdiction, and 
especially a declaration accepting the compulsory juris­
diction, it is politically inconceivable that another 
State would seek to invoke the denounced instrument as 
the basis for the introduction of a new proceedings". The
question is "therefore largely be relegated to the realm 
1of theory".
Yet, the MILITARY ANB PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IE S  IN  
ANB AGAINST NICARAGUA case (jurisdiction and admissibili­
ty) showed the fallacy of this prediction. Here the Court 
settled both questions, namely the qualification of the 
declarations, and the possibility of denouncing or withd­
rawing a declaration made indefinitely. The United Stat­
es, it is to be recalled, argued that the declarations of
acceptance "are SUI GENERIS, are not treaties and are not
12^governed by the law of treaties", " and that Nicaragu­
110
a's declaration, being indefinitely in duration "is
subject to a right of immediate termination, without
124previous notice by Nicaragua". Nicaragua on the other 
hand, denied that declarations of this kind are ter­
minable by a simple notice. For, "the general view is 
said to be that" these declarations "continue in force 
indefinitely, in contractual terms; the question how far 
they may be terminable is governed by the principles of 
law of treaties applicable to consensual legal relations 
arising within the system of the Optional Clause". It 
concluded that "there can be no legal justification for 
the view that (its declaration) is subject to unilateral
i ric-
modification".
Concerning the arguments of the parties as regards 
the qualification of declarations the Court emphasised, 
on the one hand, the fact that they are "facultative, 
unilateral engagements, that States are absolutely free 
to make or not to make". In making them. States are 
"equally free either to do so unconditionally and without 
limit of time for (their) duration, or to qualify them 
with conditions and reservations". Being of an unilateral 
character, declarations of acceptance of the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction are, like other unilateral acts 
creating legal or factual situations, binding according
to their terms, as the Court observed in the NtfCLEQR
126TESTS cases.  ^ Thus, the Court continued, "the unilate­
ral nature of a declaration does not signify that the 
State making the declaration is free to amend the scope 
and the contents of its solemn commitments as it please­
s ’’. On the other hand the Court drew the attention to the 
second element of the declarations. It said:
"... The declarations, even though they are unilateral 
acts, establish a series of bilateral engagements with other 
States accepting the same obligation of compulsory jurisdic­
tion, in which the conditions, reservations and time-limit 
clauses are taken into consideration. In the establishment 
ofthe network of engagement, which constitutes the Optional 
Clause system, the principle of good faith plays an important 
role".
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The Court then reiterated its jurisprudence in the NUCL- 
EQR TESTS cases that:
"... Just as the very rule of PACTA SUNT SERVANT)A in the 
law of treaties is based on good -faith, so also is the binding 
character o-f an international obligation assumed by unilateral 
declaration. Thus interested States may take cognisance of 
unilateral declarations and place confidence in them, and are 
entitled^to require that the obligation thus created be respe­
cted." 127
It seems from the above statements that the Court 
has followed Waldock's view that the consensual relation 
between the declarant States is SUI GENERIS. 1j1‘S
The United States relied INTER ALIF) on the prece­
dents in which declarations were modified or withdrawn 
not in conformity with their terms, to support its claim 
that Nicaragua's declaration was terminable immediately 
without previous notice.
In fact, the declaration of El Salvador was the 
only instance in addition to Paraguay's termination and 
Columbia's correction mentioned above, in which a declar­
ation for an indefinite term was revoked and replaced the 
129previous one.
However the Court refused to take into considera­
tion these instances, and therefore rejected the United 
States argument. It said:
"... The right of immediate termination o-f declarations 
with indefinite duration is far from established. It appears 
from the requirements of good faith that they should be trea­
ted , by analogy, according to the law of treaties, which 
requires a reasonable time for withdrawal from or termination 
of treaties that contain no provision regarding the duration 
of their validity."
It seems thus that the Court applied the customary 
international rule inserted in the Vienna Convention of 
the Law of Treaties [Article 56 (2)] which requires 12
112
months' notice, though it did not say the 12 months would 
be the reasonable notice for the termination of a declar­
ation of that kind. The Court found it unnecessary to 
determine what reasonable period of notice would legally 
be required, since Nicaragua did not manifest any inten­
tion to withdraw its declaration. It said that "it need 
only be observed that from 6 to 9 April would not amount 
to a reasonable time". 1'~‘1 This statement seems to sug­
gest that that period should be determined according to
1 Tt2
the circumstances in each case. Presumably a shorter
period than 12 months would be sufficient, if the 
object intended by the requirement of reasonable time is 
to disallow the State making such a declaration to escape 
being sued by the other declarant, or to give the latter 
the opportunity to file an application against that 
State.
However, the significance of this case in regard to 
the nature of the relations between the declarant States, 
being SUI GENERIS, lies in the fact that the Court remo­
ved any doubt as "to the existence of any contradiction 
between either its own jurisprudence or that of its
17,4
predecessor the P. C. I. J. “ The unilateral character 
of a declaration must be taken into account in some cir­
cumstances such as the interpretation of the words in­
serted in it, as the Court ruled in the ANGLO IRANIAN OIL 
COMPANY case. On the other hand, the "bilateral
engagements" established within the Optional Clause 
system may require in some instances, and in the absence 
of a provision to the contrary in the declarations, the 
application of the general principles governing interna­
tional treaties. However it must be noted that these 
principles are not applicable as such, but by analogy as 
the Court observed in this case.
Accordingly if the termination of the declarations 
of Paraguay and El Salvador had been tested, it would 
have been difficult not to consider them effective during 
a reasonable time, especially if the circumstances sur­
113
rounding such terminations were taken into account. The 
former, as already mentioned, had been maintained amongst 
States accepting the Court's jurisdiction until 1960, and 
six States protested against its action. The latter 
relied on the customary international rule according to 
which treaties for indefinite duration could be ter­
minated after a reasonable time.
Although the requirement of a reasonable time would 
create some stability between States parties to the 
Optional Clause, three judges expressed their disagree­
ment with the Court’s reasoning. They all gave much 
consideration to the instability created by declarations 
made terminable immediately by a simple notice, and 
relied on the instances of changes to these declarations 
to suggest that the declaration of Nicaragua should be 
considered terminable at any time. ^  If the modifica­
tion of these declarations creates some uncertainty 
between the declarant States - as will be seen shortly- 
the reference to Indonesia's withdrawal from the United
Nations and hence from the Statute by a notice of 24
1 ^7
hours, seems irrelevant here. " Furthermore the argu­
ment that how a State can withdraw from the Charter or 
the Statute on 24 hours notice, and cannot do the same to 
withdraw from a declaration accepting the Court's compul­
sory jurisdiction, seems but to suggest that treaties are 
terminable immediately without a reasonable period of 
time.
It is to be observed finally that Honduras ter­
minated its declaration of March 10, 1960 which was made
expressly for an indefinite term by a new declaration
1 "^8deposited with the Secretary-General on May 22, 1986. 
Since it was terminated after the Court's judgment, it 
might be assumed that the reasonable time requirement is 
applicable to this termination. For this reason, perhaps, 
the new declaration does not stipulate that it produces 
its effects immediately.
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(IV) The Reservation of the Right to Terminate 
with Immediate Effect
(i) Validity
The inconsistency of declarations terminable by a 
mere notification to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations with Article 36 (3) has been questioned in the
literature. In fact, if the provision that declarations 
may be made "for a certain time" (POUR UN DELRI DETER­
MINE) is interpreted to mean that declarations must be 
made for a "fixed" period as opposed to an undetermined 
period i.e. for a "non-fixed period" according to the
1 7 , Q
French meaning of the term, there would be no doubt
that such declarations are not made for a "certain time" 
and therefore are not compatible with the Statute. Thus,
many commentators have not hesitated to consider it as
1 •*] 0
not in conformity with the Statute. ~~"J Others, although 
they agree that it is not for a certain time, have found 
in the Rule in the NETTOBONM case that once the Court has 
been regularly seised the subsequent termination has no 
effect on the case referred to it, and in the possibility 
of invoking the MOaIN ID CERTUN EST QUOD CERT U N  REDELI 
POTEST by States making it to bring their declarations 
within paragraph 3, possible reasons which prevent decla­
rations in this form from being totally incompatible with 
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the Statute. ' “ The validity of this form has not been 
contested on the basis of that express stipulation of 
Article 36 only, but also on other grounds.
Lauterpacht, for instance, expressed the view that:
"A wording which loaves the State at liberty to denounce 
an arbitration treaty at any moment seriously impairs its 
value5 and although it ran be -found in a number of arbitration 
conventions, there is little justification for it in a general 
treaty, except inadvertence in drafting", '
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The third and most convincing ground which is 
relied on by almost all commentators is the glaring 
inequality created by such a form between States accept­
ing the Court's compulsory jurisdiction system and its 
effect on the very purpose of that system.
In 1955 Waldock called attention to the fact that a 
declaration terminable by a mere notice can be used as an 
escape clause, since a State, whose declaration is for a 
fixed period or terminable after the expiration of a 
given period notice, engaged in dispute with a State 
whose declaration is terminable at any time and without 
any warning, may find that its opponent has withdrawn the 
dispute from the jurisdiction of the Court. Such a State 
has, thus, no means to sue its opponent, but, recourse to 
a premature filing of an application at the outset of the 
dispute. Accordingly, Waldock observed that "one objec­
tion to declarations immediately terminable by a mere 
notice to the Secretary-General is ... the pressure which 
they put on States to institute proceedings under the
Optional Clause without first exhausting the possibilit-
14^les of settlement out of the Court." " However, the 
fundamental objection to these declarations lies in the 
fact that "they tend to undermine the whole purpose of 
the Optional Clause. A State concerned can shape its 
course of action according to its position as a potential 
plaintiff or as a defendant". He continues:
"The Right to terminate the declaration immediately by 
the mere giving of notice may be used HOT SO MUCH OS 0 MEANS 
OF TERMINATING THE GENERAL OBLIGATION OF THE STATE CONCERNED 
TO COMPULSORY JURISDICTION UNDER THE OPTIONAL C L A US E, BUT AS A 
MEANS OF 'NITHDRANING FROM THE COURT'S COMPULSORY JURISDICTION 
A PARTICULAR DISPUTE AFTER IT HAS A R I S E N 144
For these reasons Waldock observed that this form 
of termination may be used to serve much the same purpose 
as the reservation of vital interests, national honour 
and independence, with the difference that, unlike these 
reservations, the rule in the NOTTEBOHM case is applica­
116
145ble to termination by a simple notice.
This one-sided privilege, the inequality and incer­
titude created by this reservation, and its use arbitrar­
ily in practice have been insisted upon by the publicists
as warning signs of its draconic effect on the compulsory
146jurisdiction system. This reservation has been used
widely in practice, and sometimes in a short period 
subsequent to the making of a declaration. The United 
Kingdom, for example, used it six times between June 2,
1955 and November 27, 1963. Recently Senegal made a
declaration on December 2,1985, which replaces its decla­
ration made eight months before (May 3, 1985) in order to 
exclude disputes arising before the date of its last 
declaration. On November 21, 1985, Israel withdrew its
declaration of 1956 which was subject to modification on
147February 1984. Furthermore, the registration of the
right to terminate has been used many times after the 
initiation of litigations before the Court. This can be
illustrated by many examples. In 1951, Iran terminated
its declaration of 1932 after it had been sued by the 
United Kingdom in the ANGLO - IRANIAN OIL case. India
terminated its declaration of 1940 following the ap-
148plication in the RIGHT OF PASSAGE case. France ter­
minated its declaration of 1966 following the order of
interim measures of protection in the NUCLEAR TESTS
149
cases, and in the same year (i.e. 1974) India further
narrowed the scope of its declaration by including a 
RATIONE TENPORIS reservation, excluding disputes arising 
out of hostilities and including a new reservation desig­
ned to prevent an opponent from relying on the General
Act of 1928, changes which followed the proceedings
1 50
instituted by Pakistan in the PRISONERS OF MAR case.
It has been observed that terminations of declarations 
following the institution of proceedings, such as those 
of India and Iran, were made in order to put the States 
concerned in a defensive posture against new applications 
in those disputes. iw,i
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If the termination of declarations in the above 
cases did not deprive the Court's of jurisdiction by the 
application of the rule in the NOTTEBOHM case, there are 
instances in which States were unable to resort to the 
Court because the opponents' declarations were terminated 
and replaced by new ones, excluding disputes between 
these States. In 1954, Australia, for example, made new 
reservations relating to the Law of the Sea to frustrate
a possible Japanese application concerning pearl fisheri-
157es, and in 1955, the United Kingdom terminated its
declaration made only five months previously, with the 
apparent aim of excluding its dispute with Saudi Arabia
over Buraimi Oasis after the break-down of the attempted
15"^arbitration. Again, in 1957, the United Kingdom
introduced a new reservation concerning disputes which
might affect national security in order to preclude any
154challenge to its nuclear weapons testing. In 1970,
Canada made a new reservation so as to exclude a possible
American application regarding the Arctic Waters Pollu-
155tion Prevention Act. Another example is provided by
the United States attempt to terminate or modify tem-
porarily its declaration of 1946 V IS - A - V IS Central Amer- 
156can States. Following published reports that Nicara­
gua was planning to bring a complaint against the United 
States, the latter made on April 6, 1984, its new reser­
vation with the aim of preventing Nicaragua from bringing
157the dispute before the Court. Although this example 
may not be relevant here, its significance lies in the 
fact that the United States contended that its declara­
tion could be modified at any time. If that contention 
had been accepted, the Court would have been deprived of 
jurisdiction in that case.
Although the instances mentioned above are con­
sidered as terminations. Judge Jennings considered them 
as modifications to declarations which, though they 
reserved the right to terminate, did not expressly rese—
1CJ0
rve the right to modify. “ However, the qualification 
of these changes as modifications or terminations seems
118
to be theoretical, since those States could have notified 
the Secretary-General separately "of the intention to 
terminate the previous declarations or to include in the 
new declaration a clause to the effect that "this declar­
ation revokes and replaces the previous declaration" as
159did India in its declaration of 1974.
Having taken into account Waldock's view and State 
practice, some publicists have raised the question that, 
if the reservation of the right to terminate by a simple 
notice is invalid, will the whole declaration be invalid 
or is it valid despite the invalidity of the reservation?
Although the damaging effects of the immediate 
denunciation are now incontrovertible, there are, howev­
er, some grounds which may support its validity. Firstly, 
according to Article 36 (5) of the Statute, declarations 
made under the Optional Clause of the P. C. I. J. are 
deemed acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
present Court "in accordance with their terms". Accord­
ingly, the declaration of South Africa of 1940 made 
terminable by a simple notice was deemed as a valid 
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the present 
Court. It may be argued that the drafters of the present 
Statute had not much time to consider each reservation 
made before, and they did not have in mind that the 
effect of this reservation would be drastic. However, the
broad statement made by the drafters as to the possibil-
161ity of making reservations, coupled with the provis­
ion of Article 36 (5) leave no doubt as to the validity
of the declaration of South Africa according to its 
terms. Secondly, the right to terminate with immediate 
effect has been widely used - as has been said - without 
any protest at least form States making their declara­
tions for a fixed period or unconditionally. Thirdly, and 
this is the most important, the Court seems to have 
considered it as valid. In the RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER 
INDIAN TERRITORY case (preliminary objections) the Court 
refused to consider the Portuguese Third Condition, by
160
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which Portugal reserved the right to modify its declara­
tion by excluding categories of disputes at any time, as 
being worse than the reservation in India's declaration, 
i.e. the right to terminate at any time, though India 
argued that the Third Condition was incompatible with the 
object and the purpose of the Optional Clause and hence
invalid, and that it created such uncertainty as to the
162
reciprocal rights and obligations of the declarants.
The Court held that the Third Condition was valid in 
spite of the fact that it admitted that "clauses such as 
the Third Condition bring about a degree of uncertainty 
as to the future action of the accepting Governments". It 
added that the uncertainty created by Portugal's condi­
tion was substantially the same as that created by cer­
tain States, including India, whose declaration was
terminable immediately. There was "no essential dif­
ference, with regard to the degree of uncertainty", the
Court Said. 16"'
Thus, the Court rejected all the grounds on which 
the reservation of the right to denounce a declaration 
have been opposed. In fact, both conditions have the same 
effect. A State whose declaration contains a condition to 
modify at any time can escape being sued, as can the 
State whose declaration is terminable upon notice, before 
the Court if the declaration was modified or terminated 
before the seisin.
As to the uncertainty, as a common factor to both 
conditions, the Court held that it is "inherent in the 
operation of the system of the Optional Clause". The 
Court thus let prevail the unilateral character of a 
declaration over the bilateral engagement established 
under the compulsory jurisdiction system.
In the MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IE S  IN  AND 
AGAINST NICARAGUA case (jurisdiction and admissibility) 
the Court seems also to have confirmed the validity of 
the right to terminate on notice. It did not maintain
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expressly that such a condition Is valid, but it did not
deny that right, though the United States argued - as has 
165been seen - that its declaration was terminable at
any time and that a large number of declarations have 
been terminated by a mere notice. On the contrary the 
Court said that:
"... Since the United States purported to act on 6 April 
1984 in such a way as to modify its 1946 Declaration with 
sufficiently immediate effect to bar an application filed on 9 
April 1984, it would be necessary, if reciprocity is to be 
relied on, for the NICARAGUA DECLARATION TO BE TERMINABLE NITH 
IMMEDIATE E FFECT", 166
The Court referred also to its statement in the 
NUCLEQR TESTS case that:
"When it is the intention of the State making the decla­
ration that it should become BOUND ACCORDING TO ITS TER MS, 
that intention confers on the declaration the character of a 
legal undertaking, the State being henceforth legally required
to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declara- 
•. „ 167
tion."
Although this statement was made with regard to 
unilateral declarations in general, its quotation while 
considering the nature of declarations made under Article 
36 (2) is, perhaps, of significance.
It is regrettable that the Court did not declare 
the invalidity of either the reservation of the right to 
terminate on notice and the Portuguese Third Condition, 
when the number of declarations containing them was 
comparatively small. It is regrettable also that the 
number of declarations containing the former has increas­
ed, though the majority of these declarations have never
been terminated or modified, and some have not been
168subject to modification or termination for a long time.
In the light of the examples of termination mentioned 
above, and the possibility offered to other States to 
follow such actions, the pretence by which States purport
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to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court while 
running very little risk in accepting it in any case in 
which they wish to avoid being made a respondent is, 
therefore, a throwback to the era before the League of 
Nations in which elastic reservations of vital interests
and national honour, unilaterally determined, were in—
1 A 9
serted.
(ii) Solutions
If the Court's statement that uncertainty is in­
herent in the Optional Clause is accepted, and if the 
above interpretation that the reservation of the right to 
terminate on notice is valid according to the Court's 
jurisprudence is correct, there would seem to be no 
solution to the imbalance between States parties to the 
compulsory jurisdiction system, except either to modify 
Article 36 in such a way as to forbid this form complete­
ly, or to have declarations for fixed period or uncondi­
tionally modified.
Although the modification of the Statute seems 
difficult in the prevailing circumstances and might not 
acquire the necessary votes owing not to the possible 
opposition of States making it, but mainly due to the 
opposition of States not parties to the compulsory juris­
diction system, a minor change requiring the suppression
i ~7rj
of this possibility might be adopted.
Concerning the modification of States' declara­
tions, it may be suggested that declarations which are 
not terminable upon notice should be modified as to 
include a clause providing for that the Court's compul­
sory jurisdiction is accepted only in relation to States 
whose declarations are terminable after the expiration of 
a given period notice, say for example 12 month notice. 
However such a suggestion would turn out to be draconian 
in its effect, because it would exclude the majority of
171
States accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.
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It is also suggested to stipulate that "no notice
of withdrawal will be effective if given sooner than six
months after the occurrence of the events that give rise
172to the cause of action". This suggestion seems also
far from being a cure to the problem of "hit-and-run". 
Because, firstly it would create another reservation 
RfiTIQNE TEMPORIS putting another burden on the Court for 
determining the critical date - as wi11 be seen -, and 
secondly, if it would allow the respondent to sue the 
plaintiff States for another case, since the respondent 
can make a counterclaim against the plaintiff arising out 
of the litigation instituted by the latter, even if it 
has withdrawn its acceptance of jurisdiction, it may not 
achieve the same purpose in the relations between that 
State and the declarant. For, a dispute may take a long 
time before being brought to the knowledge of other 
States and hence they may know after the lapse of the 
period of six months.
It appears, therefore, as D 1Amato points out, that
the above solutions to the hit-and-run problem are cures
17?.worse than the disease.
A radical solution to the problem was proposed by
the Institute of International Law in its resolution of 
174
1959. After a long discussion on time-limits condi­
tions it was proposed at one time to require that the
175declarations must be made for an indefinite period.
The members of the Committee entrusted with making a 
report on obligatory jurisdiction did not agree upon that 
solution, but they agreed to eliminate totally the for­
mula of termination on notice as a progressive step for 
the substitution of the principle of obligatory jurisdic­
tion for the principle of voluntary jurisdiction. Owing 
to the belief that it was impossible to obtain the neces­
sary votes required for the amendment of the Statute, 176 
and the desire to maintain the declarations made before 
it was agreed to draw the attention to the incompatibil­
ity of such a reservation with Article 36 (3). i7/ The
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solution which was envisaged was that declarations should 
he for a fixed period of no less than five years renew­
able tacitly for the same period, unless notification of
denunciation was given not less than 12 months before the
178expiration of any such period.
However, a solution based on the last requirement 
alone, i.e. a declaration for indefinite period subject 
to one year's notice of denunciation seems to be suffi­
cient, if not better. For, while it would suppress the 
surprise element - or the "single shot" problem, it may 
encourage States not familiar with the system to adhere 
since they are not required to make their declarations 
for a long period.
A further solution has sometimes been envisaged in 
the application of reciprocity to time-limit conditions. 
Which is the subject of the next point.
D - INAPPLICABILITY OF RECIPROCITY
The application of reciprocity to time-limits as a 
solution to the imbalance created by the condition to 
denounce on notice, was suggested for the first time by 
Professor Waldock. In regard to the time factor, recipro­
city does not mean only that the duration of the mutual 
obligations - the juridical bond - between any two States 
under the Optional Clause is limited to the joint period 
during which both declarations are in force, but
"there is ... another aspect of reciprocity in regard to 
time-limits ... Reciprocity would seem to demand that in any 
given pairs of States each should have the same right as the 
other to terminate the juridical bond existing between them 
under the Optional Clause ... It is one thing to hold that a 
unilateral declaration made without time-limit binds a State 
concerned indefinitely toward other States which have made 
similar declarations. It is quite another thing to hold that 
such a unilateral declaration is binding indefinitely towards 
other States which have not undertaken the same commitment.
The inequality in the position of the two States under the 
Optional Clause., if the principle of reciprocity is not ap­
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plied to time-limits, becomes absolutely inadmissible when a 
State A's declaration is without time-limit while that of 
State B is immediately terminable on notice to the Secretary- 
General . It would be intolerable that State B should always be 
able , merely by giving notice, to terminate at any moment its 
liability to compulsory jurisdiction vis-a-vis State A, whilst 
the latter remained perpetually bound to submit to the Court's 
jurisdiction at the suit of State B."
Accordingly, Norway was able to deprive the Court 
of jurisdiction in the QN&LQ—NQRHE&IfiN FISHERIES case, if 
it had terminated its declaration which was made for a 
period of ten years, on the basis of reciprocity, since 
the declaration of the United Kingdom was terminable on 
notice, he observed. As to the question whether such 
termination would be vis-a-vis all States whose declara­
tions are terminable on notice, or only vis-a-vis the 
State party to the dispute, he believed that it would be 
vis-a-vis the latter only because the relations establis­
hed between States under Article 36 (2) are of a bilate-
180ral rather than multilateral character. ' He carried 
the argument further, so as to apply reciprocity, even in 
the ordinary case between a State whose declaration is 
for a fixed period and the State whose declaration is 
without limit. Since the former may choose at the end of 
the period of its declaration whether to renew or ter­
minate its obligations towards the State whose declara­
tion is without limit, the latter "may reasonably contend 
that, it also is entitled at the end of the period to 
choose whether or not to continue its particular obliga­
tion towards" the former. He concluded that "the Court 
must hold that under the Optional Clause each State, with 
respect to any other State, has the same right to ter­
minate its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction as is
■ 181possessed by that other State".
Assuming that Waldock's view is correct, the ques­
tion is how can it be applied in practice? Leaving aside 
for a while the application of reciprocity between States 
whose declarations are terminable on notice and the other 
States, and without entering into detail in regard to the
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complications that may be created by the application of 
reciprocity between the category of States A, whose 
declarations are for a fixed period, and that of States 
B, the declarations of which are without time-limit, in 
determining which State amongst the latter has relied on 
reciprocity and which has not (bearing in mind that 
Waldock did not explain whether the termination of the 
declaration of a State B towards a State A needs an 
express declaration or notification of termination, or 
that State can claim later before the Court that its 
declaration was terminated at the time when the plaintiff 
renewed its declaration), it may be asked what is the 
purpose of applying reciprocity between those States? If 
State A terminates its declaration towards State B, the 
latter cannot be sued by the former any more before the 
Court. Moreover, there is no escape clause in that case, 
since State B knew the exact date on which the declara­
tion of State A was terminable, and it could, therefore, 
have shaped its course of action accordingly.
However, the question is settled by the Court - as 
189already mentioned - by the application of the re­
quirement of a reasonable time for the termination of 
declarations made unconditionally. In other words, such 
declarations are no longer indefinitely.
The application of reciprocity between States A and 
B on the one hand, and State C whose declaration is 
terminable by a simple notice, on the other hand, seems 
to add to the complication of the compulsory jurisdiction 
system. It is to be observed firstly, that Waldock's view 
seems to contradict the rule in the NOTTEBOHM case, that 
once the Court has been regularly seised in the subse­
quent termination of a declaration by notice or expiry is
18"^irrelevant on the case before the Court. What he was 
arguing for is the application of the other aspect of 
reciprocity - as he termed it - namely, before the seis­
in. To apply reciprocity before the seisin means simply 
to give State A or B the right to terminate their declar­
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ation towards State C not only because State C may ter­
minate its declaration, but also because State A or B 
wants to avoid being brought before the Court. It is, 
perhaps, clear now that the cure proposed against the 
disease of the "gross inequality" could turn out to be a 
cause for the wide spread of the disease. In other words, 
the application of reciprocity in this context could have 
the effect of destroying what has been left by the in­
clusion of the condition to terminate by a simple notice, 
and render the compulsory jurisdiction system a mere form 
according to which dispute can be brought before the 
Court except by the consent of both parties, i.e. nul­
lifying the effect of paragraph 2, except in the rela­
tions between States A and B, which have not escaped the
1 • 4- - 4T 4.V. - 184complication of this view.
THE RIGHT OF PQSSA&E OVER INDIfiN TERRITORY case 
(preliminary objections) gave Waldock an opportunity to 
develop his view. In this case he argued on behalf of 
India that reciprocity should operate even prior to the 
deposit of an application before the Court so as to 
establish an equivalence of reservations and conditions 
between any pair of States accepting the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court. Accordingly, India had the 
right to rely on the Portuguese Third Condition to modify 
its declaration at any time during its validity by a 
simple notification to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations. Thus, he considered as unfounded the 
Portuguese argument that according to Article 36 (2) of 
the Statute, reciprocity "is only concerned with the
extent of the obligations of the two states at any time
185when the case is brought before the Court". The
condition of reciprocity provided in the Statute "was 
clearly intended to be a general and continuing reciproc­
ity governing the relations between the two States from 
the date of the establishment of the juridical bond 
between them until the date of its termination by the 
Declaration of one of them.", he argued. He rejected the 
Portuguese argument that by claiming to extend the scope
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of reciprocity to the measures that the States concerned 
might make before the institution of proceedings India 
distorted the system of compulsory jurisdiction. 186
As to these agreements the Court said:
"As Declarations, and their durations, made under Article 
36 must be deposited with the Secretary-General, it -followed 
that, MHEM A COSE is SUBMITTED TO THE C O U R T, it is always 
possible to ascertain what are, OT THOT M O M E N T, the reciprocal 
obligations of the Parties in accordance with their respective 
Declarations". 1
For these reasons, perhaps, Waldock's view has not
188gained acceptance in the doctrine. The general view
189is that reciprocity does not operate as to time-limits.
However, the Court's judgment in the MILITARY AND 
PARAMILITARY A CT IV IT IE S  IN  AND AGAINST NICARAGUA case 
(jurisdiction and admissibility) is explicit on the point 
and clears the air. Here the United States contended, as 
summarised by the Court, that:
"The principles o-f reciprocity, mutuality and equality of
States before the Court permit the United States to exercise
the right of termination with the immediate effect implicitly
enjoyed by Nicaragua, reqardless of the six months7 notice
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proviso in the United States declaration."
In rejecting this argument the Court said:
"the notion of reciprocity is concerned with the scope 
and substance of the commitment entered into including reser­
vations, and not with the^formal conditions of their creation, 
duration or extinction."
Reaffirming its jurisprudence in the RIGHT OF 
PASSAGE case, as cited above, that the critical date for 
the establishment of "the same obligation" is "the moment 
of the filing of the application", the Court added:
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possibility that, prior to that moment, the one 
wider right to modify its obligation^ than did the 
without incidence on the question."
In this case, Waldock's view was revived not only
because the United States relied on it in its arguments,
193but also two judges referred to it directly and one
194judge relied on it indirectly.
Judge Jennings pointed out that the idea of apply- 
procity before the seisin rather than after or at 
s not free from difficulty and would be something 
nnovation. For in ascertaining whether the Court 
sdiction, three factors must be taken into con­
sideration: "the terms of the declarations of the two
States concerned", and "the terms of the application" in 
the case.
"It is the latter which makes practicable the search -for 
coincidence between the twD declarations, and makes it prac­
ticable because the necessary coincidence is limited to coin­
cidence in respect of the subject matter of the application".
Therefore, he thought that "it is almost an im­
plication of this dictum that it is not possible to make
that ascertainment other than at the moment when a case
195is submitted to the Court".
Judge Oda's view is not clear on whether or not
reciprocity would be applied to time-limits. After asking
whether it was reasonable or equitable to allow a State 
as a respondent to escape at any time from the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction and to take advantage as an 
applicant by imposing upon the other party the burden of 
inescapability, which it did not bear, he concluded that 
"the reciprocity of the obligation must exist at the date 
of the seised of the case, and acceptance of the Court's 
jurisdiction by the Applicant and the Respondent must be 
current at that date". Thus the United States was, in his 
view, fully exempted from the Court's jurisdiction in 
relation to Nicaragua on the date of Nicaragua's applica-
m g  reci 
seisin 
of an 
has juri
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tion, because the latter was not in a position to invoke 
the obligation which it did not bear and which the United 
States had borne.
He predicted that his interpretation may be critic­
ised as an attempt nullify the original intention of the 
Optional Clause, but he found the answer to such a cri­
ticism in the development of State practice especially 
since 1945, namely, the compulsory jurisdiction has not 
been substituted for the Optional Clause as it was hoped 
for in 1945; the majority of States have not accepted the 
Court's compulsory jurisdiction, and amongst States 
accepting it only a small number impose upon themselves 
the obligation not to escape from the compulsory juris­
diction of the Court in the face of being brought before
, , ^ , 196the Court.
Certainly no one can deny that these points are 
regrettable facts. Yet is it the condition of the right 
to terminate on notice that has been the cause for such a 
situation? Did any State amongst those which have imposed 
upon themselves the obligation not to escape, pretend 
before that case that its declaration was terminable by a 
simple notice? As has been said El Salvador is the only 
State which had modified its declaration before that
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judgment and according to the rule REBUS SIC STfiNTIBUS. 
Furthermore the declarations of these States are now ter­
minable either by the expiry of the period notice set for 
in these declarations or after a reasonable time which in 
any event does not exceed 12 months, but they have not 
been terminated so far. The modification of Honduras' 
declaration is the only exception. Thus the view that 
"the Court should not close its eyes to practice and 
experience over the last 40 years" seems to be an exag­
geration.
Judge Mosler found in the requirement of Article 36
(2) that the consensual bond exists only between States 
accepting the same obligation" a basis for applying
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reciprocity in regard to time-limits. It must, in his 
view, be applied to both types of qualifications which 
are permitted to be included in the declarations. He said 
that:
"Reservations restrict the substantive extent of the obli­
gation, time-limits put an end to the obligation, whether made 
with or without substantive limitations, in its entirety, It 
is difficult to see how the 7 same obligation7 within the 
meaning of Article 36, paragraph 2, can continue to exist 
longer for one State than for its potential counterpart whose 
declaration is limited by a shorter notice^geriod, or may be 
terminated by notification at any moment".
Judge Mosler, then, seems not to share the general
view that the expression "the same obligation" does not
199require that declarations need not be identical. It
is true that according to the Court's ruling in the RIGHT 
OF PASSAGE case repeated in the MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY 
A CTIV IT IES case that the expression the "same objection"
"means no more than that, as between States adhering to 
the Optional Clause, each and all of them are bound by such 
IDENTICAL OBLIGATIONS as ma^ exist at any time during which 
the acceptance is binding."
However this statement was made with regard to 
reservations as distinguished from conditions. Also, it 
means no more than that however the declarations of the 
parties to the dispute before the Court differ in their 
scope by the inclusion of different reservations, the 
common ground or "identical obligations" are ascertaina­
ble at the time of the seisin. Moreover, how can it be 
denied that the declarations involved in that case, 
having been made according to the latter and spirit of 
Article 36 (3), did not meet the requirement of the same
obligation?
In arguing for the application of reciprocity to 
time-limits Judge Schwebel advanced four reasons. First­
ly, he relied on the mutuality and the sovereign equality 
of States before the law and the Court. This seems to be
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inspired from Waldock's view quoted by Schwebel in his 
fourth reason. These arguments have already been dis­
cussed above. As a second reason, he pointed out that 
"the Court has more than once entertained arguments about 
the application of reciprocity RATIONE TEMPORIS. It has 
never held that reciprocity does not apply to temporal 
conditions. ON THE CONTRARY both opposing States in these 
cases and the Court appear to ave assumed that it did or 
might". Then, he mentioned the PHOSPHATES IN  MOROCCO, the 
ANGLO—I  RAN I  AN OIL COMPANY and the RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER 
INDIAN TERRITORY cases, in addition to Helmut Stein- 
berger's view. Finally he stated in the third argument 
that "the United States, in drafting its declaration of 
14 August 1946, made it clear that it did not regard the
safeguard of reciprocity as applying to temporal condi-
4. • 2 0 1tions .
It is to be observed that there is no indication 
whatsoever in any of the cases referred to from which it 
could be deduced that the Court intended to extend the 
scope of reciprocity as to cover time-limits as distin­
guished from RATIONE TEMPORIS reservations. On the con— 
trary the Court refused, as already mentioned, in the 
RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER INDIAN TERRITORY case to apply 
reciprocity to the PORTUGUESE THIRD CONDITION„ Helmut 
Steinberger also does not say that reciprocity applies to 
time-limit conditions. In the passage quoted by Judge 
Schwebel himself, Steinberger says:
"The Court in several cases has confirmed the wide opera­
tional scope of the condition of reciprocity and stated the 
jurisdiction under the Optional Clause is conferred on the 
Court 7only to the extent to which the two declarations coin­
cide in conferring it7. THAT GOES FOR THE JURISDICTION RATINE 
TEMPORIS AS NELL AS FOR THE JURISDICTION RATINE M A T E R I A 2U3
It appears thus, that Judge Schwebel overlooked the 
difference between reservations RATIONE TEMPORIS and 
time-limit conditions. This is supported by his third 
reason. In fact, the United States did not regard the
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safeguard of reciprocity as to temporal conditions, but 
an example was given bow reciprocity applies to RATIONE 
TEMPORIS RESERVATIONS . The passage quoted by Judge Schwe­
bel himself from the Senate Report reads:
"Any limitation imposed by a State in its grant o-f juris­
diction thereby also becomes available to any other State with 
which it might become involved in proceedings, even though the 
second State has not specifically imposed the limitation.
Thus, for; example, if the United States limited its grant of 
jurisdiction to cases ’THEREAFTER ARISING* his country would 
be unable to institute proceedings regarding earlier disputes,
even though the defendant State might not have interposed this
4.- 204reservation.
The conclusion to be drawn from what has been said 
is that reciprocity cannot be applied with regard to 
time-limits whether before or at the seisin, and the 
solution to the problem created by the condition to 
terminate at any time lies in the elimination of the
205condition according to the suggestion discussed above, 
if States are genuinely interested in promoting the rule 
of law in international relations through the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.
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SECTION 2 : VARIATION OF DECLARATIONS
(THE PORTUGUESE THIRD CONDITION)
In 1955 Portugal accepted the compulsory jurisdic­
tion of the Court subject to three reservations and
conditions the third of which constituted a complete 
innovation. By virtue of this condition Portugal reserved 
"the right to exclude from the scope of [its] declara­
tion, at any time during its validity, any given category 
or categories of disputes, by notifying the Secretary-
General of the United Nations and with effect from the
*?0£>
moment of such notification." The Portuguese reliance
on its declaration in the RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER INDIAN
207TERRITORY case. ' Three days after its deposit with the
9,-)Q
Secretary-General of the United Nations gave the
Court an opportunity to examine this condition from all
209
angles. This case was thus significant for many
reasons. Firstly it was the first case in which the Court
made a distinction between reservations and conditions
with the effect of limiting the application of reciproc­
ity only to the former. Secondly, the meaning of the 
requirement of accepting "the same obligation" provided 
for in Article 36 (2) of the Statute was explained for
the first time in this case. Thirdly, it was the first 
case in which the validity of a condition or reservation 
inserted in a declaration of acceptance was invoked. The
9 1  f)
two first points are discussed elsewhere. " Reference
?11
to the third point has also been made. However, the 
way in which the court handled the Indian challenge to 
the validity of this condition and its importance as a 
criterion for the permissibility of making reservations 
might require an extensive consideration.
In its first preliminary objection India argues 
that the Portuguese Third Condition was invalid and 
entailed the invalidity of the whole declaration because 
of its incompatibility with the object and purpose of the 
compulsory jurisdiction system. Therefore, Portugal did 
not accept at all the Court's jurisdiction under Article
134
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36 (2) of the Statute. “ Three reasons were invoked for 
such incompatibility.
Firstly, it was maintained that the Third Condition
was open to the interpretation that Portugal reserved to
itself the right to exclude from its declaration any
dispute at any time, even a dispute in respect of which
proceedings had already been instituted before the Court.
The retroactive effect of this condition ran against the
21^ .principle and notion of compulsory jurisdiction.
Secondly, India argued that States party to the
compulsory jurisdiction system were entitled to expect a 
reasonable degree of certainty in regard to the oblig­
ation imposed upon them by the declarations of other 
States. However the Portuguese Third Condition had intro­
duced into the declaration of the interested State a 
degree of uncertainty as to the reciprocal rights and 
obligations under Article 36 (2). It, thus, put the
parties to the compulsory jurisdiction system in a con­
tinuous state of uncertainty as to their rights and 
obligations which might change from day to day. This
state of uncertainty rendered the declarant's acceptance
914
of compulsory jurisdiction illusory. Furthermore,
there would be and inevitable time-lag between a modific­
ation to the obligation made pursuant to this condition 
and the receipt of other States of notice of that modi­
fication. During that interval the interested States 
would have a quite different understanding as to the
categories of disputes accepted under Article 36 (2) of 
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the Statute. It was erroneous to compare the reserva­
tion of the right to vary the scope of the declaration by 
giving notice and the right to terminate the whole decla­
ration on immediate notice, India argued. For, in case of 
total termination the interested State can neither sue 
nor be sued. In contrast, in the case of the Third Condi­
tion it could protect itself against any inconvenient 
categories of disputes which might be brought by other 
States while at the same time it could maintain its claim
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to sue other States in respect of other categories of
, . , 216 disputes.
The third reason advanced for the invalidity of the 
Portuguese Third Condition was that it offended against 
the basic principle of reciprocity underlying the compul­
sory jurisdiction system inasmuch as it conferred on 
Portugal a right which was denied to other States which 
did not make such a condition.
Portugal, on the other hand, denied that its Third 
Condition was intended to have such an effect. It main­
tained its view expressed in its communication to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations after the Swedish
challenge to the validity of its declaration because of
 ^18the Third Condition, " that this condition was not
capable of divesting the Court of jurisdiction retrospec-
219tively. It argued also that there was no uncertainty
with regard to the reciprocal obligations of the parties 
at the time of submission of a case to the Court. Cer­
tainly the Third condition was capable of creating some 
uncertainty during the interval between a modification to 
the obligation and the receipt of other States of notice 
to that notification. However this uncertainty was simi­
lar to that created by the termination of a declaration 
by a simple notification without any obligatory period of 
notice. In the latter case the interested State could 
denounce its declaration and immediately make a fresh one 
excluding certain disputes. Legally such an act might be 
considered an operation of two parts. In contrast practi­
cally it was a simple act, because, the two parts could 
be made simultaneously by the same act of notification to 
the Secretary-General as did India when it terminated on 
February 7, 1956 its previous declaration and deposited a 
new one which was more restrictive. ' ' Thus Portugal 
claimed that the power to terminate the entire declara­
tion was a greater derogation from the compulsory juris­
diction system than a power merely to restrict its scope. 
Why should the lesser power have been inadmissible if the
136
221greater was permissible, it was asked?
Portugal argued also that India misunderstood the 
operation of reciprocity. For it did not claim the bene­
fit of any modification introduced under the Third Condi­
tion, but the right to modify its declaration even when 
Portugal did not exercise such a right. Thus, Por­
tugal maintained that its Third Condition was valid since 
it did not violate any provision of the Statute of the 
Court. Furthermore, it argued that even if its Third 
Condition were invalid, it did not follow automatically 
that its entire declaration was invalid. For, the nullity 
of a clause would nullify the entire act in which it was 
inserted only when that clause did constitute an essen­
tial element of the act, an element which cannot be 
isolated without prejudice to the will of hhe interested
n n T
State. India had, therefore, to prove that the Por­
tuguese Third Condition did constitute an "impulsive and
determinant clause" for the Portuguese decision to accept
994
the Court's jurisdiction. Its Third Condition did not 
constitute an essential part of the declaration, Portugal 
maintained. The only consequence which could be drawn 
from the nullity of the Third Condition was therefore to
n n c
consider that condition as unwritten.
The Court followed generally the Portuguese reason­
ing. It found that the validity of the Portuguese Third 
Condition and its effect on the entire declaration depen­
ded very much on the meaning of this condition which must 
be determined according to the "actual wording" of the 
condition and "applicable principles of law". ^  Conse­
quently, relying on the ordinary sense of the words "with 
effect from the moment of such notification", the Court 
held that these words meant simply that a notification 
under the Third Condition would apply only to a dispute 
referred to the Court after the date of the notification. 
No retroactive effect would properly be imputed to notif­
ication made under this condition. The Portuguese Third 
Condition did not, therefore, run against the NOTTEBQHM
137
rule ^  which "must be deemed to apply both to total 
denunciation and to partial denunciation as contemplated
990
in the Third Portuguese Condition", the Court said.
The Court admitted that such a condition brought about a 
degree of uncertainty as to the future action of the 
accepting State especially during the interval between 
the date of a notification to the Secretary-General and 
its receipt by the parties to the Statute. However this 
uncertainty did not differ in any way from that created 
by a total denunciation of a declaration immediately 
terminable by notice to the Secretary-General. The uncer­
tainty created by both forms "is inherent in the opera­
tion of the system of the Optional Clause and does not
affect the validity of the Third Condition contained in
229the Portuguese declaration".
As to the effect of the Third Condition on the 
basic principle of reciprocity, the Court declined to 
share the view that this condition offended against that 
principle. For any new reservation introduced under this 
condition would operate automatically against the reserv­
ing State. Nor did the Court accept the view that the
Third Condition affected the requirement of accepting the
same obligation because this expression meant no more 
than that the obligations of the parties to a dispute
must be identical at any time during which the acceptance
27,0
is mutually binding.
Having found that the Portuguese Third Condition 
was not inconsistent with the Statute, the Court did not
consider the effect of the invalidity of a reservation on
2^ 1the validity of a declaration as a whole.
As a consequence of this holding the Portuguese
third Condition has been widely adopted. It figures now
in fifteen other declarations two of which are limi­
ted to the special question of dispute settlement in the 
law of the sea. Of those fifteen declarations only
those of El Salvador and Honduras do not expressly state
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that any future reservation is to have effect only from
the date on which it is notified to the Secretary-Gener-
234al. " The declaration of El Salvador provides simply 
that El Salvador is "able at any time to modify, add, 
clarify, or derogate from the exceptions presented in 
it". However, this declaration must be interpreted as 
to exclude any retrospective effect. For, any attempt to 
give a retrospective effect to new reservations intro­
duced under this condition would violate the NOTTEBOBM
rule and must be regarded as incompatible with the Statu-
. 236te.
The question of the difference between the reserva­
tion of the right to denounce the whole declaration and 
the right to vary it has lost significance in most decla­
rations since both rights are simultaneously reserved. 
The declaration of El Salvador is the only one, amongst
those which contain this condition, which is made for a
237
fixed period. " Two other declarations are now ter­
minable on the expiration of six months after notice has
r,38been given of termination. The declarations of Botsw­
ana, Malawi and Senegal are with no provision on termina-
239
tion. There is, however, a difference between a total
termination of a declaration and a modification made
pursuant to the condition in question. Whereas in the
latter case the same declaration continues to produce its
effect, the replacement of the previous declaration in
the former case is to be considered as a new acceptance
independent of the previous. This difference might be of
critical importance for determining the consensual bond
between a State which has modified or terminated its
declaration and a State excluding disputes with any other
State whose declaration was deposited or ratified less
than twelve months previous to the filing of the applica­
n t" )
tion bringing the dispute before the Court.  ^ ' Thus, 
whereas a State which has modified its declaration con­
tinues to be a State accepting the same obligation vis-a- 
vis the State making the latter reservation, the total 
termination of a declaration and the deposit of a new one
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will prevent the interested State from suing that State
and VICE VERSA before the expiration of 12 months after
241the entry into force of the new declaration.
In practice however, and in spite of its populari­
ty, the Third condition was used only once. On December 
2, 1985 Senegal modified its declaration which was made 
eight months previously for the purpose of adding a 
RATIONE TEMPORIS reservation. However this should not 
undermine the possible draconic effect of the Third 
Condition on the compulsory jurisdiction system. It is in
24-T
fact capable - as the Court observed  ^" - of producing 
the same effect as the condition to terminate a declara­
tion on immediate notice. It is therefore open to exactly
244the same objections put forward against the latter.
In an era "of instantaneous communication and elaborate 
intelligence - gathering networks, advanced knowledge of 
the preparation of an application", they are both capable 
of turning the compulsory jurisdiction system into one in
which States decide on a case-by-case basis whether to
94s
subject themselves to the Court's jurisdiction.
However, the conclusion to be drawn from the Cour­
t's treatment to the Third Condition is that the incon­
sistency of a condition or reservation with the Statute 
of the Court would lead to the invalidity of such a 
condition or reservation.
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CHAPTER I I I
RESERVATIONS RATX PISTE
TEMP OR I S ARTO PERSONAE
SECTION 1 .- RESERVATIONS RATIONE TEMPORIS
The material scope of the jurisdiction conferred on 
the Court has been limited by the inclusion of RQT1QNE
TEMPORIS reservations in the declarations of a large
number of States subscribing to the compulsory jurisdic­
tion. This reservation has been used in many forms and 
has given rise to complicated problems of interpretation.
A - FORMS OF THE RESERVATION
(I) The Simple Formula
The restriction of the obligation assumed under
Article 36 (2) to disputes arising after a particular
date was one of the first reservations to be incorporated 
in declarations made under this Article. It was made for 
the first time by the Netherlands in its declaration of 
1921. This declaration was limited to future disputes. 
The reservation was then copied by 4 other States during
9
the period of the P. C. I. J . Of the 46 declarations 
currently in force, 8 declarations contain this reserva­
tion. These declarations vary a great deal as to the 
terms of the reservation. The declaration of the Nether­
lands covers disputes "arising or which arise after 5 
August 1921 (the date of its first declaration); that of 
Pakistan is limited to "legal disputes arising after 24 
June 1948, and that of Egypt is limited to disputes
concerning the interpretation or applicability of the
Constantinople Convention of 1888 arising after April 24, 
1957. The exclusion date in Liberia's declaration is 
determinable according to an objective element, namely 
the date of the declaration (April 17, 1953). The other
declarations are made in regard to disputes arising "in
• 4 S
the future"; "hereafter", " "after the declaration is
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6 7made", or finally "after the present declaration".
The last category of declarations, except that of Senegal
in which the date of signature coincides with the date of
deposit with the Secretary-General,- may give rise to a
problem of interpretation concerning the determination of
the exclusion date. Is it the date of signature of these
8declarations or the date of their entry into force? A 
literal interpretation may support the date of signature 
as the exclusive date since it was the only date in the 
declaration before its deposit. This interpretation may 
also prevail in case of dispute if the intention of the
declarant is taken into consideration, as did the Court
in interpreting the reservation RATIONE TEMPORIS, as will 
be seen. In practice almost all States which maintained 
the date of the previous declaration referred to the date 
of deposit, as will be seen in the next forms, but the 
reference to a previous date or the date of signature has
9
also been made. In fact the short interval between the 
date of signature and the date of deposit U makes it 
unlikely that any problem would arise in the determina­
tion of the exclusive date especially since most of the 
reservations were made a long time ago.
However, according to this form, the Court is 
required only to determine the date of the dispute. Yet 
this is not as simple as it may seem. The problem en­
countered by the Court in the INTERHANBEL case - as will
be seen - bears witness to this. 11
(II) The Double Formula
Four declarations currently in force limit the 
Court's jurisdiction to disputes concerning situations or
19
facts which may arise subsequent to the exclusion date, 
one of which contains only the word "fact" instead of 
"facts and situations". This form dates in time after 
the next form.
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(III) The Complex Double Formula
In accepting the jurisdiction of the P. C. I. J. in 
1925 Belgium marked the starting point of this form. Its 
declaration excluded disputes arising after the ratifica­
tion of the present declaration with regard to "situa-
14tions or facts subsequent to the ratification". Thus,
if the previous form appears to stipulate that only the
facts and the situations giving rise to the dispute must
be subsequent to the exclusion date, this form stipulates
clearly that both the dispute and the facts or situations
giving rise to it must be subsequent to the exclusion
date. In practice, however, there is no difference bet-
15ween these forms. For it is difficult to imagine that 
a dispute would arise prior to the exclusion date whereas 
the facts and situation from which it arose would be 
subsequent to that date. Furthermore the jurisprudence of 
the Court concerning the reservation RGTIQNE TEMPORIS 
shows - as will be seen - that the Court has always 
divided the reservation into two parts: the determination
of the date on which the dispute arose, and the date of
1 6the facts and situation which gave rise to it.
However, this form can be found in the declarations 
of Belgium, Canada, Japan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Mexico, 17 
Sudan and the United Kingdom.
(IV) The Most Comprehensive Formula
In its declaration of November 26, 1973, El Sal­
vador introduced an entirely new form. It excluded:
"pre-existing disputes, it being understood that this 
includes any disputes the -foundations., reasons, facts, causes, 
origins, definitions, allegations or bases of which existed 
prior to this date, even if they are submitted or brought to 
the knowledge of the Court hereafter".
Keeping in mind its failure to deprive the Court of 
jurisdiction in the Rl&R7 OF PfiSSfiSE case, India did not
156
hesitate to copy this form literally in its declaration
of 1974, with the exception that the words "disputes
prior to the date of this declaration" are substituted
for the words "pre-existing disputes". Although the
18
interpretation of this form - as Merrills observes -
is a matter of speculation in the absence of any pronoun­
cement from the Court, it may be said that this formula 
could have the effect of excluding a large number of
disputes, if there are still some not excluded.
In determining the exclusion date in the last three
forms a large variety of terms have been used. Seven
19declarations indicate clearly the exclusion date. In 
four declarations the exclusion date is that of their
entry into force, or the entry into force or the deposit
20of a previous declaration. ' The date of independence is 
the exclusion date in the declarations of Kenya and
Sudan, and the end of the Second World War is the ex­
clusion date in that of the United Kingdom. The date of
signature is the exclusion date in the declaration of
Luxembourg (September 15, 1930). The declarations of
India and Mexico provide that disputes prior to the date 
of "this declaration" are excluded. Whatever the inten­
tion of the last two States, the interval of 3 days 
between the date of signature and the deposit in the 
former, and 5 days in the latter exclude the possibility 
that any problem of interpretation would arise. The 
declarations of El Salvador and Japan use almost the same 
language with the difference that their date of signature 
and deposit are the same.
B - PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION
According to the last three formulae, the Court is 
not required only to ascertain the date on which the 
dispute arose and its relation to the exclusion date 
embodied in the declaration, but it has also to face the 
chronological development of events and causal relation­
ship between them, and the conflict of view expressed by
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the parties to the dispute, along with the ascertainment
of the link between these facts and situations and the
21exclusion date. Thus, Lautherpacht, in his discussion
of the complex double formula in the British declaration 
of 1929 termed it as an "elastic and comprehensive reser­
vation". For it is clear that the phrase "of situations 
and facts prior to the ratification" is vague and admitt­
ing of a variety of interpretations. An event given rise 
to a dispute may happen on a given date, but the essen­
tial facts relevant to and forming the background of the 
dispute may have happened many decades before, he ob-
On
served. Furthermore, he drew attention to the dif­
ficulties inherent in the reservation. To illustrate them 
he asked:
"Does the restriction to situations and facts prior 
to the ratification include the interpretation of treaties 
concluded before the ratified acceptance of the Optional 
Clause? ... When does a dispute arise? Does the verb refer to 
the time at which the injurious event occurs? Or to the time 
when the claim is first put forward through the appropriate 
channels? Or when the claim has been rejected and the parties 
have finally disagreed? Or raise another query, what does a 
situation prior to ratification mean? If legislation injuriou­
sly affecting aliens and alleged to be contrary to interna­
tional law has been passed prior to ratification, would the 
continued application of such legislation fall under the termsn_ 
of the reservation? One can easily multiply these questions,"
Some of these questions are still valid. The Court, 
for example, has not defined the notions "facts" and 
"situations". It observed in the first case in which the 
reservation RATIONS TEMPORIS was invoked before it that 
the determination of the existence of these notions 
depends on the specific circumstances of each case. It
might be true that they are "incapable of definition in
25abstract legal terms", " but what was sometimes termed 
by the Court as a "situation" has been challenged. In the 
RIGHT OF PASSAGE case (Merits), for example, the Court 
determined the "situation" as that of the "Portuguese 
enclaves within the territory of India which gave rise to 
the need for the Right of Passage for Portugal and its
claim to such a right." This qualification seemed to 
judge Badawi erroneous. He thought that the Court ar­
bitrarily ascribed to the notion situation a purely
geographical meaning, whereas that was only a factor in
27the situation. Nor did the Court interpret terms
embodied in declarations, such as "relating" to or "with 
regard to" or "arising out" of subsequent facts and 
situations. In the ELECTRICITY COMPANY OF SOFIA AND 
BULGARIA case judge AD HOC Papazoff did not concur with 
the Court reasoning in determining the critical date. He 
pointed out that the words "with regard to" were broader 
in scope than the words "arising out of". Consequently, 
he said that according to the former, "the essential 
point is that the past must not be called in question in 
any way". Thus, although the dispute arose after the 
exclusion date, the situation from which it arose existed
'ng
prior to that date in his view.
Moreover, the determination of the date of the 
dispute and its relation to the critical date requires 
that the general phrase "a disagreement on point of law 
or facts, a conflict of views of interests between two
*?9
persons" " as a classical definition of the dispute, be 
transferred into concrete terms. To go further, for 
determining these dates the Court must interpret the 
dispute itself. This task is not as easy as it might 
seem. The practice of the Court, as in the INTERHANBEL 
case, shows that the dispute could be looked at from 
different angles. As Rosenne explains in his exhaustive 
study of the problems to which the concept of dispute 
could give rise with regard to RATIONE TEMPORIS reserva­
tions, that in order to reach a correct interpretation of 
the dispute "the judges found themselves confronted with 
three issues. The first was to establish the relevant 
facts; the second to postulate the mutual relations of 
all the relevant factors of the dispute. The solution of 
these items itself constituted the preliminary to the 
third and final phase".
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In connection with the interpretation of the dis­
pute, two complicated problems should be settled: the 
determination of the subject of the dispute, and the 
distinction between it, the subject of the claim and the 
relief sought. This could be a very complicated task. The 
ELECTRICITY COMPANY OF SOFIA AND BULGARIA, the I  NTERHAN­
GEL and the RIGHT OF PASSAGE cases show how the opinion 
of the judges can be divided. In the first, judge Erich 
thought that the subject of the dispute was the acts of 
the Bulgarian authorities and not the formula established 
by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. In the second, judge 
Basdevant, though he concurred with the decision that the 
application was inadmissible, followed a different ap­
proach. He stated that he should direct his attention to
the subject of the dispute and not to any particular
“TO
claim put forward. Four other judges disagreed with
the Court's determination of the subject of the dispute. 
They believed that the core of the dispute was the chara­
cter of enemy or non-enemy status of the Interhandel and 
its assets. In the third case judge Chagla stated that
the real dispute was "with regard to the obligation of
India, not with regard to her violation of that obliga­
tion".
Whatever the difficulties raised by this reserva­
tion, it is objectively stated. Certainly it has the 
effect of complicating the task of the Court, but the 
latter has kept it within bounds and limited its scope in
many cases as wi11 be seen after the discussion of the
object of reservation.
C -  THE OBJECT OF THE RESERVATION
There is no doubt that the reservation RATIONE
TEMPORIS was inserted to counteract the retroactivity of
the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. It has been made
with a view to achieving distinct objectives. The first
is to exclude specific disputes with which the declarant
T*5State was concerned when it accepted the jurisdiction.
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Thus, the Insertion of the complex double formula for the 
first time in the Belgium declaration of 1925 was desig­
ned mainly to exclude its dispute with the Netherlands 
concerning the sovereignty over Wielingen. The second 
is to exclude a large number of categories of State 
disputes. Thus, it is said that the British declaration 
of 1930 was made with the intention of excluding "ter­
ritorial disputes and claims arising out of the opera­
tions of the British fleet and the application of Prize 
Law of Great Britain during the (First) World War". '~f/ 
This object was explained by the P. C. I. J. in the 
PHOSPHATES IN  MOROCCO case. It said that the reservation 
was :
"inserted with the object of depriving the acceptance 
of the compulsory jurisdiction of any retroactive effects, in 
order to avoid, in general a revival of the old disputes, and 
to preclude the possibility of the submission of the Court, by 
means of an application, of situations or facts dating from a 
period when the State whose action was impugned was not in a 
position to foresee the legal proceedings to which these acts 
and situation give rise."
The third objective is to preclude the possibility 
of the submission to the Court of disputes arising from a 
particular period of national history. This can be il­
lustrated by the choice of the date of independence as
the exclusion date in some declarations such as those of
19
Kenya, Sudan and Malawi. ‘ It is clear that these States 
intended to keep the complicated disputes concerning the 
colonial period out of the Court's compulsory jurisdic­
tion .
There is little doubt that the reservation,, espe­
cially in its three double exclusion formulae, is capable 
of achieving all these objectives, but the question is 
whether these objectives require such a broad reserva­
tion. As Lauterpecht pointed out, instead of referring EO 
NOMINE to the specific dispute or even to the categories 
of disputes, the draftsmen preferred the "more general 
GENUS PROXIMUM which necessarily goes beyond the object
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4<’)
of the limitations as originally intended.” ' Thus he 
described it, correctly, as "one on the face of it ar­
bitrary, and it saddles future governments with a duty 
which the government stipulating the reservation is not
willing to accept in respect of the acts of its predeces- 
41sors". Brierly expressed the same view. In commenting 
on the reservation made by the British government in 
adhering to the German Act of 1928, he said:
"Why we propose to lay on our successors in respect of 
disputes which we are bequeath to them, a procedure which we 
are unwilling to apply to the disputes which have been be­
queathed to us? Can the thought behind the reservation be that 
our predecessors have done certain questionable things which 
we should not care to defend, whereas, our own conduct is so 
exemplary that our successors have nothing to fear from ar­
bitration? The explanation seems to be too cynical to be
42
accepted; but is there any other?"
D - APPLICATION OF THE RESERVATION
Although the simple exclusion formula is histori­
cally the older, both the P. C. I. J. and the present 
Court faced jurisdictional objections relying on the
double formulas (including the complex one). It was
4?invoked before the P. C. I. J. in two cases: ~ The
PHOSPHATES IN  MOROCCO case and the ELECTRICITY COMPANY OF 
SOFIA AND BUL&ARIA case. In dealing with the reservation, 
the P. C. I. J. regarded its task as constituting of a 
determination of two consecutive dates: the date on which 
the dispute arose and the date of the facts or situations 
which gave rise to it. In the first case, the Court 
proceeded directly to the determination of the date of 
the facts and situation from which the dispute arose, 
because both parties agreed that the dispute arose after 
the crucial date, V IZ  f the date of the French acceptance 
(April 25, 1931). Italy, the plaintiff argued that the
monopolization of the Moroccan phosphates instituted by 
the DAHIRS of 1920 has established a monopoly contrary to
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international obligations. The regime, being still in 
operation, constituted, in its view, a situation subse­
quent to the crucial date, and that situation fell, 
therefore within the Court's jurisdiction. Furthermore, 
it invoked the notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of 1933 and 1934 in which it was pointed out that there 
was no appeal from the decision of the Mines Department 
of January 8, 1925, and accordingly no satisfaction was 
made. 44
Thus the Italian government contended that the 
dispute arose from facts subsequent to France's accep­
tance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction for three 
reasons: firstly, certain acts were accomplished after
the crucial date; secondly, these acts taken in conjunc­
tion with earlier acts "constitute as a whole a single, 
continuing and progressive illegal act which was not 
fully accomplished until after the crucial date", and 
thirdly, that act, having taken place prior to that date, 
"gave rise to a permanent situation inconsistent with 
international law which has continued to exist after the 
said date".
The Court relied on the terms included in the 
French declaration for determining the criterion of which 
facts and situations should be taken into account. It 
found that these terms were "PERFECTLY CLEAR". It said:
"The only situation or facts falling under compulsory 
jurisdiction, are those which are subsequent to the ratifica­
tion and with regard to which the dispute arose, that is to 
say, THOSE NHICH MUST BE CONSIDERED i)S BEING THE SOURCE OF THE 
DISPUTE."
In interpreting the two terms "facts" and "situa­
tions" the Court refused to resort to a restrictive 
interpretation as a means of enhancing the scope of its 
jurisdiction. Such an interpretation, it observed, may 
exceed the intention of the States making the reserva­
tion. For, they were inserted with the object of depriv—
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ing the acceptance of any retroactive effect and "to 
embrace in the most comprehensive expression possible, 
all the different factors capable of giving rise to a 
dispute". It continued that the facts, or situations:
"are placed in conjunction with one another, so that the 
limitation RftTIONE TEMPORIS is common to them both, and that 
the employment of one term on the other could not have the 
effect of excluding the compulsory jurisdiction".
This interpretation may be of significance because
Columbia's declaration applies only to disputes arising
out of "facts" subsequent to January 6, 1932 and the
Mexican declaration is limited to disputes arising out of
48"EVENTS" subsequent to the date of the declaration. 
Although the latter includes a different term, the above 
comprehensive interpretation seems to cover it.
By the application of the above criterion the Court 
found that the DAHIRS of 1920 and the decision of the 
Mines Department of 1925 were the essential facts which 
really gave rise to the dispute. Consequently, it found 
it impossible to admit that factors subsequent to the ex­
clusion date were sufficient to found jurisdiction if 
they merely presumed the existence of, or confirmed or
developed, prior situations or facts which constituted
49"the real cause of the dispute".
The Court rejected also the Italian argument con­
cerning the continuing and progressive unlawful action, 
which has only been completed by certain acts subsequent 
to the exclusion date, as well as the contention that the 
prior acts gave rise to the permanent situation inconsis­
tent with international law. The Court found that the 
ascertainment whether there was a denial of justice or 
not was not possible without calling in question the
50
decision of 1925, as a fact prior to the exclusion date.
By this ruling the Court, thus answered Lauter- 
pecht's question whether a continued application of the
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legislation alleged to be contrary to international law
51falls under the terms of the reservation.
In his dissenting opinion, judge Van Eysinga ob­
served that the "continuity and performance of unlawful 
acts certainly constitutes a situation". The Court was 
not, in his opinion, required to find "the causal facts 
of the dispute". A dispute "which arises with regard to 
situations subsequent to a given date" is something 
different from a dispute the causal facts of which are 
subsequent to that date, or from a dispute which arises 
from a situation subsequent to that date", he said. ** He 
observed also that the dispute meant by the French decla­
ration was a dispute between States and not for instance 
between Italian claimants and the Moroccan authorities. 
Consequently judge Eysinga thought that the dispute 
between Italy and France did not arise until the latter 
took up the case of its nationals, i.e. June 16, 1933.
Judge Cheng also was in favour of a restrictive 
interpretation of the terms "situations and facts". 
Firstly, he relied on the idea of continuity or progres- 
sivity of the wrongful. In his view the monopoly was 
still existing, although it was instituted by the 1920 
D M I R S . He said:
"It is an existing fact, or situation. It is wrongful. It 
is wrongful not merely in its creating, but in its continuance 
to the prejudice of those whose treaty rights are alleged to 
have been fringed, and this prejudice does not merely continue 
for an old existence but assumes a new existence every date".
Secondly, he looked at the phrase "situations or 
facts subsequent to this ratification" from a different 
angle. He thought that it did not mean quite the same 
thing as "situations or facts CREATED after the ratifica­
tion. Consequently a situation or fact existing after the
crucial date is no less a situation or fact subsequent,
55although it may have existed also before that date."
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In the ELECTRICITY COMPANY OF SOFIA AND BULGARIA 
case - Bulgaria, (the respondent), whose declaration was 
without reservation RATIONE TEMPORIS, relied on the
reservation embodied in the Bulgarian declaration ratif­
ied on March 10, 1926. In this case also the Court was
not obliged to determine the date on which the dispute 
arose, because the parties agreed that the dispute arose 
on June 14, 1937, i.e. after the exclusion date. Dif­
ferent facts were regarded by the parties as the source 
of the dispute. Whereas according to Bulgaria's view the 
dispute arose with regard to the situation created by the 
awards of the Mixed Tribunal of July 15, 1923 and May
27,1925 fixing the price per kilowatt hour of power 
distributed, Belgium argued that the decision of the 
State of Mines of November 24, 1934 and the judgment of
the Bulgarian Courts of 1936 and 1937 constituted the
57facts from which the dispute arose.
The Court rejected the Bulgarian view observing 
that a distinction must be made between the source of the 
right of the claimant company and the source of the 
dispute. The awards of the Mixed Tribunals, as the source 
of the right claimed, "did not give rise to the dispute,
since the parties agree as to their binding character and
58their application gave rise to no difficulty", the 
Court said.
The Court’s judgment in this case seems to narrow 
the scope of the criterion established in the previous 
case. After reaffirming the previous statement that the 
only situations or facts which must be taken into account 
are those which must be considered as being the source of 
the dispute, the Court observed:
"It is true that a dispute may presuppose the existence 
of some prior situation or fact, but it does not follow that 
the dispute arises with regard to that situation or fact. A 
situation or fact in regard to which a dispute is said to have 
arisen must be THE P,E0L CRUSE of the dispute".
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This dictum seems to substitute the criterion of 
the real cause for that of the source of the dispute. 60 
By its distinction between the source of right and the 
situations or facts as a source of the dispute, the Court 
answered Lauterpecht's question whether the reservation 
covers the interpretation of treaties concluded prior to 
the exclusion date.
The reservation RQTIONE TEMPORIS arose in a com­
pletely different form before the I. C. J. in the GN&LO- 
IRQNIfiN OIL COMPONY case. Here the Court found itself 
obliged to interpret the phrase "disputes arising after 
the ratification of the present declaration with regard 
to situations or facts relating directly, or indirectly 
to the application of treaties or conventions accepted by 
Persia and subsequent to this declaration"  ^ included in 
the Iranian declaration. The issue turned on whether the 
words "subsequent to the ratification" referred to treat­
ies or "facts and situations". The United Kingdom argued 
that the meaning of this phrase would become clear if it 
was regarded merely as a variant of the Belgian formula. 
In such a case the reservation would not apply to the 
date of conclusion of treaties. 6'“’
Relying on the Iranian intention, the Court rejec­
ted the British arguments holding that Iran intended to 
limit its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction to dis­
putes relating to the application of treaties accepted by
64Iran after the ratification of the declaration.
The I. C. J. had the occasion to discuss the simple
65exclusive formula in the INTERHRNDEL case. The juris­
diction of the Court was founded in this case on the 
Swiss and American declarations. The former was without 
reservation RQTIONE TEMPORIS and the latter, which was 
deposited on August 26, 1946, was applicable only in 
regard to disputes "hereafter arising". Thus the crucial 
date was August 26, 1946.
167
In its First Preliminary Objection the United 
States asked the Court to judge and decide:
"That there is no jurisdiction in the Court to hear or 
determine the matter raised by the Swiss Application and 
Memorial, -for the reason that the dispute arose before August 
26, 1946, the date on which the acceptance of the Courts
compulsory jurisdiction by this country became effective".
The United States contended that the dispute went 
back at least to the middle of the year 1945, and that 
divergent opinions as to the character of the Interhandel 
were exchanged between the American and the Swiss author­
ities on a number of occasions before August 26, 1946. 67
The Court connected the determination of the criti­
cal date with the subject of the dispute. Since the 
latter was regarded as the return to the Interhandel of 
the assets vested in the United States, the Court con­
sidered the date of the negative reply (July 26, 1948), 
which was described by the Department of State as its 
final and considered view, as the crucial date. For, it 
was at that point that the "divergence of views of the
two Governments were concerned with a clearly defined
68legal question. Thus the Court refused to adopt the
view that the dispute had arisen during 1945, 1946 and
1947 because the discussions between the Swiss authoriti­
es, on the one hand, and the allied and the American 
authorities, on the other, related to the research for 
the blocking and liquidation of German property and 
interests in Switzerland, i.e. the exchange of views 
related to the character of the Interhandel as enemy or 
non-enemy. Since these discussions were without any final 
conclusion, the Court could not see in them a dispute 
between Governments which had already arisen with regard 
to the restitution of the assets claimed by the Interhan­
del in the United States. The facts and situations which
have led to the dispute must not be confused with the
69
dispute itself. The Court therefore, rejected, by 10
votes to 5 the first Preliminary Objection. /U
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THE RIGHT OF PASSQGE OVER INDIQN TERRITORY case 
(preliminary objections) shows the difficulties to which 
the double exclusion formula is capable of giving rise. 7 
It was the first case in which the agreements of the
parties were sharply divided as regard both the date of
the dispute and the facts or situations from which the 
dispute arose. Portugal, the applicant, contended that 
the dispute arose after 1953, when India adopted certain 
measures relating to the passage over its territory, and 
that the question of the existence or non-existence of 
the legal right of passage was not, prior to February 5, 
1930 (the exclusion date indicated in the Indian declara­
tion of 1940) in controversy between the parties to the 
dispute.
India on the other hand, challenged the Court's
jurisdiction in its sixth preliminary objection by invok-
79
m g  its complex double exclusion formula. It argued
that the dispute itself arose - partly or wholly - before 
1930, and that it was the whole concatenation of events 
from 1779 onwards, if anything, which established the
7"^
right of passage.
The Court found itself unable to determine at that
stage either the date on which the dispute arose, or the
situations or facts which gave rise to it. It stated that
a pronouncement of those questions necessitated "an
examination and clarification of often COMPLICATED,
questions of facts bearing on the practice pursued by the
Authorities concerned for a period of very considerable
74duration and stretching back to 1818, or even 1779".
The objection was, therefore joined to the merits.
In the second phase, the Court believed that it had 
to consider what was the subject of the dispute in order 
to form a judgment as to its jurisdiction. For this 
purpose it did not confine itself to the subject cited in 
the Portuguese application as being "the conflict of 
views between the two States when, in 1954, India opposed
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the exercise of Portugal's "right of passage", but it 
held that the dispute had a threefold subject:
"(1) the disputed exercise of a right of passage in -fav­
our of Portugal;
(2) the alleged -failure of India in July 1954 to comply 
with its obligations concerning the right of pass­
age
(3) The redress of the illegal situation flowing from 
that failure," 7,J
The Court proceeded then to the definition of the 
dispute in order to determine the date on which it arose. 
In the light of the P. C. I. J.'s definition in the
NAVRQMNATIS case that the dispute is a "conflict of legal
76views", the Court found that the dispute with all its
consistent elements had not come into existence before
1954, since before that time passage had been effected in
a way recognised as acceptable to both sides. It refused 
to take into consideration certain incidents which had 
occurred before 1954, because they did not lead the 
parties to adopt clearly defined legal positions as
against each other. 77 Concerning the second part of the 
reservation, the Court preferred the criterion in the
ELECTRICITY COMPANY OF SOFIA AND BULGARIA case, namely 
the "real cause", then that in the PHOSPHATES case (the 
source of the dispute). Pointing out that in the former 
case a distinction had been drawn between the source of 
the rights claimed and the source of the dispute, the 
Court confirmed that "only the latter are to be taken
into account for the purpose of applying the Declaration
73accepting the jurisdiction of the Court."
In determining the "situation" and "facts" which 
gave rise to the dispute, the Court found the former in 
the situation of the Portuguese enclaves within the 
territory of India, which gave rise to the need for a 
right of passage for Portugal and its claim to such a
right, and the latter in those of 1954 which Portugal
advanced as showing the failure of India to comply with
170
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its obligations, and infringement of that right.
The most significant point in this judgment is the 
Court's approach in interpreting the reservation ROTIONE 
TEMPORIS. It was interpreted in a positive manner as 
indicating the disputes which were covered by a decla­
ration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction rather than
proceeding on the principle of excluding from that accep-
80
tance any given dispute. ' This interpretation combined 
with the preference of the "real cause" constitute a 
major element in enhancing the scope of the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction. The result of this approach was 
that the Court considered what it termed as "minor inci­
dents" which occurred before 1954 as irrelevant, and 
treated the situation of those territories as a "whole
whatever may have been the earlier origin of one of its
81parts". This whole was regarded as having come into 
existence only after the critical date embodied in the 
Indian declaration. It said:
"the -fact that a treaty of a greater or lesser antiquity, 
that a rule of international law, established for a greater or 
lesser period, are invoked, is not the yardstick for the 
jurisdiction of the Court according to the Indian Declaration,
That Declaration is limited to the requirement that the dis­
pute shall concern a situation or facts subsequent to February 
1930; the present dispute satisfies that requirement,"
Three judges did not concur with the Court's reaso­
ning. Judge Kojevnicon declared that he could not concur
8Twith the Court without giving his reasons. J Judge Bad- 
awi pointed out that, according to a positive interpret­
ation of the reservation RRTIQNE TEMPORIS, the intention 
of India was disregarded. For, it was not possible, for 
the purpose of the interpretation of the Indian declara­
tion, to join the facts to the dispute. Accordingly he 
concluded that "not only the situation which gave rise to 
the dispute, but also the very subject of the dispute ...
come within the period proceeding the crucial date of the
84
Indian Declaration". Judge Chagla believed that Por­
tugal's argument that the facts and situations prior to
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1930 dealt with the source of its right was false. "If 
there is a divergence between the Parties as to the very
sources of the right claimed, then it is clear that this
85divergence or difference constitutes the dispute". He
regarded also the Portuguese contention that, a wide 
construction of the reservation RATIONE TEMPORIS would 
deprive the Court of jurisdiction in most cases, as 
false. This was so, because in most cases the legal 
titles were not disputed, as in the ELECTRICITY COMPANY
D i
OF SOFIA ANB BULGARIA case.
The lesson to be learned from these cases is that, 
although the Court has managed to keep the reservation 
within bounds, the application of the vague criteria of 
the "source of dispute" or "real cause" did not lessen 
the difficulties imposed upon it by the inclusion of this 
reservation.
E - RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF ACCEPTANCES SILENT ON THE ISSUE
Portugal is the only State that has accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction expressly with a retroactive 
effect. Its declaration of 1955 covers disputes "arising 
of events both prior and subsequent to the declaration of 
the 'Optional Clause1 which Portugal made in December 15,
1920, as a party to the Statute of the Permanent Court of
87 88international Justice". Twenty three declarations
out of 46 are made without any reference to RATIONE TEM­
PORIS reservation. The question that might be raised, 
therefore, is whether the scope of the obligation accept­
ing the Court's compulsory jurisdiction has a retroactive 
effect or is it limited to disputes arising after that 
acceptance and therefore, at least the simple formula of 
the reservation, is inserted ABUNBANTE CAUTELA?
This question was dealt with by the P. C. I. J. in 
the MAVROMMATIS case (Jurisdiction). Here the jurisdic­
tion of the Court was founded on Article 26 of the Man­
date for Palestine. Dealing with its jurisdiction RATIONE
1 7 2
TEMPORIS the Court said:
"The Court is of the opinion that, in case of doubt, 
jurisdiction based on international agreement embraces all 
disputes referred to it after its establishment . „. The reser­
vation made in many arbitration treaties regarding disputes 
arising out of events previous to the conclusion of the treaty 
seems to prove the necessity of an explicit limitation of the 
jurisdiction and, consequently, the correctness of the rule of 
interpretation enunciated above, The fact of a dispute having 
arisen at a given moment between two States is a sufficient 
basis for determining whether, as regards tests of time, 
jurisdiction exists, whereas any definition of the events 
leading up to a dispute is in many cases inextricably bound up 
with the actual merits of the dispute".
Relying on the first part of this dictum, Farman- 
farma observes that "It must not be forgotten that when a 
declaration is not expressly made unconditionally and has 
made no reference to time limitation, the principle to be
applied is that jurisdiction extends to disputes arising
90
after the declaration has been made." ' This opinion 
constitutes an exception from the general view that by 
this dictum, though concerned with a compromissory clau­
se, the Court laid down the principle that if no express
limitation is made the acceptance of the compulsory
91
jurisdiction would have a retroactive effect.
The retroactivity of the obligation assumed under 
Article 36 (2) can be deduced also from the Court's
judgment in the PHOSPHRTES IN  MOROCCO case. Since reserv­
ations RRTIONE TEMPORIS are made in order to deprive the 
acceptance of any retroactive effects and to avoid and
preclude a revival of old disputes according to that
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judgment, declarations which do not contain such a 
reservation could not achieve that purpose. Furthermore 
the INTERHRNOEL case removed any doubt as to the retroac­
tivity. In that case, the declaration of Switzerland, the 
applicant, was without reservation RRTIONE TEMPORIS, and 
the United States declaration, in which the exclusion 
date was August 26, 1946, was made in regard to disputes
9^
"hereafter arising", as already mentioned. " The United
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States argued in its Second Preliminary Objection that 
the dispute, even if it was subsequent to its declara­
tion, arose before July 28, 1948 (the date of the deposit 
of the Swiss declaration and on which Switzerland became 
party to the Statute), and therefore the Court was depri­
ved of jurisdiction by the application of the principle
of reciprocity, otherwise, retroactive effect would be
94given to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
Switzerland, on the other hand, argued that in the 
absence of an analogue reservation in its declaration, 
the jurisdiction was accepted in regard to disputes prior 
to 1948, and, therefore, there was no critical date as 
far as its declaration was concerned. For supporting its 
argument Switzerland invoked the doctrine of the P. C. I. 
J. in the M8VRQMMQTIS case, and the general view adopted 
by publicists. 95
In rejecting that objection the Court noted the
false conception which was attributed to the principle of
96reciprocity by the United States. Although the Court 
did not discuss the retroactive effect of declarations, 
it had in fact decided that the retroactivity is the 
rule. This is established by the fact that the Court
found that it had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute 
though it arose, as has been seen, before July 28, 1948.
In the light of this decision the other question 
that may be raised is whether in case of successive
declarations, the later declaration would have a retroac­
tive effect, if the previous was made with regard to
future disputes only. Where the later declarations main­
tain such a reservation it seems that the rule discussed 
above, and that laid down by the Court in the QMBRTIELOS 
case is applicable. In this case the Court refused to
give a retroactive effect to a later treaty contrary to
97its own provisions. However if the reservation is
omitted in the later, it seems reasonable to infer the
retroactivity, unless it is proved that the declarant
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intended to renew its previous declaration as it was. In 
such a case the critical date of the previous might be 
maintained.
The third question is whether there exists a tem­
poral limit as to the retroactive effect of the accep­
tance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. In other 
words, is the jurisdiction of,the Court limited to dis­
putes arising after the establishment of the P. C. I J.
taking into consideration the continuity between the
98present Court and its predecessor, or does it cover
disputes arising out of facts and situations prior to 
that establishment? J G Sauveplanne believes that accord­
ing to the general view that a general clause of juris­
diction implies a limitation of its application in future 
disputes, the potential competence pre-established by the 
insertion of the general clause into the Statute is
limited to disputes arising after the establishment of
99the P. C. I. J. The statement of the P. C. I. J. in
the MROROMMRTIS case cited above, seems to lay down the 
general proposition that in the absence of a reservation 
RRTIONE TEMPORIS, the jurisdiction of the Court would 
cover disputes arising before its establishment. This 
view is supported by the fact that in the RIGHT OF PRS-  
SRGE case the Court reached its decision on the basis of 
an examination of events which occurred before 1920.
But does the retroactivity in this sense apply vis- 
a-vis new States? In other words does the Court's compul­
sory jurisdiction cover disputes arising out of events 
occurring before the date of independence, if the reser­
vation RRTIONE TEMPORIS had not been made? This question 
is of significance since the following States, which 
achieved their independence after the Second World War, 
have not inserted the reservation in their declarations. 
Those are: Botswana, Democratic Kampuchea, Mauritius,
Nigeria, Somalia, Swaziland, Togo and Uganda. The jurisp­
rudence of the Court seems to indicate that its jurisdic­
tion, in the absence of an express reservation, extends
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as to cover disputes arising before the independence. In
the RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER INDIAN TERRITORY case, the
Court - as has been seen - was obliged to examine events
101
stretching back to 1818 or even 1779. The decisions
of the Court in other cases such as the EASTERN GREEN­
LAND, TEMPLE OF PEAH 01 HEAR and NORTHERN CAMEROON, was
based on an examination of events which occurred before
102one or both parties existed. ' Rosenne finds in what he 
termed as a "strongly marked element of continuity in 
policy and personnel" (i.e. the former movement which 
becomes the new State and the people remain the same) an 
element supporting the idea of extending the Court's 
jurisdiction to the period prior to the date of indepen­
dence. However he believes that "as a matter of general 
principle the Court ought not to be quick in exercising 
jurisdiction over disputes originating before the exis­
tence of the State". This principle cannot, in his view, 
be effected by the exceptional character of the cases 
mentioned above. 1U'‘' In fact, as he observes, the Court 
in the RIGHT OF PASSAGE case, for instance, had not been 
asked to make any finding whatsoever with regard to the 
past, but to pronounce on the existence of the right 
claimed by Portugal in 1954. Furthermore there is a major 
element which refutes the idea of retroactivity, namely, 
the connection between international responsibility and 
international personality. How can the retroactivity be
applied in a period during which the international per—
104
sonality as an essential factor was missing? ’ Undoub­
tedly, this view, if taken, would create more stability 
in international relations.
Bearing in mind the uncertainty as to whether an 
unqualified acceptance would have a retroactive effect, 
Kenya, Pakistan and Sudan find it reasonable to protect 
themselves expressly against such retroactivity by the 
exclusion of disputes arising prior to their indepen­
dence, while others exclude either disputes prior to the 
date of the declaration (Barbados, Gambia, Philippines 
and Senegal) or disputes arising out of facts and situa—
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tions prior to that date (Malawi). However, the reserva­
tion RATIONE TENPORIS has been regarded as a reasonable 
clause to be inserted in the declarations of newly in­
dependent States as long as its scope does not exceed the 
date of independence. 1U,J
F  -  UNDESIRABLE DEVELOPMENT
The different problems discussed above and the 
difficulties encountered by the Court in dealing with the 
reservation RATIONE TENPORIS might justify its criticism 
and the strong appeal to eliminate it, ” except where 
it is intended to exclude disputes which occurred before 
the independence. That criticism has been considered only 
by Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands. The two 
former States omitted the double exclusion formula from 
their previous declarations, and their effective declara­
tions are without reservation RATIONE TENPORIS. The 
Netherlands changed the exclusion date of the simple 
formula from August 6, 1946, in its declaration made the 
same date, to August 5, 1921 (the date of its first
declaration) in its current declaration. Certainly the 
effect of the reservation diminishes with time. Thus 
the declaration of the Netherlands is more than 65 years 
old; those of Luxembourg and Columbia are more than 55; 
the declarations of Mexico, Sweden, the United Kingdom, 
Belgium and Pakistan are about 30 years old. However, the 
recent developments indicate the undesirability of the 
reservation. The declaration of the Philippines of 1947 
was without this reservation, but its current declaration 
includes the simple exclusion formula. El Salvador's 
declaration of 1973 substituted the new complicated 
formula of the sweeping effect for the simple exclusion 
formula. Furthermore, by maintaining the new reservation 
in the declaration of 1978, El Salvador reduced the 
period subject to the Court's jurisdiction by 57 years. 
The same can be said with regard to India's declaration 
of 1974, with the difference that the latter substituted 
the new exclusion formula for the double (complex) for­
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mula, and reduced the period by 15 years. By using the 
date of the declaration as the exclusion date, Canada's 
declaration of 1985 reduced that period by 15 years. This 
period was reduced by the previous declaration of 1970 by 
40 years.
On December 2, 1985, Senegal modified its declara­
tion made just eight months before only for the purpose 
of including the reservation RATIONE TENPORIS. Bearing in
mind the implications which the new formula is capable of
108giving rise to, and the application of reciprocity ' to 
the RESERVATION RATIONE TENPORIS, those declarations are 
capable of reviving the effect of the old declarations 
and introducing it in those made without it. Moreover, 
what is the significance of excluding by a new declara­
tion a period during which the Court's jurisdiction had 
been accepted? If these reservations are not to be eli­
minated in spite of the fact that they have gone beyond
their object, it is greatly hoped that at least those
109
examples will not be followed.
G -  EXCLUSION OF D ISPU TES AR ISING  DURING A PERIOD OF 
H O ST IL IT IE S
In some declarations there is to be found a war or 
hostilities exclusion clause connected with the reserva­
tions RATIONE TENPORIS. In September 1939, as already 
mentioned, France, the United Kingdom and five Common­
wealth States (Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand and 
South Africa) sought to amend their declarations to ex­
clude disputes arising during the Second World War.
When the declarations of the United Kingdom and the 
Commonwealth States, except Canada, terminated in 1940, 
the exclusion of "disputes arising out of events occurr­
ing at a time when (these States) were involved in hos— 
111
tilities" were included in the new declarations made
in the same year. Thus, the determination whether a
dispute is included or not is based mainly on the criter­
ion of time during which the dispute arose. If it has
arisen during a period of hostilities it would be ex­
cluded whatever its origins and even if there was no
112connection between it and the hostilities. This
reservation became a reservation RATIONE MATERIA in the 
United Kingdom's subsequent declarations. For the crite­
ria - as will be seen 11'~' - transferred from the period 
during which the dispute arose to the "causal facts" of 
the dispute. In other words the relation between the 
hostilities and the dispute must be a relation between
cause and effect for the exclusion of the dispute from
114the Court's jurisdiction.
Disputes which occurred during the Second World War 
were excluded from the United Kingdom acceptance of June 
2, 1955 by another reservation, namely, the exclusion of 
"disputes arising out of events occurring between the 3rd 
of September 1939 and the 2nd of September 1945". This 
reservation, being updated, has been criticised as "un­
necessary". It set an example which was followed by
Israel. The latter excluded from the scope of its 1956 
declaration "disputes arising out of events occurring 
between 15 May 1948 and 20 July 1949". The broad war 
exclusion clause included in that declaration excepted:
"disputes arising out of, or having reference to any 
hostilities, war, state of war, breach of peace, breach of 
armistice agreement or belligerent or military occupation 
(whether such war shall have been declared or not, and whether 
any state of belligerency shall have been recognised or not) 
in which the Government of Israel are or have been or may be 
involved at any time". 1
and was capable of excluding disputes occurring during 
the specified period covered by that reservation. Furthe­
rmore, the declaration of Israel, unlike that of the 
United Kingdom of June 2, 1955, excluded disputes con­
cerning situations or facts prior to October 25, 1951. 
The reservation of hostilities seems, therefore - as 
Merills observes - to be inserted EX ABUNBANTE CAUTELA. 11 
However, the reservation of disputes occurring during a
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determined period have disappeared. The United Kingdom 
abandoned it for a reservation RATIONE TENPORIS excluding 
disputes prior to October 24, 1945 and Israel's declara­
tion of 1956 was terminated on November 21, 1985. Sudan's 
declaration, thus, is the only one which includes a 
RATIONE TEMPORIS hostilities clause. According to the 
terms of its declaration "disputes arising out of events
occurring during any period in which the Republic of
118Sudan is engaged in hostilities as belligerent" are 
excluded. This reservation seems to be worse than those 
of the United Kingdom and Israel since it is not limited 
to a specific period but operates in any period of hos­
tilities in the future on the condition that Sudan would 
be belligerent.
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SECTION 2 : RESERVATIONS RATIONE PERSONAE
The provision of Article 36 (3) that declarations 
can be made "on condition of reciprocity on the part of 
several or certain States" and the existence of some 
special considerations at the time of making declarations 
have led certain States either to exclude from the 
operation of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction disputes 
with certain States or to delay the entry into effect of 
their declarations. The exclusion of disputes with 
certain States has been made mainly with the object of 
preserving the special relations existing between a
determined group of States, or on the contrary excluding
119States with which the relations are hostile, or as an
escape clause, or on the contrary for the purpose of
depriving other States of the possibility of using the
compulsory jurisdiction system only as a beneficial means
VIS-A-VIS the declarant States. No protest whatsoever has
been made against the insertion of reservations RQT10NE
PERSQNQE, and they have been considered in the doctrine
as not inconsistent with the system of compulsory juris- 
1 ?o
diction
A -  RECIPROCITY RATIONE PERSONAE
The provision of Article 36 (3) mentioned above was 
inserted in the Statute of the P. C. I. J. in 1920 to 
satisfy the preoccupation of the Brazilian delegate M 
Fernandez. His original proposition was as follows:
"[States] may adhere unconditionally or conditionally to 
the Article providing tor compulsory jurisdiction, a possible 
condition being on the part ot a certain number of Members or, 
again, of a number of Members including such and such specif­
ied Members,"
In order to adopt this proposition, he argued 
before the Sub-committee of the Third Committee of the 
First Assembly that "It was inadmissible for a State to 
accept the principle of compulsory jurisdiction without
knowing exactly toward whom it accepted such obligation". 1 
This view reflected Brazil's desire not to be the only 
important State to accept the Optional Clause. That 
desire was expressed in its instrument of ratification of 
the Optional Clause deposited November 4, 1921 which 
recognised as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Per­
manent Court "on condition of reciprocity and as soon as 
it has likewise been recognised as such by two at least
of the Powers permanently represented on the Council of
125the League of Nations". This condition was met on
124February 5, 1930, the date of entry into force of the
declaration of the United Kingdom as the second permanent 
member of the Council of the League of Nations to accept
the Optional Clause after Germany. This - as Waldock
125observed - is not really a "condition of reciprocity" 
but rather a suspensive condition. It simply authorises 
States to delay the entry into force of their declaration 
until a certain number of States or certain named States 
accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. However, 
in spite of maintaining that provision of the present 
Statute, no State, except Brazil, has ever benefited from 
it.
B - PRESERVATION OF PARTICULAR RELATIONS BETWEEN 
A DETERMINED GROUP OF STATES
Some States without affecting the normal operation 
of the compulsory jurisdiction system vis-a-vis other 
declarant States, included in their declarations, clauses 
of quite different nature from that provided for in 
Article 36 (3), excluding disputes with certain specified 
States with which particular relations exist. These 
relations are either the outcome of the Colonial period 
or of the common factors existing between a group of 
States belonging to one region. Three different types of 
reservation have been inserted at one time or another. 
The first and the largest excludes disputes between the 
members of the Commonwealth of Nations, the second ex­
cluded disputes between Arab States and the last excluded
182
disputes between the United States and any Central Ameri­
can State.
(I) Inter-Commonwealth Disputes
When the United Kingdom accepted the jurisdiction 
of the P. C. I. J. in 1929, it excluded "disputes with 
the Government of the British Commonwealth of Nations,
all of which disputes shall be settled in such a manner
1^ 6as the parties have agreed or shall agree". The same
reservation was included in the declarations of all the
127other members except Ireland. The reason for insert­
ing this reservation was explained by the government of 
the United Kingdom as follows:
"Disputes with other members of the British Commonwealth 
of Nations are excluded because the members of the Common­
wealth, though international units individually in the fullest 
sense of the term, are united by their common allegiance to 
the Crown".
If Sir Cecil Hurst's view expressed during the 
discussion of the Statute of the P. C. I. J., that Ar­
ticle 14 of the Covenant excluded "disputes between two 
of the units composing the British Empire, because the 
relations between them were different from the relations
between two foreign States, and for this reason the
129relations between them were not international", is
taken into consideration, it would seem that the above 
explanation did not contradict the British Government 
view in 1928 that the signature of the Optional Clause 
must be general and not discriminating against any State.
As a second reason for excluding INTER SE disputes, 
it was expected that the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council would constitute an alternative, purely Common­
wealth institution for the settlement of these disputes.
130
However it operated that that body was regarded so close­
ly associated with the United Kingdom rule, and 
therefore not likely to be an acceptable tribunal between
183
newly independent members. As MacKay said "It smacks of
the pre-Commonwealth days, when inferiority not equality
1^ 2of States was the rule". An attempt to fill that gap 
was made by the Imperial Conference in 1930. It was 
suggested to follow the experience of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration, namely, to constitute an OH HOC tribunal 
of five members selected from the panel. 1"’"
Taking into consideration the insufficiency of 
either reasons to maintain this reservation at the pres­
ent time, the general view is that it should be aban-
1^ 4doned. ~ This is because the first reason seems to 
ignore the fact that the members of the Commonwealth 
cling to their independence. They are "often more closely 
associated with non-Commonwealth than with the Com­
monwealth States, are unwilling to accept loyalties
1^ 5associated with a colonial past". " Secondly, no tribu­
nal for the settlement of INTER SE disputes has been 
constituted and there is no prospect that it would be
i  • ,  136realised.
In these circumstances it appears that, instead of 
strengthening relations between Commonwealth States, the 
reservation favoured the settlement between them and the 
so called "foreign States". This was made very clear by 
Ali Khan as a Prime Minister of Pakistan. Urging India to 
refer the Canal Water Dispute to the International Court 
of Justice, he said:
"Under the Optional Clause the Government of India have 
agreed to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court 
on the application of countries which are not members of the 
Commonwealth. The exception doubtless contemplated that there 
would be Commonwealth machinery equally suited to the judicial 
settlement of disputes. While such commonwealth machinery is 
lacking it would be anomalous to deny to a sister member of 
the British Commonwealth the friendly means of judicial set­
tlement that is affected by India to countries outside the 
Commonwealth".
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It is, perhaps, this reason which led to the omis­
sion of this reservation from Pakistan's declaration of 
1948 and the following declarations. However, the use of 
the reservation has decreased in comparison to.the number 
of Commonwealth countries accepting the Court's compul­
sory jurisdiction. Whereas in 1955 the declarations of 
the seven Commonwealth parties to the compulsory juris­
diction system all contained such reservations, only
1 Ti8
eight declarations out of 15 contain it at the pres­
ent time. By the application of reciprocity only disputes
1^ 9between States which have not inserted it “ can be 
referred to the Court. Also disputes between India and 
Pakistan or any other Country which might leave the 
Commonwealth are excluded. For, India's declaration 
excludes disputes with "any State which is or has been a 
Member of the Commonwealth of Nations." It is to be
observed that Kenya's declaration is the only one exclud-
140ing future members expressly.
(II) Disputes Between Arab States
The common factors existing between Arab countries
appear to be the main cause for copying the Commonwealth
reservation in Iraq's declaration of September 22, 1938.
The reservation excluded "disputes with the government of
any Arab State, all of which disputes shall be settled in
141a manner as the Parties have agreed or shall agree. 
However the reservation was without effect not merely 
because that declaration had not been ratified, but also 
because Egypt, whose declaration had also never been 
ratified, was the only Arab State which accepted the 
Optional Clause of the P. C. I. J.
No such reservation is made in the declaration of 
Sudan and the special one of Egypt as the only Arab 
States accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
present Court. Taking into account the absence of any 
machinery suitable for the settlement between Arab 
Countries, it might be advisable not to make such a
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reservation, should they ever accept the Court's
jurisdiction. The fallacy of the psychological conception
that recourse to the Court is not a friendly means of
settling disputes between what might be called the "Arab
family" should not be a bar to the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction. On the contrary the complicated disputes
existing between these States require the submission of
142these disputes to the Court, especially in the light 
of the fact that they have not been able, and there is no 
prospect of so doing, to create their projected Arab
147.
Court of Justice.
(Ill) Disputes Between the United States and 
Central American States
On April 6, 1984, it is to be recalled, the United 
States deposited with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations a notification excluding "disputes with any 
Central American State or arising out of events in Cent­
ral America, any which disputes shall be settled in such
144a manner as the parties to them may agree". The
reservation on the face of it appears to suggest the
preservation of the particular relations between the
States. This was made clear in the second paragraph of
the modification, which justified the exclusion of those
disputes by the desire "to foster the continuing regional
dispute settlement process which seeks a negotiated
solution of the inter-related political, economic and
security problems of Central America". However in fact-
145as already mentioned - it was inserted for the purpose 
of depriving the Court of jurisdiction to entertain the
dispute between Nicaragua and the United States. It was
invoked by the United States in the MILITARY AND 
PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IES  IN  AND AGAINST NICARAGUA case. 146 
The Court neither discussed its scope nor its validity 
since the issue turned on whether the stipulation
provided for in the notification that "it shall take
effect immediately", was valid or not, i.e. whether a 
declaration made for fixed period and thereafter
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terminable after the expiration of six months' notice 
could be terminated or modified at any time. However, the 
reservation, which was made for two years only, 
disappeared when the United States withdrew its
declaration on October 8, 1985. The arguments cited above 
as to the desirability of making this kind of reservation 
applies here especially if it is - as here - used as an 
escape clause.
C -  UNDESIRA BILITY TO HAVE SOME D ISPU TE S WITH 
CERTAIN STATES SETTLED BY THE COURT
( I )  N o n - r e c o g n i t i o n
Special political reasons affecting the relations 
between a declarant State and certain other States have 
led the former to exclude disputes with the latter. Thus, 
in 1930, Rumania and Yugoslavia accepted the jurisdiction
of the P. C. I. J. in relation to any other State the
147government of which was recognised by them. Poland 
also excluded in its declaration of 1931, which had never 
entered into force, disputes arising between it "and
States which refuse to establish or maintain normal
148diplomatic relations with" it. This reservation was
inserted with the object of depriving Liechtenstein of 
the possibility of bringing a dispute before the Court by
unilateral application because the relations between the
149two States were very tense at the time.
These examples have been copied in two declarations 
accepting the jurisdiction of the present Court. Israel's 
declaration of 1956 included the Polish formula but with 
more qualifications. Its declaration excluded:
"Any dispute between the State of Israel and any other 
State ... which does not recognise Israel or which re-fuses to 
establish or maintain normal diplomatic relations with Israel 
and the absence or breach of normal relations precedes the 
dispute and. exists independently of that dispute." ”“(J
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This reservation was designed mainly to exclude 
Arab, Moslem and other States which refuse to recognise 
the existence of Israel or refuse to establish normal 
diplomatic relations with it. This formula consisted of 
an amelioration of the old reservation included in the 
previous declaration made in 1950. The latter excluded
"any dispute between the State of Israel and another 
State which refuses to establish or maintain NORMAL
-j tr I
RELATIONS with it. u This formula was open to criticism 
in two respects. According to Meron, it was pointed out 
in diplomatic correspondence with Israel that the use of 
the phrase "normal relations" rather than "normal diplo­
matic relations":
"Could conceivably have the result negativing the entire 
effect of the acceptance by the Israel Government of the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, since the very fact of 
serious dispute might allow it to be maintained that relations 
had ceased to be normal, and that there was thus no obligation 
upon the Israel Government to accept the jurisdiction of the 
Court."
Secondly the attention was drawn to the meaning of 
the word "maintain". It was pointed out that the reserva­
tion "was susceptible of at least two interpretations; 
one of which was probably not in conformity with the 
Court Statute, which, in Article 36, paragraph 6, reser­
ved to the Court the COMPETENCE BE LA COMPETENCE". 153
Israel clarified the point in the instrument of 
ratification of the declaration which contained the 
following interpretation:
"It being understood that reservation (C) is intended in 
principle to apply in cases where the absence of relations 
existed prior to and independently of the dispute, it shall 
not normally be invoked in cases where relations are broken 
after or as a result of the dispute. Nevertheless, any dif­
ference of views which may arise in a given case will come 
under the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with Article 
36, paragraph 6, of its Statute. Taking into account this 
provision of the Statute, the Government of Israel cannot 
commit itself or its successors to abide strictly by this
183
interpretation should a difference arise as to the competence
of the Court under this declaration and, should such a dispute
arise, full freedom of action is hereby reserved as to the way
154
in which the jurisdiction of the Court may be invoked".
The clarification itself gave rise to another 
complication. The phrase "this interpretation", which 
referred to the interpretation contained in the instru-
i  crcr
ment of ratification, was understood by the United
Nations Secretariat as a statement by which Israel could 
not commit itself "to conform strictly to the Court's
interpretation in a case where the Court's competence
156would be questioned". Although the United Nations
corrected its press release, Hudson believed that the 
clarification "seems to be designed to open the door for 
a challenge of the application of the provision of Ar­
ticle 36, paragraph 6", and that "a general tolerance of
such an inroad on a most important provision of the
157Statute would be a regrettable retrogression". 
However the reservation had never been invoked before the 
Court, and if it had, problems of interpretation of the 
words "in principle" or "shall normally be invoked" could 
have been raised. Nevertheless, the modification of the 
reservation in the declaration of 1956 clarified the 
issue, though the words "normal relations" were inserted 
after the phrase "normal diplomatic relations".
Non-recognition reservation is now limited to 
India's declaration of 1974. The reservation covers:
"Disputes with the Government of any State with which, on
the date of an application to brinq a dispute before the
Court, the government of India has no diplomatic relations or
158
which has not been recognised by the Government of India",
Although this reservation avoids the criticism made 
against Israel's declaration and, therefore, it cannot be
said to be inconsistent with Article 36 (6), it is much
159
broader in scope. Whereas the Israeli reservation
could not have been invoked except where the applicant 
refuses to establish or maintain normal diplomatic rela-
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tions with Israel and the breaking off of relations had 
no connection with the dispute brought before the Court, 
India's reservation can be invoked even where India 
itself breaks off those relations whatever the connection 
between the breaking of relations and the dispute. There­
fore, it can be used as an escape clause if the breaking 
off precedes the filing of the application. Thus the 
formula has been regarded as an overdraft, and if it was
160
not, it must be regarded as a thoroughly retrograde step. 
Certainly a State has the entire right to exclude dis­
putes with those who refuse to establish diplomatic 
relations with it, but to exclude from the Court's juris­
diction disputes for no better reason than that relations 
have become politically tense is to deny that the Court 
can contribute to the settlement of the contentious 
issues and to undermine its authority and jurisdiction. ^  
It is hoped, therefore, that India, if it considers that 
the reservation must be maintained, will modify it as to 
insert the conditions made in Israel's declaration of 
1956.
(II) Disputes with a Determined State Over a Specific 
Subject Matter
In its declaration of January 27, 1947, Guatemala
excluded from the Court's compulsory jurisdiction "the 
dispute between England and Guatemala concerning the
1*9
restoration of the territory of Belize. This reserva­
tion is both RATIONE PERSONAE (applying only to England) 
and RATIONS MATERIA (applying only to the dispute 
concerning Belize). Guatemala preferred - as pointed out 
in the declaration - to have the dispute settled by the 
Court £A AEQUO ET BONO in accordance with Article 38 (2) 
of the Statute.
The validity of this ' reservation cannot be con­
tested. On the contrary, it is believed that it establis­
hed a perfect example to be followed by any State which 
really intends to promote the Court's compulsory juris—
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diction. Instead of making a general reservation, the 
declaration specified the State and the dispute excluded, 
and at the same time contained an offer to settle the
dispute by the Court in another manner, without any other
reservation.
(III) Disputes with Non-Sovereign States or Territories
Surprisingly, the current declaration of India 
contains an entirely new reservation covering "disputes 
with non-sovereign States or Territories". Such a reser­
vation has never been made, even by Great Powers during 
the colonial period, either in arbitration treaties 
before the establishment of the P. C. I. J. or later.
Since the reasons for making it are not clear, its
examination would be a matter of speculation. However, at 
first glance it seems that it is inserted EX ABUNBANTE 
CAUTELA since the membership to the Statute is limited to 
STATES members of the United Nations or STATES non­
members of the United Nations, parties to the Statute 
according to Article 93, paragraph 2, of the Charter of 
the United Nations within the conditions laid down by the
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security
164council, in 1946, or finally to other STATES in
accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute. 
It is true that the organs of the United Nations 
including the Court do not question the Statehood of 
political units whose admission to the statute has been 
decided upon by the General Assembly on the 
recommendation of the Security Council. They are 
considered as States from the point of view of the 
Statute, regardless of whether they will be so regarded 
by the General international law. Thus when Liechtenstein 
applied to be a party to the Statute it was argued that 
it was not an independent State, and San Marino's 
application was opposed to on the ground that the Country 
was a diminutive State. However if India intended to 
exclude those States only, it might have made its 
declaration O IS -A -O IS States member of the United Nations
191
as has been done by some States. It is also very well
known that the general declarations of the third category
of States made in accordance with Article 35 and the
resolution adopted by the Security Council on October 15,
1946, cannot "be relied upon VIS-A-VIS States parties to
the Statute which have made the declaration in con-
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formity with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute".
It may be argued that the reservation intended to 
exclude the possibility of referring disputes in the 
regions concerning some territories, in which there exist 
movements of independence, belonging to neighbouring 
States in which India has been involved, or to close the 
door for the possibility of referring disputes concerning 
non-sovereign states or Territories by other States as
167did Ethiopia and Liberia in the South West Africa cases.
It might be said also that the reservation reflects 
India's fear of independence of one of its internal 
States, though in such a case the non-recognition of the 
reservation is capable alone if excluding such disputes 
from the Court's jurisdiction. However, the effect of 
this reservation on compulsory jurisdiction cannot be 
weighed as long as its meaning is unclear.
(IV) Disputes with States not Members of the 
United Nations Parties to the Statute
The Court's jurisdiction has sometimes been ac­
cepted in relation to States member of the United Na­
tions. This reservation is limited at present to the
1 £.R
declaration of Democratic Kampuchea of 1959. “ It was
copied in the French declaration of 1959. The view has
sometimes been advanced that the latter was a drafting
169
error. Yet its retention in the french declaration of 
1966 rebutted that view. Thus Prasasvinitchai believes 
that it was inserted with the desire not to establish any 
judicial link except with a State whose admission to the 
International community is subjected to its decisive 
control. It is obvious that this view cannot be
JL92
applied to the declaration of Democratic Kampuchea. Thus 
the reservation in the declaration of the latter might be 
considered as a drafting error.
However the effect of the reservation is limited to 
the exclusion of Liechtenstein, San Marino and Switzer­
land as the only States not member to the United Nations, 
members to the Statute.
(V) The Buraimi Reservation
In October 1955 the United Kingdom terminated its 
declaration made only five months previously and issued 
another one including a new reservation excluding:
"Disputes in respect of which arbitral or judicial proce­
edings are taking, or have taken, place with any State which, 
at the date of the commencement of the proceedings, had not 
itself accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice".
The formulation of the reservation followed the
breakdown of the Buraimi Arbitration with Saudi Arabia
because of the charges of bribery of potential witnesses
171by the government of the latter. Although it was made 
specifically to preclude Saudi Arabia from referring that 
dispute to the Court, it was capable of depriving the 
Court of potential jurisdiction to decide disputes which 
had not been settled by arbitration. For this reason and 
the possibility of preventing potential appeals, arbitral 
or judicial, to the International Court of Justice,
Briggs could not see the advantages of introducing the
172reservation. However Merrills regards this view as
"too harsh a judgment". For the reservation requires that 
the dispute must first have been submitted to ar­
bitration, and therefore recourse to the Court be with 
the desire to reopen the case. This would have been
true if the reservation was confined to the Baraimi 
dispute especially if the special circumstances surround­
ing it are taken into consideration, but why should the
193
fear of reopening the dispute be a bar to the Court's 
jurisdiction if a tribunal had not been able for one 
reason or another to settle other disputes with other 
States? In such a case the dispute has not been closed at 
all.
This reservation is copied literally by some Corn-
174monwealth States in their current declarations.
(VI) Single Shot Solutions
The filing of an application by Portugal against
India in the RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER INDIAN TERRITORY case,
three days only after the deposit of its declaration,
gave professor Waldock the opportunity to draw attention
to what he called a "glaring inequality in the position
of a State which does and a State which does not make a
1
declaration under the Optional Clause". The latter
can use the Optional Clause for a tactical opportunity by 
making a declaration just before instituting the suit 
against the former which is continuously liable to be 
brought before the Court and then remain immune simply by 
withholding an "open-ended" 176 acceptance of general 
compulsory jurisdiction. As a solution to the problem 
Waldock proposed the inclusion of a reservation includ­
ing:
"all disputes with a State which at the date of the 
ratification of the declaration has not been accepted the 
Optional Clause, except disputes which arise after the accep­
tance of the Optional Clause by the State with regard to 
situations or facts subsequent to the said acceptance," ^77
Two other elements appear to have encouraged some 
States to adopt Waldock's view, though in different 
formulae. The Statement of the Court in the RIGHT OF 
PASSAGE OOER INDIAN TERRITORY case that "a State accept­
ing the jurisdiction of the Court must expect that an 
application may be filed against it before the Court by a 
new declarant State on the same day on which that State
194
deposits with the Secretary-General its declaration of
178acceptance". and the deposit of the Egyptian declara­
tion of July 22, 1957 concerning its declaration of April 
24, 1957 on Suez Canal and the arrangements for its 
operation.
Thus the United Kingdom withdrew its declaration of 
April 18, 1957, which contained the following reservation 
excluding from the Court's compulsory jurisdiction:
"(Viii) disputes in respect of which any other party to 
the dispute has accepted compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter­
national Court of Justice only in relation to, or for the 
purposes of the dispute; or where the acceptance of the Cour­
t's compulsory jurisdiction on behalf of any other Party to 
the dispute was deposited or ratified less than twelve months 
prior to the filing of the application bringing the dispute 
before the Court",
The first part of the reservation seems to be 
designed to exclude declarations such as the Egyptian 
one, i.e. limited to specific disputes. It might be 
regrettable that such a reservation was made for the 
first time by a State which was itself the first one to 
introduce in 1946 a declaration limited to "disputes 
concerning the interpretation, application or validity of 
any treaty relating to the boundaries of British
1 7 9
Honduras". Moreover, although, it is questionable
whether these declarations can be qualified as
acceptances under Article 36 (2) , ' they should not be
disregarded. The Egyptian declaration, for example,
cannot be devoid of any importance. It concerns subject- 
matter of vital interest for the world. Therefore, why 
should a step like it be defeated? Such a declaration
should - as professor D'Amato observed be welcomed at
least as a partial step along the road to general
, 181 acceptance.
If the first part of the British reservation has 
undoubtedly the effect of excluding subject-matter decla­
rations, it is not so easy to have the same effect with
regard to general acceptance. For the phrase "only In
relation to or for the purpose of the dispute", may give
rise to difficulties and may meet with unsympathetic
182interpretation by the Court. For example, it would be 
somewhat difficult to prove that the Portuguese accep­
tance of the Court's jurisdiction in 1955 was - as profe­
ssor Briggs points out - made only in relation to or for
18
the purpose of the Right of Passage dispute with India, 
for the following reasons: firstly, it is to be recalled 
that the Portuguese declaration is the only one which has 
been made expressly to cover disputes arising out of 
events both prior and subsequent to the date of the 
declaration. Therefore, if it was made for the purpose of 
that dispute, it might not have given the other declara­
nts the opportunity to sue it for any dispute whenever 
one arose. Secondly, Portugal became a member of the
United Nations, and hence party to the Statute on Decem-
184ber 14, 1955, i.e. 5 days only before the deposit of
its declaration. Thirdly, the declaration of India as 
respondent, was terminable immediately by a simple notice 
to the Secretary-General. Consequently if India had known 
that the declaration was deposited, it might have ter­
minated its declaration on the same day, or at least 
introduced a reservation depriving the Court of jurisdic­
tion to entertain the case. Lastly, Portugal's declara­
tion is amongst the few declarations which have not been 
subject to modification though it was made for one year.
However, there is no doubt that the lesson learned 
from that case is the possibility offered to States 
outside the system, of using it as a means of oppor­
tunism. The second part of the reservation aims at depri­
ving those States of such opportunism, and providing some 
protection against surprise application. Thus the modifi­
cation of the declaration fo Israel on February 24, 1984 
by introducing a similar reservation seems intended to 
deprive Egypt of the possibility of referring the dispute
with Israel over Taba by modifying its declaration of
1 S^i1957 or making a new declaration.
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It is obvious that the principle of reciprocity 
suspends the effect of a new declaration containing such 
a reservation for one year VIS-A-VIS other States, i.e. 
this State cannot be sued by the other declarants during 
that period.
Certainly the inclusion of the Second part of the
reservation is necessary for the establishment of e-
186quality between States in and outside the compulsory
jurisdiction system, but it is believed that it is not a 
perfect solution, for it might be used against its aim. 
The clause of twelve months may give a State making the 
reservation the opportunity to sue the new declarant just 
after the expiry of that period then terminate its decla­
ration or modify it in away to exclude a potential dis­
pute with that State. The problem has, thus, a strong 
connection with the termination of declarations at any
time. Thus it is regrettable that when the United Kingdom 
introduced the reservation, its declaration was ter­
minable on notice. Any complete solution for the single 
shot problem has to take into consideration the hit-and- 
run problem. Thus it seems that neither of the following
proposals constitute a general solution for these two
problems: the first, which was made by professor Waldock, 
requires the addition at the end of Article 36 the provi­
so :
"Provided that for a period of two years after the date
when any such declaration comes into force it shall not have
effect with respect to a dispute concerning matters which were
the subject of differences between the Parties durinq two
187
years immediately preceding that date".
and the second is that made by professor L Gross requir­
ing the following addition to paragraph 4 of Article 36:
declarations "shall not enter into force until a month or
188so after the deposit". It is obvious that the effect 
of both these proposals is limited to the "single shot" 
problem. They constitute thus a partial solution to the 
problem as a whole, as long as they leave States parties
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to the compulsory jurisdiction system free to hit each 
other and run. Since both these proposals require amend­
ment of the statute, the simple and perhaps, complete 
solution can be achieved by adding to that Article the 
proviso:
"Provided that the declaration shall have effect as long 
as it has not been revoked subject to one year's notice".
A worse solution than the British one was made by 
France in its declaration of 1959 which excluded:
"Disputes with any State which, at the date of reference 
of facts and situation giving rise to the dispute, has not 
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice for a period at least equal to that specified 
in this declaration".
This reservation was capable of giving rise to compli­
cated problems. The determination of the date of the
facts and situation giving rise to the dispute is not
189easy , as already mentioned. It could have the effect 
of excluding disputes with States which had accepted the 
jurisdiction for along time before the declaration was 
made. Furthermore, France could have had difficulties for 
determining - according to the terms of its own declara­
tion - which States were excluded and which engagements
190
were superior or inferior to the French engagement.
For example, was it possible to invoke it against States 
whose declarations were made unconditionally especially 
in the light of the rule in the MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY 
A C T IV IT IES  IN  AND AGAINST NICARAGUA case that they are
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terminable after a reasonable time? Could it cover
declarations terminable immediately or if the notice of 
termination required was less than 3 years (the period 
for which the French declaration was made)? The applica­
tion of reciprocity could have complicated these proble— 
192
ms, and might have had the effect of depriving franee 
from resorting to the Court at least vis-a-vis States the
declarations of which were for a period more than 3
193years.
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In 1966, France modified its declaration of 1959. 
By omitting the initial period for which that declaration 
was made, the final phrase of the reservation was omitt­
ed. The reservation is, fortunately, no longer a feature 
of current practice. It disappeared following the French 
termination of the declaration of 1966, in 1974. On the 
other hand, the British reservation appeared to some 
States as acceptable formula. It has been incorporated in 
seven declarations. India was, naturally, the second 
State to make it in 1959 following the Court's judgment 
in the RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER INDIAN TERRITORY case. With 
the termination of Israel's declaration, the reservation 
is to be found in the declarations of Malta, Mauritius, 
New Zealand, Philippines, Somalia and the United Kingdom.
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C H A j P T E R  I V
UNNECESSARY RESERVATIONS 
RATIONE MATERIAE
Many States excluded from the scope of their accep­
tances of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction disputes 
which are already excluded from that jurisdiction by 
virtue of the Court's Statute. Thus, the reservations 
limiting the Court's jurisdiction to legal disputes only, 
or excluding disputes concerning matters which by inter­
national law fall within the jurisdiction of the declara­
nt, appear in may declarations. Also the emphasis that 
the acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction is made on the 
condition of reciprocity can be found in a large number 
of declarations. This condition and the above reserva­
tions will be dealt with in the following sections.
SECTION 1 : RECIPROCITY
Reciprocity plays a major role in the determination 
of whether the Court has jurisdiction over a concrete 
dispute before it, through the determination of the 
common will of the parties to the dispute, or the extent 
to which their declarations coincide in conferring juris­
diction upon the Court. Reciprocity has thus two aspe­
cts to it. First, it means that in a dispute between two 
States, the narrower title of jurisdiction becomes the 
common denomination for both States. It means also that a 
State can invoke a reservation in its opponent’s declara­
tion even though it is not included in its own declara­
tion.  ^ In other words "what is sauce for the goose is 
sauce for the gander"' Reciprocity in this sense has
been treated as a "condition" or "principle", and even
5
sometimes as a "reservation".
The determination of the place of reciprocity in 
the system of compulsory jurisdiction raised some ques­
tions, which have been described as "the most difficult 
and important" 6 questions with regard to the declara-
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tlons under Article 36 (2) of the Statute. Views are
divided with regard to the basis of reciprocity, its 
effect and application. This is due mainly to the phrase­
ology *of Article 36 (2 - 3) and, to some extent, the
position taken by the Court with respect to reciprocity. 
Thesj, points will be examined after considering the 
principle of reciprocity in the declarations accepting 
the Court's jurisdiction.
A - RECIPROCITY IN THE DECLARATIONS OF ACCEPTANCE
Different formulae have been adopted by States in 
regard to reciprocity. 13 of the 46 declarations current­
ly in force stipulate expressly that the Court's juris­
diction is accepted subject to "the condition of recipro- 
city". ' 13 other declarations include what might be 
termed as the "double formula of reciprocity". They 
accept the Court's jurisdiction "in relation to any other 
State ACCEPTING THE SAME OBLIGATION, that is to say, on
g
condition of reciprocity". The same formula appears in 
the 5 other declarations with he sole difference that the
9
words "that is to say" are omitted. The other declara­
tions do not contain any reference to the word "reciproc­
ity",, but 12 of them are made expressly "in relation to 
any other State accepting the same obligation", one is 
made "conditionally"; ^  one simply recognises the Cour- 
t's compulsory jurisdiction "as compulsory"; and one 
recognises that jurisdiction "as provided for in paragr­
aph 2 of the Statute".
B - THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY
(I) The Basis of Reciprocity in the Doctrine
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice provides that "the States 
parties to the present Statute may at any time declare 
that they recognise as compulsory IPSO FACTO and without 
special agreement, in relation to any other State ACCEPT-
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ING THE SANE OBLIGATION the jurisdiction of the Court in 
all legal disputes" concerning four listed categories. 
Paragraph 3 of the same Article adds:
"The declarations referred to above may be made uncondi­
tionally Cthe French texts PURENENT El SIMPLENENT1 or ON
CONDITION OF RECIPROCITY on the part of several or certain 
' • 14
• ' States, or for a certain time".
This Article has been interpreted in two different 
ways in order to determine the basis of reciprocity: the 
interpretation of the said Article as it stands and its 
interpretation by reference to the preparatory works 
especially the proceedings of the Advisory Committee of 
Jurists of 1920.
(i) Paragraph 3 of Article 36 as a basis of reciprocity
In the view of those who follow the first approach, 
the interpretation of paragraph 2 of Article 36 has to 
take into consideration the provision in paragraph 3 that 
the Court's jurisdiction might be accepted "uncondition­
ally or on condition of reciprocity". In other words,
paragraph 3 alone has never been considered as a basis of
15reciprocity, but in connection with paragraph 2 .
Professor G Enriques explains the connection bet­
ween these two paragraphs as follows:
"Si I7on met ces regies en presence l7une de I7autre et 
si on les apprecie dans leur coexistence en tenant compte de 
la reference faite par la premiere a la second, il semble que 
I7on doive conclure que la reciprocity est etablie pour ce qui
concerne la declaration d7 acceptation de la jurisdiction
16
obligatoire, tell qu7elle est prevue par le 2. alinia".
There is no doubt, in his view, that there exists a
distinction between the acceptance of the Court's compul-
17sory jurisdiction with and without reciprocity. In 
supporting this view professor Enriques advanced the 
following arguments: firstly, the very existence of
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paragraph 3 implies that there exists a distinction 
between accepting the Court's jurisdiction with and 
without reciprocity. The only way of affirming the non­
existence of the distinction provided in paragraph 3 
would be to demonstrate that this paragraph is deprived 
of any significance. Secondly, the declarations accepting 
the Court's jurisdiction at that time proved, in his
opinion, the existence of such a distinction. This was so
18because all States, except two, included in their
declarations explicitly or implicitly the condition of 
reciprocity. Accordingly, Enriques has reached the con­
clusion that paragraph 2 Article 36 should be read as if
the words "in relation to any other State accepting the
19same obligation", were not there. Furthermore, the 
idea that paragraph 3 of Article 36 is a suspensive 
condition, and that reciprocity is inherent in the Op­
tional Clause system, is not applicable, in Enriques' 
view, not only because this interpretation is erroneous, 
but:
"plus exactement, 17interpretation de la reciprocity,
tell qu7elle a ete supposee plus haute, ne pent pas etre 
admise, primo, parce que ce n7est pas sur la base de la volo- 
nte des Etats signataires du Statut qu7il taut determiner le 
sens de 1?obiigation de soumettre a 17arbitrage at celui de la 
reciprocite y relative; secondo, par ce que la volonte qui a 
reellement etabli la convention d7arbitage at la reciprocity 
est celle qui est manifestee par la declaration d7acceptation 
de la juridiction obligatoire, volonte qui attribue a la 
reciprocite un sens different de celui qui est expose plus 
haut",
Although professor Hambro believes that reciprocity
is an absolute condition according to paragraph 2 of
Article 36, he points out that paragraph 3 seems to
support the possibility of making declarations without
reciprocity. However such an unconditional acceptance
21cannot be presumed.
Professor J H W Verzij1 also rejects the idea that 
reciprocity is an absolute requirement according to
213
Article 36 (2). "It is, in the contrary, so little a 
principle CONSACRE (principle embodied) by Article 36 (2) 
that paragraph 3 of the same Article explicitly permits 
on a footing of equality declarations on condition of
DD
reciprocity and unconditional declarations."
The aforementioned opinions seem to have confused 
the two types of reciprocity: reciprocity RAT10NE NATER- 
IAE according to paragraph 2 of Article 36 in the sense 
set out in the beginning of this section, and reciprocity 
RATIONE PERSONAE, or as a suspensive condition, according 
to paragraph 3. A reference to the drafting of paragraph 
3 by the Advisory Committee of Jurists in 1920 shows 
clearly that it was inserted as a result of a proposition 
made by Mr Fernandez, the Brazilian delegate, who in­
tended to make it possible for a State to pick and choose 
its partner in the compulsory jurisdiction relationship. 
Fernandez .insisted that the States, in accepting the 
Court's jurisdiction, can condition their acceptance on
the acceptance of that jurisdiction by a particular
27-,
number of States or by certain specified States. " In 
his proposal Fernandez pointed out that States "may 
adhere unconditionally or conditionally to the Article 
providing for compulsory jurisdiction, a possible condi­
tion being reciprocity on the part of a certain number of
Members, or, of a number of Members including such and
24such specified Members." To clarify this proposal,
Fernendez stated before the Third Committee of the First 
Assembly that "he considered that it was inadmissible for 
a State to accept the principle of compulsory jurisdic­
tion without knowing exactly towards whom it accepted
25such obligation." *■ At the same meeting Mr Hube (Swit­
zerland) explained more precisely the meaning of Fernan­
dez's proposal. Hube stated that "the draft of the Sub­
committee provided for reciprocity 'RATIONE HATERIAE'  
whereas Fernandez wished a stipulation establishing
reciprocity 'RATIONE PERSONAE'; both things could without
26difficulty be combined."
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The Intention of the Brazilian delegate was ex­
pressed in the Brazilian declaration of November 1, 1921, 
which was made "on condition of reciprocity and as soon 
as it has likewise been recognised as such by two at
least of the powers permanently represented on the Coun-
27cil of the League of Nations".
Thus the attempt to interpret paragraph 2 of Ar­
ticle 36 in connection with paragraph 3 without reference 
to the preparatory works had led to a misunderstanding of 
the meaning of reciprocity according to that paragraph. 
It seems also that the misuse of the word "reciprocity" 
in paragraph 3 is the main factor which has contributed 
to this confusion. However, the preparatory works of 
paragraph 3 show that this paragraph has its reason 
d'etre and that it is not an interpretation of the words 
"in relation to any other State accepting the same obl­
igation". Nor can paragraph 2 be read as though those 
words were not there, as it has been suggested.
(ii) Paragraph 2 of Article 36 as a basis of reciprocity
Leaving aside the above mentioned views for a 
while, it is generally agreed that reciprocity finds its 
basis in the words "in relation to any other State ac­
cepting the same obligation". These words appeared to the 
late judge Hudson to suggest that every declaration made 
under Article 36 (2) has this characteristic impressed 
upon it. Thus, reciprocity " is not a reservation made by 
the declarant; it is a limitation in the very nature of 
the declaration which operates under, or is made 'in
90
conformity with' paragraph 2 of Article 36". He went
on to state that, form a legal point of view, the inser­
tion of the condition of reciprocity into the decla­
rations of acceptance "seems to serve no purpose; all of 
the declarations contain the limitation IPSO F&CIQ, and
this is true even though they are said to be without
29condition".
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The same view is shared by the late judge professor 
Waldock. The above phrases of paragraph 2 were inserted, 
he observes, "in the earliest declarations EX OBUNDONTI 
COUTELO when jurisdiction under the Optional Clause was 
still untried, and the general opinion is that they are 
otiose ... Reciprocity, in short is a basic constitution­
al provision of the Statute applying to every declaration 
even to a declaration like that of Nicaragua expressed to 
be made 'unconditionally'." These views are widely
adopted.
However, it is to be observed that the words "in 
relation to any other State accepting the same obliga­
tion" do not mean that the declarant State is bound only 
V 1 S -0 -V IS other States which have made exactly, or even 
broadly, the same declarations, reservations and condi-
TO
tions. ",J“ Taking into account the number of declarations 
and the unilateral determination of the conditions on 
which States are willing to accept the Court's jurisdic­
tion. such an interpretation would lead to the nullifica­
tion of the compulsory jurisdiction system. These words 
seem thus to have been inserted in Article 36 "simply for 
the purpose of limiting a State's liability to accept the 
Court’s jurisdiction at the suit of another State to 
COSES HHEN THE DISPUTE POLLS HI  THIN 0 COTEGORY OF D IS ­
PUTES COVERED BY BOTH THEIR DECLOROTIONS". "3 Thus,
having regard to the unilateral drafting of declarations, 
reciprocity is the means by which the common will of the 
parties, as a basis for the Court's jurisdiction, and the 
common element in different texts can be determined in 
any case before the Court.
Reciprocity in this context finds its roots in the 
Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907. Since States were 
generally prepared to accept some enumerated categories 
of matters without reservation, a protocol indicating 
which States had agreed to submit different categories of 
dispute was envisaged. Accordingly, a State would be 
under an obligation to resort to obligatory arbitration
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without reservation in relation to any other State for 
these categories of dispute with regard to which both 
States had accepted that obligation. This was explained 
in the protocol proposed by the British delegation as 
foilows:
"each power signatory to the present protocol accepts 
arbitration without reserve in such of the cases listed in the 
table hereto annexed as are indicated by the letter A in the
column bearing its name. It declares that it makes this engag­
ement with each of the other signatory powers whose reciproc­
ity in this respect is indicated in the same manner in the 
table",
The idea of applying reciprocity to reservations 
had also been contemplated in that conference. It was 
expressed clearly by Mr Georgios Streit in his proposi­
tion that:
"every restriction or reservation which any one of the
signatory Powers may add with respect to matters regarding
which it declares itself willing to accept arbitration, may be 
invoked against that Power, even if the latter has not made 
any reservation or restriction with respect to the said mat­
ters in its notification."
However, the words "in relation to any other State ac­
cepting the same obligation" were inserted by the drafts­
men of the Statute as an indication that a dispute could 
not be referred to the Court unless it fell under a 
category of the four enumerated in paragraph 2 of Article 
36 over which both parties had accepted the Court's 
jurisdiction. Hence, these words were intended to be a 
criterion for determining the obligations of the parties 
as regard the category into which the actual dispute fell 
and not as a requirement for the reciprocal operation of 
reservations, since the insertion of the latter was never 
contemplated by the draftsmen in 1920, as already ex­
plained. However, the interpretation of Article 36 (2
— 3) as allowing States to make their declarations sub­
ject to different reservations has given the principle of 
reciprocity a great importance.
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The view that reciprocity RATIONE MATERIAE finds 
its basis in paragraph 2, and not in paragraph 3 of 
Article 36 is supported also by State practice. There is 
no mention at all of reciprocity "according to paragraph 
3 either in States' declarations accepting the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction, or in their pleadings before the 
Court". On the contrary, 13 declarations state clearly 
that the words "in relation to any other State accepting 
the same obligation" are equivalent to the word "recipro­
city" (RATIONE HATERIAE). "7 States had also referred to 
reciprocity, as provided for in paragraph 2 , in their 
pleadings before the Court.
From what has been said, it might be argued that 
reciprocity finds its basis not only in the words "in 
relation to any other State accepting the same obliga­
tion", but in the system of compulsory jurisdiction
itself. This might be so since it is generally agreed, as 
stated above, that reciprocity is applicable even to 
declarations made unconditionally. In other words, recip­
rocity as an element of jurisdiction, is inherent in the 
compulsory jurisdiction system and could be applied even 
if the above mentioned words had not been provided for in 
Article 36 (2). It could be regarded as a general prin­
ciple applicable to any act conferring jurisdiction upon
7.9
an International Court or tribunal. Thus, the applica­
tion of this principle was contemplated in the Hague 
Peace Conference of 1907, embodied in Article 39 (3) of
the General Act of 1928, and is applicable even between
States which accept the Court's jurisdiction under Ar­
ticle 36, paragraph 1.
(II) The Basis of Reciprocity in the Opinions of the Court
The P. C. I. J. had been consistent in regarding 
reciprocity as embodied in Article 36 (2) of the Statute. 
Thus, in the PHOSPHATES IN  MOROCCO case it stated that 
"as a consequence of reciprocity stipulated in PARAGRAPH 
2 OF ARTICLE 36 of the Statute of the Court, it is recog-
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nlsed that [the] limitation holds good as between the 
parties". 4U In the ELECTRICITY COMPANY OF SOFIA AND
BULGARIA case, the P. C. I. J. also referred to the
"condition of reciprocity" as "laid down in PARAGRAPH 2 
OF ARTICLE 36 of the Court's Statute ... " 41
The I. C. J. followed this view in the first case
in which it had an occasion to comment on the principle
of reciprocity, namely, the ANGLO IRANIAN OIL COMPANY
42case. ■“ However it referred to reciprocity as provided 
for in paragraph 36 (3) in the NORNEGIAN LOANS case.
After declaring that it was following the jurisprudence 
of its predecessor the P. C. I. J. and its own jurisprud­
ence in the ANGLO IRANIAN OIL COMPANY case, the I. C. J. 
stated that:
"In accordance with the condition of reciprocity to which 
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction is made subject in 
both declarations and which is provided for IN ARTICLE 3 6 f 
PARAGRAPH 3 of the Statute ... " 4'“
This statement raises the question why this refere­
nce to paragraph 3 instead of paragraph 2? It is, per­
haps, difficult to consider this statement as indicating 
a deviation from the previous jurisprudence. The refere­
nce by the Court to the jurisprudence of the P. C. I. J. 
and its own judgment in the ANGLO IRANIAN OIL COMPANY 
case may support this view. The assumption that the 
Court's statement was an explanation of reciprocity 
RATIONE PERSONAE seems to be without support. For, first­
ly, the Court was considering reciprocity as a condition 
according to which "Norway, equally with France, is 
entitled to except from the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Court disputes understood by Norway to be essentially 
within its national jurisdiction". 44 Secondly, Norway 
referred in its preliminary objections to reciprocity as
4=;
a principle embodied in Article 36, paragraph 2. 
Furthermore, the absolute character of reciprocity as a
jurisdictional requirement clearly appears from the Cour-
46t's opinions, even in this case. Thus the reference to
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paragraph 3 was " probably, an error".
In the MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IE S  IN  AND 
AGAINST NICARAGUA case the Court referred also to recipr­
ocity according to paragraph 3 of Article 36. In reject­
ing the contention of the U S A  that Nicaragua's declar­
ation was terminable by a simple notice and therefore the 
U S A  had the right, according to the principle of 
reciprocity, to terminate its declaration with immediate 
effect, the Court declared that:
"the United States argument attributes to the concept of 
reciprocity, as embodied in PfiRfi&RfiPHS 2 flf-W 3 a meaning that 
goes beyond the way in which it has been interpreted by the
Court according to its consistent jurisprudence." ^
The Court's reference to reciprocity in this case 
is, thus, based on both paragraphs 2 and 3. Hence this 
statement could be understood as a reference to reciproc­
ity in its two types: reciprocity RATIONE MATERIAL ac­
cording to paragraph 2, and reciprocity RATIONE PERSONAE 
according to paragraph 3. The Court's mention of its 
"consistent jurisprudence" might support this view be­
cause - as already mentioned - the Court referred to
paragraph 3 in the NORMEGIAN LOANS case only.
Whatever the intention of the Court, the drafting
of paragraph 3 of Article 36 as explained above seems to 
leave no doubt that the "condition of reciprocity" provi­
ded for in paragraph 3, refers to another type of recipr­
ocity different from that embodied in paragraph 2. For­
tunately, the Court's reference to paragraph 3 is without 
practical effect, since reciprocity RATIONE MATERIAE had 
been applied - as will be seen - in the same manner in 
all cases in which it was relied on.
C - THE EFFECT OF THE OMISSION OF RECIPROCITY 
FROM THE DECLARATIONS OF ACCEPTANCE
Although the weight of Scholarly opinion regards.
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as pointed out above, the mention of reciprocity in the
49declarations of acceptance as otiose, some commen­
tators take another view, especially when the declaration 
is made unconditionally. It might be, therefore, ap­
propriate to consider the arguments advanced in support 
of this view in order to remove any doubt on this point,
although there is only one declaration which is made
50
"unconditionally".
i*I;
The main argument which is usually cited by the 
writers who reject the idea that the rights and obliga­
tions of the parties under Article 36 (2) of the Statute 
are necessarily reciprocal, is that States are free, 
according to the express terms of paragraph 3 of the said
Article, to accept the Court's jurisdiction "uncondition-
51
ally" or on condition of reciprocity. " This argument
appears to be ill-founded, for, firstly, the history of
52paragraph 3 shows - as has been seen - that it has 
another meaning; secondly, there is no declaration provi­
ding that it is made "without reciprocity"; and thirdly, 
it is believed that to assume that unconditional accep­
tance is an acceptance "without reciprocity" is to impose 
more obligations upon the State concerned and hence such 
interpretation is contrary to the general rules which 
requires a restrictive interpretation in such a case.
It has also been suggested that it should be per­
missible for a State to make a declaration broader than 
Article 36 (2), by dispensing with the requirement of
reciprocity, as it is permissible for it to adopt the 
narrowest interpretation of the Article, by inserting 
reservations. Yet it is emphasised that a mere assertion 
that the acceptance is made unconditionally would not be 
enough; the provision would have to be drafted in the
55
clearest terms. ~ However it might be asked whether it
is likely that a State would be prepared to make such a 
54declaration?
221
Professor Hambro criticises Hudson's view that the 
formula "without condition" seems to serve no purpose, as 
going too far. This is, in spite of his recognition that 
reciprocity is an "absolute condition". In addition to 
the freedom of making unconditional acceptance according 
to paragraph 3, professor Hambro argues that:
"If a State wished to make its acceptance of the compul­
sory jurisdiction not subject to any condition, why should it 
not be able to do so? Is there any rule of international law 
preventing States from accepting far-reaching unilateral 
obligations? They may thereby put themselves in a position of 
inequality as regard other States, They may give up a fraction 
of their sovereignty. They may consider it laudable for States 
to give up some of their sovereignty in order to increase the 
scope of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice". JJ
There is maybe no rule of international law preven­
ting States from accepting far-reaching unilateral oblig­
ation, and there is no doubt that the invocation of 
reservations by reliance on the principle of reciprocity 
may weaken the jurisdiction of the Court, but this is the 
meaning which has been given to reciprocity by both the 
Court - as wi11 be seen - and States. They have never 
challenged the right of a State to rely upon a reserva­
tion included in the other party's declaration. On the 
contrary, it was argued that reciprocity should be ap­
plied in a broader manner so as to cover conditions in
addition to reservations and to be applied even before
5 *4the filing of an application before the Court.
On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine 
States giving up a fraction of their sovereignty and 
putting themselves in a position of inequality in order 
to increase the scope of compulsory jurisdiction. If they 
wished really to increase it, they would have accepted it 
without reservations, a hypothesis in which there is no 
need at all to apply reciprocity. However, having taken 
into consideration the fact that the overwhelming major­
ity of declarations contain reservations, some of which
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have a sweeping effect, it would not seem desirable to 
regard a unique "unconditional" declaration among the 46 
currently in force as a means of improving the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction, and, therefore, deprive that 
State of the right to avail itself of the reservations 
included in the other declarations. The main reason
behind the existence of reciprocity in the compulsory 
jurisdiction system is the establishment of equality
cr*7
between the members of the system. J/ Accordingly it
might not be possible to deprive a State of the right to
58benefit from such a principle without strong reasons.
Professor Enriques adopted a wider criterion than
that adopted by professor Hambro for the determination of
whether a State had accepted the P. C. I. J.'s jurisdic­
tion with or without reciprocity. In professor Enriques' 
view a State was accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of 
that Court without reciprocity not only in case of making 
its declaration explicitly "unconditionally" but also in 
case of making it without mention of the "condition of
reciprocity" or the words "in relation to any other State
59
accepting the same obligation".
After about 30 pages, Enriques reached the con­
clusion that the difference between accepting the Court's 
jurisdiction with or without reciprocity is that in the 
former case States undertook the obligation V I S - f i - V I S  
States which accepted the Optional Clause only, whereas 
their obligation in the latter was assumed in relation to 
all other States which had ratified the Statute of the P. 
C. I. J. regardless of whether or not they made declara-
t.i")
tions under the Optional Clause. " The legal relation­
ship between States which accepted the jurisdiction 
without reciprocity and States which ratified the Statute 
of the P. C. I. J. without accepting its jurisdiction was
based, in his view, on what he called "RECORD RRBITRRL 
6> 1TIP IQUE",  ~~ which allowed the latter to sue the former, 
but not VICE VERSft. 6Z
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This view seems to be inadmissible on more than one 
ground. It is obvious that a declaration accepting the 
Court's compulsory jurisdiction is made under Article 36 
(2) of the Statute. There is no need, therefore, to 
reiterate the terms of that Article. Consequently, how 
can it be possible to deduce from the omission of the 
words "in relation to any other State accepting the same 
obligation" that the declaration is made without recipro­
city. Furthermore, it was not possible for a State which 
had ratified the Statute of the P. C. I. J. without 
accepting the jurisdiction of that Court to sue a State 
party to the Optional Clause for the following reasons: 
firstly, there is no doubt that, according to the addi­
tional Protocol of December 16, 1920 (the Optional Clau­
se) and Article 36 (2) of the Statute of the P. C. I. J., 
a State could not be brought before the Court without 
making a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of that 
Court. In other words, the ratification of the Protocol 
of Signature had to be followed by the declaration, if it 
was not made before. ~~ A State which had ratified the 
Protocol of Signature without accepting the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the P. C. I. J. was in the same position 
as any State which is now a member of the United Nations 
but does not accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. 
It is obvious that the latter State cannot sue another 
party to the system of compulsory jurisdiction. Secondly, 
if Enriques' viewpoint was to be accepted, the principle 
of equality between States accepting the compulsory 
jurisdiction would have been jeopardised. Thirdly, Enri­
ques' "accord" finds no basis in practice. No State 
opting-out of the system has ever sued a State opting-in 
before the Court on the basis of Article 36 (2). The I. 
C. J. has been clear in stating that Article 36 (2) 
requires the making of a declaration of acceptance and
its deposit with the Secretary-General, otherwise no case
•44can be brought before it on that basis. ~
D W Greig appears also to differentiate between the 
existence and non-existence of an express mention of the
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condition of reciprocity in the declarations of accep­
tance. This view is based on the difference between 
reciprocity as a "condition" and as a "principle". He 
points out that the first is incorporated in most declar­
ations of acceptance whereas the second is inherent in
Article 36 (2) of the Statute, which refers to "any other
6*”*State accepting the same obligation". J In his opinion, 
the Court has clarified correctly the difference between 
them in the NORNE&IAN LOANS case, since the Court allowed 
Norway to rely upon the french reservation of domestic 
jurisdiction. Greig observes that:
"... the two reservations placed side by side only ex­
cluded matters within the national jurisdiction as understood 
by the French Government, so that it was not possible -for 
Article 36 (2) to operate at all, certainly not to the extent 
of enabling the Norwegian Government to exclude the subject 
matter of the dispute from the Court’s jurisdiction on the 
grounds that it fell within Norway's national jurisdiction.
How, then, was the Court able to reach the conclusion 
that Norway, could rely on the French reservation to the 
extent of enabling it to classify the dispute as being within 
Norwegian domestic jurisdiction? The Court's explanation was66
that both declarations included a condition of reciprocity."
It seems that Greig1s reliance on the Court's 
reference to reciprocity as embodied in the declarations 
of the parties to the dispute to reach this conclusion, 
contradicts what he says in the same page about the
ELECTRICITY COMPANY OF SOFIA AND BULGARIA case. He points
out that Bulgaria was able to invoke the Belgian reserva­
tion RATIONE TENPORIS because "it was accepted by both 
parties, and by the Court that Bulgaria could rely upon 
the terms of the Bulgarian reservation." For this
reason and the fact that the Bulgarian declaration was 
made unconditionally, "it is clear that whether the
matter was approached as a condition, or as a principle
of reciprocity, the conclusion would have been the same. 
The area common to both declarations was restricted by
the Belgium time limitation, so that from either point of
68view, Bulgaria was in effect relying upon it."
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It may be difficult to find such a difference 
concerning reciprocity in these two cases. There is no 
indication that the P. C. I. J. took into consideration 
the agreement of the parties in regard to the invocation 
of the Belgian reservation, or the opinion of the Court 
would have been different if there had not been such an 
agreement. Also, the P. C. I. J. referred in the ELECTRI­
CITY COMPANY OF SOFIA AND BULGARIA case - as in the 
NORNEGIAN LOANS case - to the declaration of Bulgaria as 
containing the condition of reciprocity. The Court said 
that "... the condition of reciprocity laid down in 
paragraph 2 of Article 36 ... and repeated in the Bul­
garian declaration, is applicable as between the par- 
69ties". Moreover, did the French government challenge 
the possibility of relying upon its reservation of domes­
tic jurisdiction? What is the obstacle that could prevent 
Norway from relying in that case on the french reserva­
tion to the extent of enabling it to exclude the subject 
matter of the dispute from the Court's jurisdiction? 
Finally, what is the effect of the difference between the 
"PRINCIPLE" of reciprocity and the "CONDITION" of recipr­
ocity since the former "will normally enable one party to 
rely upon the reservation contained in the other party's 
declaration"? - as Greig himself concedes. /0
Almost the same argument was put by professor
Waldock, as a counsel for the Indian government in the
RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER INDIAN TERRITORY case. He referred
to "the condition of reciprocity which is inherent in the
Optional Clause" and "the condition of reciprocity ex-
71pressly made in the Indian declaration...". Professor 
Waldock stressed the difference between making a declara­
tion with or without the express condition of reciproci­
ty. Reciprocity "applies, perhaps A FORTIORI when there 
is such an express condition in the defendant State's 
declaration. For - and the point seemed obvious to us- 
the sole purpose of such an express condition is to make 
clear that the Court's compulsory jurisdiction is ac­
cepted only on the basis of a complete equality of rights
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and obligations between the declarant State and any other 
State adhering to the Optional Clause", 1 he argued. As 
a response to the Portuguese contention that the express 
condition of reciprocity adds nothing to a declaration, 
professor Waldock pointed out that "very possibly an 
express condition of reciprocity adds little or nothing 
to the legal effect of the declaration." 7~
However, this view was rejected by the Court in
74that case. In fact the Court did not make any dif­
ference between the "condition" of reciprocity and the
75"principle" of reciprocity - as Greig himself admits ' - 
or between the existence or non-existence of an express 
mention of reciprocity, as will be seen shortly. Conse­
quently, reciprocity produces its effect IPS/9 LEGE since 
it is inherent in the compulsory jurisdiction system, 76 
and the words "on condition of reciprocity" in the dec­
larations of acceptance are "unnecessary and presumably 
inserted EX ABUNBANTl CRUTELA". 77 However this is not to 
say that States cannot renounce the right to invoke the 
principle of reciprocity, or that the Court has to apply
it PROPRIO MQTU if the respondent State did not invoke
. . 78it.
D -  RECIPROCITY IN  THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURT
The P. C. I. J. had the first opportunity to dis­
cuss the application of reciprocity in the PHOSPHATES IN
79MOROCCO case between Italy and France. The French dec­
laration contained the reservation of "disputes which may 
arise after the ratification of the ... declaration with
regard to situations or facts subsequent to such ratific-
RO
ation". The Italian declaration did not contain such a 
reservation, but was made subject to previous recourse to 
diplomatic channels. In its preliminary objection, France 
invoked the principle of reciprocity claiming the benefit 
of the Italian reservation in addition to its own reser­
vation. The Court sustained the preliminary objection 
based on the French reservation. It said:
r?r7'J
"This declaration [the Italian] does not contain the 
limitation that appears in the French declaration concerning 
the situations or facts with regard to which the dispute 
arose; nevertheless as a consequence of the condition of 
reciprocity stipulated in paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the 
Statute of the Court, it is recognised that this limitation 
holds good as between the parties".
The importance of this case, as far as reciprocity 
is concerned, lies in France's reliance on the words "in 
relation to any other State accepting the same obliga­
tion" as equivalent to the condition of reciprocity, a 
view which was confirmed by the Court's reference to 
Article 36 (2) of the Statute. Yet the Court's reference 
to reciprocity in regard to the invocation of a reserva­
tion contained in the defendant's own declaration seems 
- as professor Waldock observed - to be a misuse of that 
term. "The true ground would seem to be the fundamental 
rule that a State can never be brought before the Court
except on the conditions on which it has consented to
82jurisdiction."
In the ELECTRICITY CQtiPRNY OF SOFIR RTW BUL&RRIR 
case reciprocity was directly in issue. Here, the court 
had also to examine the application of reciprocity to the 
reservation RRTIONE TEMPORIS, which had been included in 
the applicant’s (Belgium) declaration. Although the 
Bulgarian government accepted the Court's jurisdiction 
"unconditionally", it relied upon the Belgian reservation 
in its objection to the Court's jurisdiction. In accept­
ing the Bulgarian objection the Court said:
"The Belgian Government relies on the limitation RRTIONE ■ 
TEMPORIS embodied in the Belgian declaration concerning the 
situations and facts with regard to which the dispute has 
arisen, in order to dispute the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Although this limitation does not appear in the Bulgarian 
Government's own declaration, it is common ground that, in 
consequence of the condition of reciprocity laid down in 
paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Court's Statute and repeated 
in the Bulgarian declaration, it is applicable as between the 
parties."
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Several judges had confirmed in their separate and
dissenting opinions in this case the Court's holding that
the respondent State can rely on any reservation to a
declaration of acceptance which the applicant State has
84
expressed in its declaration.
The significance of this case is that neither did 
the Court refer to the UNCONDITIONAL acceptance of its 
jurisdiction, nor did Belgium contend that Bulgaria had, 
accordingly, no right to rely on the principle of recipr­
ocity. On the contrary, the Court considered reciprocity 
as embodied in the Bulgarian declaration. Thus, there 
should still be no doubt that the words "in relation to 
any other State accepting the same obligation" refer to 
reciprocity.
The I. C. J. has endorsed this view. Thus in the 
ANGLO - IRANIAN OIL COMPANY case, Iran, the respondent 
State, objected to the Court's jurisdiction on the ground 
that the Court had jurisdiction only in so far as juris­
diction is conferred on it by the declarations of the
qc;
parties. " Accordingly, Iran relied on the terms of its 
declaration, which was limited to disputes relating 
directly or indirectly to the application of treaties 
accepted by Iran and subsequent to the ratification of 
the declaration, provided that these disputes did not 
concern, INTER ALIA , questions which, by international
86law, fell exclusively within its domestic jurisdiction. 
Although there was no need for the invocation of recip­
rocity when a State relied on its own reservation, ac­
cording to the rule mentioned above, the Court made a
brief statement with respect to reciprocity. After stat­
ing that its jurisdiction depended on the declarations 
made by the parties under Article 36 (2) on condition of 
reciprocity, the Court elucidated the function of recipr­
ocity as a necessary element for the determination of the 
scope of its jurisdiction through the determination of 
the mutual obligations covered by the declarations of the
parties to the dispute before it. The Court said:
"By these declarations, jurisdiction is conferred on the 
Court only to the extent to which the two declarations coin­
cide in conferring it. As the Iranian Declaration is more 
limited in scope than the United Kingdom Declaration, it is
the Iranian Declaration on which the Court must base itself.
87
This is the common ground between the Parties."
D O
The NORNE&IAN LOANS case provided the Court with
another occasion to develop and examine in more detail
the principle of reciprocity, France, the applicant
State, had appended to its declaration a reservation
excluding "differences relating to matters which are
essentially within the national jurisdiction as under-
89stood by the Government of the French Republic." The 
Norwegian declaration did not contain this reservation, 
but was made "on condition of reciprocity". Four prelimi­
nary objections were filed by Norway. The first objection 
consisted of two parts. In the first part, it was claimed 
that, since the dispute was about the payment in gold of 
the bonds held by French nationals, it did not fall
within any of the categories enumerated in Article 36 (2) 
relating to international law, but within the domestic 
jurisdiction of Norway. In the second part, Norway con­
sidered itself "fully entitled" to rely on the French
90
reservation mentioned above. " It agreed that there 
could be no possible doubt that the dispute fell within 
its jurisdiction:
"If however, there should still be some doubt, the Nor­
wegian Government would rely upon the reservations made by the 
French Government in its Declaration of March 1st, 1949, by 
virtue of the principle of reciprocity, which is embodied in 
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court and which 
has been clearly expressed in the Norwegian Declaration of 
November 16th, 1946, the Norwegian Government cannot be bound, 
VIS-A-VIS the French Government, by undertakings which are 
either broader or stricter than those given by the latter 
Government."
The Norwegian Government stated clearly in its prelimi­
nary objection that although it did not insert any such 
reservation in its own declaration it had the right to 
rely upon the reservation placed by France upon its own
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92undertakings.
In the second objection, Norway relied upon the 
French reservation RQTIQNE TEMPOR1S limiting the Court's 
jurisdiction to disputes which may arise in respect of 
facts or situations subsequent to the ratification of its 
declaration.
The Court having sustained the second part of the 
first preliminary objection, did not examine the first 
part of that objection. However, it ruled that:
"The Court notes in the first place that the present case 
has been brought before it on the basis of Article 36, paragr­
aph 2, of the Statute and of the corresponding Declarations of 
Acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction; that in the present 
case the jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the declara­
tions made by the parties in accordance with Article 36, 
paragraph 2, of the Statute on condition of reciprocity; and 
that, since two unilateral declarations are involved, such 
jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court only to the extent to 
which the two Declarations coincide in conferring it. A com­
parison between the two declarations shows that the French 
declaration accepts the Court’s jurisdiction within narrower 
limits than the Norwegian Declaration; consequently, the 
common will of the Parties, which is the basis of the Court’s 
jurisdiction, exists within these narrower limits indicated by 
the French reservation. 94
Then the Court continued:
"In accordance with the condition of reciprocity to which 
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction is made subject in 
both Declarations and which is provided for in Article 36, 
paragraph 3, of the Statute, Norway, equally with France, is 
entitled to except from the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court disputes understood by ^Norway to be essentially within 
its national jurisdiction." J
It is to be noted that this pronouncement of the 
Court would have been necessary only if the Court had 
examined the first part of the first Norwegian objection 
and found that the object of the dispute was covered by 
international law.
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The question whether or not the principle of recip-
96rocity applies to the Portuguese Third Condition had 
been given extensive importance in the RIGHT OF PASSAGE 
OVER INDIAN TERRITORY case. 97 The Indian Government
relied on the principle of reciprocity in three prelimi­
nary objections: the first, second and fourth. It chal­
lenged the Court's jurisdiction on the grounds that the 
Portuguese declaration was invalid, inasmuch as it gave 
Portugal a right which was denied to other signatories; 
the premature filing of the Portuguese application "vio­
lated equality, mutuality and reciprocity to which India 
was entitled under the Optional Clause under the express 
condition of reciprocity contained in her declaration, 
and finally the filing of the said application had vio­
lated the reciprocal right conferred upon India by the
Optional Clause to invoke the third condition in the
98Portuguese declaration.
The grounds on which the Court rejected these
99
objections have already been examined. However, it
might be worth recalling that the significance of this 
case lies in the Court's statement that "the notions of 
reciprocity and equality are not abstract conceptions. 
They must be related to some provisions of the Statute or 
of the Declarations," ^  and the Court's explanation, 
for the first time, of the expression "the same obliga­
tion" incorporated in Article 36 (2) of the Statute. In
explaining it the Court said:
"It is not necessary that the ’same obligation’ should be 
irrevocably defined at the time of the deposit of the Declara­
tions of Acceptance for the entire period of its duration. 
That expression means no more than that - as between States 
adhering to the Optional Clause each and all of them are bound 
by such identical obligations as may exist at any time during 
which the acceptance is mutually binding". ^
By this statement the Court affirmed its jurisprud­
ence that the declarations of States need not be "identi­
cal" in a sense that they must include the same reserva-
tions or conditions. It is clear form the cases examined 
above that the Court considered the declarations as 
containing the same obligations though they were dif­
ferent in their contents. Therefore, the expression 
"identical obligations" should be considered to bear the 
meaning that the parties to a dispute before the Court 
must have undertaken the obligation of accepting the 
Court's compulsory jurisdiction, and that the scope of 
this obligation is to be determined by the exclusion of 
reservations appended to both declarations at the time of 
the filing of the application.
Reciprocity was one among other grounds on which
Bulgaria objected to the court's jurisdiction in the
1 O'5
AERIAL INCIDENT OF JULY 2 7 t h , 1955 (Israel v Bulgaria).
In its second preliminary objection Bulgaria contended 
that since Israel excluded disputes prior to the date of 
its submission to the Court's jurisdiction, the Govern­
ment of Bulgaria, could not, pursuant to the principle of 
reciprocity, "be regarded as having accepted the compul­
sory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
1 ot;
in respect to the facts prior to December 14th, 1955". 
Bulgaria relied also on the principle of reciprocity in 
its fourth preliminary objection that the dispute was 
essentially within its domestic jurisdiction and, there­
fore, excluded from the Court's jurisdiction according to
104
Israel's declaration. " The Court lacked jurisdiction
on the ground that the Bulgarian declaration, which
formed part of the Protocol signature of the P. C. I. J.,
ceased to be in force. Accordingly, it found it necessary
1 f)*”!
to proceed to the consideration of these objections.
As in the RIGHT OF PASSAGE case, the Court con­
sidered the reliance on reciprocity as an inappropriate 
use of this term, and hence rejected the claim to benefit 
from its application, in two other cases; the INTERHANDEL 1 
case and the MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IE S  IN  AND 
AGAINST NICARAGUA 1U7 case in respect to RATIONE TEMPORIS 
reservations and time-limits conditions respectively.
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E - DELIMITATION OF RECIPROCITY
The fact that reciprocity forms an integral part of 
the system of compulsory jurisdiction does not mean that 
its application is absolute with respect to any reserva­
tion or condition incorporated in the declarations of 
acceptance. The following limitations on its operation 
can be inferred from the Court’s jurisprudence.
(I) Reciprocity Operates with Respect to Reservations Only
The idea of the "absolute reciprocity" in a sense 
that it applies to any limitation or condition contained 
in the opponent's declaration has been adopted by the
late judge professor Waldock in his article "Decline of
1 OR
the Optional Clause". He relies on the Court's state­
ment in the ELECTRICITY COMPANY OF SOFIA AND BULGARIA 
case that the Bulgarian reservation RAT I  ONE TEMPORIS was 
applicable between the parties, and on the treatment of 
several judges in their dissenting opinions in the same 
case, of the limitations, conditions and reservation in 
the declaration of one party as automatically read into 
that of the other party, as a basis for his statement 
that "it could be regarded as settled that, in virtue of 
the principle of reciprocity laid down in the Optional 
Clause, a defendant State can always rely upon a limita­
tion, condition or reservation in its opponent's declara- 
109
tion". It is true that some judges referred in their
discussion of the application of reciprocity to "L IM IT A ­
TIONS" and "CONDITIONS". However it seems difficult to 
deduce from their opinions that they had considered 
reciprocity as applicable to CONDITIONS as distinguished 
from reservations. Firstly, the terms reservations,
limitations and conditions are - as already mentioned 111 
- usually used interchangeably. This is supported by the 
reference of judge Eysinga and judge AD HOC Papazoff in 
the same case, to the reservations of previous recourse 
to other methods of pacific settlement, and ratione 
temporis as a "CONDITION" and "LIMITATION" respectively. 112
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Secondly, the judges opinions addressed mainly the reser­
vation RATIONE TEMPORIS which undoubtedly falls within 
the scope of the operation of reciprocity. Finally, a 
general statement like that of judge Anzilotti that "as a 
result of ... declarations, an agreement came into exis­
tence between the two States accepting the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court, in conformity with Article 36 
of the Statute and subject to the limitations and condi­
tions resulting from the declarations" 1-v is still true 
in a sense that disputes covered by RESERVATIONS might be 
excluded by the application of reciprocity, but the 
application of conditions is due to the terms of the
declarations themselves and the general rule that States
cannot be brought before the Court except within the 
conditions set forth in their declarations. However
professor Waldock's argument concerns the application of
114reciprocity as to time limits conditions. He repeated 
the same view on behalf of India in the RIGHT OF PASSAGE 
OVER INDIAN TERRITORY case while advocating the applica­
tion of reciprocity to the Portuguese Third Condition. 
Professor Waldock argued in this case that " the Optional 
Clause does give such a reciprocal right to invoke ANY 
condition, reservation or limitation in the other Party's 
Declaration".
The question has, however, been settled by the 
Court, as already mentioned in the RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER
INDIAN TERRITORY case, and the MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY
A C T IV IT IES  IN  AND AGAINST NICARAGUA case. In the former, 
the Court rejected the claim to benefit from the Por­
tuguese Third Condition, and in the latter stated without 
any ambiguity that:
"the notion of reciprocity is concerned with the scope 
and substance o-f the commitments entered into including reser­
vations, and not with the -formal condition o-f their creation, 
duration or extinction."
(II) Non-application of Reciprocity 
to the Pre-seisin Period
In addition to the above view professor Waldock 
argued also in the same case, VIZ, the RIGHT OF PASSAGE, 
that reciprocity should operate from the date of the 
deposit of a declaration and not only from the date of 
filing of an application. This was because reciprocity 
"was clearly intended to be a general and continuing 
reciprocity governing the relations between the two 
States from the establishment of the judicial bond bet­
ween them until the date of its termination by the expiry 
of the declaration of one of them." A/ This view was, 
however, rejected by the Court. After reiterating its 
jurisprudence concerning the application of reciprocity, 
the Court indicated the difference between the date of 
the deposit of a declaration and the date of the filing 
of an application. The contractual relations between the 
parties and the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court are 
to be established at the former date, the Court observed. 
"For it is on that very date that the consensual bond,
which is the basis of the Optional Clause, come into
11Sbeing between the States concerned". . On the other
hand the "identical obligation" that exists between the 
parties is to be determined at the date of the seisin be­
cause:
"when a case is submitted to the Court, it is always 
possible to ascertain what are at that moment, the reciprocal 
obligations of the Parties in accordance with their respective 
Declarations".
This view has been confirmed by the Court in the 
MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY A CT IV IT IE S  IN  AND AGAINST 
NICARAGUA case by rejecting the United States argument
that reciprocity should be applied before the date of the
120filing of an application.
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(III) Reciprocity Does Not Enable a State to Rely Upon a 
Reservation Not Included in the Opponent's Declar­
ation
The manner in which the United States invoked the 
principle of reciprocity in the INTERHANBEL case obliged 
the Court to examine this limitation. The United States 
declaration contained a reservation restricting the 
Court's jurisdiction to disputes "hereafter arising", 
i.e., after August 26, 1946. The declaration of Switzer­
land, the respondent, did not include such a reservation, 
but was effective on July 28, 1948. The United States 
contended that, in virtue of reciprocity the Court's 
jurisdiction was limited to disputes arising after July 
28, 1948. The Court rejected this objection unanimously 
on the grounds that:
"Reciprocity in the case of Declarations accepting the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court enables a Party to invoke 
a reservation to that acceptance which it has not expressed in 
its own declaration but which the other Party has expressed in 
its Declaration. For example, Switzerland, which has not 
expressed in its Declaration any reservation R.RTIOME T E M PO RI S, 
while the United States has accepted the compulsory jurisdic­
tion of the Court only in respect of disputes subsequent to 
August 26, 1946, might, if in the position of the Respondent,
invoke by virtue of reciprocity against the United States the 
American Reservation if the United States attempted to refer 
to the Court a dispute with Switzerland which has arisen 
before August 26, 1946. This is the effect of reciprocity in 
this connection, Reciprocity enables the State which had made 
.the wider acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court to rely 
upon the reservations to the acceptance laid down by the other 
Party. There the effect of reciprocity ends. It cannot justify 
a State ... in relying upon a restriction which the other 
F'arty ... had not included in its own Declaration,"
On the same ground the Court overruled the United 
States objection to its JURISDICTION IN  MILITARY AND 
PARAMILITARY A CTIV IT IES case that it could disregard the 
clause of six months notice inserted in its declaration 
V IS - A - V I S  Nicaragua. The Court said "it appears clearly 
that reciprocity cannot be invoked in order to exclude
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departure from the terms of a State's own declaration,
122whatever its scope, limitations or conditions".
F - CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions might be drawn from what 
has been said above:
Reciprocity forms an integral part of the Optional 
Clause. It is an essential element in the determination 
of the Court's jurisdiction, through the determination of 
the common will of the parties to a concrete case before 
the Court. It is, therefore of a great importance since 
the declarations of acceptance are drafted unilaterally 
and consequently include different reservations.
Reciprocity in this context finds the basis in the 
requirement of the establishment of equality between 
States party to any treaty which permits the making of 
reservations. Thus, it has been applied to obligatory 
arbitration treaties and become a general rule of ar­
bitral law. However as far as the Optional Clause is 
concerned, it finds its basis in the words "in relation 
to any other State accepting the same obligation" set 
forth in Article 36, paragraph 2. This view is supported 
by the practice of States, both in their declarations of 
acceptance, though many formulae have been used, and in 
their pleadings before the Court. They have never refer­
red to reciprocity according to paragraph 3. The Court's 
jurisprudence also supports this view, though it referred 
to paragraph 3 twice.
The TRflVQUX PREPRRRT01RES of the Committee of 
Jurists of 1920 shows that the words " ... or on condi­
tion of reciprocity on the part of several or certain 
States" refer to reciprocity RQTICiNE PERSQNfiE i.e. the 
possibility of making a declaration on condition that, 
until the acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction by 
certain determined States, it cannot be regarded as an
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effective declaration.
It follows that, since all the declarations are 
made according to Article 36 (2), reciprocity is ap­
plicable to every declaration regardless of whether it is 
made without this condition, or "unconditionally". Its 
insertion is, thus, unnecessary.
The requirement of the parties' acceptance of the 
"same obligation" does not mean that the declaration must 
contain the same reservations or conditions. It means no 
more than both declarations must involve within their 
scope the subject matter of the dispute, and that each 
party is entitled to rely upon any reservation inco­
rporated in the opponent's declaration. In other words, 
jurisdiction is conferred on the Court only within the 
narrower limits.
The fact that a State has the right to invoke any 
reservation in its opponent's declaration means neither, 
that the Court has to apply reciprocity "PRQPRIQ MOTU" in 
case that the interested party did not invoke it, nor 
that the exercise of such right is without limits. On the 
contrary, reciprocity should not be regarded as an abstr­
act conception, but States in invoking it must take into 
consideration that reciprocity operates only in regard to 
reservations as distinguished from conditions; that the 
crucial date in the application of reciprocity is the 
date of the seisin, and finally, that they are not en­
titled in the name of reciprocity, to rely upon a reser­
vation which the opponent's declaration does not contain.
Since every State has an absolute right to invoke 
the conditions included in its declaration as a bar to 
the Court's jurisdiction, reliance on the principle of 
reciprocity would be a miss-use of that term. The ap­
propriate rule, in such a case, is that jurisdiction is 
conferred on the Court only within the conditions set 
forth in the declaration of acceptance.
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Within the limits mentioned above, there is a 
complete reciprocity in the relations between States 
party to any dispute before the Court.
SECTION (2) : THE OBJECTIVE FORMULA OF DOMESTIC
JURISDICTION RESERVATION
As has been seen in the first chapter, the general 
feature of arbitration treaties concluded in the era 
before the establishment of the League of Nations was the 
insertion of clauses excluding from the competence of 
tribunals disputes concerning vital interests, national 
honour and independence. By retaining the power of inter­
preting these vague terms, there was no need for States 
to speak of the reservation of domestic jurisdiction. For
the first term alone was broad enough to cover matters
122bfalling within the reserved domain. In those cir­
cumstances the principle of absolute sovereignty had been 
fully preserved. However the conflict between the desire 
to protect the independence of States and the require-
JOT
ments of an organised international Society, led to
exclusion form the conciliation function of the Council
(or the Assembly) disputes arising out "of matter which
by international law is solely within domestic jurisdic-
124tion of" States. This provision, which has been
12described as "one of the last refuges of sovereignty", 
has been maintained, but with a totally different ver­
sion, in Article 2 (7) of the Charter of the United
Nations. The latter provides:
"Nothing in the present 'Charter shall authorise the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
.within the domestic jurisdiction o-f any State or shall require 
the Members . to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Chapter",
It is not intended here by the reference to these 
two Articles, to discuss all the problems to which they 
have given rise. Such a discussion is beyond the object
of this study. Their relevance is limited, firstly to the
1 ^6fact that they have provided for two formulae,  ^ which 
have been used in the declarations accepting the Court's 
jurisdiction, and, secondly to the question whether 
Article 2 (7) is applicable as such to the Court, being
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the main judicial organ of the United Nations.
Thus the determination of the scope of the reserva­
tion of domestic jurisdiction and its significance, it is 
believed, might better be discussed separately according 
to these two forms before the consideration of whether or 
not the reservation proved to be a useful means in prac­
tice for contesting the jurisdiction of the Court.
A - THE COVENANT FORMULA
The insertion of the reservation of domestic juris-
127
diction in Article 15 (8) of the Covenant did not as
such lead directly to the inclusion of the reservation in 
the declarations made under Article 36 (2) of the Statute 
of the P. C. I. J. The jurisdiction of the Court having 
been regulated by an independent instrument and derived 
from declarations made under the Optional Clause, was not 
affected in any way by the provision of Article 15 (8) . 
In fact, the provision did not affect even the general 
obligation undertaken under Articles 12 - 14 of the
Covenant to settle by arbitration or judicial settlement
disputes recognised to be suitable for such forms of
1 7R
settlement. J"“ However it served as a model copied in 
Article 39 of the Geneva General Act of 1928 as one of 
the reservations which could be made by States adhering 
to the Act. From this Article (i.e. 39) the reservation 
of domestic jurisdiction seems to have found its way into
1 79
the declarations made under the Optional Clause. 
Thus, it was made for the first time by the United King­
dom and the members of the Commonwealth (Australia, 
Canada, India, New Zealand and South Africa) in their 
declaration deposited in 1929. The declarations excluded:
"disputes with regard to question5 which by international 
law ••fall exclusively within [their] jurisdiction", ~ ^
In the following year, the reservation appeared in 
the declarations deposited by Albania, Iran and Rumania,
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then by Poland in 1931; Brazil in 1937, Iraq in 1938 and 
Egypt in 1939. *'“’1 It is asserted that the insertion of 
this reservation into the United Kingdom and the domini­
ons declarations was due mainly to the apprehension of
certain Dominions that their immigration laws might be
17,2
encroached upon by the P. C. I. J. " This was made 
abundantly clear in the despatch sent in 1925 by the 
Government of New Zealand to the Home Government on the 
subject of the compulsory jurisdiction.
The reservation of domestic jurisdiction in this 
form can be found now in the declarations of Barbados, 
Canada, Democratic Kampuchea, El Salvador, Gambia, Hon­
duras, Kenya, Malta, Mauritius, Pakistan, Senegal and 
1^ 4Switzerland.
(I) The Scope of the Formula "Matters Exclusively Within 
Domestic Jurisdiction According to International Law"
The concept of domestic jurisdiction was dealt with 
by the P. C. I. J. in its Advisory Opinion on the NATION­
ALITY DECREES IN  TUNIS AND MOROCCO. 1"  A 1though the 
question at issue was the determination whether the 
Council of the League of Nations was competent or not 
under Article 15 (8) of the Covenant to deal with the 
dispute which arose out of the Nationality decrees issued 
by France, the opinion of the Court is of a critical 
importance with respect to the scope of the reservation 
of domestic jurisdiction. For, firstly, it is still the 
most extensive and most influential opinion that has so 
far been given on the question. Secondly, it concentrated 
on terms identical to those which are embodied in the 
declarations of acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction, 
namely, matters solely or exclusively within the domestic 
jurisdiction of States according to international law.
The Court pointed out, first, that its task was 
limited to the determination of the nature of the matters 
in dispute, and not whether the parties were or not
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competent in law to take or refrain from taking a par­
ticular action. Such determination appeared to depend to 
a large extent on the meaning of the phrase "solely 
within the domestic jurisdiction". This phrase seemed to 
the Court " to contemplate certain matters which, though 
they may very closely concern the interests of more than 
one State, are not, in principle regulated by interna­
tional law". ^
The Court then proceeded to the determination of 
the nature of the boundaries between domestic and inter­
national jurisdiction and the criterion to be applied for 
determining whether a matter belongs to the one of the 
other sphere. Qualifying the above definition, the Court 
said:
"The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely 
within the jurisdiction o-f a State is an essentially relative 
question; it depends upon the development o-f international 
relations. Thus in the present state of international law, 
questions of nationality are, in the opinion of the Court, in 
principle, within this reserved domain.
For the purpose of the present opinion, it is enough to 
observe that it may well happen that a matter which, like that 
of nationality, is not, in principle, regulated by interna­
tional law, the right of a State to use its discretion is 
nevertheless restricted by obligations which it may have 
undertaken towards other States, In such a case, jurisdiction 
which, in principle, belongs solely to the State, is limited 
by rules of international law. Article 15 (8) then ceases to 
apply as regards those States which are entitled to invoke 
such rules, and the dispute as to the question whether a State 
has or has not the right to take certain measures becomes in 
these circumstances a dispute of an international character 
and falls outside^the scope of the exception contained in this 
paragraph
This dictum of the Court has many significance:
1. The test for determining whether a matter
falls within domestic or international jurisdiction 
is international law. This test received its im­
petus from the terms of the reservation itself
[both in Article 15 (8) or in the declaration]
which refer to international law. Thus by referring 
to "the development of international relations", 
the Court meant "the development of international 
law This is so because the Court continued
"Thus in the present state of international law 
Furthermore the phrase "regulated by inter­
national law" in the Court's definition of the
concept of domestic jurisdiction supports this 
138view.
The question whether a certain matter is
within or outside domestic jurisdiction turns
simply on whether the matter involved is or is not
the subject of international obligations stemming
from the sources of international law as indicated
in Article 38 of the Statute of the International
139
Court of Justice.
There are no matters which by their intrinsic 
character fall within the reserved domain. A matter 
is either regulated by international law - general 
or particular - and therefore belongs to the sphere
of international jurisdiction, or left by interna-
140
tional law for regulation by States ‘ Thus the
IN S T I  TUT BE DROIT INTERNQTIQNfiL rejected by a large
majority (63 votes to 5) a proposition that there
are certain matters which fall by their nature
141within the domestic jurisdiction of States.
In determining the scope of Domestic Jurisdic­
tion the dynamic character of international law 
must not be overlooked. The state of international 
law - general and particular - is, thus of a criti­
cal importance. Consequently, the moving boundaries 
between domestic and international jurisdiction may 
have the following implications:
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Firstly, the reserved domain may decrease. In 
fact this is a natural consequence of the grad­
ual development of general international law and 
the process of treaty making. The effect of the 
diminution of the sphere of domestic jurisdic­
tion differs, therefore, according to the reas­
ons by which a matter has become a subject of 
international obligations. If this was due to a 
rule of general international law, the matter 
ceases universally to be within domestic juris­
diction, but if it was due to the assumption of 
a treaty obligations, the matter ceases to be a
matter of domestic jurisdiction only between the
142parties to the treaty.
Secondly, the sphere of domestic jurisdiction 
may increase. This is a result of the first 
implication. For inasmuch as the new accepted 
obligations remove a matter from the reserved 
domain, the theory implies that a matter prin­
cipally of domestic jurisdiction, but trans­
ferred to the international jurisdiction, can be 
transferred back to the sphere of domestic 
jurisdiction, this can be accomplished either by 
terminating certain treaties or concluding new 
treaties according to which the States free
themselves from the obligation that has removed
143the matter from their reserved domain.
Thus the scope of the reserved domain differs 
according to the content of general international law at 
any given moment on the one hand, and according to the 
international obligations assumed by the States in their 
relations with each other on the other hand. For a matter 
that has been transferred to international jurisdiction 
in the relations between States A and B may still fall 
within the reserved domain in the relations between 
States A and C or B and C.
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The Court also explained what would and what would 
not suffice to remove a matter from domestic to interna­
tional jurisdiction. Firstly, it said that it was certain 
that the mere fact that a State brought a dispute before 
an international organization (The League of Nations) 
would not suffice to give a dispute an international 
character. Nor would it suffice that the complainant 
should rely on engagement of an international character, 
"i.e. merely dress up its complaint in the guise of one
founded on alleged international obligations of the 
144defendant". The matter would enter the sphere of
international jurisdiction when the legal grounds relied
on are of judicial importance for the settlement of the
. . . 145dispute.
In the light of this background, both the P. C. I. 
J. and the International Court of Justice have dealt with 
the reservation of domestic jurisdiction as will be ;seen. 
The Institut de Droit International followed the general 
lines of the above opinion. This can be illustrated by 
the definition adopted by the Institut in 1954:
" ’The reserved domain’ is the domain o-f State activities 
where the jurisdiction of the State is not bound by interna­
tional law.
’The extent of this domain depends on international law
146and varies according to its development’."
This definition was considered as a correct state­
ment of the general concept of the reserved domain of 
domestic jurisdiction, in spite of the radical changes- 
at least of wording - brought about by Article 2 (7) of 
the Charter of the United Nations.
The above definition has been widely adopted by 
writers as the correct LE&fiL definition of the term 
domestic jurisdiction. For, this test, being based on 
whether the matter is or is not one regulated by interna­
tional law, or that based on "whether in the particular
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case there exists a concrete rule of international law
147
limiting the State's freedom of action", and that
based on "whether the matters involved are or are not the 
subject of international obligations, whether arising
under treaty or international agreement, or under rule
143of general customary international law", lead to a
similar practical result as long as it can be considered
149
that the first two tests include treaty obligations. 
Consequently, if the reservation of matters of domestic 
jurisdiction is included in the declarations with the aim 
of objecting to the Court's jurisdiction to examine such 
a matter at all, it is almost always closely bound up 
with the obligations and rights of the parties on these 
merits. In other words, the concept of domestic jurisdic­
tion has a "dual character ... concerned both with the 
boundaries between international and States jurisdiction 
and with the substantive rights and obligations of States 
under international law." This will be explained in
more detail when discussing the reservation of domestic 
jurisdiction in the practice of the Court.
(II) The Effect of the Formula
Having taken into consideration the fact that the 
Court's jurisdiction is limited to the four legal catego­
ries of disputes enumerated in Article 36 (2) of the
Statute and that the Court must, by virtue of Article 38 
of its Statute, decide the case brought before it in 
accordance with international law, the question that 
arose, shortly after the introduction of the reservation 
of matters of domestic jurisdiction in the declaration of 
the United Kingdom in 1929, was what could be accomplis­
hed by such a reservation. In the light of these facts,
the reservation seemed to H Lauterpacht "meaningless"
1 tr -j
unless it was intended to have another effect. ~~ For, 
the limitation of the Court's power to decide legal 
disputes in accordance with international law leads 
necessarily to the exclusion of disputes with regard to 
matters which by virtue of international law are within
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the exclusive jurisdiction of a State. The Court must 
declare such matters to be within the exclusive jurisdic­
tion of that State and must reject any claim contrary to 
that exclusive right. In order to avo.id this interpreta­
tion depriving the reservation of any meaning Lauterpacht 
drew attention to the possibility that it might have been 
inserted by States with the intention of substituting 
themselves for the Court in determining the nature of the 
matter in question. This appeared to him to be supported 
by what he called "the studied determination" to refrain 
from indicating who was competent to decide whether a 
question was or was not within domestic jurisdiction, and
by the canon of interpretation that provisions of a
152treaty should be interpreted as to yield a meaning.
This was so in spite of the provision of Article 36 (4) 
of the Statute of the P. C. I. J. which provided express­
ly that "in the event of a dispute as to whether the 
Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by 
the decision of the Court", and in spite of the clear 
statement in the British official memorandum on the 
Optional Clause that the reservation was "merely an 
explicit recognition of a limitation on the jurisdiction 
of the Permanent Court which results form international 
law itself". 1'J"’
The jurisprudence of both the P. C. I. J. and the
154I.C. J. appear "to lay at rest such a fear". In
fact, no State had ever contended before the P. C. I. J. 
that disputes as to jurisdiction were outside the provis­
ion of Article 36 (4). Nor did any State in inserting a
reservation of domestic jurisdiction in a declaration 
under Article 36 (2) attempt to substitute itself for the 
Court in interpreting or applying the reservation. Jd 
The same is true with regard to declarations made under 
Article 36 (2) of the Statute of the I. C. J. containing 
the reservation of domestic jurisdiction in the Covenant 
formula. The existence of the subjective formula of the 
reservation of domestic jurisdiction, keeping the inter­
pretation and application of the reservation within the
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hands of the declarant confirms, regardless of its 
validity, the view that the Court's power to decide on
its own jurisdiction cannot be affected without the most
156express and unambiguous language to that effect. J Thus 
in all cases in which the reservation of domestic juris­
diction in this form was raised the Court - as wi11 be 
seen - has decided the question as to the nature of the 
matter in dispute.
The view that the reservation is implied in the 
Statute of the Court has also been confirmed by the Court 
in many cases. In the LOSINGER AND COMPANY case Yugos­
lavia relied on Article 36 (2) of the Statute as exclud­
ing matters of domestic jurisdiction, and not on the
157terms of its declaration excluding such matters. In
1 SR
the ELECTRICITY COMPANY OF SOFIA AND BULGARIA case, 
neither the applicant nor the respondent declarations 
contained a reservation of domestic jurisdiction. However 
Bulgaria filed a preliminary objection in which it con­
tended that the dispute did not fall within any of the 
categories of dispute enumerated in Article 36 (2) of the 
Statute. The Court, though it did not pronounce on the 
accuracy of this contention, recognised that this was in 
effect a contention that matters of domestic jurisdiction 
were excluded from its competence by virtue of Article 36
(2) . 159
The same argument had also been advanced before the 
I. C. J. In the RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER INDIAN TERRITORY 
case, India argued, in the fifth of its six prelimi­
nary objections that the dispute concerned a question
which by international law fell exclusively within its 
domestic jurisdiction and, therefore, was excluded from 
the Court's jurisdiction both by virtue of the reserva­
tion inserted in its declaration and by virtue of Article 
36 (2) of the Statute.
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lA'?
The INTERHfiNBEL case provides the clearest
example on the effect of including or not the reservation 
of domestic jurisdiction in the declarations of accep­
tance of the Court's jurisdiction. Although neither the 
United States nor the Swiss declarations contained the 
objective formula of the reservation of domestic juris­
diction, the United States contended in part (6) of its 
fourth preliminary objection that there was no jurisdic­
tion in the Court to hear and determine any issue con­
cerning the seizure and detention of the vested shares of 
the G. A. F. on the grounds that such seizure and reten­
tion were, according to international law, matters within
l at:
the domestic jurisdiction of the United States. It is
noteworthy that Switzerland did not contest the United 
States reliance on the principle of domestic jurisdiction 
according to international law. On the contrary, it ad­
mitted expressly that part (6) of the Fourth Preliminary
Objection was based on a general rule recognised by
164international law.
The Court's treatment of this objection as an 
objection to its jurisdiction in spite of the absence of 
any reservation in either of the declarations in ques­
tion, confirms, by implication, the view, that the reser­
vation of domestic jurisdiction is inherent in the Stat-
1ute of the Court, w and can always be raised both as a 
preliminary objection or as a defence on their merits. 
Thus the general view is that the inclusion of the reser­
vation in a declaration cannot offer any additional 
protection other than that already provided by the Stat­
ute itself, and therefore, it is "otiose and too cautious"
It is to be observed that, in supporting this view 
some commentators have relied on Article 2 (7) of the
Charter of the United Nations as a further limitation 
upon the Court not to intervene in matters of domestic
It)"/*
jurisdiction. The relevance of this Article to the
Court's jurisdiction wi11 be discussed shortly.
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However, some writers believe that there is a 
difference between the existence and the absence of the 
reservation of domestic jurisdiction in a declaration. A 
State making the reservation can rely on it both as a bar 
to the Court's jurisdiction and as a defence on the 
merits, whereas in the absence of a reservation the plea
of domestic jurisdiction can only be advanced as a defe-
168nee on the merits.  ^ This view seems to be affected by 
Waldock's view advanced in 1954, though he considered the 
reservation as implied in Article 36 (2) of the Statute
and therefore it can always be raised also as a prelimi-
169nary objection. However, the INTERHANOEL case - as
has been said - appears to eliminate such a distinction.
B - THE CHARTER FORMULA
As a result of the adoption of the new formula of
domestic jurisdiction in Article 2 (7) ,U of the Chart­
er, some States have modified the reservation of domestic 
jurisdiction modelled upon Article 15 (8) of the Covena­
nt, or made a new declaration bringing the language of 
that reservation in line with that of Article 2 (7). This 
formula was introduced for the first time by the United 
states in its declaration made in 1946. It is now in­
cluded in the declarations of India, Botswana, Liberia, 
Malawi, Mexico, the Philippines and Sudan, These declara­
tions do not recognise the jurisdiction of the Court over 
disputes "in regard to matters which are ESSENTIALLY 
within the domestic jurisdiction" of these States. 1/1'
However it is to be observed that only the declarations
172of India and Botswana ' are relevant here. For in all 
the other declarations the reservation of domestic juris­
diction is used in its subjective form — namely, the
State alone is entitled to decide whether the matter is 
or is not within its domestic jurisdiction. 1/'
The Charter formula has given rise to two important 
questions: the first is whether Article 2 (7) of the
Charter is applicable IPSO JURE to the contentious juris—
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diction of the Court and the second is, in what sense 
does the reservation purport to restrict the jurisdiction 
of the Court?
(I) The Relevance of Article 2 (7) of the Charter 
to the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the Court
The view that Article 2 (7) of the Charter is
applicable IPSO JURE to the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court was advanced by Iran in the ANBLO-IRANIAN OIL
COMPANY case. Iran contended that the words "Nothing in
the present Charter" in Article 2 (7) should be read in
conjunction with Articles 7 and 92 of the charter. Also
since the former expressly makes the Court one of the
principal organs of the United nations and the latter
refers to the Statute of the Court as "annexed" to the
Charter and expressly provides that it "forms an integral
part of the present Charter", Article 2 (7) would form a
constitutional limitation upon the Court's jurisdiction
174in all contentious cases. These arguments were ad­
vanced by Iran to support its claim that the subsequent 
adoption of article 2 (7) had the effect of substituting 
the formula "matters essentially within" for that of 
"matters which according to international law, are within 
domestic jurisdiction".
Regardless of the substance of those arguments, 
that claim did not carry conviction as far as the juris­
diction of the Court under Article 36 (2) of the Statute 
is concerned. for Article 36 (5) of the Statute is clear 
on this point. It expressly states that declarations 
under the old statute are to be deemed acceptances of the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the new Court "in accordance 
with the terms".
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, opposed the 
Iranian interpretation of Article 2 (7) with great force. 
It argued that the prohibition in Article 2 (7) concerned 
only organs whose authority is derived from the Charter,
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not directly, as in the case of the Court, from the 
consent of the parties. Secondly, even if Article 2 (7) 
was applicable to the Court, it would have no effect 
whatsoever on the Court's contentious jurisdiction. For 
all matters of domestic jurisdiction are by definition 
beyond the scope of international law. Moreover, any 
dispute concerning any of the four points enumerated in
Article 36 (2) of the Statute fell necessarily outside
176the scope of domestic jurisdiction. As the Court
upheld the second preliminary objection concerning the 
reservation RATIONS TEMPORIS, the opportunity to pronou­
nce on this point was lost. Thus, the question is still 
one on which divergent opinions have been expressed.
On the one hand, some writers have relied on one or 
more of the Iranian arguments to prove the applicability 
of Article 2 (7) of the Charter as such to the Court's 
contentious jurisdiction. i// Thus, Rosenne, for in­
stance, believes that by virtue of the provision of 
Article 92 of the Charter, that the Statute forms "an 
integral part" of the Charter, the Statute and the Char­
ter are to be read as one instrument. Accordingly, the 
general provisions of the Charter (other than those in 
Chapter XIV concerning the Court directly) are applicable 
also to the Court. However there is no subordinate status 
in the Statute in relation to the Charter. This is so in
spite of the fact that the Court is governed by the
17R
Statute and not by the Charter. ~ Also the provision of 
the same Article (i.e. 92), that the Court is the prin­
cipal judicial organ of the United Nations, seemed to C
Vulcan sufficient for the application of Article 2 (7) to
179the work of the Court. ' Other authors state simply
that Article 2 (7) is applicable to the Court without
1 90
explaining on what argument this view is based.
On the other hand, the theory of the non-applicabi­
lity of Article 2 (7) to the Court has found many advo­
cates. Professor Waldock has been, perhaps, the leading 
authority on this point. Firstly, he reiterated the
argument advanced by the United Kingdom in the A n g lo -  
I r a n i a n  O i l  Company case, that the Court derives the 
jurisdiction neither from the Charter nor from the Statu­
te, but from the consent of States given in one of the 
methods enumerated in Article 36 of the Statute. In fact 
this was confirmed by the Court in the AERIAL INCIDENT OF 
27 JULY 1955 case. Here the Court said: " ... Article 36, 
contrary to the desire of a member of delegations at San 
Francisco, does not make compulsory jurisdiction an
immediate and direct consequence of being a party to the
181Statute." Then Waldock advanced a more convincing
argument. He observed that the words "the present Chart­
er" in Articles 2 (7) and 92 of the Charter were used in 
the narrow sense exclusive of the Statute of the Court. 
The internal evidence of the Charter and Statute - such 
as Articles 93 and 108 of the Charter - supports this 
view. Moreover, even if the words "the present Charter"
were interpreted in the wide sense inclusive of the
Statute, it would not follow that the Court's jurisdic­
tion is limited by the reservation of "matters essen­
tially within domestic jurisdiction". For "there is 
nothing in the words of Article 2 (7) to preclude the 
Court ... from intervening in matters essentially within 
domestic jurisdiction, I F  I T  HAS BEEN AUTHORISED TO DO SO 
BY STATES CONCERNED in an INSTRUMENT DEHORS THE CHARTER".
Consequently he reached the conclusion that "It may be 
said with confidence that Article 2 (7) of the Charter
does not, as such, touch the Court's jurisdiction in 
contentious cases".
Be that as it may, the question whether Article 2
(7) consists, as such, of a limitation upon the compul­
sory jurisdiction of the Court remains, however, a doctr­
inal question, as far as the reservation of domestic 
jurisdiction is concerned unless it is proved that the 
scope of the formula "matters which are essentially 
within domestic jurisdiction" is wider than that of 
"questions which by international law fall exclusively
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within domestic jurisdiction".
(II) The Portee of the Formula "Matters Essentially Within 
Domestic Jurisdiction
As is well known Article 2 (7) of the Charter has 
introduced considerable changes in the formula of domes­
tic jurisdiction as embodied in Article 15 (8) of the
Covenant. It is not proposed here to embark on a general
184examination of these changes, nor is it intended to
consider in detail the meaning of the formula "matters 
... essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" as 
embodied in Article 2 (7). Such examination is outside 
the scope of this thesis. This formula is relevant only 
to the extent that it is copied in some declarations and 
within the limits set for in these declarations. Conse­
quently, since the declarations exclude "disputes in
regard to matters which are essentially within the domes-
1 ^5tic jurisdiction" u‘ of the State concerned, the main 
question is whether the scope of domestic jurisdiction 
before is altered by this new formula. The answer will be 
limited to the effect of the omission of the reference to 
international law as the standard for determining domes­
tic jurisdiction; the omission of any indication as to 
who should decide whether a matter is or is not within 
domestic jurisdiction, and finally, the substitution of 
the word "essentially" for the word "exclusively" or 
"solely".
Before examining these points it might be observed 
that there is no reference to the word "intervene", which
has given rise to a sharp controversy as to its meaning
1E6with regard to political organs, ' in the reservation 
of domestic jurisdiction as embodied in the declarations. 
This might be explained by the conviction of States that 
the judicial decision could never be the equivalent of an 
intervention in the customary accepted sense of the word, 
as the United Kingdom argued in the PN&LO-IRPNIPN OIL
1 ° 7
COMPANY case.
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(i) The omission of "international law"
The TRfMEfWX PREPGRQTOIRES of the San Francisco 
Conference are confused and throw an uncertain light on
the deletion of the words "by international law" from
188Article 2 (7) of the Charter. Whereas the delegate of 
the United States Mr Dulles defended the omission on the 
ground that "international law was subject to constant 
change," 189 "undefined and inadequate" 19u on this 
subject Dr Evatt, the delegate of Australia, did not see 
any need for including the words "according to interna­
tional law" in Article 2 (7) on the ground that "there
191was any other possible criterion that could be used".
However, it seems certain that the omission was 
intentional. This might be inferred from the failure of 
the Belgium proposal to add the words "according to
international law" to obtain the required two thirds
199
majority. It was defeated by 18 votes to 14.
The above explanation of Mr Dulles has been widely 
criticised on many grounds even by the political organs 
of the United Nations. It is asserted that that explana­
tion completely overlooked the opinion of the P. C. I. J.
on the nationality Decrees which laid down the criterion
19-?,
of international obligations. " Furthermore, the flexi­
bility of international law was the very reason for the 
existence of the reservation of domestic jurisdiction and 
referring to international law as a yardstick. For if the 
boundaries between domestic and international jurisdic­
tion were rigid, there would have been no reason for the
194existence of the reservation.
Whatever was the reason for omitting "international 
law", the question that might be raised is whether there 
exists another criterion for determining whether a matter 
is or is not within domestic jurisdiction.
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According to one interpretation, the result of the 
intentional omission of international law is that the
political organs of the United Nations are free to apply
195a political or extra judicial criterion.
According to another interpretation the omission 
should be interpreted in favour of the United Nations 
organs. For the sphere of State activities free from 
international legal obligations is further eroded by the 
criterion of international concern or repercussions. This 
interpretation is said to be not only in conformity with 
Article 2 (7), but also with the intention of the framers 
of that Article, who intended to establish an effective 
political organization for the maintenance of interna­
tional peace and security. It would, therefore, be absurd
to limit the competence of the political organization to
196deal with legal disputes.
None of these interpretations is regarded as a 
correct one for the concept of domestic jurisdiction- 
even vis-a-vis the political organs. For, it is asserted 
that the question of jurisdiction is a legal one and the 
concept of international concern is a political one. Also 
since it is fairly "obvious that no legal term can be 
explained except by reference to the law of which it is
part", the only relevant criterion is that of interna-
197tional law. Secondly, the criterion of international 
concern fails to afford any reasonably ascertainable 
test, since the determination of what is of an interna­
tional concern is itself a matter of opinion. Bearing in 
mind the fact that "under the present day condition very 
little that a country does fails to have some repercus­
sion outside its border", this criterion could "unduly 
restrict the field, if it would not virtually destroy the
1 9R
whole concept of international jurisdiction". ~ Third­
ly, the concept of international concern was expressly 
rejected by the P. C. I. J. in its opinion on the Nation­
ality Decrees. It said that as regards matters which 
"though they may VERY CLOSELY CONCERN THE INTERESTS OF
MORE THOM ONE STATE", "EACH STATE IS  SOLE JUDGE". 199 
Finally, the concept of domestic jurisdiction appeared to 
some members of the INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL to 
require the elimination of any connection between the 
extent of domestic jurisdiction and "the development of 
international RELATIONS". Thus this phrase, which was
inserted in the draft resolution was omitted from the
200
final resolution adopted by the Institut. " The final 
resolution connected the scope of domestic jurisdiction 
with the development of international law as the only 
criterion. Consequently the repercussion or international 
concern are not relevant except where the legal rights of
another State or the international community are in-
201
volved. The omission of the words "according to
international law" seemed thus to the majority of the
writers to "imply somewhat gratuitous disparagement of
202international law and to have no effect whatsoever".
This conclusion is undoubtedly accurate with regard 
to the omission of the words "international law" from the 
reservation of domestic jurisdiction in some declarations 
accepting the Court's jurisdiction. This is so not only 
because of the above reasons but mainly because the Court 
cannot, by its very nature as a judicial organ and by 
virtue of the express provisions of its Statute (Article 
38), but apply the rules of international law.
(ii) The omission of the reference to the body 
competent to decide whether a matter is or not 
within domestic jurisdiction
This omission is not, in fact, peculiar to the 
reservation modelled on Article 2 (7) of the Charter, but 
even the declarations made prior to the establishment of 
the United Nations did not mention the body competent to
decide on the nature of the matter. This was - as ex-
204
plained before ‘ ‘ - due to the express provision of
Article 36 of the Statute of the P. C. I. J. which em­
powered the Court to decide on its own jurisdiction. It
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may be asked, therefore, whether the adoption of the 
charter formula has affected Article 36 (6) of the Stat­
ute of the I. C . J .
Professor Kelsen found in the intentional omission 
of a reference to the organ competent to decide an in­
dication that the decision upon the nature of a matter 
was kept in the hands of States concerned. He went furth­
er, saying that this was so with regard to declarations 
accepting the Court's jurisdiction under Article 36 (2) 
of the Statute. He said:
"The only question is whether, in case the other party 
contradicts this view, paragraph 6 of Article 36 applies 
providing that the Court shall settle the matter. Even if the 
answer is in the affirmative, the Court is bound by Article 2, 
paragraph 7, of the Charter and consequently has to recognise 
a matter to be essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
the State which, under this provision of the Charter, declares 
the matter to be essentially within its domestic jurisdiction.
That means that Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter may 
deprive a declaration made under Article 36, paragraph 2, of 
the Statute of almost all its value."
This view does not appear to carry conviction. It 
seems, firstly, to disregard the fact that the Court, 
though established by the Charter, functions according to 
its Statute (Article 1 of the Statute). That view, thus, 
attempts to extend the effect of Article 2 (7) of the
Charter to the work of the Court, a question which is 
doubtful, as has been said, and to make devoid of any
significance a clear text, i.e. Article 36 (6) of the
Statute. Secondly, it might be asked what is the sig­
nificance of the compulsory jurisdiction if the Court is 
deprived from the decision to decide on its own jurisdic­
tion? Or can the jurisdiction of the Court under Article
36 (2) in such a case, be described as compulsory? There 
is no doubt that paragraph 6 of Article 36 is an essen­
tial part, not only of that Article but of every scheme
207
of truly obligatory jurisdiction. Thirdly, is it fair 
to assume that the framers of paragraph 6 intended to
205
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waste the time of the Court and to cause the parties much 
expense for the purpose of obtaining a declaratory judg­
ment holding the view of the defendant? Also, this view 
seems to disregard the general rule of international law 
that international tribunals are entitled to determine
questions of their jurisdiction arising under the instru-
208ment from which they derive their jurisdiction. Thus, 
in all the cases in which the objective reservation of 
domestic jurisdiction was invoked, the Court - as will be 
seen - applied paragraph 6 of Article 36 as it stands. 
Certainly in almost all these cases the reservation was 
modelled on the Covenant formula, but this does not alter 
the fact that even according to the latter formula, there 
is no reference to the organ competent to decide.
Finally, since the issue concerns international 
obligations of a State valid in international law, it is 
submitted that if a decision is kept within the hands of 
States concerned, the obligation would cease to be an
obligation of international law although it might be an
209
obligation of international morality. '' Moreover the 
existence of the subjective form of the reservation of 
domestic jurisdiction indicates that the objective reser­
vation of domestic jurisdiction is governed by Article 36
(6) .
Thus, it is generally recognised that the omission
of a reference to the organ competent to decide in Ar­
ticle 2.(7) of the Charter does not mean necessarily that
910
the decision is left for States concerned. "" ' Also as 
regards the declarations made under Article 36 (2) of the 
Statute, paragraph 6 of that Article is regarded, as 
decisive on this point, even by those who believe that
9 1  1
Article 2 (7) is applicable to the Court.
(iii) The substitution of "essentially" for "exclusively"
At the San Francisco conference the Belgium propo­
sal concerning the substitution of the words "exclusive—
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ly" or "solely" for "essentially" was defeated by a large
 ^1 ^majority (28 to 2 votes) .  ^ The preference of the word
"essentially" was due - as explained by Dulles and Dr
Evatt - to the desire to broaden the scope of domestic
jurisdiction and correspondingly to restrict the sphere
of the activity of the United Nations especially that of
the Social and Economic council to deal with Economic and
217.
Social problems. " The substitution disclosed, thus, 
the great desire for a flexible and wider interpretation 
which would ensure that certain matters would fall "ES­
SENTIALLY" within the domestic sphere, even though by 
reason of their international repercussion, or the exis­
tence of relevant international legal obligation, they
214might no longer be comprised "SOLELY" within that sphere.
Since international repercussion is not relevant to 
the Court - as has been said - it might be asked whether 
international law contains any criterion determining 
matters which are in ESSENCE matters of domestic juris­
diction. Although the P. C. I. J. had refuted in its 
advisory opinion on the NATIONALITY DECREES, the view 
that a matter of a treaty obligation can be of domestic 
jurisdiction regardless of the subject matter of the
215treaty obligation, that view has found some proponents. 
Robin, for instance, considering only the first part of 
the P. C. I. J. definition of the concept of domestic 
jurisdiction, in that case, pointed out that the word 
"essentially" was synonymous with "principally", conse­
quently, if a matter was principally within domestic 
jurisdiction it must be treated as a whole within that 
sphere even if it was practically within the internation­
al sphere. He admitted that treaty obligations affect the 
limits of domestic jurisdiction, but this was so only to 
the extent that there existed a clear indication in that 
direction. A treaty of an exceptional nature made in 
special circumstances could not affect the limits of 
domestic jurisdiction. Otherwise how can the States be 
blamed if they reserved for themselves the decision 
whether a matter was or was not within domestic jurisdic-
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This view was refuted by the Court in its Advisory 
Opinion on the INTERPRETATION OF PEACE TREATIES. Here 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and several other governments 
considered the request for an advisory opinion as "an 
action ULTRA VIRES on the part of the General Assembly". 
This contention was based on the conception that in 
dealing with the question of observance of human rights 
and fundamental freedom in the States concerned, the 
general Assembly disregarded the provision of Article 2
(7) of the Charter and was "interfering" or "intervening"
in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
217of States.
The Court dismissed the objection on the ground 
that it was not called upon to deal with either the al­
leged violations of the provisions of the treaties con­
cerning human rights and fundamental freedom, or the 
interpretation of the Articles concerning those matters. 
The object of the request was much more limited, the 
Court observed. It was "directed" solely to obtaining 
from the Court certain clarifications of a legal nature 
regarding the applicability of the procedure of the 
settlement of disputes by the "commission provided for in 
the express terms" of the relevant Articles of the treat­
ies concerned. The Court said:
"The interpretation of the terms of a treaty for this 
purpose coi.il d not be considered as a question essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of a State. It is a question 
of international law which by its very nature, lies within the 
competence of the Court.
These consideration also suffice to dispose of the objec­
tion based on the principle of domestic jurisdiction and 
directed specifically against the competence of the Court, 
namely, that the court as an organ of the United Nations, is 
bound to observe the provisions of the charter, including 
Article 2, paragraph 7."
Although this statement does not provide a basis 
for the application or non-application of Article 2 (7) 
to the Court's jurisdiction, it confirms the jurisprude­
nce of the P. C. I. J. that there are only two spheres. A 
matter is subject to international legal obligations, and 
hence within international jurisdiction or not subject to 
these obligations and therefore belongs to the domestic 
sphere regardless whether it is described as "exclusive­
ly" or "solely" or "essentially".
It might be argued that since the Peace Treaties 
case is the only instance in which the objection was 
based on Article 2 (7) of the Charter, the finding of the 
Court in that case cannot be cited to prove that the 
Court is favourably inclined towards extending the inter­
pretation peculiar to the Covenant formula to that of the 
Charter. Such a view would neglect the fact that a State
cannot impose its view on other States with respect to
219treaty obligations. It should also be borne in mind
that the rule PACTA SUNTA SERVANJ3A cannot be regarded as
merely treaty law but as the most elementary principle of
220international legal order.
It follows that the substitution of the word "es­
sentially" for "exclusively" or "solely" has no legal 
significance whatsoever. Or as Pollux said "the change 
has merely an ideological significance and nothing more". 
To have the effect of excluding treaty obligations the 
reservation must be unambiguous. The Charter formula 
cannot as such have that effect.
The conclusion to be drawn from what has been said 
is that the balance of argument seems to be in favour of 
the non-applicability of Article 2 (7) of the Charter to 
the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36 (2) of the 
Statute. However, if there is still some doubt in the 
light of an absence of a clear decision from the Court, 
the question seems to be without practical importance. 
This is so, inasmuch as the idea that the Charter formula
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is broader than that of the Covenant, is refuted by the
997,
practice of the Court, of the United Nations organs 
and of States themselves. This can be illustrated by the 
position taken by the United States, which played a 
considerable role in introducing Article 2 (7) into the 
charter, and the United Kingdom before the Court in the 
PEACE TREATIES case. They emphasised that the only crite­
rion for determining whether a matter is or is not within 
domestic jurisdiction is that of international law as 
consistently maintained by the P. C. I. J. It was argued 
also that "in the event of dispute, the issue whether a 
matter was or was not essentially of domestic jurisdic­
tion would be subject to settlement by Treaty Commis­
sions". As to the significance of the word "essentially" 
it was maintained that:
"Certainly as between the parties, matters expressly
covered by treaties cannot be considered matters essentially
224
of domestic jurisdiction."
In the RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER INDIAN TERRITORY case,
*
India appears to have been convinced of the weakness of 
the idea that the reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
modelled on Article 2 (7) is broader than that modelled 
on Article 15 (8) of the covenant. Although a reference 
was made to that idea by Soskice (council for India), he 
stressed that "it is for the Court rather to know and lay 
down the precise limits of the reserved domain." ^  He 
recognised also that the assumption of treaty obligation 
shifts a matter from domestic to international jurisdic-
1 • t)tion.
The position of Switzerland in the Interhandel case 
was also in the same direction. Although the declarations 
of both parties were without the objective reservation of
nny
domestic jurisdiction. Switzerland - as has been said 
- relied on Article 36 (2) of the Statute and not on
Article 2 (7). That means, by implication, that Switzer­
land was coincided either of the non—app1icabi1ity of
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Article 2 (7).to the Court or that that Article was of 
the same significance as the reservation inherent in
r-yr-yr*
Article 36 (2) of the Statute.
Perhaps the most important fact in this respect is
States practice in their declarations. As observed befo-
229re, all States - with the exception of Israel and 
India - which favoured the inclusion of the objective 
reservation of domestic jurisdiction since 1945, have 
excluded from their declarations "disputes with regard to 
questions which, by international law, fall exclusively 
within the jurisdiction of the State concerned" or, as in 
the declaration of Botswana "disputes relating to matters 
which, by international law, are essentially within [its] 
domestic jurisdiction". This practice seems to suggest 
that the reservation of matters essentially within domes­
tic jurisdiction have left the scope of the reserved 
domain very much where it was under the declarations made 
under Article 36 (2) of the P. C. I. J. and within the 
limits determined by that Court in the NATIONALITY DECR­
EES OPINION. Otherwise the new formula could have widely 
spread in the declarations made under Article 36 (2) of
the new Court.
C - THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT IN REGARD TO THE RESERVATION
The Chief characteristic of the concept of domestic 
jurisdiction in relation to the practice of the Court in 
contentious cases has been its lack of specific relevan­
ce. The reservation was invoked in one case only (the 
LOSINGER case) before the P. C. I. J. However it was 
lodged as a plea to the jurisdiction of the same Court in 
the ELECTRICITY COMPANY OF SOFIA AND BULGARIA case in 
spite of the absence of any express reservation in the 
declarations of both parties. The reservation has been 
invoked before the International Court of Justice in four 
cases: the ANGL0—1 RANI AN OIL COMPANY, the RIGHT OF PAS­
SAGE OVER INDIAN TERRITORY, the INTERHANDEL and the 
AEGEAN SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF. In addition to these cases
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the question of domestic jurisdiction has been examined 
by the Court in there Advisory Opinions: TUNIS AND MOROC­
CO NATIONALITY DECREES, the TREATMENT OF POLISH NATIONALS 
IN  DANZIG and INTERPRETATION OF PEACE TREATIES. 2:U
1. The ADVISORY OPINION ON THE NATIONALITY DECR­
EES IN  TUNIS AND MOROCCO has an important relevance
27,1
here not only for the reasons discussed before,
but also because of the way the plea of domestic
jurisdiction had been disposed of by the P. C. I. 
J. In the light of the fact, that the objection was 
made to the Council and not to the jurisdiction of 
the Court itself, the Court had no choice but to 
uphold the French objection or reject it as ill
founded. Having taken into consideration the in­
timate connections between the plea of domestic 
jurisdiction and the merits of the case and the 
requirement to dispose of the objection without 
prejudging the rights of the parties as they might 
emerge from a full investigation of the merits, the 
Court applied what is now well known as the "provi-
r^-yr-y
sional view" theory. w"'i' According to this theory 
the relevant issue in determining whether the 
matter in dispute is or is not within domestic 
jurisdiction is not the substantive rights of the 
parties under international law but the PRIMA FACIE 
status of the matter itself, namely whether it 
discloses agreeable points of international law. In 
other words it is sufficient, for that purpose, to 
make a summary examination of the merits without 
deciding on the substantive rights of the parties. 
"When once it appears that the legal grounds (titr- 
es) relied on are such as to justify the provisio­
nal conclusion that they are of judicial importance 
for the dispute" concerned, the Court would
reject the plea of domestic jurisdiction. It goes 
without saying that a decision based on this theory 
rejecting the objection cannot be "interpreted as 
indicating a preference on the part of the Court in
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favour of any particular solution as regards the
whole or any individual point of the actual dis-
2 :T. 4
pute".
The provisional view principle has influenced 
the future jurisprudence of the Court as will be 
seen.
2. In its Advisory Opinion of february 4, 1932 on
the TREATMENT OF POLISH NQTIONGLS IN  B8NZIG the P. 
C. I. J. reaffirmed its previous opinion with 
regard to the relativity of the concept of domestic 
jurisdiction and the Chief element which has to be 
taken into consideration in determining the scope 
of that concept. As regards the latter, the Court 
pointed out that the plea of domestic jurisdiction 
cannot be advanced where an international obliga­
tion has been assumed and conversely a matter 
remains within the sphere of domestic jurisdiction 
as long as international obligations are absent. 
Thus, rejecting the Polish argument that, though 
the application of a constitution is in principle a 
matter of domestic jurisdiction, the Danzig con­
stitution, being under the guarantee of the League 
of Nations and intimately connected with certain 
treaty provisions, eliminated "the ordinary legal 
distinction between matters of domestic and inter­
national character", the Court said:
"It should be observed that, while on the one 
hand according to generally accepted principles, a 
State cannot rely, as against another State, on 
the pro- visions of the latter?s Constitution, but 
only on international law and international oblig­
ations duly accepted, on the other hand and con­
versely, a State cannot adduce as against its own 
constitution with a view to avoiding obligations 
incumbent upon it nunder international law or 
treaties in -force.1
The P. C. I. J. had the first opportunity to 
consider the concept of domestic jurisdiction in a 
contentious case in the LOSIN&ER AND COMPQNY case. 
Here the respondent (Yugoslavia) filed a prelimi­
nary objection to the Court's jurisdiction on the 
ground that the dispute did not concern a question 
of international law. It contended also that there
existed no international obligation accepted by
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Yugoslavia. Although the Yugoslav declaration
excluded disputes with regard to questions which by 
international law fell exclusively within the 
jurisdiction of Yugoslavia, the latter did not rely 
on the terms of its reservation but relied directly 
on Article 36 (2) of the Statute.
The Court found that that objection was in­
timately connected with the Swiss submissions on 
the merits. Consequently it observed that deciding 
the objection at that stage involved the danger "of
passing upon questions which appertain to the mer-
277
its of the case, or prejudging their solution".
278The objection was therefore joined to the merits.
The jurisdiction of the P. C. I. J. was also 
objected to on the ground that the dispute fell 
within domestic jurisdiction in the ELECTRICITY  
COMPANY OF SOFIFi fiND BULGQRIf) case. However the 
difference here was that the declarations of both 
parties (Belgium and Bulgaria) did not contain the 
reservation of domestic jurisdiction. Thus, here 
again the objection was based on Article 36 (2) of
the Statute. Bulgaria argued that the dispute did 
not fall within any of the four categories of legal 
disputes provided for in Article 36 (2) . Since the 
argument intended to deprive the legal relation 
created between the Belgian Company and the Bul­
garian authorities by the awards of the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunals of any international element, 
the Court considered that argument as amounting
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"not only to encroaching on the merits, but to 
coming to a decision in regard to one of the fun­
damental factors of the case." The plea was, there­
fore, dismissed on the ground that it did not
possess "the character of a preliminary objection
, 240
within the meaning of Article 62 of the Rules.
5. The reservation of domestic jurisdiction was
invoked for the first time before the International
Court of Justice in the ANGLO—IRANI AN OIL COMPANY
241 242case. The Court, as previously mentioned,
lacked jurisdiction on another ground and made no 
pronouncement on the issue of domestic jurisdic­
tion. Nevertheless, the case has some significance 
for two reasons. The first is that it might be 
inferred from the brief statement made by the Court 
at a previous hearing, when it considered the 
United Kingdom's request for an indication of 
interim measures of protection, that the Court had 
followed the 'provisional view' principle adopted 
by its predecessor in the NATIONALITY DECREES
OPINION, In its order of JUly 5, 1951 the Court
said:
"Whereas the complaint made in the application 
is . one of an alleged violation of international 
law by the breach of the agreement for a conces­
sion of April 29, 1933, and by a denial of justice 
which, according to the Government of the United
Kingdom, would follow from the refusal of the
Iranian Government to accept arbitration in accor­
dance with that agreement, and whereas it cannot 
be accepted a priory that a claim based on such a 
complaint falls completely outside the scope of 
international jurisdiction
Secondly, the same Order seems to indicate
that when once it appears on a summary view that 
the applicant state raises arguable questions of 
international law, the plea of domestic juris­
diction would be insufficient to stop the indica-
tion of interim measures of protection pending a
final judgment on the jurisdiction to examine the
. . 244merits
The RIGHT OF POSSOGE was the second case in 
which the reservation of domestic jurisdiction was 
relied on before the International Court. In its 
fifth preliminary objection India argued that the 
dispute concerned a question which by international 
law fell within its domestic jurisdiction and, 
therefore, was excluded from the Court's jurisdic­
tion both by its declaration and by virtue of 
Article 36 (2) of the Statute, which limits the
Court's jurisdiction to the four categories of
245questions of an international legal nature. It
is noteworthy that India relied on the provisional
246view theory. It contended that a summary view
of the relevant facts and applicable law showed
that none of the legal grounds, namely; treaty,
custom and general principles of law, invoked by
the applicant justified "the provisional conclusion
that they are of real importance judicially for
determining the legal position of the Parties with
respect to the passage of Portuguese persons and
247goods between Daman and the enclaves." Nor 
could it be possible to regard those grounds as 
reasonably arguable under international law.
Since those facts were disputed by Portugal, 
the Court held that the fifth objection invoked an 
elucidation of those facts and their legal conse­
quences, which required an examination of the 
actual practice of the British, Indian and Por­
tuguese authorities with respect to the right of 
passage; the legal significance of the practice 
followed by the British and Portuguese authorities, 
and the legal effect and the circumstances sur­
rounding the application of Article 17 of the 
treaty of 1779 and the Mahratha Decrees issued in
pursuance thereof. All these questions appeared to 
the Court to be so intimately tied up with the 
merits that it was not possible to pronounce upon 
this objection without prejudging the merits.
Accordingly, the objection was joined to the meri-
248ts.
Judge Chagla (ad hoc) pointed out in his 
dissenting opinion that the Court had been inclined 
to join the objection to the merits because of the 
feeling that it was impossible to pronounce on the 
issue without investigating the merits. "But this 
is not always so. Otherwise it could never be open
to a State to take a preliminary objection on that
247
ground."
In the second phase (Merits) the Court rejec­
ted India's fifth preliminary objection. It ob­
served that a treaty, international custom and 
principles of international law were relied upon as 
establishing a right of passage as against India. 
To claim that such an obligation is binding upon 
India, to invoke, whether rightly or wrongly, such 
a principle, is to place oneself on the plane of 
international law. The Court added:
"Indeed, in the course of proceedings both 
Parties took their stand upon that ground and on 
occasion expressly said so. To decide upon the 
validity of those principles, upon the existence 
of such right ot Portugal, and upon the alleged 
failure to fulfil that obligation, does not fall 
exclusively with the jurisdiction of India."
The INTERHfiNBEL case set another example of 
the possibility of invoking the plea of domestic 
jurisdiction as a bar to the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction even in the absence of any express 
reservation to that effect in the declarations 
accepting that jurisdiction. It is true that the 
United States declaration contained the subjective
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reservation of domestic jurisdiction. However the 
objection that there was no jurisdiction in the 
Court to consider the seizure and detention of the 
vested shares of General Ami line and Film Corpora­
tion because they were, QCCORBIN& TO INTERNfiTIQNOL 
LON, matters within the domestic jurisdiction of
the United States, was of "different character and
951
of unequal scope", *" as the Court said, to the . 
objection based on the subjective reservation of 
domestic jurisdiction. Here, Switzerland invoked 
Articles 4 and 6 of the Washington Accord of May 
25, 1946. By virtue of the former, the United 
States had assumed the obligation to unblock Swiss 
assets in the United States, and by virtue of the 
later, the parties had undertaken the obligation to 
refer disputes concerning the application or inter­
pretation of the Accord to arbitration in case of 
failure of other means of settlement. The obliga­
tion to recourse to arbitration or conciliation had 
also been undertaken by the parties by virtue of 
Article 1 of the Treaty of Arbitration and Con-
n c r n
ciliation of February 16, 1931.
In order to avoid an examination of the meri­
ts, the Court confined itself to considering whet­
her the grounds invoked by Switzerland "are such as 
to justify the provisional conclusion that they may 
be of relevance in this case and, if so, whether
questions relating to the validity and interpreta­
tion of those grounds are questions of internation- 
257:
al law". The interpretation of the relevant
provisions of the Washington Accord, the enemy or 
neutral character of the property of the assets of 
Interhandel, and the interpretation and application 
of the provision relating to arbitration or con­
ciliation were considered sufficient grounds which 
justified the provisional conclusion that they
invoked questions of international law relevant to
254the case. Accordingly the objection was rejected.
The Court had, thus followed the view enun­
ciated by the P. C. I. J. in the NATIONALITY DECR­
EES opinion. A view that refused to follow in the 
previous case (the RIGHT OF PASSAGE) though both 
parties preferred it. However, the significance of 
this case is that the Court made it clear that the 
provisional view theory is not limited to advisory 
opinion but it is also a convenient way for dispos­
ing of the objection based on the reservation of
255domestic jurisdiction in contentious cases.
The AEGEAN SEP CONTINENTAL SHELF 256 is the 
last case in which the reservation of domestic
jurisdiction was examined by the Court, but was 
considered this time from an unusual angle. Since 
the dispute concerned the delimitation of the 
continental shelf, the Greek Government tried to 
diminish the scope of its reservation to the Gene­
ral Act of 1928 excluding from the Court's juris­
diction:
"Disputes concerning questions which by inter­
national law are solely within the domestic juris­
diction of States, and in particular disputes
relating to the territorial status of Greece, 
including disputes relating to its rights of 
sovereignty over its ports and lines of communica­
tion." ^5/
Relying on a grammatical interpretation, Greece
argued that when making the reservation it did not
intend by the reference to "disputes relating to
the territorial status of Greece" to designate this 
category of disputes as an autonomous category 
additional to that concerning matters solely within
O erg
domestic jurisdiction. The Court refused to
give the reservation such an effect. For in reser­
vations to treaties or in declarations accepting
the Court's compulsory jurisdiction and in Article 
39 (2) of the General Act of 1928, disputes con­
cerning matters of "domestic jurisdiction" and
disputes relating to "territorial Status" have been 
kept quite separate and distant. Furthermore, the 
Court observed that if the Greek interpretation was 
accepted, the reservation of disputes relating to 
territorial status would have been deprived of any 
significance especially in the light of the relati­
vity of the concept of domestic jurisdiction as
explained by the P. C. I. J. In NQTIONQLI TV DECREES
. . 259opinion
The Court has, therefore, reaffirmed its 
predecessor's view concerning the scope of domestic 
jurisdiction. Explaining that view the Court said:
"a matter which is net in principle regulated 
by international law and is thus a matter within 
the State's domestic jurisdiction, will cease to 
be such i-f the State has undertaken obi iqations
26k)
towards other States with respect to that matter". J~
From the above practice it is clear that the reser­
vation of domestic jurisdiction did not achieve its 
purpose if it is intended to bar the jurisdiction of the 
Court IN  L IM IN E . Nor did the Court uphold an obligation 
to its jurisdiction based on the concept of domestic 
jurisdiction. This seems to be logical in the light of 
the Court's jurisprudence. It is so, as long as the Court 
would reject the preliminary objection to its jurisdic­
tion unless, when on a summary examination, the plaintif­
f ’s case would not disclose any arguable matters of 
international obligation relevant to the issue. Such a 
hypothesis is "in the nature of things likely to be rare" 
For it is unlikely that a case may arise in which the 
plaintiff's case would not disclose grounds of interna­
tional law relevant to the issue. Therefore, the provisi­
onal examination test "reduces to the bare minimum the 
practical effect envisaged by the reservation in ques- 
tion." “ “ The Court seems also to have taken into con­
sideration what has been called the "Chief danger of the 
'provisional view’ theory"  ^ for the plaintiff State.
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For a decision upholding a preliminary objection to 
jurisdiction prevents the plaintiff State from any furt­
her presentation of its case. In other words by losing
the preliminary objection the plaintiff State becomes'
264IPSO F&CTO a loser of the merits.
D - THE PLEA OF DOMESTIC JURISDICTION 
IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEW RULES
Under the Rules of 1936 and 1946, the Court had 
three options to dispose of a preliminary objection. It 
could uphold, reject - as in the INTERHPNBEL case, or 
join it to the merits as did the Court in the LOSIGER and 
RIGHT OF PfiSSQ&E cases. In fact the P. C. I. J. first 
joined an objection to the merits (in the PRINCE VON
965
PLESS case) before there was any rule to that effect.
The joinder had been considered a suitable way of dispos­
ing of a preliminary objection "whenever the interests of 
good administration of justice require it" and especially 
where the decision on the objection "would run the risk 
of adjudicating on questions which appertain to the 
merits of the case". J However the experience of the 
BARCELONA TRQCTION LIGHT AND PONER CONPQNY case, 267 
which showed that after a prolongation of an expensive 
and time consuming procedure the decision could be in 
favour of the preliminary objection, was regarded in many
9£,p
quarters as a reason for amending the Rules of the Court. 
Consequently the 1972 Rules maintained in 1978, have 
introduced two important amendments. The first is the 
elimination of the procedure of joinder. Article 79 (7) 
of the 1978 Rules provides that the Court "shall either 
uphold the objection, reject it, or declare that the 
objection does not possess, in the circumstances of the 
case, an exclusively preliminary character". The second 
amendment concerns the determination of the Court's 
jurisdiction at a Preliminary stage of the case. Paragr­
aph 6 of the said Article reads:
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"In order to enable the Court to determine its jurisdic­
tion at the preliminary stage of the proceedings, the Court,
whenever necessary, may request the parties to argue all
questions of law and fact, and to adduce all evidence, which 
bear on the issue".
Bearing in mind the fact that the preliminary
objection based on the reservation of domestic jurisdic­
tion is directed against the judicial competence of the 
Court, it should be asked whether the Court's choices of 
disposing of this objection will be limited, by virtue of 
Article 79 (6) of the Rules, only to upholding or reject­
ing the objection at the preliminary stage of the procee­
dings, or it can declare that the objection does not 
possess, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusively 
preliminary character. The answer will, of course, depend 
on how the Court will apply paragraphs 6 and 7 of article 
79 to a preliminary objection of domestic jurisdiction.
The Court has availed itself of the new choice 
provided for in paragraph 7 only in the MILITARY AND 
PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IES  IN  AND AGAINST NICARAGUA case. As 
the point of issue involved an objection based on the 
multilateral treaty reservation, not much assistance can
be derived from the case. However, in the first phase of
269the case (jurisdiction and admissibility) the Court
seems to have taken the view that the new Rules require 
that the jurisdictional aspect ought to be decided at the 
preliminary stage, either by upholding or rejecting the 
objection based on the multilateral treaty reservation. 
This could be inferred from the Court's emphasis that the 
question at issue, i.e. what States were "effected" by 
the decision on the merits, was not in itself a "JURIS­
DICTIONAL P R O B L E M 27U The Court availed itself of the 
new procedural technique after noting that the multi­
lateral treaty reservation "could not bar its adjudica-
271tion of all Nicaragua's claims" and therefore did not 
"constitute an obstacle for the Court to entertain the 
proceedings instituted by Nicaragua under the Application 
of 9 April 1984". The issue did not, therefore,
concern a jurisdictional aspect, but matters of substance
277
relating to the merits of the case. For, as the Court 
said, it was not possible to identify the States "af­
fected" before the general lines of the judgment became
TTT
clear.
274In the second phase of the case the Court took
the opportunity to comment briefly on the rational of the 
third choice offered by Article 79 (7) of the Rules.
Here, again, the Court pointed out that the question 
whether the Court has jurisdiction is among the questions
which "do not NORMALLY require an analysis of the merits
275of the case." Then it said:
"While the variety of issue raised by preliminary objec­
tions cannot possibly be foreseen, practice had shown that 
there are certain kinds of preliminary objections which can be 
disposed of by the Court at an early stage without e>; ami nation 
of the merits. ABOVE IT IS CLEAR THAT f) QUESTION OF J UR ISDIC­
TION IS ONE NHICH REQUIRES DECISION RT THE PRELIMINARY STAGE 
OF THE P R O C E E D I N G S 2/6
However this statement is qualified by the limitation of 
the immediate decision upon preliminary objections only 
to those which are of an exclusively preliminary charac­
ter. An objection is not of that character when it con­
tains "both preliminary aspects and other aspects relat—
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ing to the merits.
This qualification, in conjunction with the word 
NORMALLY mentioned above seems to suggest that the Court 
might declare that the preliminary objection of domestic 
jurisdiction, being, usually, as the practice has shown, 
bound up with the merits, does not possess, in the cir­
cumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary chara­
cter and thus will have to be dealt with at the stage of
.. 278the merits.
The preliminary objection of domestic jurisdiction 
might thus be disposed of according to one of the follow­
ing methods. It could be upheld either on a summary view,
278
as did the Court in the INTERHANDEL case, or according to 
Article 79 (7) of the Rules by asking the parties to 
argue at the preliminary stage questions of law and fact, 
even those touching upon the merits, which bear on the 
jurisdictional issue. The third option is to declare that 
the objection does not possess an exclusively preliminary 
character if the objection "is so intertwined with ele­
ments pertaining to the merits that a bearing of the
issue would syphon of into the preliminary stage the
279whole of the case."
E - CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions to be drawn from the foregoing 
considerations may be summarised as follows.
The concept of domestic jurisdiction refers to 
matters which are not regulated by international law 
general or practical. Its scope differs according to the 
content of that law at any given time. The practical 
significance of the reservation of domestic jurisdiction
is almost similar to the reservation limiting the Court's
7 go
compulsory jurisdiction to legal disputes. ' For the 
ascertainment whether a matter is within domestic juris­
diction is tantamount to asking whether it is subject to 
international legal objections.
The inclusion of the reservation in declarations 
accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction is unneces­
sary. For it cannot - as the practice of the Court has 
shown - offer any additional protection other than that 
already provided by international law and the Statute of 
the Court. A State can always advance the plea of domes­
tic jurisdiction either as a preliminary objection or as 
a defence on the merits. This is so regardless whether 
the reservation is modelled on the Covenant formula or 
that of the Charter of the United Nations. This con­
clusion is supported by the fact that the reservation in 
both its formulae (i.e. of the Covenant and the Charter)
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is inserted only in 14 out of 46 declarations currently 
in force.  ^ Furthermore, of the original parties 3 
States (Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom) 
have abandoned the reservation. In this context the 
reservation is not harmful to the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction.
The retention of the reservation in spite of the 
foregoing considerations reflects the strong connection 
which exists between the concept of domestic jurisdiction 
and the notion of sovereignty. Thus, it has been argued 
that the reservation was adopted at the San Francisco 
Conference to have "above all the psychological effect of 
reassuring some States that their sovereignty would 
thereby be preserved". " It is not surprising, there­
fore, to find the reservation almost limited to the 
declarations of newly independent States. In fact, with 
the exception of Canada, the reservation is included only 
in the declarations of developing States.
Whatever the reason for inserting the reservation 
it proved to be a fragile instrument to bar the jurisdic­
tion of the Court IN  LIMINE L I T I S .
In order to discourage the unnecessary prolongation 
of proceedings at the jurisdictional stage a new approach 
is adopted by the 1972 and 1978 Rules. The Court may now 
request the parties to argue at the preliminary stage all 
questions of law and fact even those touching upon the 
merits, which bear upon the jurisdictional issue, or 
declare that the objection does not possess, in the 
circumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary 
character.
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SECTION (3) : THE RESERVATION OF "LEGAL DISPUTES
A - "LEGAL DISPUTES": A LIMITATION ON 
A LIMITED JURISDICTION?
While the majority of States have accepted the 
Court's compulsory jurisdiction in "all disputes" other 
than those expressly reserved without qualifying the term 
"disputes" but with the mention that the acceptance is
'pgcj
made "in conformity with", " or in accordance with,
9 0 ^  O Q 7
or "pursuant to", . 1'u" or "as provided for" J~‘ in Article
2RS36 (2) of the Statute, 16 States, ~ i.e. almost one 
third, stipulated that their acceptance is to cover 
"LE&fiL DISPUTES" other than those excluded. This is in 
spite of the fact that the declarations of the latter 
States use the same terms as those of the former, i.e. 
"in conformity with" ... etc or "under Article 36, parag­
raph 2, of the Statute". These latter declarations can be 
classified into two groups: either they simply accept the 
Court's jurisdiction in "all legal disputes", or in "all 
legal disputes concerning" the four points set forth in 
Article 36 (2) of the Statute. This classification seems
however without significance since these declarations are 
made in conformity with Article 36 (2).
It may thus be asked whether States, by making this 
reservation, are only reiterating the term "legal dis­
putes" as used in Article 36 (2) or they wished to em­
phasis that they have excluded some disputes even though 
these may fall within one of the four categories of 
disputes enumerated in Article 36 (2).
States must be aware of the fact that the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction is limited by Statutory provisi­
ons to "legal disputes". Thus Article 36 (2) of the
Statute provides for that the Court's compulsory juris­
diction may be accepted "in all legal disputes concern­
ing:
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a) the interpretation of a treaty;
b) any question of international law;
c) the existence of any fact which, if established, 
would constitute a breach of an international 
obligation;
d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be 
made for the breach of an international obliga­
tion.
Besides, this paragraph should be read in conjunc­
tion with Article 38 (1) of the Statute, which requires
the court "to decide in accordance with international 
law". The jurisprudence of the Court also confirms this 
limitation. It was confirmed by the P. C. I. J. shortly 
after its establishment. It said in the STATUS OF EASTERN 
CARELIA case that "The Court, being a Court of justice,
cannot, even in giving advisory opinions, depart from the
^R9
essential rules guiding their activity as a Court."
In the Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962 on CERTAIN 
EXPENSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS the I. C. J. pointed out 
that it had always been guided by the above principle 
articulated by its predecessor. After reiterating the 
above statement the Court continued that "if a question
is not a legal one, the Court has no discretion in the
290
matter; it must decline to give the opinion requested".
One year later the Court said in the Northern 
Cameroon case that:
"The -function of the Court is to state the law, but it 
may pronounce judgment only in connection with concrete cases 
where there exists at the time of the adjudication an actual 
controversy involving a conflict of legal interests between 
the parties. The Court's judgment must have some practical 
consequence in the sense that it can affect existing legal 
rights or obligations of the parties, thus removing uncertain- 
ty from their legal relations."
If the reservation of "iegal disputes" is aimed at 
excluding from the scope of the compulsory jurisdiction
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"political disputes" it seems also without significance 
at least in the light of some pronouncements of the
Court. Thus, being unable to deduce any legal obligation 
from the general considerations of the case, the Court 
stated in its Advisory Opinion on the International 
STATUS OF SOUTH-NEST AFRICA that "it is not for the Court
999
to pronounce on the political or moral duties".
This principle was confirmed in the following year 
in the HAVA 13E LA TORRE case. The Court made it clear 
that it is not part of its judicial function to make a 
choice which "could not be based on legal considerations, 
but only on considerations of practicability or political
997
expediency." Consequently if the limitation of "legal 
disputes" is to have any significance it must be intended 
either to have the effect of keeping the determination of 
the character of the dispute in the hands of the inter­
ested State, or excluding certain disputes, despite being 
encompassed within one of the four categories of disputes 
enumerated in paragraph 2 of Article 36, from the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction.
The first supposition cannot stand. As has been
294seen in the previous section a reservation keeping
the power of the determination of the character of a 
matter cannot - regardless of its validity - be presumed 
without an express mention to that effect inasmuch as the 
Statute confers clearly on the Court the decision to 
decide its competence, [Article 36 (6)]
As to the second hypothesis, it seems desirable to
be preceded by a brief examination of the distinction
between legal and non-legal disputes.
(I) The Doctrine of "Legal" and "Non-legal" Disputes
In 1930 — shortly after the British acceptance of
the compulsory jurisdiction of the P. C. I. J. Lauter- 
pacht asked to what disputes did the expression "legal
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disputes" or "justiciable disputes", which appeared in 
the Official Memorandum, refer?
"Does it refer to disputes which are capable p-f a solu­
tion by the application of an existing rule of international 
law? Or to disputes of minor importance as distinguished from 
political disputes involving grave issues? Or to disputes in 
which the plaintiff State puts forward its demand in the term 
of a legal proposition? Or does it refer to disputes in which 
the application of legal rules is likely to yield results 
compatible with iustice and the progress of internationalr 'nrjEr ” ' =
relati ons?"
In this passage Lauterpacht summarised the four 
clear classical - although not mutually exclusive - tests 
for the distinction between "legal" and "non-legal" or 
"justiciable" and "non-justiciable" disputes.
The diversity of these tests illustrates how the 
distinction between those terms baffled international 
lawyers. However, in its simplest and earliest form, the 
distinction was based on the conception that certain 
disputes were inherently of a legal character and hence 
capable of settlement judicially and others were politi­
cal and hence outside the scope of such settlement. The 
basic idea behind such conception was that arbitral or 
judicial settlement should be limited to disputes of 
minor importance while the solution of important disputes 
should be left to other means of peaceful settlement. 
Thus the Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes in 1899 and 1907, to which the 
first formal use of the distinction between legal and 
political disputes is usually attributed, arbitration or 
judicial settlement was regarded as the most effective 
and the most equitable means of settling disputes "of a 
legal nature and especially ... the interpretation or 
application of international conventions", provided 
that the honour, vital interests, independence of the 
parties and the interests of the other States were not 
involved. Unsuccessful attempts have also been made to 
limit arbitral or judicial settlement to enumerated
284
questions of an extremely technical character without the
297above reservations.
According to this test, and that limiting arbitral 
or judicial settlement to disputes "which are justiciable 
.■ in their nature by reason of being susceptible of decis-
999
ion by the application of the principles of law", or
its variant that "rights" are justiciable, while "inter-
9^9
ests" are not, x" the distinction between legal and non- 
legal disputes is based on the nature of the subject 
matter to which the disputes refer.
Such a theory was criticised in the inter - war 
years on many grounds. Some intrinsic gaps in those 
criteria were patent to most scholars in that period. The 
subjective reaction to an event in determining the impor­
tance of a dispute or whether the dispute touched upon 
the honour or vital interests was observed. "°l') It was 
also thought that some of these criteria were based on 
the conception that there are many gaps in international 
law, and on the limited role of international judges. "Ul 
Furthermore, it was noted that owing to the nature of the 
parties entitled to appear before the International Court 
or International Tribunal, being political institutions, 
every dispute is of a mixed character. Every dispute 
between States is legal and economic or political. "A 
conflict is economic or political with respect to the 
interests which are involved, it is legal (or non-legal) 
with respect to the normative order controlling these
302interests." ' The apparent contradictory practice of 
States by submitting disputes of high political impor­
tance to judicial settlement and withholding disputes 
obviously capable of decision on strictly legal line from 
that procedure, had its effect on abandoning those objec­
tive tests.
Thus the characteristic feature of most . post war 
tests, is that they substitute both the attitude of 
States for the nature of the dispute and the theory of
285
•^04"justiciability" '' or "non-justiciability" for "legal"
“T (")*=■
or "non-legal" or "political". they constitute what
is called the "subjective theory of justiciability". "Ucj
To say that the most recent tests are based on the 
attitude of States i.e. whether they are demanding the 
application of the existing rules or they are basing 
their claims on other than legal considerations, does not 
mean that the objective theory of justiciability has 
disappeared. H J Morgenthau, for instance, believes that 
disputes concerning "the overall distribution of power" 
cannot be submitted to a Court of Law. They cannot be 
formulated in legal terms. At the bottom of these dis­
putes lies a "tension between the desire to preserve the 
existing distribution of power and the desire to over­
throw it". “U7 Morgenthau classifies international dis­
putes according to their relation to tension into three 
types: "pure disputes", "disputes with the substance of 
tension" and "disputes representing tension". Justiciabi­
lity is limited, in his view, to the first type of dis-
. 308putes.
Although it is generally recognised each of the
guides which have been proposed for the identification of
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"legal" and "non-legal" is unsatisfactory, “ the most 
widespread guide seems to be that proposed by H Kelsen. 
The distinction between legal and political dispute 
should, in his view, be based not on the nature of the 
subject matter to which the dispute refers but on the 
norms to be applied for the resolution of the dispute. "A 
dispute is a legal dispute if it is to be settled by the 
application of legal norms, that is to say, by the ap­
plication of existing law. It is a political - not a 
legal - dispute if it is to be settled by the application 
of other norms - such as principles of equity, justice, 
and the like." 'JJ As to the effect of the attitude of 
the parties on the character of a dispute, Kelsen belie­
ves that "legal disputes are disputes in which both 
parties base their respective claims and their rejection
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of the other party's on positive international law, 
whereas political disputes are disputes in which at least 
one party bases its claim or its defence, not on positive 
international law, but on other principles or on no 
principles at all."
This test has been widely adopted - as such or with 
1
313
312a little variation both individually " and collective­
ly.
Another aspect of the problem concerning the jus­
ticiability of international disputes is determination of 
the extent of justiciability. Taking into consideration 
the mixed character of almost every dispute, the question 
is raised as to whether every conceivable international 
dispute is justiciable, or are there inherent limitations 
on the theory of justiciability? This question has been 
approached in different ways, even by scholars who sub­
scribe to the subjective theory of justiciability, ac­
cording to - INTER RLIPi, the different conception on the 
State of international law - whether it is complete or 
incomplete - and the degree of belief in the usefulness 
and efficiency of international adjudication, thus Laute- 
rpacht observed in his seminal study of the question of 
justiciability that virtually all international disputes 
can be formulated and resolved in legal terms. States 
invoke justiciability, in his view, because of the desire 
to have the dispute resolved politically, and not because 
the dispute is inherently insusceptible to judicial or
314
arbitral resolution. ~ Lauterpacht denied the theory of 
non-justiciability of any logic or substantive validity, 
characterising it as "a well meant attempt to lend the 
authority of a legal principle to an attitude of States
inimical to any real recognition of the sovereignty of
315
law." Variations on his views were later articulated
by - among others Kelsen, R Higgins, _,1/ Jenks, °18
319 32*") 391
Hambro, ' Brownlie and Rosenne.
28,7
On the other hand there are many scholars who 
consider the above view as an Idealistic view. They 
believe that there are some valid reasons for States' 
refusal to accept compulsory adjudication. The common 
ground between these scholars, who are sometimes lumped 
together as "realists" in spite of diverse opinions,
is that some disputes are not amenable to judicial set­
tlement for one reason or another. The non-justiciability 
is attributed sometimes to the existence of certain
7H7
relations between the dispute and the tension, and
sometimes to the efficiency of the solution offered by 
"24the judgment. " Thus it is thought that judicial set­
tlement should be limited to disputes which involve a 
limited number of questions "THAT ARE DISPOSITIVE of the
dispute, which are complete in themselves, and which can
^25be posed in terms of two clear alternatives." " Also 
sometimes the non-justiciability is attributed to the 
importance of political or economic interests involved.
The foregoing consideration demonstrate the compli­
cated problems which are associated with the expression 
"legal disputes". The question is whether Article 36 (2) 
of the Statute has facilitated the task of the Court in 
dealing with that term.
(II) Article 36 (2) as a Criterion
7,27
The Court seems - as the above statements suggests 
- to consider the limitation of "legal disputes" as an 
inherent limitation on its function as a Court of Law. 
Thus it must first of all, be satisfied that the dispute 
before it is a "legal dispute". The role of the Court is, 
therefore intimately linked with the scope of that ex­
pression. The growth of its role depends on the expansion 
or construction of that concept. However, how can the 
Court satisfy itself that the dispute is not "non-legal"?
Article 36 (2) appears, it is believed, to facil­
itate the task of the Court for determining the character
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of the dispute. For inasmuch as the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction is limited to the four categories set forth 
in Article 36 (2), the Court is not required to determine 
whether the dispute is of a political or other non-legal 
character. The Court is not equipped to measure the 
political impact of the dispute. It is required only
to satisfy itself that the dispute falls within one of 
those categories. In other words the expression "legal 
disputes" in Article 36 (2) is equivalent to saying that
the dispute must be "justiciable" being encompassed by
7,
one of the four categories enumerated therein. Non- 
legal disputes do not fall within these categories. This 
is the result of an enquiry made by the most eminent 
authorities "”'U on the Court on whether the adjective 
"legal" is descriptive or limitive of these categories of 
dispute. In other words whether it requires that the 
dispute which falls into one of the four categories must 
be also a "legal dispute"? After an exhaustive examina­
tion of the drafting of Article 13 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, from which those categories were 
taken, and Article 36 (2) of the Statute of the P. C. I. 
J. by the Committee of Jurists in 1920, they reached the 
conclusion that the term "legal" is "merely a descriptive 
word, employed with reference to disputes which satisfy 
the requirements of one of the four categories". It
is far from being in the nature of a limitation and far 
from qualifying and limiting the scope of the four clas­
ses of disputes. Furthermore, it is believed that it 
would not be possible to consider the term "legal dis­
putes" as a limitation unless it is estimated that categ­
ories (c) and (d) can encompass non-legal disputes. In 
such a case they are not legal disputes and hence they 
lose their REASON D'ETRE.
Consequently, regardless of whether the enumeration 
of the four categories of disputes in Article 36 (2) does 
constitute the provision of criticism for the distinc­
tion between "LEGAL” and "NON—LEGAL7 disputes or merely 
indicates those classes of disputes in respect to which
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the obligation of compulsory jurisdiction is undertaken, 
and leaving aside the question of whether the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction encompasses any international 
legal dispute, especially in conformity with point (6) 
[any question of international law], it is submitted
that those categories constitute a criterion - and may be 
the only criterion which guides the Court in determining 
th e  "JU S T IC IA B IL IT Y " of a dispute referred to it under 
Article 36 (2) .
Keeping in mind these considerations and the com­
pulsory nature of the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 
36 (2), the generally accepted criterion of justiciabil- 
ity based on the attitude of States seems, so far as 
the compulsory jurisdiction is concerned, to require a 
re-examination. To make a dispute non-justiciable because 
one party has relied exclusively on other than legal 
considerations - say political, economic or military
considerations - means that that party has a discretion­
ary power to rid itself of its obligation to adjudicate 
inasmuch as the Court's compulsory jurisdiction is limi­
ted to legal disputes. There is no doubt that the
justiciability depends completely on the attitude of 
States in the sense that the Court's compulsory jurisdic­
tion depends totally on the previous consent of States. 
However the importance of States' attitude is limited to 
the time at which the compulsory jurisdiction is ac­
cepted. At, that time a State may limit the scope of 
justiciability by excluding certain disputes, which it 
thinks are not justiciable in relation ot other States 
for one reason or another, from the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction. However once the jurisdiction is accepted 
the criterion of justiciability becomes objectively
ascertainable according to both the statutory provisions 
relating the Court's jurisdiction and the terms of the 
parties' declarations. In other words the Court must 
satisfy itself that the subject matter of the dispute
falls within both the scope of Article 36 (2) read in
conjunction with Article 38 (1) of the Statute and the
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scope of the declarations of the parties. Another limita­
tion on the attitude of States is that the decision upon 
the character of the dispute - being judiciable or not- 
is within the Court's hand pursuant to Article 386 (6) of 
the Statute. To say otherwise, i.e. to give States which 
choose not to benefit from the opportunity of making a 
category of dispute non-justiciable by means of a reser­
vation a second choice to do so "is tantamount to allow­
ing the requirement of consent to degenerate into a
requirement of double consent, in the form of confirma-
7>~\7
tion of consent previously given."
From the aforesaid considerations it appears that 
the reservation of "legal disputes" is without significa­
nce. For it cannot have any effect other than that produ­
ced by the expression "legal disputes" in Article 36 (2). 
This conclusion is supported by States' attitude with 
regard to such a limitation before the Court and the 
jurisprudence of the latter.
B -  "LEGAL D ISPU TES" IN  STATE PRACTICE
It is not surprising, perhaps in the light of what 
has been said, to find that no State has ever ralied on 
"legal disputes" as a reservation embodied in its declar­
ation accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.
States, however, have sometimes referred to one or 
another of the tests discussed above in their attempts to 
attribute a non-legal character on the dispute. Thus in 
the FISHERIES JURISDICTION case Iceland challenged the 
Court's jurisdiction on the ground INTER OLIO, that its 
VITftL INTERESTS were involved. Non—justiciabi1ity in 
the sense that there was no legal obligation imposed by 
international law in regard to atmospheric tests was the 
feature of the Nuclear Tests Cases. In its note of
february 7, 1973 to the Australian Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister, France alleged that its nuclear tests 
did not constitute a violation of any existing rule of
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international law.
A combination of some of the test of justiciability 
was made by Canada as a reason for modifying its declara­
tion in 1970 in order to exclude the dispute concerning 
Arctic. It pointed out that it was not prepared to litig­
ate "on vital issues concerning which the law is either
inadequate, non-existent, irrelevant ... [or] does not
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provide a firm basis for decision".
Nevertheless, States have generally approached the 
question whether a concrete dispute is legal or not by 
means of one of the following arguments: either that the 
dispute is not one which falls within one of the four 
categories set out in Article 36 (2) of the Statute, or
that the dispute is not one which can be decided by the
application of international law pursuant to Article 38
342(1) of the Statute. " The first argument was advanced 
in the LOSINGER AND COMPANY; ELECTRICITY COMPANY OF SOFIA 
AND BULGARIA; AERIAL INCIDENT OF 27 JULY 1955 and M I L I T ­
ARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVATES IN  AND AGAINST NICARAGUA 
cases. In the first the objection was joined to the 
merit. In the second it was regarded as not possessing 
the character of a preliminary objection. “ In the 
third the Court declined jurisdiction on other grounds. 
In all these cases the argument that the dispute did not 
fall within the scope of paragraph 2, of Article 36 had 
been merged with the argument that the dispute fell 
within the domestic jurisdiction of the respondent.
In the MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IE S case 
professor Louis Sohn argued for the United States that it 
"was not the United States purpose to argue that the 
application must be dismissed because it presents a 
'political1 question, as opposed to a legal question". 
The United States' purpose was to demonstrate that ongo­
ing use of unlawful force did not come within the scope
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of Article 36 (2) . " However, this statement was con­
tradicted later by the United States when it resorted to
the 'political issue' argument. In the statement issued 
by the Department of State on October 7, 1985 it was
pointed out that "the conflict in Central America is not 
a narrow legal dispute, it is an INHERENTLY POLITICAL 
problem that is not appropriate for judicial resolution".
This argument that the dispute cannot be decided by 
the application of international law in accordance with 
Article 38 (1) was made in the RIGHT OF PASSAGE 0 0 ER
INDIAN TERRITORY case. It was presented in a form of a 
contention that there had been no arguable case for
decision in accordance with Article 38 (1) of the Statu­
te. Here also the argument had been merged with the 
contention that the dispute fell within domestic juris­
diction. The Court found that it was not possible to
pronounce upon the objection without prejudging the
747
merits. " ‘ The objection was dismissed in the second 
phase on the ground that the existence of delicate ques­
tions of application was not sufficient for holding that
the right was not amenable to judicial determination
7,48according to Article 38 (1) .
The above cases show not only that States have
never invoked the RESERVATION of "legal disputes", but 
also they have never relied on the expression "legal
disputes" of Article 36 (2) alone. They have invoked the 
latter together with the objection of domestic jurisdic­
tion and with other objections. This fact has led Rosenne 
to the observation that States seem to adapt themselves
to the tendency of the Court considering the objection as
749
a defence to the merits rather than a plea in bar.
C - "LEGAL DISPUTES" IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURT
It is very fortunate that the Court has had some 
occasions recently in which it took a position on the 
most complicated point in the theory of justiciability 
namely, the mixed character of disputes. This character 
has been the main element behind the divergent views on
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justiciability. Whereas it appeared to some as a reason 
for the restriction of the scope of the judiciabi1ity,
77
it seemed to others a reason for broadening that scope.
The Court seems, however, to have taken the second 
view in the UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF 
IN  TEHERAN and MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IE S  IN  
AND AGAINST NICARAGUA cases.
In the former, the Iranian Government, which did 
not participate in the proceedings, contested the Court's 
cognisance of the case in its letters to the Court of 
December 9, 1979 and March 16, 1980 on the ground that
the dispute was non-justiciable. It was so because it 
only represented "a marginal and secondary aspect of an 
overall problem". It was not possible, Iran argued, to 
study the case divorced from other elements concerning, 
INTER A LIA , more than 25 years of continual interference 
by the United States in the internal affairs of Iran, the 
shameless exploitation of [Iran], and numerous crimes 
perpetrated against the Iranian people, contrary to and 
in conflict with all international and humanitarian 
norms".
Iran seems thus to have taken the view that the 
question of hostages was inherently political or at 
least, evaluated in its relation to the "tension" between 
the two parties, it represented, according to Morgan-
thau's theory of justiciability, only the tip of the
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iceberg. This question involved in the conflict was 
not, in Iran's view, a legal one concerning the inter­
pretation or application of treaties, but resulted from 
"an overall situation containing much more fundamental 
and more complex elements". Consequently, Iran continued:
"The Court cannot examine the American application divor­
ced -from its proper context, namely the whole political dos­
sier of the relations between Iran and the United States over 
the last 25 years, This dossier includes, IHTER ATJA, all the 
crimes perpetrated in Iran by the American Government, in
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particular the COUP O'ETOT of 1953 stirred up and carried out 
by the C I A ,  the overthrow of the lawful national government 
of Dr Mossadegh, the restoration of the Shah and of its regime 
which was under the control of the American interests and all 
the social, economic, cultural and political consequences of 
the direct interventions in ou.r internal affairs, as well as 
grave, flagrant and continuous violations of all international
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norms, committed by the United States in Iran."
Although the Court agreed with Iran that there was 
no doubt that the Islamic revolution of Iran was a matter 
"essentially and directly within the national sovereignty
TCjcr
of Iran", it rejected the Iranian arguments. Having
regard to the importance of the legal principle involved, 
namely the interpretation or application of multilateral 
conventions codifying international law governing diplom­
atic and consular relations, the Court was not able to 
share the view that the case of hostages would be regar­
ded as "secondary" or "marginal" and thus outside of the 
Court's jurisdiction. On the contrary it was one which by 
its very nature fell within international jurisdiction. 0lJt>
The Court rejected also the basic idea underlying 
the Iranian arguments, namely that the Court cannot take 
cognisance of the case because of the mixed character of 
the dispute. The Court did not find any provision of the 
Statute or Rules which "contemplates that the Court 
should decline to take cognisance of one aspect of a
dispute namely because that dispute has other aspects,
"rcry
however important. ~u Accordingly the Court ordered some 
interim measure of protection.
In the second stage of the proceedings (the merits) 
the Court, after noting the absence of any explanation by 
Iran of the reasons why the American application could 
not be examined separately from the "overall problem", 
observed that any contention intending to deprive the 
Court of jurisdiction only on the ground that the dispute 
is of a mixed character would overlook not only the 
nature of the relations between States; -the provisions 
governing the Court's jurisdiction; the jurisprudence of
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the Court, but the more fundamental element namely the 
object for which the Court is created. It said:
"CLlegal disputes between sovereign States by their very 
nature are likely to occur in political contexts, and often 
form only one element in a wider and long-standing political 
dispute between the States concerned. Yet never has the view 
been put forward before that, because a legal dispute sub­
mitted to the Court is only one aspect of a political dispute, 
the Court should decline to resolve for the parties the legal 
questions at issue between them. Nor can any basis for such a 
view of the Court's functions or jurisdiction be found in the 
Charter of the Statute of the Court; if the Court were, con­
trary to its settled jurisprudence, to adopt such a view, it 
would impose a far-reaching and unwarranted restriction upon 
the role of the^Court in' the peaceful solution of internation­
al disputes."
This dictum, which was adopted unanimously, seems 
to have many implications. The first and the most obvious 
is the rejection of the idea that the legal aspects in a 
dispute of a mixed character cannot be separated from 
other aspects, especially the political aspects - as 
submitted to adjudication. " The second is that this 
dictum read in conjunction with the above mentioned 
statement in the Court's Order of December 15, 1979, 
seems to suggest that the crucial point of justiciability 
is the ascertainment that the dispute has fallen within 
the Court's jurisdiction. Once the Court finds that the 
dispute is within its jurisdiction it would take cog­
nisance of the case regardless of the other aspects of 
the dispute and regardless of their weight. Accordingly 
the theoretical argument as to whether there is more law 
in every international dispute or more politics, seems 
meaningless. The Court is to decide only legal elements. 
The third is that the dictum appears to imply that all 
disputes brought before the Court are to be presumed 
justiciable. For it is unlikely that a State would not 
formulate its claim on legal terms whatever the implica­
tions of other non-legal elements involved in the dis­
pute. The fourth is that the Court seems to have refused 
to give much importance to the attitude of States - the
respondent in the case - as a criterion for justiciabili­
ty. i.e. once a party has relied on non-legal grounds the 
dispute would be "political" For there is no doubt
that the "deep rootedness and the essential character of 
the Islamic revolution of Iran, a revolution of a whole 
oppressed nation against its oppressors and their master- 
s", ~~ and the other aforesaid arguments advanced by
Iran cannot be considered as legal grounds.
It is said that such an approach by the Court, i.e. 
considering only the legal elements in a dispute of a 
mixed character, may have the effect that the dispute 
will have been judicially DECIDE D but not judicially 
SETTLED . However the Court expressly pointed out that 
its task as the principle judicial organ of the United 
Nations " is to resolve any legal question that may be in 
issue between the parties to a dispute; and the resolu­
tion of such legal questions by the Court may be an
important, and sometimes decisive factor in promoting the
7,67-peaceful settlement of the dispute." By this inter­
pretation the Court seems to have taken the view adopted 
by some treaties that the combination of more than one 
procedure is sometimes the best method for the settlement 
of certain disputes.
In the MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IE S  IN  AND 
AGAINST NICARAGUA case the United States did not - as has 
been said - argue that Nicaragua's application should 
have been dismissed because it involved a 'political' ra­
ther than 'legal' question. It argued that an allegation 
of an ongoing use of unlawful armed force was never con­
templated by the framers of the Charter to be encompassed 
by Article 36 (2) of the Statute. Nevertheless, the 
Court reaffirmed its view expressed in the UNITED STATES 
DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF IN  TEHERAN case while ex­
amining the fifth ground of inadmissibility advanced by 
the United States - namely Nicaragua's failure to exhaust
the regional process (the Contadora process) for the
"\AR
resolution of conflicts occurring in Central America.
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Here again the Court found UNANIMOUSLY that Nicaragua's
■^69application was admissible. " However in the second 
phase (merits) judge Oda observed that the Court should 
have declared the non-justiciability of Nicaragua's 
application because it did not fall within the categories 
of legal disputes within the meaning of Article 36 (2). 
He stated that even if his argument was ill founded, "it 
would ... have been prudent for the Court, in the light 
of the merits of the present case, to find it a matter of 
judicial propriety not to proceed with a case so highly 
charged with issues central to the sensitive political 
relations of many States". ’"'U The determination of the 
appropriate procedure for settling disputes of a mixed 
character depends, in his view, on which elements in the 
dispute are prevailing. A dispute of an "overwhelmingly 
political character" is better to be settled by a con­
ciliation procedure.
Two points might be inferred from this case. The 
first is that the United States seems to have been con­
vinced that the Court's compulsory jurisdiction cannot be 
barred by the mere qualification of a dispute as apoliti­
cal character. The second is that between the warning 
that the tendency to submit "essentially political con­
flicts, to adjudication ... would undermine the very 
foundation of jurisdiction" and bolstering up its
role in the peaceful settlement by narrowing the scope of 
non-legal disputes, the Court has chosen the latter 
approach. Therefore the Court's statements cited in the 
beginning of this section, limiting the Court's jurisdic­
tion to "legal disputes", should be understood in the 
light of the cases concerning the UNITED STATES DIPLOMA­
TIC AND CONSULAR STAFF IN  TEHERAN and MILITARY AND PAR­
AMILITARY A C T IV IT IES  IN  AND AGAINST NICARAGUA.
To sum up, the reservation of "legal disputes" in 
some declaration cannot, if intended to, have the effect 
of excluding "NON-PURE LEGAL DISPUTES", for the simple 
reason there are no purely legal disputes in the rela­
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tions between States. Nor can it have an effect more than 
that of the same expression in Article 36 (2) of the 
Statute. The attitude of States, having never invoked it 
as a reservation but as an inherent limitation on the 
Court's jurisdiction, indicates that it is an UNNECESSARY 
reiteration of the same term embodied in paragraph 2 of 
Article 36 instead of declaring simply that the jurisdic­
tion is accepted pursuant to that paragraph. For these 
reasons, and having never been able to bar the Court's 
jurisdiction, even as a statutory limitation, the reser­
vation of "legal disputes" is harmless.
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and see his argument before the I.C.J as an advocate for the Iranian Government 
in the Anglo_lranian Oil Co. case, I.C.J Pleadings _  ( United Kingdom V Iran ),
pp.469_70, 619 21); A.Verdross, " The Plea of Domestic Jurisdiction before
International Tribunals and Political Organs of the United Nations", 28 
Z.A .d .fi.(1968), pp.33_40, La Competence ..., supra note 122, at 323, and his 
observations in 44 (I) Annuaire I.D .I.(1952), pp.176_180.
(1 4 1 ) 45 (II) Annuaire I.D .I (1954), pp .149_150.
(142) See Sir G.Fitzmaurice, " The Law and Procedure of the International Court of 
Justice : International Organisations and Tribunals, " 29 B.Y.B.I.L (1952 ), 
pp.1_62, at 36, and A.N.Farmanfarma, The Declarations of the Members 
Accepting The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 
Thesis (Universite de Geneve, Faculte de Droit ), 1952, pp.112_113.
(143) A.N.Farmanfarma, lbid.,p.113.
(144) C.H.M.Waldock, the Plea ..., supra note 122, at 112, at 109.
(145) P .C.I.J., Series B, No.4, p.26.
(146) 45 (II) Annaire I.D .I (1954) pp.150, 299.
(147) H.Lauterpacht, the British Reservations ..., supra note 5, at 153 note 33.
(148) Sir G.Fitzmaurice, General Principles ..., supra note 139, p.197.
(149) Ibid., pp.197_198. Most of the legal definitions are based generally on one 
of these tests. See .e.g. C.H.M.Waldock, the Plea ..., supra note 122 at 96_97; 
J.S.Woo, " the World Court and Domestic Jurisdiction ", 10 K .J.I.L  (1965), 
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of the International Court of Justice", 2 /n f7 .fie /.(1954), pp.39-49, at 47, 
and the system ..., supra note 15, at 596. For views considering the reservation 
as unnecessary see e.g. Ch.Rousseau, Droit International Public, Vol.5, 1983, 
p.456; S.Rosenne, the law..., supra note 4, p.394; A.N.Farmanfarma, supra note 
142, at 93 ; K. Yokota, "the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court 
of Justice", International Law Association, Reports of the 51 st Conference, 
Tokyo, 1964, pp.8_19, J.G.Merrills, "the Optional Clause Today " 50 B.Y.I.L. 
(1979), pp.87_116, and R.P.Anand, Compulsory ..., supra note 4, p.190.
(167) See R.St.J.Macdonald, supra note 4, p.32. Comp. J.S.Bains supra note 166, 
484_485 and S.Prasasvinitchai, La Clause Facultative de Juridiction 
Obiigatoire de la Cour Internationale de Justice, Thesis (Universite de Paris, 
Faculte de Droit et des Sciences Economiques,1962, at 99_100.
(168) J.H.W.Vezijl, The system ..., supra note 15, p.596 and sir G.Fitzmaurice, 
General Principles ..., supra note 139, p.200. Bearing in mind this distinction, 
Judge H.Lauterpacht observed in his dissenting opinion in the Interhandel case 
that part (b) of the fourth preliminary objection of the U.S.A. " must properly 
be regarded as defense on the merits, as being a substantive plea in the sense that 
there is no rule of Internatioanl Law limiting the freedom of action of the United 
States on the subject." I.C.J.Reports 1959, p.122.
(169) The plea ..., supra note 122, p.115.
(170) Article 2, paragraph 7, provides : " Nothing in the present character shall 
authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit 
such matters to settlement under the present charter."
(171) I.C.J.Y.B., 1985_86,pp.61_92. It is to be noted that the declaration of 
Mexico does not contain the world "essentially". It excludes matters which, in its 
opinion, are within its domestic jurisdiction, ibid., 80.
(172) The declaration of Botswana is relevant only to the extent that it uses the 
term essentially, otherwise it is identical to the covenant model. The declaration 
excludes " matters, which, by international law, are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the Republic of Botswana." Ibid.,p.63.
(173) For the subjective form see section 1, chapter 6 infra.
(174) I.C.J. Pleading, Anglo-lranian Oil Co.case (United Kingdom v.lran ),pp.292 
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180 ,pp.330-332 ; A .Verdross , La competence ... ,supra note 122 , p.323 ; 
Q.Wright , supra note 138,pp. 29 -31 ; Pollux , supra note 125 , pp. 26 -29; 
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CHAPTER V 
OBJECT I VE RE S E RV ATI 03NTS 
RAT I Q3STE MATE RI A
The general characteristic feature of this group of 
reservations.is that their scope can be determined objec­
tively. They intend either to adjust the competence 
between the Court and other means of pacific settlement 
of disputes or to exclude, disputes relating to some 
specific subject matters. Therefore, they do not general­
ly contravene either the Statute of the Court or the 
spirit of the compulsory jurisdiction. 1
SECTION (1) : RESERVATIONS RELATING TO THE CONFLICT 
OF COMPETENCE BETWEEN THE COURT AND 
OTHER MEANS OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
Almost all States accepting the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction under Article 36 (2) of the Statute have
also accepted that competence under Article 36 (1) of the 
Statute by the insertion of clauses in multilateral or 
bilateral treaties conferring jurisdiction on the Court 
over any dispute which may arise between the parties or 
disputes relating to the interpretation and application 
of that treaty.  ^ These Treaties often contemplate other 
procedures for the pacific settlement in addition to the 
judicial settlement of the Court. Furthermore, pursuant 
to the Charter of the United Nations, States have under­
taken the obligation to settle their disputes peacefully. 
Thus Article 33 (1) of the Charter reads:
"The partiee to any dispute, the continuation■of which is 
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial set­
tlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other 
peaceful means of their own choice."
The political organs of the United Nations, especially 
the Security Council and the General Assembly are given a 
wide authority for the maintenance of international peace 
and security. The Court's jurisdiction may thus concur
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with either other judicial or non-judicial means of 
peaceful settlement. Some States deemed it necessary to 
regulate such "conflict" in their declarations of accep­
tance.
Before examining these two forms of conflict it 
might be desirable to discuss briefly the effect of 
plurality of titles of jurisdiction on the reservations 
included in these titles.
A - THE EFFECT OF PLURALITY OF TITLES OF JURISDICTION ON 
THE RESERVATIONS INCLUDED THEREIN
As has just been pointed out a State may confer 
jurisdiction on the Court by virtue of both a declaration 
of acceptance and another instrument. How will the dif­
ferent reservations included in these titles be applied? 
Do they operate cumulatively of exclusively?
The resolution of a conflict between the different 
titles of jurisdiction appeared to many writers not very 
difficult. It has been suggested that the general prin­
ciples of law applicable to conflicting or incompatible 
international agreements between the same parties such as 
LEX POSTERIOR BERO&OT LEBI P R IO R I, LEX SPECIO US BEROBOTE 
LEBI BENEROLI, and LEX SPEC IO US PRIORI BEROBOT LEBI 
GENERGLI POSTERIORI should be relied on for determining 
which title is to prevail. " Some went even a stage 
further in suggesting that the question of which title is 
to prevail must be decided by the Court even if it is not 
raised by the respondent and even if both parties to the 
dispute agree that both instruments are in force so long 
as there is no agreement between them as to the com­
petence or incompetence of the Court to entertain the 
dispute. Otherwise the existence of different reserva­
tions in each instrument would lead to the situation 
where recourse to the Court is permitted by a treaty but 
not by the declarations or OICE OERSO. This, it is ar­
gued, would mean that, in the same legal system, there
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can at the same time exist two rules relating to the same
facts and attributing to these facts contradictory conse-
4quences.
This approach appeared to others non convincing for 
two reasons: firstly it is difficult to be certain that 
one title is LEX GENERALIS and the other is LEX SPECIAL- 
I S ; secondly all instruments conferring jurisdiction on 
the Court "have so much in common that it cannot be
presumed that two or more such documents are either 
conflicting or incompatible with one another, so as to
bring either of these two very general and divergent
5
principles into play". Therefore it is deemed more
reasonable to consider the plurality of titles of juris­
diction as an indication of the parties' intention to
£
have them applied cumulatively.
The principle was first applied by the P. C. I.J. 
in the ELECTRICITY COMPANY OF SOFIA AND BULGARIA case 
where the applicant, Belgium, relied on its own declara­
tion and that of Bulgaria in addition to the Treaty of 
Conciliation, Arbitration and Judicial Settlement of. June 
23, 1931, which came into force in February 4, 1933. 7 
The Court took a liberal view warmly welcomed by whoever
feels that the judicial settlement of disputes may great-
R
ly contribute to easing international tension. " Relying 
on the intention of the parties, having not contested the 
validity of both titles, the Court decided that the 
multiplicity of concurring titles of jurisdiction must be 
interpreted in a way that the parties intended to extend 
compulsory jurisdiction rather than to restrict it. It 
said:
"In its opinion, the multiplicity of agreements concluded 
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction is evidence that the 
contracting Parties intended to open up new ways of access to 
the Court rather than to close old ways or to allow them to 
cancel each other out with the ultimate result that no juris­
diction would remain.
“TOO
In concluding the Treaty of Conciliation, Arbitration, 
and Judicial Settlement, the object of Belgium and Bulgaria 
was to institute a very complete system of mutual obligations 
with a view to the pacific settlement of any disputes which 
might arise between them. There is, however, no justification 
for holding that in so doing they intended to weaken the 
obligations which they had previously entered into with a 
similar purpose, and especially where such obligations were 
more extensive than those ensuing from the Treaty.
It follows that if, in a particular case, a dispute could 
only be submitted to the Court under the Treaty, whereas it 
might be submitted to it under the declarations of Belgium and 
Bulgaria accepting as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Court 
... the Treaty cannot be adduced to prevent those declarations 
from exercising their effects and disputes from being thus 
submitted to the Court."
Then the Court explained how it would tackle objec­
tions to its jurisdictions under both titles. It may not 
examine the objections raised under the second title
unless objections under the first title prove well-found­
ed. "Only if both these sets of objectives are alike held 
to be well-founded will the Court decline to entertain 
the case." 1U
Reciprocal declarations and compromissory clause 
had been relied on together in many cases before the
International Court of Justice. 11 In none of them the
question of which title should prevail was raised either 
by the parties concerned or by the Court. The principle 
set down in the ELECTRICITY OF SQFIQ MW BULGGR18 case 
had been applied in the subsequent cases. Thus the reser­
vations in each title operate separately. In other words 
the Court will consider its jurisdiction under each title 
separately. If it found that it is deprived of jurisdic­
tion by virtue of a reservation in the parties' declara­
tions it will consider the second title (the treaty) and 
will take cognisance of the case unless it upholds an 
objection based on a reservation included therein. In
this sense the multiplicity of titles of jurisdiction
operate cumulatively, namely, an application will not
fail because the subject mater is not covered by one
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title, if it is encompassed by the other title.
This being the case, it does not follow that the 
multiplicity of titles of jurisdiction cannot operate 
exclusively. This may occur not only pursuant to a spe­
cial reservation in one title (the declaration) maintain­
ing -as will be seen 1"' - the reservations in other
titles, but also by virtue of a general reservation in 
the former. This can be illustrated by the titles invoked 
in MILITARY AND PARLIAMENTARY A C T IV IT IE S case namely, the 
reciprocal declarations of Nicaragua and the United 
States and the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Naviga­
tion concluded between them in 1956. If that treaty had 
been a multilateral one, the Court would have eliminated 
the possibility of founding its jurisdiction on the 1956
Treaty pursuant to the multilateral treaty reservation
14included in the declaration, of the United States. The 
Court would have had no choice but to decide its com­
petence on the basis of the reciprocal declarations 
alone. Thus the Court in that case, deemed it appropriate 
to ascertain under the 1956 Treaty after pointing out
that, the multilateral treaty reservations "OBVIOUSLY" did
15not affect its jurisdiction under that Treaty.
B - CONFLICT WITH JUDICIAL ORGANS
(I) The General Rule Governing Such a Conflict
The conclusion of different treaties providing for 
recourse to other judicial or arbitral bodies for the 
settlement of disputes either before or after the accep­
tance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction by a declar­
ation under Article 36 (2) may lead to a conflict of
jurisdiction between the Court and another judicial or
arbitral body. Such a conflict may take a positive or
negative form. It is negative where neither organ con­
siders itself competent and positive where both estimate 
that they are competent. How are such conflicts to be 
settled?
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The answer was given by the P. C. I. J. in the 
CHORION FACTORY case. In fact the argument that the
Court should step aside because another tribunal was 
competent was advanced in an earlier stage of the dis­
pute, namely, in the BERMAN INTERESTS IN  POLISH UPPER
S ILE S IA case. However the Court managed to escape the 
question whether the doctrine of litispendence was ap­
plicable or not, by refusing to consider the claim brou­
ght before it and that referred to the tribunal as iden- 
17tical. Yet it was not possible to follow that approach 
in the CHORION FACTORY case, because there were two 
arbitral tribunals before which the same case could have 
been brought. The Court was, therefore, obliged to answer 
how the conflict with other judicial organs could be 
settled. It said:
"When it has to define its jurisdiction in relating to 
that of another tribunal, [it] cannot allow its own competence 
to give away unless confronted with a clause which it con­
siders sufficiently clear to prevent the possibility of nega­
tive conflict of jurisdiction involving the danger of a denial 
of justice," ^
The Court thus, facing the argument that another 
tribunal was competent, did not hesitate to determine not 
only its own jurisdiction but also at least on a PRIMA 
FACIE basis, the jurisdiction of the other tribunal
involved and preferred to exercise its jurisdiction to
l o
the exclusion of that of the other tribunal.
(II) Reservations Concerning the Conflict of Competence
Between the Court and Other Judicial Organs
Can the Court follow the same approach, i.e. prefer 
its own jurisdiction in spite of the existence of a clear 
reservation in the relevant jurisdictional instrument 
limiting the resort to the Court to cases where no other 
means of judicial settlement are provided? The adjustment 
of this conflict by giving priority to other judicial 
bodies than the International Court of Justice is the
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object of these reservations which have taken different 
f orms.
(i) Exclusion of disputes in regard to which the parties 
have agreed to recourse to arbitration or judicial 
settlement by another body 
*
The declarations of Liberia and Pakistan excluded 
from the Compulsory jurisdiction of the Court disputes 
"in regard to which the parties have agreed or may agree 
to bring before other tribunals as a result of agreements
Of)
already existing or which may be made in the future". 
This formula is even narrower in the declarations of 
Austria and Japan. They exclude "disputes which the 
parties thereto have agreed or shall agree to refer for
final and binding decision to arbitration or judicial
21settlement".
This reservation is amongst the few reservations 
which are expressly permitted. It is consistent with 
Article 95 of the Charter which reads:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall prevent Members of
the United Nations from entrusting the solution of their
differences to other tribunals by virtue of arguments already 
in existence or which may be concluded in the future."
The reservation indicates the intention of the 
declarant not to revoke or endanger in any degree what­
soever the agreements with other States to settle their 
disputes by arbitration. i’J" However the application of 
the reservation depends on the existence of a competent 
concurring tribunal or other court for the settlement of 
the dispute referred to the Court. This condition must 
clearly be fulfilled in order to deprive the Internation­
al Court of Justice of jurisdiction. It seems that the
reservation cannot have such effect - at least in so far
as the reservation of Japan and Austria are concerned- 
except where there exists a real obligation to arbitrate 
that dispute. Consequently, the reservation cannot depr—
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ive the I.. C. J. of jurisdiction even where the treaty 
compromissory clause contains such obligation but with a 
reservation for example RQTIONE TEMPORIS excluding that 
dispute because it has arisen out of events which oc­
curred before the crucial date. The same can be said 
where the concurring title provides for a facultative 
recourse to arbitration. It is obvious that the decis­
ion upon the fulfillment of these conditions is for the
I. C. J. according to Article 36 (6) of its Statute.
(ii) Disputes excluded from judicial settlement 
or compulsory arbitration by virtue of a 
previous Treaty of Instrument
In 1955, the United Kingdom introduced in its 
declaration made on June the 2nd, a new reservation 
excluding "disputes relating to any matter excluded from 
compulsory adjudication or arbitration under any treaty,
convention or other international agreement or instrument
24
to which the United Kingdom is a party". This reserva­
tion had been maintained in all the British subsequent 
declarations except that of 1969 which is now in force.
It has been copied textually in the declarations of
25Democratic Kampuchea, Malta and Mauritius.
It has been said that this reservation is a reiter­
ation of the reservation excluding from the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction disputes in regard to which the 
parties to the dispute have agreed to have recourse to 
other means of peaceful settlement included in the same 
declarations. *" Maus carries the argument a stage furth­
er. It is obvious, he believes, that if a question is 
excluded from arbitration, it cannot be submitted to the 
International Court of Justice pursuant to Article 36 (2) 
of the Statute because the special rule prevails over the 
general rule and the will of the parties is always the 
basis of jurisdiction even as regards an act so important 
as the Optional Clause. It is a general rule of interna­
tional law' that does not require a special reservation
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and hence the reservation is useless in his view.
This argument does not seem to carry conviction.
This is not only because it contradicts the rule applied
by the Court in the ELECTRICITY COMPANY. OF SOFIA AND 
BULGARIA case and others to concurrent titles of juris-
*7Q
diction,  ^ but also because it disregards the very terms 
of the reservation. In fact the simultaneous existence of 
those two reservations in the same instrument - espe­
cially in that of the United Kingdom - a  country which is 
very careful in drafting its declarations - implies that
they are of a different scope. However, the terms of the
reservation seem to indicate that it was intended to 
operate against the presumption of the cumulative effect
99
of concurring titles of jurisdiction. Thus, a State 
making the reservation may deprive the Court of jurisdic­
tion to entertain a dispute brought before it not because 
the dispute is excluded expressly in either of the decla­
rations, but because that dispute was excluded at some 
time - even in the last century - by any act of what­
soever character whether TREATY or CONVENTION or INTERNA­
TIONAL AGREEMENT or INSTRUMENT regardless whether multi­
lateral or bilateral and regardless of its object and the 
character of the obligation undertaken, be it obligatory 
or facultative. Moreover, the general terms of the reser­
vation appear to have the effect of maintaining old 
treaties of arbitration containing the famous reserva­
tions of vital interests, honour and independence . . . 
etc. although the decision whether those reservations are 
involved or not cannot be left to the State concerned 
because the question concerns the Court's jurisdiction, 
which is to be determined by the Court itself pursuant to 
Article 36 (6) of the Statute. It goes without saying
that the principle of reciprocity wi11 complicate those 
difficulties. A State making the reservation, or a State 
intending to sue the former, has to consider any instru­
ment to which its opponent is a party, contemplating 
recourse to judicial or arbitral procedure for the set­
tlement of their dispute.
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The foregoing considerations indicate clearly the 
uncertainty created by this form of reservation. This 
uncertainty may exceed any degree of uncertainty created 
by other reservations. For however the relations between 
States accepting compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36
(2) are complicated, the scope of the obligations between 
two or more States can be determined at any time by a 
simple comparison between the declarations of those 
States. In contrast the determination of the common
will of a State making such a reservation and the other 
States requires a deep study of all treaties and instru­
ments concluded between those States relating to judicial 
or arbitral settlement of disputes. In these conditions 
it may be asked what kind of disputes has a Country ac­
cepted, and not what kind of disputes it has excluded, 
like the United Kingdom, for example, which has concluded 
throughout the period since the end of the last century a 
long series of arbitration treaties.
In the light of these considerations, and although 
the Court appears to have considered the uncertainty as 
insufficient ground for the invalidity of a reservation, 
the reservations seems to run against the conception of 
the compulsory jurisdiction system. In this sense it 
seems also subjective unlike the other reservations in 
this chapter, and it is included here only for the sake 
of classification. Thus, it is strongly hoped that Democ­
ratic Kampuchea, Malta and Mauritius will follow the 
British action by eliminating this reservation as they 
followed the United Kingdom before by copying the reser­
vation from, its previous declarations, or they will re­
consider its terms if they are intending to exclude some 
defined disputes.
C -  CONFLICT WITH N O N -JU D IC IA L ORGANS
As has been explained in the beginning of this 
section, that the different titles conferring jurisdic­
tion on the Court not infrequently contemplate recourse
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to other means for peaceful settlement of disputes, and 
the mutual relations of the Court and other principle 
organs of the -United Nations may lead to the submis­
sion of the same dispute to different organs. Different 
kinds of reservations have been made in the declarations 
of acceptance with a view to adjusting the jurisdictional 
conflict between the different means of settlement. These 
reservations concern either the suspension of the procee­
dings before the Court when a dispute is put on the
active agenda of the Security Council or excludes dis­
putes which are not settled by other methods of settle­
ment or disputes in regard to which the parties have 
agreed to have recourse to other means of peaceful set­
tlement. It might be appropriate to precede the discus­
sion of those reservations by a brief discussion on how 
the Court has treated objections to its exercising juris­
diction, in the absence of such reservations, based on 
the simultaneous consideration of the same dispute by 
another political organ.
(I) The Non-application of the Doctrine of 
Litispendence Between the Court and the 
Political Organs
In the absence of a clear reservation preventing
the Court from exercising, or requiring it to suspend, 
its jurisdiction another organ is considering the dis­
pute, the Court did not hesitate to take cognisance of 
the case. The earlier practice on the issue is summed up 
in the SOUTH NEST AFRICA COSES where the Court had 
followed the general lines marked out by its predecessor 
in MINORITY SCHOOLS :4 and the INTERPRETATION OF THE 
STATUTE OF THE MOMEL TERRITORY ~'J cases and therefore 
went forward in spite of the fact that the dispute has 
been continuously on the agenda of the General Assembly. 
However the UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC and CONSULAR STAFF IN  
TEHERAN and MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IE S  IN  AND 
AGAINST NICARAGUA cases have raised the issue in its
most extreme form.
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In the former case the same dispute had been under 
the consideration of many organs. It was first referred by 
the United States to the Security Council on November 9, 
1979. Four days later the dispute was submitted to the 
Court, which held its jurisdiction unanimously on December 
15, 1979 to entertain the United States request for indica­
tion of provisional measures of protection in spite of the 
fact that not only the Security Council was "actively 
seised of the matter" but also the Secretary-General was 
under an express mandate from the Security Council to use 
his good offices. Nor was the Court prevented from going 
into the merits of the case in a later stage because of the 
establishment of a COMMISSION by the Security Council "to 
undertake a fact- finding mission to Iran to hear Iran 
grievances and to allow for an early solution of the crisis
40
between Iran and the United States."
The Court seems to have considered the simultaneous 
exercise of jurisdiction over the same matter by both the 
Security Council and itself as a NORMAL thing for two 
reasons. First, the absence of any provision in either the 
Charter or the Statute which prohibit the Court from exer­
cising its jurisdiction over a matter in respect of which 
the Security Council is exercising its jurisdiction. If 
such a prohibition were contemplated it would have been 
made expressly in either of those instruments as it is the 
case in Article 12 of the Charter which expressly forbids 
the General Assembly to make any recommendation with resp­
ect to "disputes or situations under the consideration of 
the Security Council". Second, the Court, as a principle 
Judicial organ of the United Nations, is vested with the 
power to solve ANY LEGAL questions that may be at issue 
between the parties. On the other hand the Security Council 
is under an obligation to take into consideration the 
important and decisive role of the Court in promoting 
peaceful settlement of disputes. Thus Article 36 (3) of the 
Charter provides:
"In making recommendations under this Article, the Secur­
ity Council should also take into consideration that legal 
disputes should as a. general rule be referred by the parties 
to the International Court of Justice, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Statute of the Court."
Accordingly the Court observed that it did not 
"seem to have occurred to any member of the Council that 
there was or could be anything irregular in the simul­
taneous exercise of their respective functions by the 
Court and the Security Council. Nor IS  THERE IN  THIS NAY 
ANY CAUSE FOR S U R P R IS E 41
The character of the other concurring organs ap­
pears thus of a critical importance for determining 
whether the Court should proceed with the examination of 
the case or step aside. The Court will declare itself
incompetent only where the function of the other organ is 
identical to that of the Court, i.e. empowered to decide 
matters of fact and law in the dispute. Since such re­
quirement was not complied with by the existence of a
commission as an instrument for mediation, conciliation
42or negotiation, the Court decided the case.
In the MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IE S  IN  AND
AGAINST NICARAGUA case the Court refused to depart from
its consistent jurisprudence on the issue because of the
allegations that the case concerned matter over which the
43Security Council is given a "primary responsibility" 
or that the Court’s admission of the claim would amount 
to exercising a function, which does not find a basis in 
the United Nations system, namely, a judicial "review" of 
the Security Council actions. For the failure of the 
Security Council to adopt a resolution condemning the 
United States actions owing to the negative vote of the
United States amounted, it was agreed, to a Security
44Council decision to take no action. In rejecting this 
ground of inadmissibility, by a vote of sixteen to zero, 
the Court was more explicit that in the previous case. It 
observed that the fact that the Security Council and 
itself constitute two organs of a different character
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entrusted with functions of a different nature must not 
be overlooked. "The Council has functions of a political 
nature assigned to it, whereas the Court exercises purely 
a judicial function. Both organs can therefore perform
their separate but complementary function with respect to
45the same events".
As to the argument that the judicial proceedings 
constituted an appeal to the Court from an adverse decis­
ion of the Security Council, the Court pointed out that 
it was not asked to examine the action taken by the 
Security Council, but to perform its duty as principle 
judicial organ of the United Nations namely to pass a 
judgment on some legal aspects of a situation which had 
also been considered by the Security Council.
The conclusion to be drawn from what has been said 
is that owing to the existence of different bodies entru­
sted with the function of maintaining international peace 
and security, and to States' freedom to confer on one or 
more of those bodies the jurisdiction to settle the dis­
pute, the simultaneous exercise of jurisdiction by judi­
cial and political organs will happen not infrequently. 
This parallel exercise of jurisdiction by organs of 
different nature appeared to the Court as not only normal 
but sometimes desirable in promoting the peaceful settle­
ment of disputes. Thus neither did the Security Council
dis-seise the Court from a case pending before it - as
47has been suggested - nor did the Court, as had been
4R
predicted, follow "the most cautious attitude" ~ by dif­
ferentiating the issue before it from that before the 
Council or adjourning the case until the Council takes 
action.
(II) The Suspension of Judicial Proceedings by 
Bringing Disputes Before the Security Council
This reservation seems to have found its origins in 
the statement made by the Third Committee of the Fifth
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Assembly of the League of Nations in which attention was 
drawn to the possibility of reserving from the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction "the right of laying disputes 
before the Council of the League of Nations with a view 
to conciliation in accordance with paragraphs 1 - 3 of 
Article 15 of the Covenant with the proviso that another
party might, during the proceedings before the Council,
49
take proceedings against the other in the Court". 
Inspired by this statement the unratified French declara­
tion of 1924 reserved the possibility of appeal to the 
Council of the League in accordance with paragraph 3 of 
Article 15 of the Covenant. vjU It was then introduced by
the British Declaration of 1929 and subsequently adopted
51by several other States.
The reservation was made in two forms. Whereas the 
declaration of Great Britain and the Commonwealth States 
set forth some conditions for the application of the 
reservation, the other States reserved for themselves the 
right to suspend unilaterally and at any time the judi­
cial proceedings by bringing the dispute before the 
Council. The former accepted the jurisdiction of the P. 
C . I. J . with:
"The condition that [the Government of the declarant 
State] reserve the right to require that proceedings in the 
Court shall be suspended in respect of any dispute which has 
been submitted to and is under consideration by the Council of 
the League of Nations, provided that notice to suspend is 
• given after the dispute has been submitted to the Council and 
is given within ten days of the notification of the intention 
of the proceedings in the Court, and provided also that such 
suspension shall be limited to a period of twelve months or 
such longer period as may be agreed by the parties to the 
dispute or determined by a decision of all the members of the 
Council other than the parties of the dispute,"
The object of this reservation was explained in the 
declaration of signature made by the Government of the 
United Kingdom, partly, by the necessity to exclude 
"disputes which are really political in character though 
judicial in appearance. Disputes of this kind can be
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deals with more satisfactorily by the Council." This
54
explanation was criticised strongly by H Lauterpacht
55and John F Williams as long ago as 1930. It was con­
sidered as "essentially retrogressive" and involving "a 
nervous quest for the security from law" as if the polit­
ical decision of a legal question provided greater safe-
. 56ty.
By virtue of Article 36 (5) of the Statute of the
I. C. J. the reservation has been maintained for some 
time in the declarations of Great Britain and the Common­
wealth States. The Australian Declaration of 1954 was the 
only declaration made under Article 36 (2) of the Statute 
of the I. C. J., which maintained the suspensive reserva­
tion with almost the same conditions with the substitu­
tion of the Security Council of the United Nations for
t r y
the Council of the League of Nations. However, the 
reservation was dropped from the new declarations of 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand made in 1970, 1975 and 
1977 respectively and therefore, it has now disappeared.
The elimination of the reservation might be due to 
the limited practical value of the reservation and the 
strong criticism levelled at it. The possibility that a 
party can convince the other party to accept something 
less acceptable than his rights or change his view in
less than 12 months, which is a very short period in
53international relations, has been questioned. A decis­
ion from the Council to examine the dispute was also a 
necessary condition for the operation of the reservation. 
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Security Council is 
limited by virtue of Chapters VI and VII of the Charter 
to certain kinds of disputes described therein and even 
with regard to these disputes the Council is under an
obligation to take into consideration that legal disputes
59should be referred to the Court (Article 36 (3) of the 
Charter). On the other hand some weighty objections have 
been raised against the inclusion of the reservation. It 
is observed that such a reservation does not allow only
335
either party to a dispute to suspend the judicial proc­
eedings but any member of the United Nations since under
Article 35 of the Charter any member State may bring a
60
dispute to the attention of the Security Council. 
Furthermore, it is believed that the way in which dis­
putes are handled by the Security Council does not jus­
tify the substitution of that body for the Court in the 
settlement of legal disputes. On the contrary the Coun­
cil's composition; namely, being composed of representa­
tives of various States, the resort to "walking outs",
delays and adjournments are elements that can magnify and
61complicate the dispute instead of resolving it.
To sum up, the suspensive reservation is undesirab­
le, as long as it is intended to harmonize arrangement 
for peaceful settlement, because, as R St J Macdonald 
observes, "at best it will accomplish a delay [and] at 
worst it will be invoked against the declarant ... not 
only in matters which are 'really political in character'
(III) Disputes in Regard to which the Parties 
Have Agreed to Have Recourse to Other Means 
of Peaceful Settlement
The Netherlands declaration of 1921 was the first 
to introduce this reservation. It was made in respect of 
"any future dispute in regard to which the parties have 
not agreed to have recourse to some other means of frien­
dly settlement." The use of the reservation soon
became quite common. In fact it has been the most popular 
reservation since 1921. It appeared in 25 out of 56
Declarations made under the Optional Clause of the P. C.
64
I. J. and it is now included in 22 out of the 45
65declarations in force. It has been used in two forms. 
Whilst some declarations exclude disputes in respect of 
which the parties have agreed before their acceptance of 
the compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36 (2) to have
recourse to other means of settlement, ~b the majority
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have extended the scope of their reservations to cover
even subsequent agreements. They excluded disputes in
respect of which the parties "//AV£ AGREED or SHPiLL Q&REE" 
to have recourse to other means of peaceful settlement. 
Being framed in general terms, the reservations have
given rise to many difficulties of interpretation, espe­
cially as to the meaning of the expression "other means 
of settlement".
(i) The meaning of the expression 
"other means of peaceful settlement"
Different views have been propounded on the meaning 
of this expression. Those views can be grouped into 3 
main groups. Some authors believe that according to both 
the classical terminology and the terms of Article 33 of 
the Charter of the United Nations the expression encom­
passes all the peaceful methods of settlement, whether 
judicial or political. 67 The absence of any qualifica­
tions in the reservation except the requirement that the 
other means must be peaceful is advanced as another 
argument. The other means must not, therefore, be judi­
cial , or arbitral, or binding or final. The reservation 
is in line, it is argued, with the flexibility that 
characterizes the Charter provisions on the peaceful 
settlement of disputes. It "serves to encourage the 
development of a definite procedure for peaceful settle­
ment by determining in advance a rough order of priorit- 
■ 68
y". In the same direction some go further as to in­
clude within that expression even the political organs of 
the United Nations. 67
According to the second view the reservation, being 
copied from treaties of arbitration and conciliation, is 
inserted in part to preserve special arbitral procedures 
envisaged in early treaties and in part to safeguard the 
procedure of conciliation. /U
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Finally, some authors observe that the expression 
"other means of peaceful settlement" is limited to judi­
cial and arbitral means. For the expression "peaceful
SETTLEMENT" implies that the "other method" is one lead-
71
ing to a final result.
However, in the absence of a clear pronouncement by
7 ?
the Court, "L‘ the meaning ot that expression depends to a 
large extent on the intention of the parties to the 
dispute brought before the Court. Yet there are some 
indications that the political procedures are excluded 
from the scope of that expression or at least limited. 
The existence of a reservation designed to suspend proce­
edings before the Court when the dispute is under the 
consideration of the Security Council, seems to exclude 
the political organs of the United Nations. If States
intended to extend the scope of other means of peaceful 
settlement so as to cover the political organs of the 
United Nations, they would not have made the suspensive 
reservation. However such a reservation appeared in all 
declarations along with the reservation of other peaceful 
means of settlement. State practice also seems to indi­
cate that the meaning of that expression is limited to 
peaceful means leading to a final settlement for the
following reasons. Firstly, some States - as has been
74seen - have qualified the expression in that direc­
tion. Secondly, when States intended to extend the scope 
of that expression, they have not hesitated either to 
enumerate these methods or to use other terms. Thus, the 
French declaration of 1929 limited the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction to disputes which had not been settled by 
CONCILIATION or the COUNCIL or by OTHER METHOD OF SETTLE­
MENT BY ARBITRATION 7‘J and the Italian declaration, made 
in the same year, recognized the jurisdiction of the P.
C. I. J. "subject to any other method of settlement 
provided by a special convention, and in any case where a 
solution through the diplomatic channels or further by 
the action of the Council of the League of Nations could
~7L
not be reached". On the other hand, India and Kenya
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have expressed their intention not to limit the scope of 
the expression "other peaceful means of settlement" to 
those leading to a final settlement. Their declarations 
exclude "disputes in regard to which the parties to the 
dispute have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to 
some other METHOD or METHODS of settlement. 77 The decla­
ration of Gambia may also be interpreted in the same way. 
It excludes "disputes in regard to which the parties have
agreed to a settlement OTHER THAN BY RECOURSE TO THE
7RINTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE„
Thirdly, the British explanation, though special, 
of the effect of the reservation seems to support the 
above interpretation. It was said that:
"Commercial treaties and conventions dealing with special 
subjects such as reparations, or other technical matters, such 
as copyright, very often contain provisions setting up SPECIAL 
TRIBUNALS to deal with disputes which may arise as to the 
meaning or application of their terms. When that is the case, 
the dispute will be dealt with as provided in the agreement 
and will not be submitted to the Court at the Hague." /
Finally the limitation of the meaning of the ex­
pression "other means of peaceful settlement" to means 
leading to a final settlement seems to be in line with 
the object of accepting the compulsory jurisdiction. It 
may be doubted whether in accepting a settlement by a 
binding decision States intended to resort to other means
g (-}
which do not lead to a final solution.
The determination of the meaning of that expression 
is an important element in the determination of the 
effect of the reservation. Thus if the above interpreta­
tion is correct, there would be no need to enquire whet­
her the reservation has a suspensive effect, or would a 
mere recourse to another means of peaceful settlement 
exclude altogether recourse to the Court. The existence 
of the reservation renders the exhaustion of the agreed 
upon process a pre-condition for the Court to take cog­
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nizance of the case. If the parties reach a final settle­
ment by the agreed upon process, there should be no need 
at all to have recourse to the Court. Otherwise their 
failure to reach such a settlement, for one reason or 
another, cannot deprive the Court of jurisdiction. Howe­
ver the wording of the reservation would not warrant an
answer if the expression "other means" is extended to
81
cover non-judicial as well as judicial means. In such
a case the intention of the parties must be considered in
82every case.
Cii) The significance of the reservation
According to the terms of the reservation a real 
agreement between the parties to the dispute is a neces­
sary condition for the application of the reservation. 
It is obvious that if the parties to a dispute agree to 
settle it by other means than the Court they will not 
bring it before the Court. If their agreement to resort 
to another means is reached after the seising of the 
Court they can discontinue the judicial proceedings at 
any time pursuant to Article 88 of the Rules of the 
Court. Thus the reservation seems to have been made only 
with the object of excluding proceedings instituted in 
violation of an agreement to resort to other means for 
the settlement of that dispute. The necessity of the 
reservation is questioned also even with regard to the 
last hypothesis. For the Court, it is submitted, might 
"well decline to adjudicate in such a situation on grou-
g-r
nds of judicial priority". However, in the absence
of a clear pronouncement by the Court on the scope of the 
reservation its significance is unclear. Nevertheless, 
the Court's handling of a case referred to several other 
political organs simultaneously, the real risk of over­
lapping between universal, regional and other systems, 
and differences involved in those systems of possibiliti­
es, procedures and norms to be applied, appeared to some 
authors sufficient reasons for retaining the reservations 
as one that "facilitates adjustments between systems of
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dispute settlement and allows States maximum flexibi1it-
84y". However the Court's jurisprudence that the paral­
lel exercise of jurisdiction by judicial and non-judicial 
means over the same dispute can constitute an important
and decisive factor in promoting the peaceful settlement
85
of a dispute, ~ seems to indicate that those reasons may 
not justify the exclusion of the judicial settlement if 
the parties are really willing to settle their disputes.
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing 
considerations is that the reservation of disputes in 
regard to which the parties have agreed to have recourse 
to some other method of peaceful settlement has not been 
relied on in practice in spite of being widely adopted. 
Nevertheless the expression "other means of peaceful 
settlement" is vague. It needs to be clarified if it is 
to be maintained. There are two ways for such improve­
ment; either to adopt the formula in the declaration of 
Australia, namely, disputes "in respect of which the 
parties thereto have agreed or shall agree to have recou­
rse to OTHER MEANS OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT FOR IT S  FINAL
a  f
AND BINDING DECISIONS", or to adopt the formula used 
in some treaties providing that if no definite and oblig­
atory solution is arrived at by recourse to other means
87
of pacific settlement the Court will be competent.
(IV) Previous Recourse to Diplomatic Channels
(i) The reservation of disputes not satisfactorily 
adjusted by diplomacy
/
The reservation that recourse to judicial settle­
ment should be limited only to disputes "not satisfac­
torily adjusted by diplomacy" is - as the Court observed
— very common in bilateral treaties of amity and of
83
establishment. An attempt to include a similar condi­
tion in the Statute of the P. C. I. J. was made - it is 
to be recalled — by the Committee of Jurists, which dra­
fted that Statute in 1920. However the condition was
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deleted later from Article 33 of the drafted Statute when
It was referred to the Assembly and the Council of the
89League of Nations. This reservation reflects States
preference of diplomatic means for the settlement of 
their disputes. In fact, the settlement of disputes by 
the Court is today, for various reasons, less popular in
international society than the other means of dispute
90
settlement, especially the diplomatic ones. Yet it is
beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss all those 
means separately in order to find out the advantages 
which have encouraged States to reserve the right to
solve their disputes by those means rather than by the
91Court. It may suffice to note here that the fear of
loss of control over the case is regarded generally the 
main reason behind States reluctance to refer their
disputes to judicial settlement as a "win - or -lose,
92
zero - sum game". This reason is best summarised by
the late judge Sir Fitsmaurice. Drawing upon his long 
experience as juris consult, he ascribes the preference 
of almost all governments to settle their disputes by 
"means of political acts they understand, rather than 
judicial ones they do not and tend to distrust" to the 
fear of:
"Loss of all freedom of manoeuver. once the dispute is 
fairly in the hands of a Court or arbitral tribunal, No longer 
then - whatever may be achievable through the forensic arts- 
can the processes of propaganda, persuasion, bargaining, 
lobbying and the manipulation of votes, It is the feeling of 
LOSS OF COHTROL over the future of the case when it becomes 
SUB~JUdI.CEf and goes as it were into cold storage for perhaps 
two or three years before the final decision is given, as 
compared with the ability to retain such control whenever the 
matter is dealt with on a political basis or in a political 
forum, which, even if only subconsciously, ^cause governments 
to shy away from the arbitrator or judge",
However, the reservation of previous recourse to 
diplomatic channels has never appeared EXPRESSLY in a
declaration of acceptance except in the Italian Declara-
94
tion of 1920. It was relied on by France in PHOSPHATES 
IN  MOROCCO case. However the Court, having upheld
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another objection, did not feel called upon to adjudicate
9 A
on the objection based on that reservation.
Among the declarations currently in. force, the 
Japanese declaration is perhaps the only one that can be 
interpreted as to require a previous recourse to diploma­
tic channels. It excludes disputes "which are not settled
97
by other means or peaceful settlement". This reserva­
tion must not be confused with the reservation of dis­
putes with regard to which the parties have agreed to
have recourse to some other method of settlement. Whereas
9Rthe latter intends - as has been said ~- to safeguard 
the competence of other organs as the parties have agre­
ed, the former is designed to impose an obligation on the 
other party to show evidence of effort to settle the
dispute by diplomatic means before resorting to the
99
Court, even if the parties to the dispute have not
agreed to resort first to diplomatic means of settlement. 
The Court must, thus, ascertain whether recourse negotia­
tions had taken place before the filing of the applica­
tion instituting proceedings before it, and it will 
uphold an objection to its jurisdiction based on the 
reservation if such a condition is not complied with. 
This is what can be inferred from the Court's practice, 
under Article 36 (1) of the Statute, concerning this
reservation. Although the Court has not upheld such an 
objection, it has always made it clear that that condi­
tion must be complied with before the filing of the 
application instituting the proceedings before it. CJU
The rejection of the objection based on the reser­
vation of previous recourse to diplomatic channels might 
be due to the permissive approach that has been followed 
in the ascertaining of the exhaustion of diplomatic 
negotiations. This approach was followed by the P. C. I. 
J. in the MAORONMATIS PALESTINE CONCESSIONS case where it 
said:
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"Negotiations do not of necessity always presuppose a 
more or less lengthy series of notes and dispatches; it may 
suffice that a discussion should have been commenced, and this 
discussion may have been very short; this will be the case if 
a deadlock is reached, or if finally a point is reached at 
which one of the Parties definitely declares himself unable, 
or refuses to give way, and there can be therefore no doubt 1 n 1
that the dispute cannot be settled by diplomatic negotiation."
1 09
While maintaining the same approach, " the I. C. 
S. has taken a more permissive outlook towards the re- 
quirment of diplomatic negotiations provided for in the 
jurisdictional title. Thus in the SOUTH-NEST AFRICA case 
the Court, after recalling its predecessor's view that 
"it is not so much the form of negotiation that matters 
as the attitude and views of the parties on the substan­
tive issues of the question involved", lu"' interpreted a 
reservation limiting the jurisdiction to disputes that 
cannot be settled by negotiation as not requiring a
direct negotiation between the parties to the dispute
before it. It considered the extensive debate in the 
United Nations Organization over the subject matter of 
the dispute sufficient. The Court held that the collec­
tive negotiation in the United Nations had reached an 
impasse and therefore it was evident that "there can be 
no doubt ... that the dispute cannot be settled by dipl­
omatic negotiation". lu4
In the UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF
IN  TEHERAN case the Court has given another example on
how a deadlock can be reached. It said that the refusal
of a party to enter into any discussion of matter would
dispose of the requirement of previous recourse to dipl- 
105omacy.
This being the case when the reservation is in­
cluded in a declaration, can it be said that the situa­
tion is the same even in the absence of as express 
reservation because such a condition is inherent in the 
Statute or in declarations silent on this point?
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(ii) Priority of diplomatic negotiations
The question whether there exists an obligation to 
recourse to diplomatic negotiations before referring a 
dispute to the Court had been considered before the
INSTITUT de DROIT International in 1956 when a proposi­
tion was made to introduce a reservation to that effect 
in the "clause - modele" for the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the Court. That proposition was rejected by a large 
majority (40 votes to 15) . The refusal to adopt such 
a reservation was due mainly to the convincing arguments 
advanced by Jessup and Waldock. Jessup regarded it as a 
survival of the period during which governments were 
hesitating to submit their disputes to the court. He 
thought that the insertion of such a reservation would 
mean that judicial settlement by the Court is regret­
table. Whereas States should consider such method as a
107 _
normal means for the settlement of their disputes. In
addition to this argument, Waldock drew attention to the
danger of retaining that "traditional clause". He relied 
on the cases on which the reservation was invoked {MAO-
ROMMATIS and PHOSPHATES IN  MOROCCO> to show how it can
1 OQ
incite States to use it as a "dilatory manoeuvres".
Yet many authors still believe that the Court 
cannot take cognizance of a case unless it is satisfied 
that diplomatic channels have failed to settle the dis­
pute. This is because the obligation to resort to diplom­
atic negotiations is, it is argued, either a customary
109
rule of International law ' or a general principle of 
international law that cannot be ignored by the Court. 
in support of these views, reliance has been made on 
State practice in inserting the reservation of previous 
recourse to diplomatic channels in a large number of 
compromissory clauses; the jurisprudence of the Court, 
and on the fact that negotiations are made on the top of 
peaceful means of settlement of disputes listed in Ar­
ticle 33 of the Charter of the United Nations. ***
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It is true that in practice it will rarely happen 
that disputes will be referred to the Court without there 
having been some diplomatic negotiations beforehand. 
However to argue that the previous recourse to diplomatic 
negotiations is a customary rule or general principle of 
international law, the argument seems to fall of its own 
weight. Firstly, the failure to adopt such a condition in 
the Declaration on Principles of International Law Con­
cerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States
112in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
in spite of the insistence of some States, in addition to 
the refusal of the Institut de Droit International to do 
so, might refute such an argument. Secondly, State
practice in including the reservation in compromissory 
clauses seems to support the non-existence of a rule or 
principle requiring the exhaustion of diplomatic means 
more than the existence of such a rule or principle. The 
inclusion of the reservation in some compromissory clause 
and its absence in the Statute and declarations of accep­
tance seems to indicate that States SOMETIMES and not
always, require that judicial settlement should be prece-
114ded by diplomatic negotiations.
Thirdly, it is true that some of the Court's state­
ments appear at first glance to suggest that recourse to 
the Court should be limited to disputes that cannot be 
settled by diplomatic means. Thus the following state­
ments are usually cited:
1- "The Court realises to the -full the importance of
the rule laying down that only disputes- which cannot be 
settled by negotiation should be brought before it,"
2. "It would no doubt be desirable that a State should 
not proceed to take as serious a step as summoning anot­
her State to appear before the Court without having 
previously, within reasonable limits, endeavoured to make 
it quite clear that a difference of views is in question 
which has not been capable of being otherwise overcome."
3. "Whereas the judicial settlement of international 
disputes, with a view to which the Court has been es-
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tablished, is simply an 'alternative to the direct and
•friendly settlement of such disputes between the Parties,
as consequently it is for the Court to facilitate, so far 
as it is compatible with its Statute, such direct and 
friendly settlement." 118
However these statements should be read in their 
proper context and not isolated form what precedes and 
follows. Thus the interpretation of the first statement 
requires that two things must be borne in mind: firstly, 
the Court was faced with a clear reservation in the title
of Jurisdiction limiting its jurisdiction to disputes
119which "cannot be settled by diplomacy", and secondly,
what follows that statement. The Court qualified its 
statement by the following phrase:
"It recognises, in fact, that before a dispute can be
made the subject of an action of law, its subject matter
should have been clearly defined by means of diplomatic negot-
170 ' ' h d
i at ion,"
The real intention of the Court was, therefore, to 
indicate the role of diplomatic negotiation in the defin­
ition of the subject matter of the dispute. It is clear 
that such a role is different from the requirement that 
diplomatic negotiation must first be exhausted.
The same can be said in regard to the second state­
ment. For it is preceded by the following passage:
"In so far as concerns the word "dispute", the Court 
observes that the manifestation of the existence of the 
dispute in a specific manner, as for instance by diplomatic 
negotiations is not required."
Moreover, the Court referred to its previous holding in 
the BERNQN INTERESTS IN  POLISH UPPER SILESIO case that so 
long as the title of jurisdiction does not stipulate that 
diplomatic negotiations must first of all be tried, re­
course may be had to the Court "as soon as one of the pa­
rties considers that a difference of opinion" has arisen.
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As to the third statement, it should be remembered
that the Court's competence was based on the CONPROMIS
according to which the parties themselves had asked the
Court to help them to negotiate during the process of the
124
judicial procedure.
Finally, the reference to diplomatic negotiation 
first in Article 33 of the Charter does not necessarily
mean that it must be resorted to before other means.
125
These are not in fact listed in order of priority.
The jurisprudence of the Court in recent cases is clear, 
not only on this point but on the whole conception of the 
inherent priority of diplomatic means. In rejecting such 
a conception the Court said in the UNITED STATES DIPLOMA­
TIC case that "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, concilia­
tion, arbitration and judicial settlement are ENUMERATED 
TOGETHER in Article 33 of the Charter as means for the 
peaceful settlement of disputes", and that negotiation
and recourse to judicial settlement by the Court had, in
176many cases, pursued PARI PASSU. ** The Court was clearer 
on the issue in the AEGEAN SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF case. 
Facing the question whether the existence of continuing 
and active negotiations between the party would con­
stitute an impediment to the Court's exercise of juris­
diction, it did not hesitate to give a negative answer.
Without even examining whether the parties had began
negotiations on the subjective issue or whether they were 
meaningful or not, as the letter of the Ambassador of
Turkey to the Netherlands of April 24, 1978 seems to 
require, the Court said:
"[It] is unable to share this view. Negotiations arid 
judicial settlement are enumerated together in Article 33 of 
the Charter of the United Nations as means for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes. The jurisprudence of the Court provi­
des various examples of cases in which negotiations and recou­
rse to judicial settlement have been pursued PORI PPSSU. 
Several cases, the most recent being that concerning the Trial 
of Pakistani Prisoners of War ..», show that judicial proceed­
ings may be discontinued when such negotiations result in the 
settlement of the dispute. Consequently, the fact that negoti­
ations are being actively pursued during the present proceed­
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ings is not, legally, any obstacle to the exercise by the 
Court of its judicial -function".
This dictum has been relied on by the Court in th e  
MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IE S  IN  AND AGAINST
NICARAGUA case in rejecting the firth ground of inadmis-
128sability put forward by the United States,  ^ namely, 
the exhaustion of the regional negotiation (through the 
Contatodora process) "is laid down in the Charter as a 
precondition to the reference of a dispute to the Secur­
ity Council only, in view of its primary responsibility 
in this domain, but such a limitation must A FORTIORI  
apply with even greater force with respect to the Court". 
The Court observed that neither the Security Council nor 
itself should be prevented from exercising their separate 
functions under the Charter and the Statute because of 
the existence of active negotiations in which both par­
ties may be involved. 1"U
It is clear from these cases that there is no 
principle or rule of international law which requires the 
judicial settlement to be preceded by diplomatic negotia­
tions, 1'1 and that the priority of diplomatic negotia­
tions requires an express reservation in the declaration 
of acceptance.
To conclude. States, contrary to their practice 
with respect to compromissory clauses, have not generally 
included an express reservation requiring the previous 
exhaustion of diplomatic means before the institution of 
proceedings. Such an attitude might be justified by the 
fact that in practice it will rarely occur that a case 
will be submitted to the Court without there having been 
some diplomatic negotiations beforehand as well as by the 
permissive attitude of the Court in interpreting the 
reservation. For these reasons also the reservation 
proved to be a weak means for depriving the Court of 
jurisdiction.
SECTION (2) - SUBJECT-MATTER RESERVATIONS
For a long time States have been urged to include, 
if necessary, reservations excluding disputes concerning 
particular cases as clearly specified subject matters. 
Although such reservations create "holes" in the scope of 
the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, they may, it is 
submitted, constitute a stage for more general acceptance 
rather than for eroding that jurisdiction. 1~’~' Thus 
reservations concerning belligerency, territorial status, 
some areas of the law of the sea, and other reservations 
peculiar to certain States have been made.
A - HOSTILITIES (RATIONE MATERIAE)
(I) Forms of the Reservation
1 7A
While some States have - as explained before - 
based their reservations relating to hostilities on the 
time during which the dispute arose, and therefore ex­
cluded disputes occurring during a period of hostilities, 
others have relied on the relation between the hostilit­
ies and the dispute. This relation must be a relation of 
cause and effect for the exclusion of the dispute from 
the Courts jurisdiction.
Again the United Kingdom is the first country to 
introduce the reservation of hostilities RRTIONE HQTER- 
I 8 E . In its declaration of June 2, 1955 the United King­
dom excluded "disputes arising out of or having reference 
to any hostilities, war, state of war, or belligerent or 
military occupation in which the Government of the United 
Kingdom have been involved". The reservation had been 
maintained in the British subsequent declarations except 
that of 1969 which is still in force. In due course this 
reservation has been incorporated in other declarations 
though in different forms. Aiming at excluding the events 
relating to the Algerian War of Independence, ~~/ France 
had made a similar reservation but in broader terms.
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Whereas the application of the British reservation was 
subject to the involvement of the U. K. in the Hostiliti­
es, the French reservation excluded simply "disputes
1 "^ 8
arising out of any war or international hostilities".
Thus the question of whether the reservation could have 
been invoked, even when France was not involved in the 
war or international hostilities had been left open. This 
may be illustrated by the following example: suppose that 
there was a war between State X and State Y and France 
wanted to protect its nationals against State Y. Could 
the latter have relied on the French reservation? The
terms -of the reservation seems not to warrant a confident
1.T.9answer. " The same can be said with respect to the 
reservation of Malawi excluding "disputes concerning any 
question relating to or arising out of belligerent or 
military occupation".
141Three other declarations are similar with an
important addition of a provision excluding disputes over 
peace keeping activities. This provision adds disputes 
concerning "the discharge of any functions pursuant to 
any recommendation or decision of any organ of the United 
Nations in accordance with which the Government ... have 
accepted obligations". This formula was introduced by
14?A
India in its declaration of 1959. ** It is said that
the reservation was made in the Indian declaration with 
the object of excluding from the Court's jurisdiction 
disputes relating to India's roles in such places as 
Korea and the Gaza Strip, where India undertook certain 
obligations on behalf of the United Nations, in addition
to the exclusion of the Kashmir dispute, though the
149
latter was excluded by other reservations.
A more restrictive form is to be found in the 
declaration of Honduras of 1986. It exempts from the 
Court's jurisdiction disputes "relating to facts or 
situations originating in armed conflicts or acts of a 
similar nature which may affect the territory of the 
Republic of Honduras, and in which it may find itself
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143Involved directly or Indirectly".
The final and the most comprehensive form of the 
reservation is that introduced by the declaration of El 
Salvador of 1973 and copied literally by India in its 
declaration of 1974. They cover:
"disputes related to or connected with facts or situa­
tions of hostilities, armed conflicts, individual or collec­
tive actions taken in self-defence, resistance to aggression, 
fulfillment of obligations imposed by international bodies, 
and other similar or related acts, measures or situations in
which [the declarant] is, has been or may in future be in- 
144 ‘
volved."
The State hostilities that characterizes the rela­
tions between the Central American States, which almost 
all accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, seems to 
have been the main reasoif behind the introduction of this 
formula by El Salvador. Such a formula appeared to India 
more protective especially in the light of the claim 
brought by Pakistan in the PRISONERS OF NOR case.
(II) Evaluation of the Reservation
A comparison between the declarations accepting the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the I. C. J. and its predeces­
sor, the P. C. I. J. shows clearly that the reservations
relating to hostilities constitute a depressing develop- 
14Ament. No comparable reservation is to be found in any 
declaration made under the Optional Clause of the P. C. 
I. J. Furthermore, the different forms of the reservation 
disclose a disquieting trend away from the exclusion of 
disputes arising out of hostilities, belligerent or 
military occupation, towards the use of force for the
United Nations purposes and in the recent form almost any
147use of force by the belligerent State.
However can it be said that the reservation itself 
in its different formulae is no more than a reflection of 
the actual legal pattern provided for the settlement of
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disputes arising out of international institutions, since 
the settlement of such disputes, being conferred by 
virtue of Chapters VI and VII of the Charter on the 
political organs - especially the Security Council - is 
outside the scope of the Court's jurisdiction?
The MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IES  IN  MW  
AGAINST NICARAGUA case 140 provided the Court with an 
opportunity to consider this question. Here the United 
States maintained that inadmissibility of disputes in­
volving armed hostilities is an implied limitation on the 
Court's jurisdiction. It argued that an ongoing use of 
unlawful armed force was never intended by the drafters 
of the Charter of the United Nations to be encompassed by 
Article 36 (2) of the Statute of the Court. i4<? The 
"primary” responsibility for the maintenance of interna­
tional peace and security was, it was asserted, conferred 
on the Security Council and complementary responsibilit­
ies were conferred on the General Assembly and regional 
organizations, but not upon the Court. Furthermore, there 
were no words in the Charter or the Statute which suggest 
a role for the Court with respect to actions under Chap­
ter VII of the Charter. On the contrary, the United 
States argued, the drafters intended to confine on the 
Security Council the entire responsibility over disputes 
falling within the scope of that Chapter. ~'jU
The Court, however, found by a vote of 16 to 0 that 
the ongoing armed conflict in Nicaragua was no barrier to
judicial resolution of the legal aspects of that con-
• 4- 151f1ict.
Examining the above arguments advanced by the 
United States, judge Schwebel found himself unable to 
agree that the drafters of the Charter and the Statute 
intended to exclude the Court from adjudicating disputes 
falling within the scope of Chapter VII of the Charter. 
Nor could he agree that the practice of States in inter­
preting the Charter and Statute confirmed such intention. 1 C
JI
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These arguments appeared to him insufficient because of 
the absence of a text excluding disputes involving the 
continuing use of armed force from the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction. On the contrary Article 36 of the Statute 
is cast in comprehensive terms, he observed. Paragraph 1 
of that Article confers on the Court jurisdiction over 
"all cases" which the parties refer to it and "all mat­
ters specially provided for in the Charter of the United 
Nations or in the treaties and conventions in force", and 
paragraph 2 provides that the States may recognise the 
compulsory jurisdiction "in all legal disputes". The 
exclusion of disputes over the continuing use of force
required an express reservation to that effect in the
1declaration of acceptance, he pointed out. 'J'~
By upholding its jurisdiction to entertain Nicarag­
ua's claims, the Court also rejected the notion held by 
many jurists and commentators that "force cases" are not
justiciable or that the Court is ineffective in adjudica-
154ting such cases.
However, the MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IE S  
case has offered a precedent in the light of which some 
American lawyers have made some suggestions with respect 
to the reservation of hostilities. Having predicted that 
the United States, having withdrawn from the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction as a result of that case, would 
not rejoin on terms that would permit lawsuits similar to 
Nicaragua's, Professor A D'Amato suggests the retention 
of the reservation of hostilities either in a modified 
form or as it exists in the declaration of other States. * 
He proposes the insertion of the following proviso in a 
future United’ States declaration:
“PRQVIBEB F UR THER? that with respect to disputes relating 
to, or pleadings of any contesting Party that allege or refer 
to, ongoing armed hostilities or the threat or use of military 
force, the Court may only declare the rights and duties of the 
Parties under international, law, and may not issue any order 
or enforceable judgment."
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He finds in the possibility that the Security Coun­
cil might be caught between enforcing its primary mission 
- namely, maintaining international peace and security- 
and enforcing a judgment of the Court, a principled 
argument for his proposal. Such a possibility may occur, 
in his view, when a State does not comply with the judg­
ment and the Security Council finds that the enforcement 
measures against that State might endanger international 
peace and security. Thus he proposes the inclusion of the
above proviso as a remedy for that dilemma, on the one
hand, and as an alternative to the over broad reservation 
of all cases of ongoing armed hostilities, on the other 
hand. As a further precaution, he suggested that the
above proviso may provide also that "it is to be automat­
ically amended to exclude cases involving ongoing armed 
hostilities entirely from the Court's jurisdiction". J/
Such a proposal seems to run against the object for 
which it is made regardless of whether it is compatible
with the United Nations Charter and the Court’s Statute
158or not. Firstly, it has never occurred in practice
that the Security Council faced such a dilemma and it
seems unlikely to happen. The enforcement of a judgment 
means enforcement of international peace and security as
the primary mission of the Council since legally the
159
later is obliged - as noted before " - by virtue of
Article 36 (3) of the Charter to take into consideration 
that legal disputes should be referred to the Court. 
Secondly, assuming that such a dilemma was likely to 
happen, it would not be limited to the enforcement of a 
judgment concerning armed conflicts, but to the enforce­
ment of other judgments as well so long as the interested 
State is refusing to comply with the judgment. The propo­
sed proviso can thus constitute a new device, which if 
generalised with respect to other disputes, may further 
erode the system of compulsory jurisdiction instead of 
mitigating the effect of the reservation concerning 
ongoing armed hostilities. Finally, it seems wiser to 
oblige a State, which has accepted voluntarily the com—
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pulsory jurisdiction system, to respect its obligation 
under Article 94 of the Charter to comply with the decis­
ion of the Court rather than to try to prove the com­
patibility of the declaratory judgments with the Charter 
and Statute. Such an attempt would not only nullify the 
effect of an Article (94) embodied in the Charter, but 
also weaken the whole system of adjudication provided in 
the Statute.
In fact the above proposal might be considered as 
an over-caution on the part of professor D'Amato, as one 
of the foremost advocates of the judicial settlement by 
the Court, in trying to find an acceptable way which 
could encourage States to adhere to the compulsory juris­
diction system and at the same time does not weaken that 
system. Thus he asks whether cases such as the MILITARY  
AND PARAMILITARY A CTIV IT IES are not an ideal occasion for 
settling conflicts in court instead of the battlefield. 
He also considers the inclusion of the reservations
relating to hostilities by States as a sign of falling
160prey to "a strange psychology", ' criticising the 
reservation in the United Kingdom declaration of 1944 
excluding cases originating in events of the Second World 
War he says:
"One wonders with bombs dropping on London, what made 
lawyers and government officials in their underground shelters 
so frightened by the prospect of a ruling on the legality of a 
war-related case by a court of law sitting at the Hague,"
Furthermore in his editorial comments^ published in
in
the preceding year i.e. 1985,  ^ he criticises very
strongly the reservation excluding disputes involving 
armed hostilities. He observed that such a reservation 
would disable the reserving State from resorting to the 
Court in many cases that may arise in the future, such as 
disputes arising out of terrorist acts especially those
1AT
supported by a State. “ More significantly, the reser­
vation may encourage the reserving State to escalate 
disputes that have began peacefully into armed hostilit-
ies so as to avoid the Court's jurisdiction. Thus, 
warning shots by a military vessel sent to a self-procla­
imed "exclusive economic zone" might escalate a dispute 
over fishing rights in that area into a dispute involving 
armed hostilities. Also "a military action that has
ceased, and thus becomes subject to a lawsuit for damag-
164
es, might be revived by intermittent military actions".
These examples indicate how the reservation can cut a
1A5
"hole" in the jurisdiction of the Court. ~'J
Nonetheless, it would be better to have the reser­
vation of hostilities included in the declaration of 
acceptance, especially where it is made alone and not in 
the broadest and the most objectionable form, if the 
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction is subordinated 
to the insertion of such a reservation.
It is to be observed, finally, that the reserva­
tions relating to hostilities might, at first glance,
give the impression that they are made by great powers as 
an indication of their intention to protect their inter­
ests by reliance on their own power rather than by sub­
mission to a system which they cannot control. In fact 
those reservations are to be found only in the declara­
tions of developing countries. This is not perhaps sur­
prising since most of the hostilities exist between those 
countries. With the exception of El Salvador those 
reservations are made by some States, members of the 
Commonwealth (India, Kenya, Malawi, Malta and Mauritius). 
Since the declaration of these States, except that of 
India, were made at a time when a similar reservation was 
made by Great Britain, it is hoped that these States will 
also drop those reservations. They deal with an area of 
international law of fundamental importance and thus con­
stitutes a "pernicious erosion of the Court's jurisdic-
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B -  TERRITORIAL STATUS RESERVATION
Although territorial disputes have, sometimes, been
one of the major reasons behind the insertion of some
168broad reservations, the territorial status reserva-
169tions as such have only appeared after 1924. However, 
as far as the declarations of acceptance are concerned, 
the reservation appeared for the first time in the Greek 
declaration of 1929. U The reference in Article 39 the 
Geneva General Act of 1928 to a possible reservation 
excluding "disputes concerning particular cases or clear­
ly specified subject-matters, such as territorial status"
must have led to the inserting of the reservation in the
171Greek declaration. ' It was then copied by several
States some of which repeated the statement in the Greek 
declaration that disputes relating to sovereignty of
ports and ways of communication were included in those
172concerning territorial status and others excluded
simply disputes relating to territorial status of the 
reserving State or relating to its "right of soverei- 
gnty .
The Iranian declaration of 1930 had, for some time, 
been the only one that contained such a reservation among 
the declarations made under Article 36 (2) of the I. C. 
J. By the termination of that declaration in 1951 after 
the institution of proceedings in the ANGLO IRANIAN OIL 
COMPANY case the reservation disappeared.However since 
1972 it has reappeared in some declarations in connection 
with the reservations concerning the law of the sea. It 
was reintroduced by the Philippines in its declaration of 
1972, which excluded disputes "arising out of or concern­
ing jurisdiction or rights claimed or exercised by the
Philippines ... in respect of [its] territory ... includ—
1 "75
ing its territorial sea and inland waters". El Sal­
vador and India except disputes "concerning or relating 
to ... the status of [their] territory or the modifica­
tion or delimitation of [their] frontiers or any other 
mater concerning boundaries". In 1983 Malta modified
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its declaration of 1966 in order to add new reservations 
excluding - INTER ALIA - disputes concerning "its ter­
ritory, including the territorial sea, and the States 
177thereof". Finally, the declaration of Honduras excep­
ts, in addition to disputes concerning facts and situa­
tions originating in armed conflicts or similar acts 
which may affect its territory, disputes relating to 
"territorial questions with regard to sovereignty or 
islands, shoals and keys, internal waters, bays, the 
territorial sea and the legal status and limits thereof".
However, two questions may be raised with respect 
to territorial status reservations: what is the object of 
the reservation and its scope?
(I) The Object of the Reservation
It has been maintained that the insertion of ter­
ritorial status reservations in numerous bilateral treat­
ies of pacific settlement of the inter-war period was
GENERALLY due to a prevailing apprehension of attempts to
179modify the post-war arrangements. However, the in­
clusion of such reservation in both those treaties and in 
declarations of acceptance reflects the reserving State's 
intention to exclude specific disputes. Thus the reserva­
tion was made by Greece in both the declaration which 
accompanied its instrument of accession to the General 
Act of 1928 and its declaration of acceptance of the P. 
C. I. J.'s jurisdiction of 1929, as the Court pointed out 
in the AEGEAN SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF case, in order "to
guard against the revival of Bulgarian aspirations to
ISO
cover direct access to the Aegean Sea". ' The dispute 
over the Rock of Quitastueno and Swan Islands between
Honduras, on the one hand, and Columbia and the United
181States, on the other hand, and the dispute between
Honduras and El Salvador concerning Land, Island and
1S9
Maritime Frontier seems to have led both Honduras and 
El Salvador to insert into their declarations the afore­
said reservations.
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(II) The Scope of the Expression "Territorial Status"
The AEGEAN SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF case has provided 
an opportunity for the Court to determine the scope of 
the expression "territorial status" and to pronounce on 
an important point of interpretation applicable to any 
reservation, namely, the effect of the subsequent evolu­
tion of international law on the terms of a reservation 
intended to exclude some determined disputes.
It was maintained by the applicant (Greece) that 
the expression "territorial status" and other equivalent 
terms such as "territorial integrity", "territorial 
situation" and "maintenance of frontiers" were included 
in order to exclude "disputes which were likely to arise 
out of territorial claims by neighbors dissatisfied with 
existing solutions". Such expressions constituted, it
was argued, of no more than "a 'code-word' for intan­
gibility of the frontiers and territorial statuses es-
1S4tablished by the international instruments in force".
The Court recognised that the motive which led 
States to include the reservation of territorial status 
was, IN  GENERAL to protect themselves against possible 
attempts to modify territorial arrangements established 
by peace treaties. However, it observed that it did not 
follow that States intended to have the scope of the 
reservation confined to questions connected with the 
revision of such arrangements. The historical evidence 
adduced by Greece did not suffice, in the opinion of the 
Court, to establish that the expression "territorial 
status" was used in that restricted sense. On the con­
trary, the evidence seemed to confirm that the expres­
sion:
"is to be understood as a generic term denoting any mat­
ters properly to be considered as comprised within the concept 
of territorial status under general international law, and 
therefore includes not only the particular isnal renifpe but-
-  -  " i p e r  ~
the territorial integrity and the boundaries of a State", ~
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Nor did the Court accept the argument that the reserva­
tion was not applicable because it concerned the subject- 
matter (the Continental Shelf) which was wholly unknown 
when the reservation was made. Such a reservation was 
"intended to have a fixed content regardless of the 
subsequent evolution of international law", the Court 
observed. Furthermore, having observed the close and 
necessary link that always exists between a jurisdiction­
al clause and reservations to it, the Court found it 
difficult to accept the idea that the meaning of such a
clause, but not of the reservation, should follow the
186evolution of the law. Consequently a reservation must
be interpreted in accordance with the rules of interna­
tional law as they exist when the application is con­
sidered by the Court, and not as they existed when the
187reservation-was made, the Court concluded.
In the light of this interpretation, the Court 
refused to accept the contention that the reservation of 
territorial status was not applicable to Greece's submis­
sions because firstly the dispute concerned the DELIMITA­
TION of the Continental Shelf boundary, a question which 
was "entirely extraneous to the notion of territorial 
status", and secondly, disputes concerning rights over 
the Continental Shelf could not be considered as encom­
passed by reservations since the Continental Shelf was
not part of the territory of the Coastal State under •
188applicable rules of international law.
In rejecting the first argument the Court observed 
that, quite apart from the fact that the dispute was not 
simply one relating to delimitation, it would be dif­
ficult to consider such delimitation as entirely ex­
traneous to the notion of territorial status. For "any 
disputed delimitation of a boundary entails some deter-
1R9
mination of entitlement to the areas to be determined". 
Additionally, the historical evidence proved that in 
treaty practice the notion "frontier" had been considered 
as closely associated with the notions "territorial
361
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integrity" and "territorial status .
As to the second argument, the Court observed that 
it was asked to decide whether the dispute referred to it 
was one "relating to the territorial status" of the 
applicant and not whether the rights in dispute were 
legally to be considered as territorial rights. However, 
"a dispute regarding entitlement to and delimitation of 
areas of Continental Shelf tends by its very nature to be 
one relating to territorial status". This was so because, 
the Court continued, "legally a coastal State's rights 
over the Continental Shelf are both appurtenant to and
directly derived from the State's sovereignty over the
191
territory abutting on that Continental shelf".
The above case shows clearly that a reservation
excluding a specified dispute is not only to the benefit
of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, but could
also be to the benefit of the reserving States. This
lesson should be learned better not only by States which
extended the scope of their reservations to disputes
concerning "the airspace superjacent to [their] land and
192maritime territory but especially by those extending
it so as to cover disputes referring to airspace over the
territories, waters, the contiguous zone and the ex-
197,
elusive economic zone. If the exclusion of territor­
ial disputes might have some justification, being both 
related to a constitutive element of the existence of a
State and made by developing countries most of which have
194
gained their independence recently, the above exten­
sion seems unjustified. However, the reappearance of the 
reservation especially in its broadest form is to be 
deplored. Such a development seems to disregard the 
efficiency of the Court in the settlement of territorial
disputes, particularly those concerning the delimitation
1of both land and maritime territories. 7J Thus the 
declaration of Guatemala of 1947 provided the best ex­
ample to be followed, if States are really interested in 
promoting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. It
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recognised the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal 
disputes except "the disputes between England and Guatem­
ala concerning the restoration of the territory of Bel­
ize", unless it were decided EX AEQUO ET BONO in accor­
dance with Article 38 (2) of the Statute.
C - RESERVATIONS CONCERNING THE LAW OF THE SEA
In addition to the previous reservation concerning 
territorial status, some States excluded another category 
of disputes concerning some areas of the sea. The latter 
reservation has been connected with the development of 
international law rules concerning those areas, and thus 
it has appeared recently in the declarations of accep­
tance. The Australian declaration of 1954 was the first 
one to contain such a reservation. It excluded from the 
Court's jurisdiction:
"disputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction or 
rights claimed or exercised by Australia
(a) in respect of the continental shelf of Australia and 
the Territories under the authority of Australia, as that 
continental shelf is described or delimited in The Austr­
alian Proclamations of 10 September 1953 or in or under 
the Australian Pearl Fisheries Acts;
(b) in respect of the natural resources of the sea-bed 
and subsoil of that continental shelf, including the 
products of sedentary fisheries; or
(c) in respect of Australian waters, within the meaning 
of the Australian Pearl Fisheries Acts, being jurisdic­
tion or rights claimed or exercised in respect of those 
waters by or under those Acts,
except a dispute in relation ot which the parties have first 
agreed upon a MODUS UIUEHBI pending the final decision of the 
Court in the dispute.
The Australian reservation had not been copied by 
any State until the beginning of the seventies. However 
since 1970 different reservations with different scope 
have emerged. This new era was inaugurated by the Canad-
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ian declaration of 1970, which contained two subject- 
matter reservations: one on the living resources exclud­
ing disputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction or 
rights claimed or exercised by Canada in respect of those 
resources, and the other - the first of its kind in the 
history of Article 36 (2) - on pollution. It excepted
disputes "in respect of the prevention or control of
pollution or contamination of the maritime environment in
198marine areas adjacent to the coast of Canada". These
199
reservations have been copied literally by Barbados. 
While those declarations do not cover disputes relating 
to territorial limits and non-living resources of the 
sea, other declarations exclude both the latter disputes 
and those excluded by the Canadian declaration. Thus the 
declaration of Malta for instance, excludes besides 
disputes concerning its territory, including the ter­
ritorial sea and the status thereof - as already men-
200
tioned * * - the following categories of disputes con­
cerning:
"(b) the continental shelf or any other zone of maritime 
jurisdiction, and the resources thereof,
(c) the determination of any .of the above,
(d) the prevention or control of pollution or contamina­
tion of the marine environment in marine areas adjacent 
to the coast of Malta."'201
However the most comprehensive reservation is that in­
cluded in the Indian declaration. Although it was — again 
- inspired by the declaration of El Salvador of 1973, the 
Indian declaration goes further in covering:
"disputes with India concerning or relating to;
(b) the territorial sea, the continental shelf and the 
margins, the exclusive fishery zone, the exclusive econo­
mic zone, and zones of national maritime jurisdiction 
including for the regulation and control of marine pollu­
tion and the conduct of scientific research by foreign 
vessels;
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(c) the condition and status of its islands, bays and 
qulfs and that of the bays and gulfs that for historic 
reasons.belong to it;
(d) the airspace superjacent to its land and maritime 
territory; and
(e) the determination and delimitation of its maritime 
20?
boundaries."
in addition to the aforesaid reservation of ter-
203
status and boundaries.
(I) Reasons for the Inclusion of These Reservations
Two reasons seem to have led States to include the
above reservations. The first is the desire to exclude
one or more determined disputes. Thus, following the 
Japanese proposal, in October 1953, to refer the dispute 
over pearl fisheries in the Arafuga Sea to the Court, the 
Australian government withdrew its declaration of 1940 
and included the aforementioned reservation. Australia 
agreed to submit the dispute to the Court on the condi­
tion that the two States reach an agreement on a provisi-
204
onal regime. Also the reservation of Canada was - as
205
already mentioned - designed to cover disputes over
the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of
206
1970.
Apprehensions as to the results of the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea seem to have 
been the second reason for the inclusion of the above 
reservations. This is best illustrated by the Norwegian 
reservation, in the declaration of 1976 of "the right at 
any time to amend the scope of this declaration in the
light of results of [the Conference] in respect of the
207
settlement of disputes". Canada was more explicit on
this issue. As already mentioned, it justified the
insertion of its reservations on the grounds that ap­
plicable international law was undeveloped. This was 
because it failed "to keep place with technology, to
This is 
ritorial
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adapt itself to special situation, and in particular to
recognize the right of a coastal State to protect itself
209
against the dangers of marine pollution".
(II) Evaluation of These Reasons
The above reasons appear to consist of insufficient 
grounds to justify the insertion of reservations couched 
in such broad terms as that of India, which is almost
equivalent to one excluding the whole subject of the law
210
of the sea. It is clear that the application of the
principle of reciprocity expands the scope of the reser­
vation as was the case in the QEGEftN S££ CONTINENTAL
211SHELF case, in spite of the fact that this principle
can only be relied on by States in the region around the 
reserving State.
This kind of reservation is also criticised on the 
ground that the development of customary international 
law concerning the reserves matter will proceed irrespec­
tive of these reservations. Thus, the Court, in a case 
involving the maritime environment of Europe or Africa 
could define customary law in a way that would have a 
great impact upon claims concerning the maritime area 
around a reserving State in America. "The net effect of 
the reservation might therefore be to disable [the reser­
ving State] from participating in a case that could
21 9determine the content of customary law".
On the other hand the conclusion of the new treaty 
on the law of the sea must have eliminated any uncertain­
ties on the new trend on the law, if they were actually a 
cause for inserting those reservations, which charac­
terised the previous decade. The reserving States should, 
therefore, have followed the Canadian example by dropping 
those reservations from their declarations of acceptance.
Moreover, and most importantly, the above reserva­
tions undermine the Court's contribution to the modern
366
Law of the Sea. If these reservations, being limited to
214developing countries which played a major role in the 
development of the modern law of the sea, are intended to 
reflect apprehensions that the Court might be very con­
servative on this issue, they disregard the fact that the
Court has, on the contrary, been progressive, without, of
215course, departing from its judicial character. Thus
the regime of straights and the innocent passage of 
warships, is regarded as the outcome of the judgment of
9 1 L
the CORFU CHANNEL case. " The contribution of the Court
217's judgment in the F1SHER1ES case of 1951 to modern 
law of the sea has been considerable. It established the 
system of strait baseline applied for indented and 
island-fringed coasts, a system which was explicitly 
provided for, for the first time, in the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. 
Also the Court's judgment in this case helped to open the
910
way to special treatment of archipelagic waters.
In the NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF case “19 the 
Court held that the equidistance principle did not refl­
ect the rule of customary law and could therefore be dis­
placed by the equitable adjustment required by the spe­
cial circumstances of the coastal configuration of the 
22t‘>parties. The concept of the continental shelf as the
natural prolongation of the coastal State's land ter­
ritory into and under the sea was initiated by the Court 
in this case. In the FISHERIES JURISDICTION case 2z2
the Court recognised the recent developments in the law 
of the sea indicating that the LAISSEZ-FAIRE treatment of 
the living resources of the high seas have been sub­
stituted by a system in which regard must be paid to the 
rights of the other States and the needs of conservation 
for the benefit for all. “i"'" Finally, in the AEGEAN SEA 
CONTINENTAL SHELF case - as already mentioned - the 
Court held that the coastal State's rights over the 
continental shelf are both appurtenant to and directly 
derived from the State's sovereignty over the adjoining 
land, and that the territorial status of the coastal
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State comprises, IPSO JURE the rights of exploration and 
exploitation of the continental shelf to what it is 
entitled under international law.
By this contribution to the modern law of the sea, 
its long tradition of judicial proceedings and its posi­
tion as the principal judicial organ of the United Na­
tions, the Court has proved to be peculiarly equipped to 
play a major part in the settlement of international
n, •—! nr
disputes concerning the law of the sea. This explains
why the reference of such disputes to the Court has
226become more popular in recent years.
From these considerations it is hoped that States 
making reservations excluding disputes concerning the law 
of the sea, especially those which expressed at one time
or another their willingness to resort to the Court for
227
the settlement of such disputes, ' will follow the
example set by Australia and Canada, and deposit an 
unqualified declaration. Or it is hoped they will couch 
their reservations in restricted terms, if the exclusion
92Q
of a particular dispute is deemed indispensible.
D - SOME PARTICULAR RESERVATIONS
For special reasons peculiar to certain States 
other reservations have been appended to the declarations 
of those States.
(I) El Salvador’s Reservations
When ratifying the Protocol of Signature on August 
29, 1930, El Salvador formulated the following reserva­
tions:
"The provision of this Statute do not apply to any dis­
putes or differences concerning points or questions which 
cannot be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the 
political constitution of this Republic.
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pecuniary claims made against the nation ,, „
By virtue of Article 36 (5), these reservations
continued to produce their effect until 1973 when El 
Salvador revoked its previous declaration and replaced it
*730
by a new one omitting those reservations. Neverthe­
less, the possibility that such reservations be inserted 
by any State may require a short comment on those reser­
vations.
(1) Constitutional questions
El Salvador's reservation excluding constitutional 
questions from adjudication was not the first precedent. 
As has already been mentioned, such a reservation ap­
peared no less than 16 times in arbitration treaties
concluded before 1920, most of which were concluded
231
between Latin American countries. A similar reserva­
tion had even been inserted in some declarations made 
under the Optional Clause of the P. C. I. J.
This reservation was inserted in the declaration of 
El Salvador as a result of the limitations imposed by the 
Constitution of El Salvador in 1886 on the treaties that 
might be concluded or ratified by El Salvador.
However, the reservation has been subjected to
criticism on more than one ground. Its validity has been 
contested on the ground that "it has been commonly agreed 
upon by international lawyers that an international
tribunal is not bound by national constitution". In
fact that principle was recognised by the Court. It said 
that "a State cannot adduce as against another State its 
own constitution with a view to evading obligations
incumbent upon it under international law ' or treaties in 
force". J~~~ Thus, without this reservation the Court 
would have rejected an argument that a treaty imposing 
certain obligations on El Salvador had been entered into 
or ratified in violation of El Salvador's constitution.
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However it is submitted that El Salvador's reservation
was intended to exclude the possibility that the Court
2^6
would render a judgment against the constitution.
However, the reservation cannot escape another 
objection. There is no doubt that the scope of a declara­
tion containing such a reservation is not limited, but 
varies according to the modification to which the con­
stitution is subjected. Thus, at least theoretically, the 
reserving State could prevent the submission of certain
237
disputes to the Court by amending its constitution.
(ii) Pecuniary claims
This reservation seems to have been made with the 
object of excluding the application of the provisions of 
clause (d) in Article 36 (2) of the Statute of the P. C. 
I. J. That clause authorised the Court to decide "the 
nature or extent of reparations to be made for the breach 
of international obligations". However according to the 
terms of the reservation, not all disputes covered by the 
clause (d) were excluded. A dispute could have been 
excluded only if it concerned a pecuniary claim. Repara­
tions of non-pecuniary nature such as restitution and 
compensation, could, thus, have been decided by the 
Court. Also El Salvador or another State could have 
asked the Court for a declaratory judgment determining 
the responsibilities, without fixing the reparations to
be made, or asked to fix the non-pecuniary reparations
240
where it was possible.
The validity of this reservation had never been 
contested. For under Article 36 of the Statute of the P. 
C. I. J. States were authorised expressly to exclude "any 
of the classes of legal disputes" encountered therein. 
Although these words have been omitted from Article 36
(2) of the Statute of the I. C. J. such a reservation is, 
no doubt valid. This is because subject matter reserva­
tions that do not run against the provisions of the
370
Statute or the object of compulsory jurisdiction are - as
242have been mentioned - deemed valid.
(II) India's Reservation (Particular Treaties)
The current Indian declaration contains a new 
reservation excepting:
"disputes where the jurisdiction of the Court is or may
be found on the basis of a treaty concluded under the auspices
of the Leaque of Nations, unless the Government of India
‘ 243
specially agree to jurisdiction in each case".
There is a strong indication that the reservation is
intended to eliminate any possibility that a case would
be referred to the Court on the basis of the General Act
of 26 September 1928 for the Pacific Settlement of Inter-
244national Disputes. The reservation was made after the
TRIAL- OF PAKISTAN PRISONERS OF MAR case, ^  which was 
based - INTER ALIA - on that Act. In this case India
contested the Court's jurisdiction on the ground that the
General Act "is either not in force or, in any case, its 
efficacy is impaired by the fact that the organs of the 
League of Nations and the Permanent Court of Interna- 
tional Justice to which it refers have now disappeared". 
Furthermore, on September 15, 1974, i.e. 3 days only
before the deposit of the Indian declaration, India 
notified the Secretary General of the United Nations that 
it had never regarded itself as bound by the General Act
since its independence, whether by succession or other-
247
wise.
Accordingly, India has, by this reservation, partly
94 c}
nullified the effect of Article 37 u of the Statute of 
the Court not only in relation to States accepting the 
Court's jurisdiction under Article 36 (2), but also 0 1 1 -  
A -O IZ any other State accepting that jurisdiction under 
Article 36 •( 1) .
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The reservation has, thus, provided another example 
on how States prefer to couch their declarations in
general terms instead of excluding the particular dis­
putes that have led to the insertion of the reservation.
However, there is a price to be paid for such a reserva­
tion because of the application of the principle of 
reciprocity. India can therefore expect to have this 
reservation automatically turned against it in any case 
in which India appear as applicant. It is perhaps wiser 
that when making a reservation, regard must also be paid 
to the possibility of being applicant not only against 
States accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction 
under Article 36 (2), but also against those accepting it 
under Article 36 (1).
(Ill) Israel's Reservation
In order to exclude from the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction disputes arising out of the activities of 
the government of Mandatory Palestine; the Jewish Agency, 
or any similar bodies before its establishment, Israel 
excluded from its declaration of 1950 - ratified in 1951 
- disputes which did not "involve a legal title created 
or conferred by a Government or authority other than the 
Government of the State of Israel or an authority under 
the jurisdiction of that Government". *‘r/ In a substan­
tially similar form the reservation was incorporated in 
Israel's declaration of 1956. i"'jU The reservation disap­
peared when Israel terminated its acceptance of the
nr -j
Court's jurisdiction on November 21, 1985. However,
the very nature of the reservation renders it impossible 
to be initiated and thus it does not require further 
discussion.
E - CONCLUSIONS
From the aforesaid considerations the following 
conclusions may be drawn. All the reservations included 
in this section are made by developing countries. Either
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they have been originated by those States or copied from 
declarations of developed countries - as the reservations 
concerning hostilities - and then modified by expanding 
their scope. This is not surprising as most of the dis­
putes reserved, such as those concerning territorial 
status or hostilities, exist between developing countri­
es.
No doubt, it is true, that a subject-mater reserva­
tion may constitute a preliminary stage for a more gene­
ral acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction and 
hence a declaration containing such "reservation is 
better than a refusal to accept that jurisdiction". 
However it is not the case with most of the reservations 
discussed here. For, on the one hand, they are couched in 
the broadest terms, which carves out of the Court's 
jurisdiction a large portion of disputes in some areas of 
international law which are of primary importance. On the 
other hand, they are made alongside several other reser­
vations most of which are framed in the same manner.
Since most of those reservation have been made with 
the object of excluding particular disputes, a reserva­
tion couched in terms excluding those specific disputes 
is most desirable for the compulsory jurisdiction system, 
and could be so for the reserving State by limiting the 
scope of the operation of reciprocity.
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that subject-mater 
reservations are valid and that they are still better 
than the general reservations such as R8TIQNE TEMP0R1S 
reservations.
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with the Court observed. Right of passage over the Indian Territory 
case(1957), cited supra note 121, p. 149. Commenting on the Court's 
acceptance of that objection Rosenne says that the prior recourse to negotiation 
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(1986), pp.1145-83, at 1174-76.
(134) See Chapter 3 above, pp.177-179.
(1 3 5 ) Ibid., pp.177-178.
(136) S. Rosenne Documents ..., supra note 24, p.308.
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(1 4 6 ) J.G. Merrills, Ibid.
(1 4 7 )  Ibid.
(148) Jurisdiction and Admissibility, cited supra note 11.
(149) Summary of Argument by Professor Louis Sohn, Verbatim Record, Public 
Sitting held on October 16, 1984, I.C.J.Doc.C.R 84/18, p.67.
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(158) There seem to be no doubt that the Court's decision" is meant to have "binding 
force" in a sense that it must be complied with. Otherwise Art.94 of the Charter 
will lose its raison d'etre. Consequently, it is very likely that the Court would 
declare the incompatibility such a proviso with the Charter and the Statute 
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observes that this criticism is based on a wholly unrealistic assumption. It is 
unlikely that a State will escalate peaceful disputes into hostilities. Rather, a 
State will not appear as a respondent or will ignore the Court's decision. As far 
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resolution see 69 A.J.I.L. 1975, pp.246-49, at 47, and for a comment on this 
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p .216.
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1987, pp.145-146.
(183) I.C.J. Reports 1978, p.30.
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(1 8 5 )  Ibid., p.32.
(1 8 6 )  Ibid., p.33.
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(188) Ibid., p.35. See also I.C.J. Pleadings, supra note 179, p.254.
(189) I.C.J. Reports 1978, p.35.
(1 9 0 )  Ibid.
(191) Ibid., p.36. Judge De Castro and Stassinopoulos(Judge ad hoc) dissented on 
this point . They thought that the expression "territorial disputes did not include 
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of Mali[ Judgement, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p.554j. Furthermore, amongst the 
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(205) See Chapter 4 above p. 291.
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law of the sea see P. Mengozzi, "the International Court of Justice, the United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea", 3 lta.Y.B.I.L.{1977), pp.92-111 ; 
C.H.M. Waldock, the International Court of justice and the Law of the Sea, 1979 
; S. Oda, "the Role of the International Court of Justice", 19 Indian  
J.I.L.{ 1979), pp.157-165, at 162-163, and W. Friedmann, the International 
Court of Justice and the Evolution of International Law", 14 Archiv V. (1969- 
70), pp.305-322, at 316-317.
(216) Corfu Channel, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p.4. See C.H.M. 
Waldock, the I.C.J. and the Law of the sea, supra note 215, pp.4-6 and S. Oda, the
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(218) See C.H.M. Waldock, the I.C.J. and the Law of the Sea, supra note 215, pp.8-, 
10 ; S. Oda, the Role ..., supra note 215, pp.162-163, and W. Friedmann, supra 
note 215, p.317.
(219) North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p.3.
(220) See W. Fiedmann, supra note 215, p.317.
(2 2 1 ) S. Oda, the Role ..., supra note 215, p.163. But Comp. D.G. Partan, 
"Increasing the E ffectiveness of the In ternational Court", 18 
Harv.l.L.J.( 1977), pp.559-575, at 568.
(222) Fisheries Jurisdiction{un\{e6 Kingdom v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports, 1974, p.3 and Fisheries(Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), 
Merits, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p.175.
(223) S. Oda, the Role ..., supra note 215, p.163. Comp. D.G. Patran, supra note
221, p.568-569.
(224) See p.361 above.
(225) See C.H.M. Waldock, the I.C.J. and the Law of the Sea, supra note 215, p.16.
(226) See note 195 above .
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parties to the dispute concerning Land, Island and Maritime Frontier which is 
under the consideration of the Court. See I.C.J.Y.B.1986-87, p.145-146.
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Prime Minister's words, does not believe in double standards nor seek to pick and 
choose the rules of the law which it finds convenient to obey, shows such lack of 
faith in its own position and in the integrity of the international bench...", supra 
note 206, p.768. Consequently Green observes that by inserting this
reservation "Canada has achieved nothing - other than to find herself the
recipient of unnecessary international criticism and accusations of hypocrisy and 
double standards.", ibid., p.770 (emphasis original). See also A. D' Amato, 
Modifying ..., supra note 45, p.397.
(228)J.G . Merrills, the Optional Clause ..., supra note 22, pp.109-110.
(229) P.C.I.J. Series D, No.6, p.52.
(2 3 0 ) I.C.J.Y.B., 1985-86, p.67.
(231) See Chapter 1 above, p.31.
(232) It was made in the declarations of Argentina of 1935(P.C.I.J. Series E, No. 12, 
p.335) and Brazil of 1937 (ibid., No.13, p.277).
(233) See B. Maus, supra note 3, pp.171-173 and A.N. Farmanfarma, supra note 
61, pp.146-148.
(234) A.N. Farmanfarma, ibid, p.147. See also S. Prasasvinitchai, supra note 3, 
p p .1 4 9 -1 5 9 .
(235) Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech 
in Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932, P.C.I.J. Series A/B, No. 44, at 
24.
(236) B. Maus, supra note 3, p.173.
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(237) See C.H.M. Waldock, "Decline of the Optional Clause", 32 B.Y.B.I.L. (1955-
56), pp.244-287, at 276 ; B. Maus, supra note 3, p .173, and S.
Prasasvinicthai, supra note 3, p.150.
(238) See B. Maus, ibid., p.174 ; A.N. Farmanfarma, supra note 61, p.148 and S.
Prasasvinitchai, supra note 3, pp.150-151.
(239) B. Maus, ibid., p.175.
(240) Ib id .
(241) See Section 2 Chapter 1 above .
(2 4 2 ) Ibid., p.59 seq.
(2 4 3 ) I.C.J.Y.B., 1985-86, p .7 2 ./
(244) J.G. See Merrills, the Optional Clause..., supra note 22, pp.93-94.
(245) Trial of Pakistani prisoners of war, Interim Protection, Order of July 1973,
I.C.J. Reports 1973, p.328.
(246) I.C.J. Reports 1978, p.16{Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case)
(2 4 7 ) Article 37 provides :
"Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of a matter to 
a tribunal to have been instituted by the League of Nations , or to the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, the matter shall, as between the parties to the
present Statute, be referred to the International Court of Justice."
(2 4 9 ) I.C.J.Y.B., 1950-51, p.193.
(2 5 0 ) Ibid., 1984-85, p.79.
(2 5 1 )  Ibid., 1985-86, p.60.
(2 5 2 ) For further details see T. Meron, Israel's Acceptance ..., supra note 145,
pp.328-330. See also B. Maus, supra note 3, pp.177-178, and J. G. Merrills,
the Optional Clause .... supra note 22, pp.108-109.
CHAPTER VI 
SUBJECTIVE RJESERVATI OISTS 
RAT I PISTE MATE JR. I AE
This classification is based mainly on the power 
conferred by the reservation on the interested State for 
the determination of the scope of the reservation and 
hence its applicability. It covers thus cases in which 
the decision of whether a matter does come within the 
scope of the reservation is vested explicitly in the 
interested State, as well as cases in which such a decis­
ion is maintained implicitly owing to the fact that the 
interested State's assessment is the major, if not the 
sole criterion for assessing the content of the reserva­
tion. It extends also to the case in which the most 
important category of legal disputes is excluded, but the 
Court's jurisdiction could be established provided that 
the declarant State "specially agrees" or third States 
act in a certain way. In other words, the establishment 
of the Court's jurisdiction depends on the will of either 
the declarant State or of third States.
SECTION 1 ;  DOMESTIC JU R ISD IC T IO N  AS DETERMINED 
BY THE DECLARANT STATE
Under the P. C. I. J. it would hardly have been 
conceived that a State would ever accept the Court's 
jurisdiction under the Optional Clause while withholding 
for itself the decision whether or not a future dispute 
would be adjudicated. Yet this happened shortly after the 
establishment of the present Court when the United States 
deviated from the established practice by recognising the 
Court's jurisdiction with the proviso that the declara­
tion shall not apply to:
"(b) Disputes with regard to matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of the Unite States of Amer­
ica AS DETERMINED BY THE UNITED STATES OF M E R I C 8 * "  1
Thus unlike the objective formula of domestic jurisdic— 
tion,  ^ this new formula is - at least according to the
apparent meaning of its terms - unblushingly "subjec­
tive". For its scope cannot be pre-determined according 
to the words of the reservation but is left for subse­
quent determination after the seisin of the Court at the 
discretion of the interested State.
The circumstances in which the United States reser-
4vation was devised have been described. These cir­
cumstances have, however, lost their significance since 
the withdrawal of the United States declaration in 1985. 
It may suffice here to recall that apprehensions of judi­
cial encroachment upon certain areas which were deemed of 
vital interests, such as the navigation of the Panama 
Canal, immigration into the United States, and tariffs, 
had led to the insertion of the reservation. 43
However, the last eight words in the United States 
reservation, namely, "as determined by the United States 
of America" have spawned countless of words of polemic 
and years of controversy. 7 Focus has been made on two 
points: the undesirability of similar reservations and 
their validity. Whilst it has ben generally admitted that 
such reservations are undesirable, “ the question of 
their validity is still unsettled. The validity issue has 
been approached in different ways, to the extent that 
almost every conceivable course, whether legal or of 
opportunity, has been followed. The Court itself has 
treated such reservations in a different manner as com­
pared to other reservations. This has deepened the doctr­
inal views as regards these reservations. It is to be 
observed that the significance of these reservations lies 
in the fact that they provide a precedent for testing the 
limits of the freedom of making reservations, more than 
in the question of their validity as such.
However, owing to the importance of State practice 
and its relevance as an element of interpretation, the 
position of the subjective reservation of domestic juris­
diction in the declarations of acceptance should be
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clarified first before proceeding to the consideration of 
the Court's attitude towards the reservation and the 
different approaches adopted by jurists.
A - The Reservation in the Declarations of Acceptance
In arguing against the insertion of the Connally 
Amendment in 1946 Senator Pepper of Florida warned that
other nations would wish to modify their adherence to the
9
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in the same way.
It did not take long to see his prediction realised. In
less than one year the reservation appeared in a new
version in the French declaration of February 18, 1947.
This declaration excluded from the Court's jurisdiction
"differences relating to matters which are essentially
within the national jurisdiction PS UNDERSTOOD BY THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC. 10 The terms of the
French declaration appeared to judge Read as requiring a
"genuine understanding". In other words the Court's
jurisdiction could not be ousted, he argued, by a mere
pretention by the invoking State that it understands or
by a declaration that it understands. 11 However, both
models seem to raise a problem of interpretation. Thus J
B Elkind thinks that exactly the opposite view of the two
models is possible. "An 'understanding' would seem to
relate to a subjective view of the matter which cannot be
questioned. A 'determination' is a more objective, almost
a judicial process, which might well be opened to revie- 
12
w " . A third model was introduced by Mexico. Its decla­
ration excluded "disputes arising from matters that, IN  
THE OPINION OF THE MEXICON GOVERNMENT are within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the United States of Mexico". 1‘"’ 
A fourth model is adopted by Liberia and the Philippines. 
They both exclude from the scope of their declarations
any dispute "which [they] consider essentially within
14[their] domestic jurisdiction". In due course the
United States' model was included in the declarations of:
India of 1956, Malawi, 16 Sweden, 17 Pakistan (of 1948
IB 19and 1957), and South Africa with the difference
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that the last two declarations excluded matters which 
were essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the 
"GOVERNMENT" of the reserving State,and that the adjec­
tive "domestic" was omitted from the declaration of South 
Africa. The latter simply excluded disputes falling 
within "the jurisdiction of the Government of the Union
of South Africa". It could, thus, have been considered
2 ftbroader than the other models. ' All these models have
21
generally been considered as producing the same effects.
Today, the subjective reservation of domestic 
jurisdiction appears only in the declarations of Liberia, 
Malawi, the Philippines and Sweden. This is due to the 
termination of the declarations of South Africa and 
the United States, x‘~' and the substitution of this reser­
vation by the objective formula in the declarations of
24
India and Pakistan.
In conclusion it is to be noted firstly that the 
reservation has appeared in two declarations (Malawi and 
the Philippines) since the end of the fifties when the 
trend to abandon the reservation was marked. Secondly, 
all the declarations containing the reservation, except 
that of the Philippines, have not been subjected to 
change since they were made for the first time. The 
Government of the Philippines terminated its previous 
declaration (of 1947) in 1972 and deposited a fresh one 
containing four other reservations in addition to the 
subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction.
B - THE COURT'S POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE RESERVATION
The Court had the following opportunities to put an 
end to the controversy on the validity of the subjective 
reservation of domestic jurisdiction.
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(I) The U. S. Nationals in Morocco Case
This was the first case brought under an instrument 
containing the subjective reservation of domestic juris­
diction. The declarations of both parties (France and the 
United States) contained such a reservation. The reserva­
tion was not invoked. However the United States stated in 
its counter-memorial that "its abstaining from raising 
the issue does not affect its legal right to rely in any
future case on its reservation contained in its accep-
27
tance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court".
The responsibility of raising the issue of the consis­
tency of these reservations with the Statute was thus 
left to the court. Yet, the Court declined to do so and 
contented itself with recording the parties reliance on 
their declarations accepting the "compulsory jurisdiction 
of the Court" in accordance with the Statute.
Whether such an attitude by the Court could be 
considered as a tacit recognition of the validity of the 
declarations, despite the reservations, as the Court 
could not have exercised its jurisdiction based on a void 
instrument, has been overridden. It is argued that the 
Court exercised its jurisdiction on the basis of the 
principle of FOPJJM PRQRQG8TIUM, in spite of the fact that 
the application was based on Article 36 (2) of the Statu­
te, since the movement of the United States withdrawal of 
its preliminary objection, which was based on account of 
insufficient clarification of the identity of the par-
HO
ties.
(II) Certain Norwegian Loans Case
France instituted proceedings against Norway by an 
application relying on the declarations of the parties 
made under Article 36 (2) of the Statute. France asked
the Court to adjudge and declare that the bonds sold to 
its nationals were international loans which only could 
be discharged by repayment or redemption in gold value at
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the date of the repayment or redemption. Norway lodged 
four preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the 
Court, but only the first is relevant here. The Norwegian 
argument on this point was in two parts. In the first 
part the Norwegian Government maintained that the subject 
mater of the dispute did not fall within any of the 
categories enumerated in Article 36 (2). The dispute was 
thus "beyond any possible doubt" within its jurisdiction, 
the Norwegian Government argued. In the second part it 
invoked the French subjective reservation of domestic 
jurisdiction. It argued that if any doubt remained as to 
the first point, it "would rely upon the reservation made 
by the French Government". ° It is worth noting that the 
Norwegian Government raised the issue of interpretation 
of the reservation. It emphasised that "such a reserva­
tion must be interpreted in good faith and should a 
Government seek to rely upon it with a view to denying 
the jurisdiction of the Court in a case which manifestly 
did not involve a matter which is essentially within the 
national jurisdiction, it would be committing an AjBUS BE 
BROIT which would not prevent the Court from acting".
The Court declined to examine "whether the French 
reservation is consistent with the undertaking of a legal 
obligation and is compatible with Article 36, paragraph 
6 , of the Statute". It accepted Norway's reliance on 
the French reservation on the ground that the validity of 
the reservation had not been questioned by the parties 
and therefore recognised Norway's right to refuse to 
accept the Court's jurisdiction on the ground of recipro­
city. In so holding, the Court said:
"tilt has before it provision which both parties to the 
dispute regard as constituting an expression of their common 
will relating., to the acceptance of the Court. The Court does 
not therefore consider that it is called upon to enter into an 
examination of the reservation in the light of consi derations 
which are not presented by the issues in the proceedings. The 
Court, without prejudging the question, gives effect to the 
reservation as it stands and as the Parties recoqnise it."
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This holding has been criticised - as will be seen 
- by both some judges of the Court as well as by commen­
tators and different conclusions have been drawn from it. 
It may suffice here to observe that the Court was critic­
ised for basing its jurisdiction on the sole ground of 
the invocation of the reservation while it had many other 
alternatives. It could h’ave based its decision on the 
interpretation adopted by Norway concerning the use of 
the reservation in good faith, or discussed its juris­
diction on the first part of the objection as did judges 
Moreno Quintana and Badawi, ol~ or could have ignored the 
declarations completely and based its jurisdiction on the 
treaties referred to by the parties in the course of the 
proceedings.
(III) Interhandel Case
This case offered two occasions for the considera­
tion of the question of validity of the subjective reser­
vation of domestic jurisdiction and its effect on the 
instrument to which it was attached.
(i) Interim measures of protection phase
The Swiss Government asked the Court to indicate- 
INTER QLIfi -, that the Government of the United States 
was requested not to sell the shares of the General 
Aniline and Film Corporation (G.A.F.C.). The United 
States Government filed a preliminary objection based on 
its subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction. It 
stated that it had determined that the matter of sale or 
disposition of the stock of the G.A.F.C. was a matter 
essentially within its jurisdiction. "This determination 
... is not subject to review or approval by the tribunal,
It operates to remove definitively from the jurisdiction
"\R
of the Court the matter which it determines", ~~ Mr 
Loftus Backer, the United States Government Agent stated. 
The terms of the reservation rendered the subject matter 
of the determination non-justiciable. For, that deter­
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mination destroyed the PRINfi FQC1E jurisdiction as a
legal basis for indicating provisional measures, Mr
9^Backer argued.
On the other hand, professor Guggenheim - Co-agent 
of the Swiss Government - contested the above inter­
pretation. He doubted that that reservation could have 
such an absolute character. Otherwise it would have the 
effect of rendering inoperative a provision essential for
the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction [i.e. Article 36
40
(6) of the Statute]. ' Although he challenged the valid­
ity of the reservation, professor Guggenheim stated that 
he could not imagine that the Court should wish to ad­
judicate at that stage "upon so complex and delicate a
41question as the validity of the American reservation".
Despite these arguments by both parties, the Court 
took jurisdiction to consider the indication of interim
measures pursuant to its Statute, but it rejected, for
42lack of urgency, the Swiss request.
Five of the sixteen members of the Court expressed 
their disagreement with the Court's reasoning. They all 
agreed, though in different ways, that since PRIMfi FQC1E 
the Court would have no jurisdiction on the merits, it
manifestly has no right to exercise jurisdiction in this
4?:
stage of the proceedings.
The clear implication of this holding of the Court
is that a declaration containing a subjective reservation
of domestic jurisdiction could be relied upon as a basis
of a valid seisin, and hence for the conferment of the
incidental jurisdiction to indicate provisional measures,
and that the invocation of the reservation cannot precl—
44ude the Court from exercising that jurisdiction.
It is to be noted, finally, that the Court made a 
formal finding at this stage. It stated that "whereas 
[the parties] have, by Declarations made on their behalf.
3 9 6
ACCEPTED THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION ON THE BOSIS OF 
QRTICLE 3 6 f POROGROPH 2 f of the Statute", and continued:
"whereas by its subject-matter the present dispute falls
45within the preview of that paragraph".
(ii) Preliminary objections phase
The United States Government maintained its previ­
ous objection which had become part (a) of the fourth 
preliminary objection. The reservation was invoked in 
regard to the "sale and disposition" of the shares only. 
The United States Government was thus willing to allow
the Court to decide whether the seisure and retention of
46shares fell within domestic jurisdiction. The Swiss 
government also maintained its previous position that the 
Unites States reservation was invalid. Relying on the 
opinions of judges Guerrero and Lauterpacht in the NOR- 
NE&ION LOONS case, professor Guggenheim based the in­
validity on the inconsistency of the reservation with
47both paragraphs 2 and 6 of Article 36 of the Statute. 
Professor Guggenheim argued also that the reservation 
must be interpreted in good faith and that the Court 
would not accept an allegation that a matter was within 
domestic jurisdiction when in fact it was manifestly not.
Such a determination would be an abuse of right, he
48maintained.
The Agent of the United States Government (Mr 
Backer), on the other hand, argued that the reservation 
was valid and that it was not used arbitrarily in that 
case by the United States Government. He exposed the 
details of the facts to which the reservation was ap­
plied, but only for "the information of the Court". Mr 
Backer emphasised that the submission of these facts 
"does not in any way modify the conclusion that the 
determination of the United States is not subject to
49
review or approval by this Court". ' He also seemed to 
argue that the Court was not entitled to judge whether 
the reservation was invoked in good faith. He said that
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"the Court has never examined and we assume will not 
examine into the motives which lead nations to exercise 
the automatic reservation". However he stated that "any 
examination would nevertheless reveal the reasonableness 
of the United States position despite the extravagant 
charges of arbitrariness which have been made here".
Also, Mr Backer maintained that since the local
remedies were available, and that the shares could not be
sold before a final decision of the Courts of the United
States, the objection based on the subjective reservation
of domestic jurisdiction had lost practical significance
51
and had become "somewhat moot" and "somewhat academic".
Thus, unlike the situation in the NORNEGION LOONS 
case, the reservation was invoked here and maintained by 
the respondent State; challenged by the applicant State, 
and was of immediate relevance. The parties to the pres­
ent case, unlike in the NORNEGION LOONS case or in the 
first phase of this case, did not handle - to use judge
Sir Percy Spender's words - "the objection tenderly" or
52walked "discretely around the issue involved". The
Court's approach had therefore to differ from that adop­
ted in the NORNEGION LOONS case.
This approach by the Court seemed to give the im­
pression that the Court cannot consistently consider the 
issue of admissibility unless its jurisdiction was es­
tablished. Thus it examined the first and second objec­
tions and part (b) of the fourth objection before the 
third objection, namely, non-exhaustion of local remedi­
es . Yet, it turned to the third objection without dispos­
ing of whether its jurisdiction covered the issue in 
regard to which the United States Government invoked the 
reservationHaving upheld the third objection, the Court 
decided by 10 votes to 5 that part (a) of the fourth 
preliminary objection was "without object".
The clear implication of this approach is that the
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Court tried to find ground on which it might have been
possible to decline its jurisdiction without pronouncing
on the question of validity. Failing to find such a
basis, the admissibility issue was the only escape route
to avoid the problem of adjudication on the validity of
the reservation. Thus, the Court left itself open to
54criticism from the Bench as well as commentators.
(IV) The Aerial Incident of July 27th, 1955 Case 
(United States of America v Bulgaria)
Although the Court was not here in a position to 
decide the validity of the subjective reservation of 
domestic jurisdiction, the case has significance in 
throwing light on how the United States Government had 
interpreted its reservation. In its application institut­
ing proceedings against Bulgaria, the United States 
Government claimed that the acts committed on July 27, 
1955 by the Bulgarian Air force in the Bulgarian Airspace 
against American Nationals on board a civil airplane fell 
within the categories of legal disputes listed in Article
crnr
36 (2). JJ Bulgaria filed four preliminary objections to 
the jurisdiction of the Court, the second of which was 
based on the United States reservation of domestic juris­
diction. The Bulgarian Government maintained that the 
defence of its territory, the security of the airspace 
above the south western frontier region, and the disposi­
tion of its anti-aircraft defence fell under its domestic
. . . . . . .  56jurisdiction.
Inconsistently with the United States argument in 
the INTERHQNBEL case, Mr Eric H Hager, the United States 
Agent, declared that "the United States reservation (b) 
[i.e. domestic jurisdiction reservation] does not permit 
the United States or any other State to make an arbitrary
nr “7
determination in bad faith". J/ He denied that this res­
ervation empowered a State "to make an arbitrary deter­
mination that a particular matter is domestic when it is 
evidently one of international concern and has been so
399
5R ■ 'treated by the parties".
At this stage the United States Government appeared 
to adopt judge Read's view - that the reservation left to
the Court a residuum of decision-making power as will be
59seen. However, being aware of the Court's view in the 
ISRftEL v BUL&fiRlfi case that the Bulgarian declaration had
been discontinued since the dissolution of the P. C. I.
60
J., the United States Government withdrew its argument 
and returned to the interpretation made in th e  INTERH3N- 
T)EL case. This change of view was based on a "further
study and consideration of the history and background of
61[the] reservation ... ". The result of the study had
thus led to the qualification of the interpretation made 
in this case as "not valid", and that a "determination 
under reservation (b) that a matter is essentially domes­
tic constitutes an absolute bar to jurisdiction irrespec­
tive of the propriety or arbitrariness of the determina- 
6?tion". Consequently the United States Government
admitted that "Bulgaria is accorded the same rights and
powers with respect to reservation (b) as the United
States". By this recognition the United States Govern­
ment established - as Rosenne observed - the first prece­
dent in which an applicant accepted a respondent's preli-
64minary objection as justified.
(V) Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and Against Nicaragua Case
The jurisdiction of the Court was based in this 
case on - INTER fiLlf i - the declarations of the United
States and Nicaragua made under Article 36 (2) of the
Statute. The United States objected to the jurisdiction 
of the Court and the admissibility of the claim on many 
grounds. 60 However it did not invoke its domestic juris­
diction reservation. Yet it informed the Court that this 
decision was "without prejudice to the rights of the 
United States under that proviso [i.e. proviso (b) con­
taining the reservation] in relation to any subsequent
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pleadings, proceedings, or case before this Court".
The Court was not thus in a position to pronounce on the 
question of validity of the subjective reservation of 
domestic jurisdiction except by raising the issue PROPRIO 
M A T U , a course which it refused to follow in the UNITED 
STATES NATIONALS IN MOROCCO CERTAIN NORNEGIAN LOANS
cases as has ben seen. However, the Court had to satisfy 
itself that it had jurisdiction under Article 36 (2) of
the Statute. For this purpose, the Court observed, first, 
that "Nicaragua has to show that it was a "State accept­
ing the same obligation "within the meaning of Article 
36, paragraph 2, of the Statute". Secondly, the Court 
raised the question whether the United States declaration 
of 1946 "constitutes the necessary consent of the United 
States to the jurisdiction of the Court, in the present
case, taking into account the reservations which were
68attached to the declaration". On the first point the
Court found that the parties to the case had accepted
"THE SAME OBLIGATION" within the meaning of Article 36 
68(2) . As to the second point, the Court noted that 
reservation (a) in the United States declaration, referr­
ing to disputes, the solution of which is entrusted to 
other tribunals, had no relevance whatsoever to the pres­
ent case; referred to the United States decision not to 
invoke domestic jurisdiction reservation while reserving 
its right to do so in future cases, and proceeded to the
examination of the multilateral treaty reservation which
70
was invoked. '' Consequently the Court found, by eleven 
votes to five, that it had jurisdiction to entertain the 
application filed by Nicaragua on the basis of Article 36 
(2) and (5) of the Statute. 71
C - VALIDITY OR NULLITY - DIFFERENT DOCTRINAL APPROACHES
The cautious attitude adopted by the Court has 
contributed to a large extent to the emergence and devel­
opment of different views, especially from the Bench, in 
respect of the question of validity of the subjective 
reservation of domestic jurisdiction. These views might
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be grouped into four different approaches.
(I) Invalid Reservations Nullifying the 
Entire Instrument of Acceptance
As has been said earlier, it was difficult under
the the P. C. I. J. to conceive an acceptance of the
Court's jurisdiction with such a reservation. However, 
the few earlier writers who had conceived it did not
hesitate to declare it contrary to the very purpose of
the Optional Clause, devoid of a legal obligation and
contrary to the proviso of Article 36 (2) of the Statute,
72and therefore invalid. This approach has been develo-
7/% 74
ped by L Preuss and Waldock, ' and fully exhausted by
"?nr
the late judge Sir H Lauterpacht in the NORNE&IAN LOANS 
and the INTERHANBEL cases. In these cases, judge
Lauterpacht based his view on the understanding that the 
reservation has an "automatic" effect. By this he meant 
that the invocation of the reservation rendered the Court 
function an automatic one limited to "registering" that 
invocation without examining its merits. The Court, 
therefore, "is bound to hold ... that it is without 
jurisdiction". 7/ This understanding leads to the con­
clusion that the reservation is invalid, and its in­
validity nullifies the entire instrument containing it.
(i) Invalidity of the reservation
In arguing for the invalidity of the subjective 
reservation of domestic jurisdiction two basic grounds 
are usually relied on, each of which is said to be capa­
ble of nullifying such a reservation: the inconsistency
of the reservation with the Statute of the Court and the 
Charter of the United Nations, and the lack of the ele­
ment of legal obligation in it.
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(a) Inconsistency of the reservation with 
the Statute and the Charter
The Court is obliged to function according to its
Statute. This obligation is provided for expressly in 
both Article 1 of the Statute and Article 92 of the 
Charter. Article 36 (6) of the Statute provides:
as to whether the Court has 
be settled by the decision of
Thus, it is argued that this text does not only confer a
right on the Court, but also obliges it, and not the
78interested party, to decide on its own jurisdiction.
The Court's jurisprudence indicates that neither the
Court nor the parties to a case before it can depart from 
the provision of the Statute. In the FREE ZONES OF UPPER 
SANOY AND DISTRICT OF BEX the P. C. I. J. refused to com­
ply with demands made by both parties to the case that it 
should communicate to them unofficially the result of its 
deliberations. It refused to do so because it found that 
the request was in conflict with "the spirit and letter 
of its Statute". Consequently the P. C. I. J. said that
it "cannot, on the proposal of the parties, depart from
79
the terms of the Statute".
The present Court has also confirmed this prin­
ciple. In its Advisory Opinion of July 7, 1955 concerning 
the NOTING PROCEDURE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN THE 
MATTER OF PETITIONS FROM SOUTH NEST AFRICA the Court held 
that the General Assembly cannot act except in accordance
Of  i
with the Charter.
It is argued that if the Court refused to depart
from the Statute at a request made by both parties, it
would be still less able to do so at the request of one 
81
party alone. ~ This argument is further supported by the 
insertion of the new provision in Article 1 of the Stat­
ute and Article 92 of the Charter requiring the Court to
"In the event of a dispute 
jurisdiction, the matter shall 
the Court".
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function in accordance with the Statute.
Accordingly a reservation depriving the Court of
its right to decide on its own jurisdiction and prevent­
ing it from performing the duty imposed upon it by the
Statute by keeping that decision in the hands of the
interested State runs against general provisions of the 
Statute and the Charter as well as against a specific 
provision of the latter.
To add even further force to this argument, it is 
said that the subjective reservation also runs against 
"one of the most fundamental principles of international 
- and - national - jurisprudence according to which it is 
within the inherent power of a tribunal to interpret the
jq-T
text establishing its jurisdiction". Both the present
Court and its predecessor, the P. C. I. J., have recog­
nised this principle even in the absence of any provision
84to that effect. The most extensive treatment of this
principle was in the NQTTEBQHM case where the Court said:
"Paragraph 6 of Article 36 merely adopted, in respect of 
the Court, a rule consistently accepted by general interna­
tional law in the matter of international arbitration. Since 
the A/.A.5MA case, it has been generally recognised following 
the earlier precedents, that in the absence of any agreement 
to the contrary, an international tribunal has the right to 
decide as to its own jurisdiction and has the power to inter­
pret for this purpose the instruments which govern that juris-
i * § • ■■ 8  *j
diction .
The importance of Article 36 (2), being inserted
deliberately into the Statute as an indispensable safegu­
ard for the operation of the system of compulsory juris­
diction, refutes, it is submitted, the attempt which
contemplates bringing the reservation within the four
66corners of conformity with Article 36 (6) by arguing
that it is still for the Court to decide upon the juris­
diction conferred upon it by a declaration containing 
such a reservation "although it will have to say that no 
jurisdiction exists when [the invoking State] has deter­
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mined that a matter is within domestic jurisdiction".
This argument has been criticised as a formal examination
88
of Article 36 (6) ignoring its substance and trans­
forming the Court's power to determine its jurisdiction
to one of a "verbal character" or "dialectical charac-
8?ter", ' or a ministerial one confined to registering the 
determination made by the interested State.
(b) Inconsistency of the reservation with 
the requirement of a legal obligation
An instrument containing this reservation cannot, 
it is argued, be considered as a declaration in the sense 
meant in Article 36 (2) of the Statute. This Article
contemplates an acceptance of "obligation" of "compulsory 
jurisdiction". A State making such a reservation has 
undertaken an obligation to the extent that it, and it 
alone, considers that it has done so. What does this 
mean? Judge Lauterpacht answered:
"This means that it has undertaken no obligation. An 
instrument in which a party is entitled to determine the 
existence of its obiipation is not a valid and enforceable 
leqal instrument. Tt is a derl on of  ^ polifirAl nn' nri nl i=
and purpose",
Consequently the reservation is in conflict with 
the purpose and object of the system of compulsory 
jurisdiction. For, whereas this system purports to ensure 
the adjudication of disputes upon the application of a 
single party, the reservation conditions the obligation 
to adjudicate "upon a further expression of consent after
91
the specific dispute has arisen".
The natural conclusion of the above arguments is 
that the subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
is void. It is a reservation of the same kind as the 
request made to the P. C. I. J. in the FREE ZONES case. 
It does not differ from a proviso stipulating that the 
Court's decision would not be binding unless given by
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unanimity, or one excluding certain judges of certain
92nationality. This conclusion cannot, it is argued, be 
affected by the argument that the Statute is interpreted 
in practice to permit reservations to the Court's juris­
diction, and that since States are free to accept or not 
to accept the jurisdiction they can limit their consent 
by whatever reservations they think fit. No doubt, it is 
true, that Article 36 (2) has been interpreted to permit 
reservation and that the jurisdiction depends on the 
consensus of the agreement of the parties. Yet the free­
dom to insert reservations is limited and the Court's 
jurisdiction depends on a further condition, namely, 
whether such consensus is compatible with the Statute. 
Reservations to the functioning and organization of the 
Court are not permitted. They cannot limit the duties and
rights conferred upon the Court by the Statute. The FREE
9^J.OHES case is illustrative.
The inequality between the reserving State and a 
non-reserving one, where the latter is the respondent, is 
also put forward as another reason for the nullity of the 
reservation. It is said that the reservation may put the 
reserving State in an advantageous position. For it can 
force any other State to come before the Court unless the 
other party is prepared to resort to a "distasteful and 
impolite determination". In such a case, it throws on the 
respondent State the difficulty and embarrassing respon­
sibility of relying on a reservation that it might con­
sider odious, in cases where it might find it wiser not 
to make a determination that may be quoted against it on
another occasion. In such a case only the invalidity of
94the reservation would remove the inequality.
(ii) Invalidity of the entire declaration
According to this approach, the criterion upon 
which the effect of an invalid reservation on the whole 
declaration is to be determined is the importance of the 
reservation for the acceptance of the Court's jurisdic-
tion. The reservation can be severed from the declaration 
only if it does not constitute an essential part of the 
instrument. Having found that the subjective reservation
of domestic jurisdiction was the crucial part of the
95
declaration, judges Sir H Lauterpacht and Sir Percy
96spender ' agreed that it could not be ignored, or other­
wise the decision would run against the will of the 
reserving State and the fundamental principle of interna­
tional judicial settlement confirmed by the established 
practice of the Court, that the Court cannot uphold its 
jurisdiction unless the intention to confer it has been 
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, a declara­
tion containing such a reservation is incapable of con­
ferring any jurisdiction on the Court. However the grou­
nds on which this conclusion was reached were different. 
While judge Sir P Spender relied exclusively on the terms 
of the reservation, which appeared to him clear enough to
the extent of precluding any reference to the preparatory
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works, " judge Sir H Lauterpacht relied on both the
terms of the reservations and their preparatory works, or
9R
the circumstances in which they were made.
This approach has been adopted by most authorities
99 1 on 1
including Charles De Visscher, L Preuss, ' Dubisson,
R Y Jennings, iUj" and R P Anand. lu~
(II) Valid Acceptances Containing Invalid Reservations
The difference between this approach and the previ­
ous one lies in the effect of the invalidity of the 
subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction. Unlike 
the first, this approach holds the severability of the 
reservation, or the offending words in it , namely, "as 
determined by the declarant State". Different argu­
ments have been advanced in support of this view. While 
judge Guerrero did not indicate the reason for which he 
favoured the separation of the reservation from the
1 qet
declaration, the intention of the reserving State 
appeared to judges Klaestad and Armand-Ugon in the INTER-
4 0 7
tifiNBEL case to be the determinant factor. This is in 
spite of the fact that the former thought that the in­
validity of the offending words precludes the Court from
1acting upon them ' and the latter believed that the 
Court may, in performing its duty to safeguard its Statu­
te, "appraise the legality of the different parts of the
declaration in order to determine whether the relevant
107
clauses of the Statute have been correctly applied". 
However, they both agreed that an interpretation in­
validating the whole declaration as a result of the 
nullity of the reservation would lead to results contrary 
to the intention of the declarant State. The consequences 
of the invalidity of the declaration would be that the 
reserving States could neither sue nor be sued under 
Article 36 (2). In other words, the reserving state could 
find itself in the same position as States which have not 
submitted to the compulsory jurisdiction. Both judges had 
no doubt that the reserving State - at least in this case
- intended to make a real and effective declaration,
1 OR
though with far reaching reservations.
Judge Armand-Ugon advanced another argument. A 
declaration accepting the Court's jurisdiction under 
Article 36 (2) consists, in his view, of two elements: 
acceptance, and reservations. They are distinct elements 
of a single judicial act. Nothing justifies treating them
as an indivisible whole. He considered the offending
. . . .  . 1 <”)C? words m  the reservation as "an accessory stipulation".
The implication of these arguments is that it might 
lead to the same result as the first approach, i.e. the 
invalidity of the whole declaration. This would be the 
case where evidence is to the effect that there would 
have been no acceptance without this reservation being 
attached to it.
Professor Briggs adds two other arguments for the 
severability of the reservation. The first is based on 
the rule of interpretation adopted by the Court in the
RIGHT OF PQSSQGE case, according to which "a text emanat­
ing from a government must, in principle, be interpreted
as producing and intended to produce effects in accor-
110.
dance with existing law and not in violation, of it' .
The second is based on the rule in the NOTTEBOHM case, 
which prevents a unilateral attempt to withdraw jurisdic­
tion in a case already pending before the Court from 
depriving the Court of jurisdiction already established. *
In order to release the Court from the invidious 
task of pronouncing the validity of the reservation while 
at the same time holding its jurisdiction in a case 
referred to it under a declaration containing such a 
reservation. Professor Leo Gross advances the rule gover­
ning the conflict between the obligation undertaken and 
the Charter of the United Nations and other obligations. 
Since the Statute "forms an integral part of the Charter" 
(Article 92 of the Charter) an obligation leaving the 
determination of jurisdiction to the parties concerned 
cannot, by virtue of Article 103 of the Charter, prevail 
over the obligation resulting from Article 36 (6) ’ of the 
Statute, the Court can ignore the reservation without 
having to declare on its validity. In other words, by 
invoking Article 103 of the Charter, the Court would need
only to find whether there exists a conflict between two 
112obligations. Professor Gross argues that the applica­
tion of the charter would be in line with the practice of 
the Court in showing respect for the sovereignty of a 
State and at the same time allows the Court to perform
its duty as a guardian of the system of compulsory juris-
, . . . 113diction.
(Ill) Reasonableness and Good Faith Tests: 
"Amelioration by Interpretation"
During the debates over the United States reserva­
tion of domestic jurisdiction many Senators, among whom 
Senator Connally himself — the author of the reservation 
- expressed the view that the United States would never
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use its reservation unreasonably and in bad faith.
Many writers have also shared the same view without
indication to what would happen if the reservation is
used arbitrarily. Nor did they indicate the criterion to
be applied for the determination of reasonableness or 
115good faith. The invocation of these tests besides
that of OBUS BE BROIT in some cases before the Court - as
has been seen 116 - has given new life to this approach. 117
The basic understanding of this approach is the rejection
of a rigid and literal interpretation of the words of the 
118reservation. It is argued that the view that the
words of the reservation are clear and therefore do not 
require an interpretation begs the decisive questions, 
namely, which interpretation should prevail, the literal 
or equitable? Moreover, the maxim UT RES MOGIS 00LE0T 
QUOM PEREQT comes into play as long as the absolute 
interpretation - i.e. that giving to the reservation a 
peremptory effect - might lead to doubts as to whether
the reservation, and hence the whole declaration is
. . , 119valid.
Two other principles have also been advanced agai­
nst the absolute interpretation. The first is that cited 
above, which was pronounced by the Court in the RIGHT OF 
POSSOGE case requiring the interpretation of any text 
emanating from a government "as producing or intended to
produce effects in accordance with the existing law and
120
not in violation of it." ' The second is that laid down
by the P. C. I. J. in the POLISH POSTOL SERVICES IN  
121BONZIG case and confirmed by the present Court in its 
advisory opinion on COMPETENCE OF ASSEMBLY REGARDING 
ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NOTIONS 122 that:
"It is a cardinal principle of interpretation that words 
must be interpreted in the sense they would normally have in 
their context, unless such interpretation would lead to some­
thing unreasonable or absurd".
An interpretation leading to the nullification of the
17^
acceptance must thus be rejected.
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However, this interpretation was canvassed par­
ticularly by the supporters of the first and second 
approaches, but has been rejected. The application of 
good faith, reasonableness and abuse of rights tests have 
been criticised on many grounds. Firstly, it is argued 
that the Court has no power to exercise control over the 
determination made by a State. If the Court attempts to 
do so, it would arrogate to itself a power which has been
expressly denied to it and kept by the reserving State 
124for itself. For instance, it was observed that the
requirement of good faith would add the proviso "provided
it is so determined by [the declaring State] in good 
125faith". Secondly, it is difficult for the Court to
attribute bad faith; unreasonableness, or OBUS BE BROIT
to a sovereign State. The Court must be guided with great
1 ^6caution in this respect. "" Furthermore, the comprehen­
siveness of the scope of the reserved domain makes it
very difficult to conceive situations where a State uses
127so extravagantly and arbitrarily its reservation. 
Finally, it is said that the practice of the Court ex­
cludes the application of these tests. Thus it did not 
apply them in the N0RNEG10N LOONS case. 123
In reply to this criticism, it is argued that this
approach had been adopted by States, though inconsistent-
129ly by some, before the Court. The cases in which the 
reservation was invoked show that the reservation was not 
invoked in a way putting an end to the proceedings. 
Rather, it was invoked as a preliminary objection in the 
same manner as other reservations are invoked. It is
also observed that if the intention of the reserving 
State was to exclude any control over a determination 
made by itself, the reservation would have been phrased 
as follows: "Provided, that this declaration shall not 
apply to any dispute which this government decides to 
withdraw from the jurisdiction of the Court", instead of 
using the reservation in question as a subterfuge. i'”'1 
Even if there is still some doubt as to the intention of 
the reserving State, it might be argued that that inten-
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tlon is respected. For the determination of the nature of
the dispute is to be made by the interested State, but
17.2
such a determination is subject to the Court's control.
The difficulties of attributing bad faith, unreasonab­
leness, abuse of right, and those inherent in arriving at a 
classification of "domestic” or "international" jurisdiction 
are generally admitted. However it is argued that such 
difficulties scarcely warrant the conclusion that the reser­
vation confers on the reserving State an absolute power to 
defeat the Court's jurisdiction. They should not prevent 
the Court from applying these tests. On the contrary, the 
Court must apply - at least the principle of good faith-
pursuant to Article 38 (c) of its Statute, since it is a
174
general principle of law. " The Court's jurisprudence, it 
is submitted, is clear on this point. In the NUCLEOR TESTS 
case, second phase, the Court said:
"One of the basic principles governing the creation and 
performance of legal obi igations^. whatever their sources, is 
the principle of good faith".
This holding was confirmed by the Court in the MILITARY  
ONI) POROMILI TORY OCTIV IT IES  IN  0 
(jurisdiction and admissibility)
ONI) O&OINST NICORO&UO case
136
As to the non-exercise of control over the deter­
mination made by Norway in the NORNEGION LOONS case, it 
is. maintained that the Court did not adopt the absolute 
interpretation, although it declined jurisdiction because 
of Norway's reliance on the reservation. The Court had no 
occasion to consider the question of reasonableness or 
good faith raised by Norway because France did not con­
tend whether Norway's determination was made in bad faith 
or unreasonableness. 1’“7
Although the supporters of this approach agree that 
the absolute interpretation should be avoided, they do 
not agree as to how the reasonableness and good faith 
tests are to be applied. While judge Read had limited his
412
view to the reasonableness test according to the specific
138circumstances of every case, others seem to general­
ly
ise on the application of these tests. “ However, there 
is a general agreement among the supporters of this 
approach that the Court examines its control over the 
truth or falsity of a declaration or whether it was made
in good faith or bad faith according to an objective
140
criterion, namely, international law.
Thus, the net result of this approach seems to be 
similar to that of the second approach. They both lead to 
the conclusion that only matters which are according to
international law within domestic jurisdiction are cove-
141red by the reservation in question. In other words,
the reservation is not subjective but it is another 
variant of the objective formula of the reservation of 
domestic jurisdiction. The only difference between them 
is that according to the latter the Court decides whether 
a matter is DOMESTIC as a matter of law, regardless of 
the determination alleged by the parties concerned, or 
whether it is reasonable and made in good faith. 1T^
(IV) Valid Reservation
Unlike the previous approach which holds the valid­
ity of the reservation as long as the intention of the 
reserving State is not clear that it intended to give the 
reservation an absolute effect, this approach is based on 
the understanding that the meaning of the reservation is 
clear. It has an automatic effect depriving the Court of 
jurisdiction if it is invoked. Yet it is not incompatible 
with the Statute. The difficult task of this approach is, 
thus, to counter the arguments of invalidity put forward 
by the proponents of approaches 1 and 2 .
(i) Consistency with Article 36 (6) of the Statute
To prove the consistency of the reservation in 
question with Article 36 (6),reliance has been made on
413
the interpretation limiting the Court's power under
Article 36 (6) to what the proponents of the first and
second approaches described as a "verbal" or "dialectal"
power confined to "registering" the determination made by
143the interested State. There is nothing wrong, it is
observed, in limiting the Court's power to determine its
jurisdiction to a ministerial one. The Court's function
is sometimes confined to registering a course of action
taken by the parties and suspend or terminate proceed- 
144ings. This is so where the parties, for example,
pursuant to a common reservation "agree to have recourse
14c;
to another means of peaceful settlement". ' ~ In support 
of this argument the attention is drawn to the circumsta­
nces in which the reservation might leave a residuum of 
decision-making power. This would be the case where the 
reservation is not invoked in the first responsive plead­
ing. In such a case the Court, and the Court alone, would
-146be empowered to decide its jurisdiction. ~ ‘ However, 
assuming the correctness of this argument, no explanation 
is given to the case where the reservation is not invoked 
at that stage, but the right to do so later is reserved.
(ii) Consistency with Article 36 (2)
Although it is conceded that it is hard to see 
exactly what obligation is accepted by a declaration 
containing the subjective reservation of domestic juris­
diction, it is maintained that the reservation is not 
inconsistent with Article 36 (2) of the Statute. This is 
because, firstly. Article 36 (2) does not require im­
plicitly that a substantive obligation is assumed. Such a 
requirement is not clear in spite of the reference to the 
terms "obligation" and "compulsory". For, the former "is 
more descriptive of what is recognised than a requirement 
of what should be" and the latter "is certainly stronger,
but an automatic declaration does constitute SOMETHING,
147even if only a procedure". Secondly, it is pointed
out that the argument depriving the declaration the 
character of a legal obligation because of its inconsis-
414
tence with the requirement of a "legal obligation" is 
based on private law standard the application of which
would invalidate a large number of declarations made
under Article 36 (2). This is so because declarations 
terminable at any time without notice, would also fall 
down. "It should be evident that these acceptances and 
these containing the automatic reservation stand in PARI
DELICTO, and attempts to denounce the one while just ify-
148ing the other can only be idle folly".
State practice has also been relied on as a proof 
of consistency of the reservation with the Statute. It is 
argued that the reservation has come to be accepted in 
practice as a permissible reservation to Article 36 (2). 
This is because it has been accepted by a number of
States and its validity has never been contested through 
diplomatic channels even by those which have shown them­
selves assiduous in protecting the compulsory jurisdic­
tion. Thus they are, prepared, at least tacitly, to
acquiesce in it. This practice constitutes therefore a
14?subsequent interpretation of Article 36 (2). 7
Two further grounds for the validity of this reser­
vation have been added recently by James Crawford: the 
"applicable principles of law" and the consideration of 
"automatic declarations" as another way of access to the 
Court. 1'“‘ Under the first, he argues that declarations
of acceptance, being not multilateral treaties, are not 
governed by treaty reservation rules. If these rules, 
viz. Article 20 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (V.C.L.T.) are extended to declarations by 
analogy, being customary international law, they would 
prohibit reservations altogether on two distinct grounds. 
Firstly, Article 36 (3) of the Statute allows declara­
tions to be made unconditionally or on condition of 
reciprocity for a certain time only [Article 19 (6) of
V.C.L.T.]. Secondly, the Court has not expressly accepted 
particular reservations to its "constituent instrument". 
[Article 20 (3) of V.C.L.T.]. As he thinks that the
415
reservation in question is not inconsistent with Article 
36 (6) of the Statute and therefore not "prohibited" by 
that Article, Crawford emphasises that the relevant issue 
must be whether the reservation is "inconsistent with the 
object and purpose" of the Optional Clause [Article 
19 (c) of V.C.L.T.]. He argues that this test is not 
applicable to the declarations of acceptance, because it 
can entail different interpretations. The Court
should be reluctant to substitute its own view for a 
consistent State practice either in accepting a par­
ticular view of the object and purpose of a treaty or in 
not objecting to the reservation in question on that 
ground, Crawford argues. He concludes that :
"the application of treaty reservation rules could well 
entail that automatic reservations have been accepted, under 
the customary analogue to the treaty reservation rules in the 
Vienna Convention, as not inconsistent with the obiect and•  ^cr rr
purpose of the Optional Clause".
In the light of State practice as mentioned above, 
Crawford argues also that the application of ordinary 
principles of vires leads to the same result, namely, the 
validity of the reservation. This is so because States, 
on a bilateral basis, so long as no underlying issue of 
JUS COGENS, or basic element of the Court's structure is 
involved, can accept States making the subjective reser­
vation of domestic jurisdiction as parties vis-a-vis 
themselves.
Under the second ground, namely,"automatic declara­
tions" as another way of access to the Court, which is 
the most convincing approach in his view, Crawford argues 
that even if the instrument containing .the automatic 
reservation is incapable of generating legal consequences 
or entails no immediate legal obligation, it does not 
follow automatically that such instrument is void. A 
conclusion drawn on the existence of general principle 
invalidating that instrument "fails to distinguish the 
voidness of an instrument, for example where an overrid-
416
ing legal rule deprives it absolutely of legal effect, 
and the presence of obligation or legal content of an 
instrument which is capable of generating legal conse-
15
quences, for instance by a subsequent course of conduct". 
The reservation in question falls in Crawford's view in 
the latter category. Explaining this point, Crawford 
points out that an instrument is void where it fails to 
comply with the requirements of the procedure set forth 
for the achievement of the results for which the instru­
ment was made only where there exists no other procedure. 
However, if that object can be achieved by another proce­
dure fulfilling the required conditions, the instrument 
will not be invalid. "An act ULRG VIRES under the in­
tended head of power may turn out to be valid under 
another".
Thus Crawford cannot see anything that could prev­
ent a State accepting the Court's jurisdiction under 
Article 36 (2) of the Statute; from considering a State
which has made a declaration to similar effect, but under 
Article 36 (1) as if the latter was party to the compul­
sory jurisdiction system under Article 36 (2). This is so 
inasmuch as the difference between acceptance of the 
Court's jurisdiction under paragraphs 1 and 2, of Article 
36 is that, under the former, the obligation is assumed 
vis-a-vis other declarants and not just any State which 
has accepted the Court's jurisdiction OB HOC or by trea­
ty. Thus he likens a declaration containing subjective 
reservation to one made by a non-member of the United
157Nations according to Security Council Resolution 9 (1). 
Accordingly Crawford concludes that:
"an automatic reservation is not void: it is in law an
Article 36 paragraph I procedure which is intended to have 
e-f-fect vis-a-vis parties to the Optional Clause, but which 
requires the letter’s consent or acceptance to operate as
t, ii 158
such ",
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D - A LIMITED CHOICE
Since the likelihood is remote, if not impossible, 
that a State would contest the validity of its own reser­
vation, the question of validity might be raised by a 
non-reserving State in two hypotheses: as a respondent or 
applicant. In the first hypothesis, It may argue that the 
reservation is invalid and its validity entails the 
nullity of the whole declaration. Although this hypothe­
sis is not excluded especially if the defendant State
159finds it wiser - as already mentioned '- not to make a 
determination that may be quoted against it on another 
occasion, it may find it easier to invoke the reservation 
being sure that the applicant State cannot contest its 
validity. The most likely hypothesis in which the ques­
tion of validity of the reservation would be raised is 
thus where the respondent State relies on its own reser­
vation claiming that the dispute concerns matters falling 
within its domestic jurisdiction. In such hypothesis the 
applicant may argue that the reservation is invalid - as 
happened in the INTERHfiNUEL case "&U - but such invalid­
ity does not entail the nullity of the whole declaration.
The sensitive question, however, is what approach 
amongst those discussed above would be adopted by the 
Court if it finds itself obliged to take a position on 
the point? 1'"’1
(I) The First Approach is Rejected by the Court
The conclusion drawn from the invalidity of the 
reservation, namely, the invalidity of the whole declara­
tion, is in contradiction to the Court's jurisprudence. 
This has been admitted even by the most protagonist of 
this approach. Thus judge Sir H Lauterpacht admitted in 
the INTERHQNUEL case that the Court had decided, at least 
provisionally, that a declaration containing such a
reservation was "a valid legal instrument cognizable by 
162the Court". Also in the first phase of the same case
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the Court - as already pointed out - made a formal find­
ing that the parties had accepted its jurisdiction "on 
the basis of Article 36 (2)". In the NORNEGIAN LOANS case 
the Court also made a statement implying the validity of 
the declaration. It said:
"CTlhe French Declaration ACCEPTS the Court’s jurisdic­
tion within narrower limits than the Norwegian Declaration; 
consequently; THE COMMON MILL of the parties, which is the
basis of the Court’s jurisdiction, exists within these nar-
164
rower limits indicated by the French reservations".
The Court's judgment in the MILITARY AND PARAMILI­
TARY A C T IV IT IES  IN  AND AGAINST NICARAGUA case seems, 
however, to remove all doubt on the question. Although 
the United States reserved its right to invoke its reser­
vation in future - i.e. did not abandon it - the Court 
found that the United States had "ASSUMED AS INESCAPABLE
OBLIGATION TONARBS OTHER STATES ACCEPTING THE OPTIONAL
16^CLAUSE". ’"■■In another passage the Court said also that
the 1984 notification excluding some disputes from the
United States declaration of 1946 with immediate effect
"cannot override THE OBLIGATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO
SUBMIT TO THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE COURT V I S - A -
1 A6VIS  NICARAGUA, A STATE ACCEPTING THE SAME OBLIGATION".
Moreover, since the view of the inseverability of 
the reservation from declarations is based almost com­
pletely on the intention of the reserving State, in other 
words on the understanding that the reservation is an 
essential part of the acceptance, the argument seems more 
theoretical so long as that intention is unknown. 167 
However, what appears to be certain is that the intention 
of one State cannot be substituted by that of another 
State. Thus, it is hard to understand Lauterpacht's 
reliance on the intention of the United States and those
of South Africa and India while he was considering the
168French reservation. In fact, it is not inconceivable, 
so long as the intention of States making the reservation 
is unknown, that a reserving State may argue that the
419
reservation was not a crucial part of its acceptance, and 
therefore it is severable. If confirmation of this hypot­
hesis is needed, it is provided by the Portuguese argu-
169
ment in the RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER INDIAN TERRITORY case.
(II) The Fourth Approach - Insufficient Grounds 
for Invalidity
The grounds on which the fourth approach stand do 
not seem strong enough to justify the adaptation of an 
important system as the compulsory jurisdiction to the 
reservation of a question instead of attempting, at 
least, to adapt the latter to the former. However, before 
discussing these grounds it might be better to return to 
the Court's position towards the reservation and reflect 
a little on the reasons which prevented the Court from 
pronouncing on the question of validity.
In spite of the rare self revelations in the judges 
individual opinions on this question in the NORNEGIAN 
LOANS and INTERHANDEL case, a careful reading of some 
opinions indicates that the Court avoided taking a posi­
tion on the question for reasons of a non-legal nature. 
The majority preferred to “postpone a decision on the 
subject" because of, firstly, the "political implica­
tions" of such a decision on other declarations contain­
ing similar reservations. 1/1 This cause seems to have 
found strong support in the fact that most of the States 
which have made such reservation were the client of the 
Court or to use Lauterpacht's words "traditionally wedded
1 7^
to the cause of international judicial settlement".
The second reason, which is almost a corollary of the 
first, was the moral value of the declarations containing 
such reservations as a support to the principle of com­
pulsory jurisdiction. 1""' Thirdly, the idea that a decis­
ion invalidating a reservation could be considered as an
"offensive to the dignity of a sovereign State" seems to
174have found a place in the deliberations of the Court.
These reasons were described by judge Lauterpacht as
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"reasons outside the realm of legal consideration".
They should not, therefore, have led a judicial tribunal 
to postpone a decision on the validity of the reserva­
tion, he thought. These reasons also led judge Sir P 
Spender to express himself as follows:
"There is more than a little practical wisdom to recom­
mend this as a course to -follow. The objection [i.e. that 
based on the reservation in question] presents issues of -far 
reaching significance. They concern not only the interests of 
the two States engaged in the present proceedings but these of 
other States as well, I MOULD HOUE PREFERRED TO 0B0PT PORT (a)
OF THE FOURTH OBJECTION IN THE SOME OTTITUBE OS EOS THE COURT,
BUT OF TER C0NSIBER0BLE REFLEXION I REGRET THOT THIS IS NOT 
OPEN TO ME". 1/0
What is the significance of these statements? Do 
not they suggest that the INVALIDITY- of the reservation 
prevailed in the minds of the majority of the members of 
the Court over its validity? Otherwise what implications 
would a decision holding the validity of the reservation 
here had on other declaration containing a similar reser­
vation. Only a decision invalidating the reservation 
could have such implications. Furthermore, the fact that 
seven judges had declared expressly the invalidity of the 
reservation and none of the judges declared its validity 
may provide some support for this view.
However, the arguments advanced for supporting the 
validity of the subjective reservation of domestic juris­
diction call for the following observations.■*'/
(i) Inconsistency with Article 36 (6)
The example put forward to prove that the Court's 
function is sometimes confined to registering a course of 
action taken by the parties does not seem to be relevant 
here. For Article 36 (6) of the Statute empowers the
Court to determine its jurisdiction "in the EVENT OF £ 
DISPUTE as to whether the Court has jurisdiction". It is
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obvious that there is no dispute as to jurisdiction in 
case the parties agree to settle their dispute by another 
means of settlement. Furthermore, the parties' action in 
such a case is exercised according to the Statute (Ar­
ticle 88 of the Rules of the Court), which enables them
178to ask the Court to remove the case from the list.
(ii) Inconsistency with Article 36 (2)
1. If the object of the argument that Article 36
(2) does not require the assumption of a substan­
tive obligation is to adapt the compulsory juris­
diction system to the reservation, its result seems 
to exceed that object. For such an argument denies 
the very existence of something that can be called 
"compulsory jurisdiction". However, it is perhaps 
not expected that such an important document as the 
Statute should explain in detail that the obliga­
tion undertaken under it "must be substantive".
2. There exists a basic difference which could
justify the nullity of the subjective reservation
of domestic jurisdiction and sustain the validity
of the reservation of the right to terminate the
acceptance without a previous notice. While the
former seeks to defeat the Court's jurisdiction
even after the application has been filed in the
case, the NOTTEBOHM rule prevents the latter from
17°
having such an effect.
3. As to the argument that the reservation has 
come to be accepted in practice as a permissible 
reservation, the following remarks may be made. In 
considering State practice in regard to domestic 
jurisdiction reservation it must not be forgotten 
that the declarations of 41 States out of the 46 
currently in force do not contain such a reserva­
tion, and that 14 out of the 41 have included in 
their declaration the reservation in its objective
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form. Furthermore, Article 36 (6) of the Stat­
ute has also been interpreted in this manner, i.e. 
as empowering the Court, and the Court alone, to 
decide on its own jurisdiction even by.some States 
making the reservation in the subjective form. Thus 
the United States had argued before the Court in 
the case concerning the INTERPRETATION OF PEACE 
TREATIES NITH BULGARIA, HUNGARY AND RUMANIA that 
"it has long been recognised in international law
and PRACTICE" that an international tribunal has an
181authority to determine its own jurisdiction. It
also argued that:
"Even if the Peace Treaties expressly provide
that their provisions should not be construed to
affect matters which are solely or essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State,
these States could not by unilateral declarations
determine for themselves what matters were solely
1 R'7
within their domestic .jurisdiction”,
It is true that non-reserving States have not 
protested against the reservation through diploma­
tic channels. Yet it cannot be taken for granted 
that they have accepted this as a valid reserva­
tion. They do not feel obliged to do so, as long as 
they have the opportunity to raise the question of 
invalidity whenever they deem it necessary before 
the Court. Thus Switzerland had not been prevented 
from contesting the validity of the reservation. 
Nor had India or Australia been prevented from
doing so in regard to the Portuguese third condi-
1R7. 184
tion and the national security " reserva­
tions. Also, it should not be forgotten that some 
States abandoned the practice of making such a 
reservation in a period during which hopes had been
expressed not only in standard writings but also by
1R5 ilegal institutions as well as some governments
that such practice should be abandoned because of
1R7its inconsistency with the Statute. " ‘ Another 
fact that must be kept in mind is that the reserva-
03
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tion represents a practice of only 5 States amongst
not the 46 States which accept the jurisdiction of
the Court under Article 36 (2), but amongst the 159 
188States members of the United Nations. For
although 116 States are still outside the system of 
compulsory jurisdiction they are very much con­
cerned with any attempt to modify the Statute, a 
modification which requires a majority of two 
thirds of the States members of the Statute.
The permissibility of the subjective reserva­
tion of domestic jurisdiction seems thus far from es­
tablished.
(iii) The invalidity of the reservation according to 
the "applicable principles of law"
1. It is doubtful that the application of treaty
reservation rules, by analogy to declarations, 
would lead to the prohibition of reservations al­
together because of the argument advanced by Craw­
ford. For, firstly, it was made clear in 1945 that 
paragraph 3 of Article 36 of the Statute had been 
interpreted to allow reservation and therefore
there was noneed to amend it in order to clarify
1 R°
this point. J/ Secondly, the Court has in practice 
accepted reservations and it has recently expressed 
clearly the view that reservations other than those 
mentioned in Article 36 (3) are permissible.
2. As to the argument that the Court should be very 
hesitant in applying the "object and purpose" rule be­
cause it might entail different interpretations, it 
might be said that there seems to be no doubt that the 
object of compulsory jurisdiction is at least to 
ensure the adjudication of disputes upon an applica­
tion of a single party without need for a further
191expression of consent after the dispute has arisen. 
More to the point, the Court has applied this rule-
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as has been seen - in the RIGHT OF PfiSSfi&E OOER INDIAN  
TERRITORY case. 192
(iv) The "automatic declarations" as another way 
of access to the Court - approach
The difficulty with this approach is that the
declarations containing subjective reservations of domes­
tic jurisdiction are made expressly pursuant to Article 
36, paragraph 2, and not paragraph 3. This distinction is 
not theoretical but has a practical effect. As Crawford 
observes, a State making a declaration under paragraph 2 
of Article 36 intends to accept the Court's jurisdiction 
- vis-a-vis - other declarant States. The question thus 
is whether such a "result" can be achieved by considering 
a declaration containing such a reservation as made 
according to the "procedure" set forth in paragraph I of 
Article 36? To condition the effect of such declarations 
on the consent of other States parties to the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court is to put these States in a 
privileged position. For, in such a case any of these 
States can sue a reserving State at any time. Whereas the 
latter can only sue those which have accepted that State 
as a party vis-a-vis themselves. It is doubtful whether
States making the reservation in question intended to put 
themselves in such a position or they will accept such 
interpretation. If such inequality is established by 
Security Council Resolution 9 (1946), it is justified by 
the desire to open the Court , to States NOT PARTIES TO THE 
STQTUTE . There seems to be no justification for generali­
sing such inequality between States PORTIES TO THE STATU­
TE. Moreover, this approach leaves the main question 
unanswered, namely, whether this reservation can be made
1 9 \
even m  a declaration made under Article 36 (1)?
From the above considerations it appears that all
the ways conceived for preserving subjective reservations 
of domestic jurisdiction lead to their nullity.
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(III) Choice Between the Second and Third Approaches
The choice left to the Court is thus the adoption
of either the second or third approach. It is difficult
to state categorically in abstract terms what course of
action would be followed by the Court if the issue of
validity were raised before it and it did not find
another way of disposing of the case without pronouncing
on the validity of the reservation. The intention of the
reserving State has been given much weight by every
approach. Yet, the intention of the five States making
194
the reservation is unknown The circumstances in which 
the reservation might be invoked would be of great impor­
tance for determining the course of action to be fol­
lowed. An argument by the reserving State that the reser­
vation was not an essential part of its acceptance, or 
that it did not intend to deprive the Court of the power 
to control a determination made by itself, or its attempt 
to prove that the matter in dispute fell within its 
domestic jurisdiction according to international law in 
spite of its invocation of the reservation may facilitate 
the Court's task and affect its decision.
However, the MILITPRY AND PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IE S  
case has provided two new grounds in support of Approach
3. The non-invocation of the reservation by the United 
States, despite its attempt not to leave any stone un­
turned, proves that there are cases in which the reser­
ving State cannot, in good faith, assert that the dispute
1 9^1
concerned matters of domestic jurisdiction. A This 
precedent cannot, however, be generalised and there is no 
guarantee that other States will use the reservation in 
such a way. The second, and the most important, is the 
clear statement made by the Court that the declaration of 
acceptance, and the reservations and conditions embodied 
therein are governed by the principle of good faith. 
After indicating that the declaration of acceptance, as a 
unilateral act, establishes a series of bilateral engag­
ements "in which the conditions, reservations and time­
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limits clauses are taken into consideration", the Court 
said:
"In the establishment of 'this network o.f engage­
ments, which constitute the Optional Clause system the 
PRINCIPLE OF GOOD FAITH PLOYS AN IMPORT OUT ROLE; the 
Court HAS EMPHASISED THE HEED IN INTERNATIONAL RELA­
TIONS FOR RESPECT FOR GOOD FAITH and confidence in
particularly unambiguous terms, also in the NUCLEAR 
196 ‘TESTS case".
Then it quoted its statement in the latter case 
that the creation and performance of legal obligations,
regardless of their sources, are governed by the basic
197principle of good faith. Consequently, the Court
applied this principle in this case. It refused to take 
the view that declarations of indefinite duration can be 
terminated immediately. It said that "the requirements of 
good faith" justified the treatment, by analogy, of such 
declarations according to the law of treaties, which
requires a reasonable time for the termination of treat-
19R
ies of indefinite duration.
The Court can thus rely on this principle and
exercise its power provided for in Article 36 (6) of the
Statute. It might also consider it wiser not to rely on
this principle for the reasons advanced especially by the
supporters of the first approach against its application
and choose to declare the invalidity of the reservation
or ignore it and proceed to the examination of the merits
of the case, i.e. adopt the second approach. This might
be the case especially where the circumstances of the
case were in favour of such approach; if , for instance,
the reserving State took the same position taken by
Portugal in the RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER INDIAN TERRITORY 
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case. The disappearance of one of the. reasons which
had prevented the Court from pronouncing on the validity 
of the issue, namely, the abandonment of the reservation 
by client States, may encourage the Court to follow the 
second approach. Furthermore, it might be argued that the 
Court is fully justified in following this approach. It
427
is true that the basic principle which governs the Cour­
t ’s jurisdiction is the consent of States. However in 
exercising its jurisdiction in spite of the invocation of 
the reservation the Court might not be considered as 
disregarding that principle. For, States have expressed
their consent to the Court's jurisdiction and, to use
200
Schwarzenberger's words "dares the Court to annul" 
the reservation in question. The Court would thus exer­
cise its function to "imbue parties to the Statute with 
due respect for the Court's JUS CO&INS and manifest the 
Court's credibility". There is no doubt that reserv­
ing States were fully aware that the Court rejected dema­
nds contrary to the Statute. The possibility of a decis­
ion invalidating the reservation had also been expressed 
- as has been seen - by seven judges of the Court. What 
are those States thus expecting the Court to do if it 
were forced to take position on the question? They have 
been offered the opportunity to revise their acceptances, 
either to renounce the reservation in question or to 
annul their declarations completely, but they chose not 
to do so. The Court therefore seems fully justified in 
adopting the second approach.
E — Conclusions
From what has been said the following conclusions 
ought to be drawn.
In spite of the fact that the Court had been of­
fered many opportunities to pronounce on the validity of 
subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction, it 
cautiously stepped aside for reasons of a non-legal 
character.
The Court will not raise the issue of validity EH 
PR0PR10 ttfiTU, but will exercise its jurisdiction on the 
basis of the parties' declarations if the validity issue 
is not raised.
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If the invalidity of the reservations is invoked
the Court will not decide the question of validity except
when all other grounds have failed to dispose of the 
case.
The weight of arguments seems to be in favour of 
the nullity of these reservations, being contrary to both 
constitutional provisions governing the Court's functio­
ning and the object and purpose of the Optional Clause.
The Court cannot hold the invalidity of the whole
declaration without revising its previous jurisprudence.
The Court might thus ignore or declare the in­
validity of these reservations and proceed to the ex­
amination of the merits of the case. The intention of the 
reserving States and the circumstances of the case would 
be of much significance in the Court's choice of what 
approach should be followed.
These reservations proved to be not in the interest
of States making them. The application of the principle
2 ft 7of reciprocity renders them a defence that backfires.
In fact reciprocity is, perhaps, the most efficace legal
207:
sanction of the reservation. Thus, it is not dif­
ficult to understand why the reservation had ben dropped
904
from many declarations.
Although these reservations were initiated by 
developing countries, they do not find a place now except 
in the declarations of developing countries. They are 
still kept by States which have never appeared before the 
Court either as a respondent or applicant on the basis of 
Article 36 (2). They did not, therefore, pay the price of 
making them though they should have learned the lessons 
of the others.
SECTION 2 : NATIONAL SECURITY AND
NATIONAL DEFENCE RESERVATIONS
Two kinds of reservations concerning national 
security and defence were made. The first was made by the 
United Kingdom and the second by France.
A - THE BRITISH NATIONAL SECURITY RESERVATION
In 1957 the United Kingdom amended its previous 
declaration of 1955 for the purpose of excluding, INTER 
Q L IQ , disputes "relating to any question which, in the 
opinion of the Government of the United Kingdom, affects
the national security of the United Kingdom or of any of
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its dependent territories". The reservation was said
to have been inserted with the object of precluding any
21challenge to British right to conduct nuclear testing. 
The form of this reservation was subject to very strong 
criticism. Thus during its declaration before the House 
of Commons Mr P Noel Baker accused the British Government 
of a "smashing blow at British interests" and observed 
that "if the action of the Government stood long
uncorrected, it would be a grave setback to the cause of
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establishing justice in international affairs." ' A l s o  
in the literature, the reservation was considered as 
"more unfortunate", than the subjective reservation of 
domestic jurisdiction. This was because, while 
international law provides a criterion for determining 
whether a matter falls within domestic or international 
jurisdiction, there are no applicable rules of
international law which can determine whether a question
208affects the national security. ' It was observed also 
that such a reservation was not able to stand alongside 
the statute of the Court "for a double reason: not only 
is the category of "national security" potentially
comprehensive, but it is not a category capable of any
70°
kind of judicial assessment". However, since the
reservation is aimed at depriving the Court of the 
decision of the applicability of the reservation, its
validity is treated in the same manner as the subjective 
reservation of domestic jurisdiction.
Although the British Government stated in 1958 that
211it had decided to withdraw this reservation, it was
maintained in the declaration of 1958 by the proviso, 
which included disputes which "had they been the subject 
of proceedings brought before the International Court of 
Justice previous to that date, would have been excluded
n
from the Court's compulsory jurisdiction". The
71
reservation was not thus dropped completely until 1963.
B - THE FRENCH NATIONAL SECURITY AND
NATIONAL DEFENCE RESERVATION
(I) National Security
In its declaration of acceptance of 1959 France
excluded from the scope of the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction disputes "arising out of a crisis affecting
the national security or out of any measures or action
214relating thereto". Thus France, unlike the United
Kingdom, did not reserve for itself the decision to 
determine whether a matter affected its national 
security. In fact by that very declaration France, having 
learned a lesson from the NORNE&IAN LOANS Case, had 
substituted its subjective reservation of domestic 
jurisdiction included in its 1947 declaration by an 
objective one.
The object of the new reservation of national
security was well known. It was designed - as already
mentioned - to exclude disputes arising from events in 
215Algeria. However the reservation, having been couched
in general terms, was able to deprive the Court's
jurisdiction in regard to other disputes concerning other
?1£
regions. Also, the terms of the reservation appeared
to suggest that the security of a nation could be taken 
into consideration only when there was a "crisis"
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affecting it. Although the existence of such a require­
ment was capable of excluding any dispute relating to
. . 217such a crisis.
Whereas this reservation did not affect the Court's 
power under Article 36 (6) to determine its jurisdiction, 
it is submitted that the comprehensiveness and character 
of the area covered by the reservation could render the 
invoking State's assessment, the major, if not the sole 
criterion for assessing its content. The necessary 
elements of a determination whether the national security 
of a State has been affected are possessed only by that 
State. The Court's control over such a determination 
might therefore be confined to the elements produced by 
that State. Thus, in spit of its consistency with Article 
36 (6) of the Statute, this reservation has been
considered "implicitly self-judging" compared with the 
explicit self-judging reservation of domestic 
jurisdiction.
(II) National Defence
In its last declaration made in 1966 France added 
to its reservation of hostilities and national security
the proviso excluding "disputes concerning activities
219
connected with national defence". Although this
reservation was introduced without being accompanied with
any public statement, the contemporary circumstances
appeared to leave no doubt that it was inserted in
anticipation of the French nuclear tests in the Pacific
and therefore with the obvious intention of barring in
advance any legal debate concerning the French
responsibility vis-a-vis States parties to the compulsory
jurisdiction system, 220 __ =  ^ 4, - .and as a result of the revision
of the French position towards the North Atlantic treaty
Organization (N.A.T.O.). The reservation was made six
weeks before the scheduled date of the French first
nuclear explosion in the atmosphere and coincided with
the continuing debate about the re—organization of
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N.A.T.O. The scope and validity of this reservation
had been argued at length before the Court in the NUCLEAR
TESTS cases. Here the applicants (Australia and New
Zealand) based their applications on both the General Act
of 1928 and their declarations of acceptance and the
French declaration of 1966. France invoked its
reservation of national defence in very short and direct
terms. In its letter dated 16 May 1973 addressed to the
Registrar of the Court, France stated that the Court was
manifestly without jurisdiction because its nuclear tests
in the Pacific were incontestably covered by the
reservation of national defence. They formed part of a
programme of nuclear weapon development and therefore
constituted one of those activities connected with
224national defence. Accordingly France did not appoint 
an agent, and requested the Court to remove the case from 
its list.
The provision on which the applications instituting 
proceedings were based appeared to the Court "PRINA
FA C IE , to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the
226court might be based". Therefore, the reservation had
been deemed not to create an impediment to the exercise
of the Court's power to indicate interim measures of 
227protection.
In its memorial on jurisdiction and admissibility, 
the Australian Government submitted that there were only 
two ways of approaching this reservation. Either it could 
be given a broad or narrow meaning and hence it could be 
regarded as a "subjective" and "automatic" reservation,
990
or as an "objective" one. It argued that although the
reservation was apparently drafted in an objective form, 
it was subjective in substance. Thus, while France 
intended to leave the decision on the applicability of 
the reservation to the Court, its conduct in this case 
rendered the reservation subjective. For, France did not 
produce the facts which were necessary for the Court to 
decide whether the French nuclear tests were really
433
,?f?9
connected with national defence. On the other hand,
the reservation could be regarded as a subjective one in 
the sense that its content could not be determined by 
reference to an objective criterion, but must be left to 
be settled in accordance with the view of the interested 
State. ~ The terms of the reservation appeared to the 
Australian government to support this approach. For they 
could be interpreted in the widest sense as to cover not 
only events actually occurring but also a "consideration 
of contingencies and circumstances in future, conceived 
by, or known only to the particular Government con-
27:i
cerned". In such a case, the reservation was invalid
for the same reasons advanced for the invalidity of the 
subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction. 
However the reservation was severable from the 
declaration which remained effective without it. This was 
so, it was agreed, because, firstly, France dropped its 
subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction from its 
declaration of 1959 in order to remove any future doubts 
as to the effectiveness of its new declaration. 
Secondly, the reservation of national defence did not 
constitute an essential part of the French acceptance. It 
was not made "jointly and simultaneously" with the 
acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction. It "was only an 
addition made to a reservation formulated in 1959, which 
existed for seven years without the addition being
considered necessary, or what is m o r e e s s e n t i a l ', by
2^4the French Government". ~ The reservation could be 
saved from nullity only if its meaning was confined to
activities which were "intrinsically" or "essentially"
975
connected with national defence.
The Government of New Zealand was of the view that 
the reservation in question had to be interpreted as 
consistent with the statute by limiting the meaning of 
its terms in a way which enables the Court to exercise 
its control over the applicability of the reservation. 
For instance, to require the measures of national defence 
be ultimately related to the right of self-defence.
434
Having found that the claims of the applicants were
without object, the Court did not discuss the scope and
27i?
validity of the national defence reservation. 
However, by the termination of the French declaration in 
1974 as a result of the NUCLEAR TESTS cases, and because 
they were not, fortunately, copied by other States, the 
reservations of national security and national defence 
have disappeared.
435
SECTION (3) : MULTILATERAL TREATY RESERVATIONS
The exclusion of disputes arising out of multi­
lateral treaties, except within certain conditions, from 
the Court's compulsory jurisdiction is one of the reser­
vations newly created since 1946. It has been adopted in 
two versions:
A - THE VANDENBERG TYPE
The multilateral treaty reservation was introduced 
for the first time by the United States in its declara­
tion of 1946. Proviso (c) of that declaration upheld from 
the scope of the accepted jurisdiction:
"disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (I) 
all Parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also 
Parties to the case before the Court, or (2) the United States 
of America specially agrees to jurisdiction",
27.9
This proviso is known as "the Vandenberg Amendment" 
because it was adopted by the United States on a motion 
of Senator Vandenberg. However, the proviso had its 
origins in a memorandum submitted by Mr John Foster 
Dulles to a sub-committee of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee when the Senate was considering the United
240
States acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction. Noting
that disputes under multilateral treaties often give rise 
to the same issue as against more than one other nation, 
and that since Article 36 (2) of the Statute used the 
singular "any other State" in referring to the principle 
of reciprocity, whereas jurisdiction should be compulsory 
only when all the other parties to the dispute have 
previously accepted that jurisdiction, Mr Dulles thought 
that it was desirable to make perfectly clear that:
"there is no compulsory obligation to submit to the Court 
merely because one of the several parties to such a dispute is 
similar 1 y bound, the others not having boy.nd • themse 1 ves to 
become parties before the Court and|: consequently, not being
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subject to the Charter provision (Article 94) requiring mem­
bers to comply with decisions of the Court in cases in which
241
they are a party".
To meet Mr Dulles' concern, the Committee proposed the
text of the reservation as quoted above, which was adop-
24-2ted by the Senate without debate or objection.
Thus neither the TRMGUX PREPftRQTOIRES nor the 
language of the reservation could help ascertain the 
purpose for which the multilateral treaty reservation was 
inserted. On the contrary, they have deepened the views 
as regard both the meaning of the reservation and its 
effect. The difficulty of wresting any intelligible 
meaning from the language which Mr Dulles employed in
241
suggesting it, " and the failure of the Committee
which drafted the reservation, in formulating in legal
244terms whatever purpose they may have had, were observed.
It is said that the reservation was formulated without 
reference to the provisions of the Statute which amply 
met Vandenberg's concerns. Article 59 confines the bind­
ing force of the RES JUBICATfi to the parties to the case. 
Article 62 allows a State to apply for leave to intervene 
when it considers that it has an interest of a legal 
nature which may be affected by the decision in the case. 
Article 63 allows a State to intervene in a case whenever 
the construction of a multilateral treaty to which it is 
a party is in question.
On the other hand, the language of the reservation 
betrayed much confusion. The main difficulty of this type 
of reservation is the qualifying words "all Parties to 
the treaty affected by the decision". Scholars discussing 
the reservation disagreed about whether the word "af­
fected" qualified the "Parties" to the treaty, or the 
"treaty" itself and hence required the presence of all 
parties to such a treaty before the Court. They disagreed 
also about the meaning of that word. It has been argued 
that the interpretation requiring the presence of all 
parties to a treaty invoked before the Court goes beyond
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the intent"of the Senate, It renders the reservation 
unworkable. In many instances it would be impossible to 
secure the pursuance of all parties to a treaty since 
many of them would have no real interest in the dispute. 
Accordingly, the word "affected" qualified the :Parties"
to the treaty invoked and must be interpreted narrowly as
246to mean "directly affected" or "legally affected".
On the other hand, some scholars took the view that 
whether the phrase "affected by the decision" qualified 
the parties to the treaty or the treaty itself, the Court 
would lack jurisdiction under this type of reservation 
unless every party to the treaty was a party to the 
proceedings before the Court. This view is based on the 
interpretation of Article 62 of the Statute, read in 
conjunction with Article 63 as laying down that, when the 
meaning of any multilateral treaty is in issue in a case, 
every party to it has a general interest of a legal
nature, which may be affected by the decision of the
247Court.
The question of, how can the Court determine who is
"affected" until the final discussion of the case is
248reached has also been raised. Moreover, it is pointed 
out that the reservation requires all parties to the 
multilateral treaty to be parties to the case; but the 
reserving State "itself would not be" party to the case 
before the Court UNLESS THE COURT OLREOBY HOB JU R ISD IC ­
TION OVER [the reserving State] NITH RESPECT TO THE COSE.
All these questions had been raised before the 
Court in the M1LIT0RY ONB POROMILITORY O C T IV IT IE S  IN  ONB 
OGOINST NICOROGUO case. In its application instituting 
proceedings against the United States, Nicaragua relied 
on four multilateral treaties: the Charter of the United 
Nations; the Charter of the Organization of American 
States; the Montevideo Convention on rights and Duties of 
States of 26 December 1933, and the Havana Convention on 
the Rights and Duties of States in the Event of Civil
249
438
Strife of 20 February 1928. iljU Relying on its multi­
lateral treaty reservation, the United States claimed 
that since the dispute was one which arose under these 
treaties, and since it did not specially agree to juris­
diction, the Court could take cognisance of the case only 
if all treaty parties affected by the prospective judg­
ment of the Court were also parties to the case. The 
United States explained the rational of its multilateral 
treaty reservation, in the words of the Court "as being 
that it protects the United States and third States from
the inherently prejudicial effects of partial adjudica-
251tion of complex multiparty disputes". It spelled out
the reasons which inspired the reservation as follows:
" (1) the United States does not wish to leave its
legal rights and obligations under multilateral treaties 
adjudicated with respect to a multilateral dispute unless the 
rights and obligations of RLE the treaty parties invoked in 
that dispute will also be adjudicated; (2) adjudication of 
bilateral aspects of a multilateral dispute is potentially 
unjust in so far as absent States may have possession of facts 
and documents directly relevant to the rights of the parties 
to the adjudication INTER S£; and (3) adjudication of bilate­
ral aspects of a multilateral dispute will inevitably affect' 
the legal rights and practical interests of the absent State".
As to the meaning of the phrase "affected by the 
decision", the United States emphasised that the phrase 
referred only to States affected by a decision in a legal 
and practical sense by adjudication of claims submitted 
to the Court and not to those which had a legal right or 
interest in the proceedings. Consequently, three States 
(Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras) were identified as 
States likely to be "affected".
Nicaragua, on the other hand, alleged that the 
reservation should be interpreted according to the TRfiV- 
fiUX PREPRRPT01 RES to the insertion of the reservation. It 
contended that the record demonstrated that the reserva­
tion was redundant. It was not capable of divesting the 
Court of jurisdiction in any case. This was so inasmuch
439
as the reservation was intended to exclude "a multiparty
suit against the United States that included parties that
254
had not accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction".
The United States interpretation did not find support, 
Nicaragua argued, in the TRFtOFtUX PREPFtRFtTOIRES, "and it 
would be necessary to ascertain in what circumstances a
State not party to a case should be deemed affected by
255the decision which is yet to be taken by the Court".
Furthermore, Nicaragua contended that its applica­
tion was not based exclusively on multilateral treaties, 
but also on proposals of customary and general law. 
Consequently, Nicaragua submitted that the reservation in 
question, even if it was relevant or valid, had no ap­
plication to its claims based upon customary interna- 
tional law.
The Court treated the reservation in a curious way. 
Although it noted that the reservation contained some 
obscure aspects, particularly as to whether the term 
"affected" applied to the "treaty" itself, or to the 
parties to it, the Court accepted, without recorded 
analysis, the view expressed by counsel for the United 
States that the reservation was referring to "States 
affected". Accordingly, the Court released itself from 
the task of considering the second interpretation whereby 
it is the treaty which is "affected", so that all parties 
to the treaty would have to be before the Court, as an ft 
FORTIORI case. J"'J The Court observed that, in so far as 
the interests of third States identified as likely to be 
"affected" by the Court decision were concerned, the 
reservation was unnecessary. These States were able to 
initiate separate proceedings against the applicant 
State, or to avail themselves of the incidental procedu­
res of intervention under Articles 62 and 63 of the 
Statute, for the protection of their interests, in so far
as these were not already protected by Article 59 of the
^  , 258
Statute.
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Besides the interpretation of the reservation, the 
case was important for another reason. It provided the 
Court with the opportunity to apply, for the first time, 
the new procedural technique first provided for in the 
1972 Rules and maintained in the present Rules, namely, 
to "declare that the objection does not possess in the 
circumstances of the case, an exhaustivly preliminary 
character". Having found that the objection based on
the multilateral treaty reservation did not raise a 
jurisdictional problem but one concerning matters of sub­
stance relating to the merits of the case, and because of 
the elimination of the joinder of a preliminary objection 
to the merits, the Court had no choice but to avail 
itself of the new procedural technique. The objection was 
deemed to raise matters of substance relating to merits 
because, firstly, the applicant State had not based its 
claims - as already mentioned - exclusively on breaches 
of multilateral treaties but had also invoked a number of 
principles of general and customary international law, in 
addition to the bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Commerce 
and Navigation of 1956. These principles remained binding 
as such, the Court said, although they were enshrined in 
treaty law provision. “ ' Consequently, and so far as the 
jurisdictional problem was concerned, the Court found
that "the claim ... would not in any event be barred by
1the multilateral treaty reservation". Secondly, it
was thought that a decision on the scope of the reserva­
tion would have meant giving a definitive interpretation 
of the term "affected" in the reservation. This had to be 
avoided since the term "affected" was deemed to apply to 
the parties to multilateral treaties and not to those 
treaties, and because it was not possible to name with 
any precision the States affected. They . could be iden­
tified "only when the general lines of the judgment to be 
given become clear". A decision, for example, reject­
ing the application on the facts would have excluded any 
possibility of third States' claims to be affected, the 
Court observed. However, the Court emphasised that "the 
determination of the States 'affected' could not be left
441
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to the parties but must be made by the Court".
The adoption of the new procedure was criticised by 
judge Schwebel. He thought that this approach was not 
acceptable so long as the multilateral treaty reservation 
was intended to be a jurisdictional bar. Such a purpose 
could not be served if the identification of States
"affected" was to be made only at the stage of the meri-
264ts. Advocating that the Court could determine the
States which would be affected by the decision prior to
going to the merits, judge Schwebel put forward two
arguments. Firstly, he noted that Article 62 of the
Statute used the same term - namely, "affected", but it
had never been suggested by either the P. C. I. J. or the
present Court that that Article could not be applied
because the determination of whether a State has any
interests that may be affected by the judgment could only
be made after the general lines of the judgment to be
given have become clear. J" J Secondly, both parties
named in their pleadings Costa Rica, El Salvador and
Honduras as the States whose interests were likely to be
affected by the Court's judgment on the merits. The
Court's approach was, therefore, inconsistent with the
*?66
parties' pleadings.. “ The dissent further noted that
the Court's holding that the reservation was incapable of
depriving the Court of jurisdiction at the jurisdictional
stage was equivalent to saying that the reservation was
invalid. This was so, judge Schwebel believed, so long as
the invalidity was no more than an inherent incapacity to
produce legal results. He carried the argument further by
saying that the result of such holding was that the
United States declaration could not be invoked because it
was invalid as a result of the invalidity of a reserva—
967
tion inseverable from it.
Judge Ruda interpreted the phrase "Parties ... 
affected by the decision" in a different Way from that 
adopted by the majority. The history of the United States 
multilateral treaty reservation seemed to him to indicate
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that the reservation was inserted in order to protect the 
United States interests and not the interests of the 
third States. Nor did it appear to him logical that a 
State accepting the Court's jurisdiction with, a reserva­
tion protecting its own interests could act on behalf of 
third States. Each State was the sole judge of its own 
interests. It could intervene under the provision of the 
Statute if it deemed that its interests were in jeopardy. 
The case involved, in Ruda’s view, two distinct disputes. 
The first was between the United States and Nicaragua, 
and the second was between Nicaragua and the States named 
by the United States as likely to be affected. A judgment 
in the first dispute would not affect the rights, duties 
and obligations of the latter States. "Whatever conduct 
if any, that the Court would impose on the United States, 
such a decision would not debar the rights of [those
r? •' o
States] vis-a-vis Nicaragua". ^ F o r  this reason judge 
Ruda thought that the situation was different from that 
which was foreseen, in which the United States would be 
obliged to follow a course of action and the other par­
ties to the dispute would remain free. The non-existence 
of other parties to the dispute between Nicaragua and the 
United States excluded any possibility of other States 
being affected whatsoever the obligations that might have 
been imposed upon the United States. Accordingly, judge 
Ruda thought that the multilateral treaty reservation was 
not applicable in that case, and, therefore, should have 
ben rejected. *‘/0
271In the merits phase the Court found itself
obliged to continue the examination of the multilateral 
treaty reservation. It had to decide on the scope of the 
reservation and rule upon the points related to it since 
its jurisdiction was based on the consent of States as 
expressed in their declarations of acceptance. The chal­
lenge to jurisdiction on the ground of the reservation 
remained and could not have been ignored or overridden by 
the acceptance of jurisdiction on grounds other than the 
multilateral treaties invoked. Otherwise the question of
268
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whether or not the objection based on the reservation was
272
well founded would have been left unanswered. A
decision on the objection based on the reservation was 
also necessary for the determination of the effect of the 
reservation. Such a decision was thus important for both 
the jurisdiction of the Court and for the determination
of what rules of law were to be applied as two aspects
277,
which were ultimately linked.
In explaining the scope of the reservation, the 
Court did not rely on the intention of the invoking State
when it inserted the reservation. Rather, it explained
274the reservation according to its own text. Thus the 
court pointed out that there were two possibilities where 
the reservation could not bar the Court's jurisdiction, 
even if there were third States not parties to the proce­
edings and who were likely to be affected by the Court's 
decision. The first was the case in which the reserving 
State specially agreed to the Court's jurisdiction and 
the second was that in which that State waived its right 
to object to the Court's jurisdiction on the Basis of the 
reservation in question. Since the United States did not 
specially agree to jurisdiction, the Court had to con­
sider whether the right to object had been waived, at 
least indirectly by the conduct of that State. The Court 
observed that the waiver must be unequivocally express­
ed. Therefore, it refused to consider the non-appearance
of the respondent State as tantamount to a waiver of that
275
right. It declined also to regard the inconsistent
attitude of the United States, by relying on multilateral 
treaty law as the applicable law and at the same time 
invoking its multilateral treaty reservation, as a waiver
7 7  f so f the reservation.
As to the meaning of the word "Affected", the Court
did not explain what does it mean in the light of Article
27759 of the Statute. However, the Court interpreted it 
broadly. It said that the application of the reservation 
did not require that the "right" of the State be af­
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fected, but that the State itself be affected - a broader 
criterion. A decision affecting the right of a State is 
affecting the State itself and thus is excluded by the
970
reservation.  ^ In line with this broad criterion the 
Court also pointed out the fact that a decision which
would affect a third State party to the multilateral
treaty was sufficient for depriving the Court of juris­
diction regardless of whether that State would be af-
279fected unfavorably or otherwise.
The Court found that a decision on Nicaragua's 
claims that the United States had violated Article 2 (4) 
of the Charter of the United Nations and Articles 18, 20 
and 21 of the Organization of American States would
affect El Salvador. Consequently, it decided that the 
reservation was applicable so as to exclude the treaty 
law of the Charter of the United Nations and the Or­
ganization of American States from its adjudication.
However the reservation had no further impact on other
treaties or other sources of international law enumerated
90f)
in Article 38 of the Statute. ' The reservation did not 
thus preclude the Court from determining the claims of
Nicaragua based upon customary international law. In so
holding the Court seems to have considered the dispute 
between Nicaragua and the United States as "ARISING  
UNDER" customary international law.
Four judges disagreed with the Court's decision
9g j
applying the reservation.  ^ Judges Elias and Sette- 
Camera thought that the reservation was not relevant in 
the merits phase. The States named as likely to be af­
fected were free to intervene under Articles 62 and 63 of
932
the Statute, but they chose not to intervene. *" Judge
Ni was of the view that the United States had waived its
287reservation by its conflicting stand in the case.
Also judge Ruda agreed with the majority that the reser­
vation was applicable, but he disagreed on the manner in 
which it was applied. He thought that the Court failed to
904
understand the effect of the reservation. This misun—
derstanding was due, in his view, to the substitution of 
the term "reservations" for the term "exception clauses" 
attached by States to their declarations of acceptance. 
The misconception of the term "reservation", had helped 
the Court to imagine that the multilateral treaty reser­
vation would be fully applied if the case was disposed of 
on other grounds, namely, principles of customary and 
general international law. There was no justification for 
such a view, judge Ruda observed, if the dispute was one
'nqcr
"arising under" a multilateral treaty. A reservation
would be respected only if the circumstances described in 
it were met. Applied to the reservation in question, this
meant either the presence of all parties affected, or a
286special waiver of the reservation.
The way in which the multilateral treaty reserva­
tion was applied by the Court was considered by the
United States as one of the reasons which required the
withdrawal of its acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction.
Fortunately, the Vandenberg type has not been 
copied except by Pakistan. The Court's acceptance,
without any discussion, of the United States view that 
the word "affected" referred to the "Parties" to the 
multilateral treaty may complicate the Court's task 
should a case be brought before it in which Pakistan 
might argue that it inserted the word "affected" as a 
qualification to the "treaty" itself and not to the
Parties to it.
B - THE SIMPLE FORMULA OF THE 
MULTILATERAL TREATY RESERVATIONS
The United States Reservation had served as a 
paradigm for another formula adopted first by Malta in
Q  7* * 7 0  ;•") '■? o  1
1966, *■ ,y then copied by the Philippines and India.
They uphold from the scope of their acceptance disputes 
"arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all 
parties to the treaty are also parties to the case before
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the Court, or (2) [they] specially agree ( ) to jurisdic- 
tion". Having omitted the qualification "affected by 
the decision" in the Vandenberg type, this formula is 
simpler, but by the same token wider in its.effect. Its 
application requires the presence of all States parties 
to the multilateral treaty invoked before the Court
99*\
together with the original parties to the case. " An 
objection based on the reservation maintains its prelimi­
nary character and therefore must be decided at the 
jurisdictional stage. The absence of only one party to a
multilateral treaty will deprive the Court of jurisdic-
294
tion at the very start.
In view of the fact that one of the important 
functions of the Court has been the interpretation of
treaties, and that most of present day international law
29f;
i s  contained in multilateral treaties, ~ the effect of 
this formula may be bizarre. Its practical effect could 
be no jurisdiction in the absence of special agreement, 
especially in cases involving universal treaties, or even 
treaties of regional ambit such as the charter of the 
Organization of American States. The reservation is 
therefore a subjective one. It leaves the establishment 
of the Court's jurisdiction dependant on either the will 
of the invoking State or - especially in treaties between
•”  n
a small number of States - of third States. i7‘
For these reasons the reservation has been widely
999
criticised *’,u and, even the question of its validity has 
been raised. Thus, professor Briggs regrets that the 
Court dismissed the objection based on the multilateral 
treaty reservation in the MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY 
A C T IV IT IE S case. He points out that the Court should have 
dismissed it on another ground, "for example, that it is 
not the function of the Court to make sense out of a 
reservation that by its terms is nonsensical". Such a 
reservation is "destructive of international judicial
n n n
process", and inconsistent with the Statute.
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The Court, however, released itself - as already 
mentioned ",UU - from considering the validity of this 
formula in the MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IE S case.
However the question had received the attention of judges
701 m 2
Jennings '' and Ago. “  Although they recognised the
draconic effect of the multilateral treaty reservation,
they did not have any doubt that "a State may, if it so
desires, reserve against any case whatsoever invoking a
treaty to which it is a party". ",0' If an unqualified
reservation is permissible, there would be no doubt that
it may be made subject to a qualification, even a vague
7.04
one such as that included in the Vandenberg type.
Whatever the portion of international legal dis­
putes excluded by this reservation might be, the reserva­
tion does not exclude the first category of disputes 
enumerated in Article 36 (2) of the Statute as a whole,
namely, "the interpretation of a treaty". It has no 
effect on bilateral treaties. ‘"'J Nor can it affect the 
other three categories of disputes enumerated in that
Article so long as multilateral treaties are not in-
706
volved. Likewise it cannot - as the Court said - 
affect the application of the sources of international 
law other than multilateral treaty law. Moreover, the 
reservation does not seem to contradict any provision of 
the Statute. It seems therefore a valid reservation.
Nevertheless this does not alleviate the undesirab­
ility of the reservation. No doubt the reservation should 
be dropped not only because of its conspicuous effect on 
compulsory jurisdiction, but mainly because there seems 
to be no justification for its insertion. It does not
afford protection for the reserving State more than that 
afforded by the provisions of the Statute (Articles 59, 
62 and 63). Thus it does not serve any purpose but that
of being used as a means of escaping the obligation
0 R
assumed under Article 36 (2) of the Statute.
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However, this reservation provides another example 
of the reservations which had been initiated by a develo­
ped country but imitated, developed and maintained only 
by developing countries.
4
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Judge ad hoc Carry who declared that he agreed with Klaestad, and Armand- Ugon 
in the Interhandel case [ I.C.J. Reports 1959, pp.95-118; 54-59; 75-78; 32; 
91-94 respectively. Judge Read also shared the same view in case the 
reservation were to be given an automatic effect.
(94) C.H.M. Waldock, the Plea ..., supra note 74, pp. 135-136 and the Sep. Op. of 
Judge Lauterpacht in the Norwegian Loans case , I.C.J. Reports 1957, p.65. In 
fact, Judge Lauterpacht had fully agreed with Waldock except on the value of the 
declaration containing such a reservation. Whereas it appeared to Waldock of 
certain value as a basis for the operation of jurisdiction forum prorogatums, 
Lauterpacht considered it of no value of whatsoever. Ibid., pp.133-134 and 64 
respectively.
(95) I.C.J. Reports 1957, pp.55-60, and 1959, p.101.
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(96 ) I.C.J. Reports 1959, pp.57-58.
(97) Ibid., p.57. Judge Spender thought that the reference to the preparatory works 
was not permissible. "Nor, were it permissible, would be necessary or 
profitable".
(98) I.C.J. Reports 1957, pp. 57-58, and 1959, pp.103, 106-111.
(99 ) Supra note 54, pp. 416-421.
(100) Questions ..., supra note 73, pp.661-662.
(101) Supra note 54, p .189
(1 0 2 ) Supra note 3, pp.361-362.
(103 ) Supra note 78, p.203. This is, of course, in addition to those mentioned 
before such as C.H.M. Waldock, the Plea ..., supra note 74. pp.131-137 and 
Decline ..., supra note 3, pp.371-273 ; G. Berlia, supra note 83, pp.115-118 ;
B. Maus, supra note 13, p.157, and M.A. Rague, supra note 91. See also K. 
H ollow ay, Modern trends in treaty Law , 1967, pp. 687-688. Comp, the 
cautious attitude adopted by S. Rosenne, the Law ..., supra note 3, pp.398-399 
and J.P. Kelly, the International Court of Justice: Crisis and reformation", 12 
A/.y.i/./.L.(1987), pp. 342-374, at 359. Many other writes hold the view that 
the reservation is invalid but without indicating the effect of such invalidity on 
the declaration as a whole. See e.g. D.H. Ott, Public International Law in the 
Modern World, 1987, p.343 and C. Vulcan, supra note 90, p.51.
(104) While Judge Gerrero did not raise the issue (Diss. Op. in the Norwegian Loans 
case, I.C.J. Reports 1957, pp.67-70), Judges Lauterpacht (ibid., pp.55-56), 
Klaestad and Armand- Ugon(Diss. Ops. in the Interhandel case, I.C.J. Reports 
1959, pp. 76 and 93) referred to the severance of the offending words. In 
fact,Judge Lauterpacht rejected the possibility of severing the whole reservation 
, Ibid. However this seems to be a theoretical question if it is admitted that the 
objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction is unnecessary. See Section 2, 
Chapter4 above
(105) Ibid. Comp, his view in "la Qualification unilateral de la Competence 
Nationale", in Constantopoulos et al (eds.), Grundprobleme des Internationalen 
Rechts, 1957, pp.207-212.
(106) I.C.J. Reports 1959, p.76.
(107) Ibid., p.91. However, Judge armand- Ugon had come to the conclusion that the 
Court should regard the offending words in the reservation as "unwritten and 
inoperative. They should be declared without effect vis-a-vis the Court." Ibid. 
Comp. G. Schwarzenberger, supra note 3, pp.502-503.
(1 0 8 )  Ibid., pp.77-93.
(1 0 9 )  Ibid., p.91.
(110) Right of Passage over Indian Territory, Preliminary Objections, Judgement, 
I.C.J. Reports 1957, 125, at 142. See H.W. Briggs, Reservations ..., supra note 
4, p.361.
(1 1 1 ) H.W. Briggs, Ibid. For this rule see Section 1, Chapter 2 above p. 101. 
Shihata describes this argument as a "weak" one , supra note 29, p.289. Comp. 
J.B. Elkind, supra note 3, p.160. There is a difference between the "unilateral 
attempt " referred in the Nottebohm case and the subjective reservation of 
domestic jurisdiction. While the letter is "an intrinsic fact build into and forms
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an integral part of the declaration", the former was an extrinsic fact of the 
termination of the declaration after the seisin. See L. Gross, Bulgaria Invokes ..., 
supra note 61, p.748 and I.F.I. Shihata ,ibid.
(1 1 2 ) L Gross, ibid., pp.749-750.
(1 1 3 )  Ibid., p.750.
(114) See e.g. Senator Connally's statement on August 2, 1946, 92 Cong. Rec. 
No.154, p.10833. See also Senator Morse's view , ibid., p.10831.
(115) See e.g. A.J. Schweppe, "the Connally Reservation Should not be Withdrawn", 
46 A.B.A.J.(1960), pp. 732-736, at 736 ; O.J. Lissitzyn, the International 
Court of Justice, : Its Role in Maintenance of International Peace and Security, 
1951, p.65 ; L Henkin, "the Connally Reservation Revisited and, Hopefully, 
Maintained", 65 A.J./.Z..(1971), pp.374-377, at 376, and F.O. Wilcox, supra 
note 4, .712.
(1 1 6 ) See the Norwegian Loans; Interhandel, and Aerial Incident cases, p.392 
seq,above.
(117) L. Gross has attributed this approach to Professors Guggenheim and Bourqui in 
their arguments in the Norwegian Loans case as Co- Agent and Advocate of the 
Swiss Government. See Bulgaria Invokes ..., supra note 61, p.745.
(118) See e. g. the Diss. Op. of Judge Read in the Norwegian Loans case, I.C.J. 
Reports 1957, p.92, but see his interpretation of the words of the French 
reservation , p 390 above. See also R.B. Schlesinger, supra note 8, pp.689- 
690.
(119) R.B. Schlesinger, ibid.
(120) See note 110 above.
(121) Polish Postal Service in Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1925, P.C.I.J. Series B, 
No.11, p.39.
(122) Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United 
Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p.4, at 8.
(123 ) See the Diss. Op. of Judge Read, I.C.J. Reports 1957, pp.94-95 and J.B. 
Elkind, supra note 3, pp. 163-164.
(124) The Sep. Op. of Judge Lauterpacht in the Norwegian Loans case, I.C.J. Reports 
1957, pp. 52_53, and his Dis. Op. Interhandel case,ibid.,1959, p.112, see also 
J.Crawford, supra note 8, p.67.
(125) The Sep. Op. of Judge Spender's in the Norwegian Loans case, I.C.J. Reports 
1957, p.59.
(126) The Diss. Op. of Judge Lauterpacht in the Interhandel case, I.C.J. Reports 
1959, p.112.
(127) Ibid., and the Sep. Op. in the Norwegian Loans case, I.C.J. Reports 1957, 
p.53. See also Ch. de Visscher, supra note 54, pp.418-419 and S. 
Prasasvinitchai, supra note 20, pp.108-109. G Schwarzenberger, considers 
Lauterpacht's argument on the non-applicability of the good faith principle as 
one "gratuitously attested" to the protagonists of the subjective reservations, 
supra note 3, p.504.
(128) The Diss. Op. of Judge Lauterpacht , ibid., p.111.
(129) See the Norwegian, Swiss and American arguments in the Norwegian loans;
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Interhandel, and Aerial Incident cases, p.392 seq above.
(130) J.H. Crabb, supra note 3, pp.534-535.
(131) Ibid., p.537.
(132) D.W. Greig, International Law, 2nd ed.,1976, pp.655-656.
(133) See J.B. Elkind, supra note 3, p.163 and J.H. Crabb, supra note 3, p.541.
(1 3 4 ) J.B. Elkind, ibid., pp.162-163.
(135) Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p.253, 
at 473.
(136) Cited supra note 65, p.418, para.60.
(137) R.B. Schlesinger, supra note 8, pp.687-688 and J. H. Crabb, supra note 3,
p .539.
(138) See his Diss. Op. in the Norwegian Loans case, I.C.J. Reports 1957, p.94. 
Judge Read was disclined to apply the test of good faith or abus de droit because 
the Court could not examine a dispute between two sovereign States on the basis of 
these principles. However he found in the Norwegian argument of the 
international question in 134 pages an indication that Norway intended to leave 
the determination of the character of the matter to the Court. Ibid., p.93.
(139) See e.g. J.B. Elkind, supra note 3, pp.157-164 ; R.B. Schlesinger, supra note 
8, pp.685-697, and J.H. Crabb, supra note 3, pp.531-543.
(140) See D.W. Greig, supra note 132, pp.655-656 and R.B. Schlesinger, supra
note 8, p.687 note 6. See also I.F.I. Shihata, supra note 29, p.290.
(141) See I.F.I. Shihata, ibid., p.291.
(142) See J.H. Crabb, supra note 3, p.539.
(143) See pp.403-404 above.
(144) See J. Crawford, supra note 8, p.72. Professor E.J. Macdonald is of the same 
view. In spite his admission of the merits of the inconsistency argument, he 
points out that if paragraph 6 of Article 36 "can be interpreted as consistent 
with the automatic reservation, then presumably it is the duty of the Court to so 
interpret, it.", '"Automatic Reservations and the World Court", 47  
Georgt.LJ.V95Q), pp.106-123, at 117.
(145) J. Crawford, ibid.
(146) E.J. Macdonald, supra note 144, p.119. It is argued also that Art. 36(6) does 
not empower the Court to invalidate an acceptance or to interpret reservations 
included therein. See E.J. Macdonald, ibid., pp.112-115 and G. Cottereau, la 
Position de la France a T Egard de la Juridiction Internationale, thesis 
(Univesite de Paris V), 1980, pp.388-390. For counter arguments see R. 
Layton supra note 6, pp.323-354. Comp. M.J. Glennon, "Protecting the Court's 
Institutional Interests : Why not the Marbury Approach?", 81 A.J.I.L.(1987), 
pp.121-129, at 124-125.
(147) J. Crawford, supra note 8, p.75(emphasis added).
(148) E.J. Macdonald, supra note 144, p .122.
(149) See J. Crawford, supra note 8, pp.81, 82, 85 and D.W. Greig, supra note 132, 
pp. 652-654. Comp. S. Rosenne, the Law ..., supra note 3, pp. 397-399. For 
this argument see also M.A. Rague, supra note 91, pp.341-342.
(150) Ibid., pp.75-85.
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(1 5 1 )  Ibid., p.79.
(152) Ibid., p.81. Thus he adopts Kelsen's view that " if almost any reservation has 
the effect of restricting the purposes and objects of Article 36, it is not easy to 
determine at what point the cumulative effect of such reservation, or the quality 
of a particular reservation, may prove incompatible with such purposes and 
objects.", Principles of International Law , supra note 87, pp.538-539 note 
114.
(1 5 3 ) J. Crawford, ibid., pp.81-82.
(1 5 4 )  Ibid., p.82.
(1 5 5 )  Ibid., p.83.
(1 5 6 )  Ibid.
(157) See the text in I.C.J.Y.B., 1986-87, p.47.
(158) J. Crawford, supra note 8, p.85.
(159) See p.394 seq. above.
(160) See D.W. Greig, supra note 132, p.653 ; I.F.I. Shihata, supra note 29, pp. 
295-296, and E.J. Macdonald, supra note 144, p.110.
(161) I.C.J. Reports 1959, p.119. In agreement with Lauterpacht , H.W. Briggs, the 
U. S. and the I.C.J. ..., supra note 3, p.559 ; L. Gross, Bulgaria Invokes ..., supra 
note 61, p.745, and J. Crawford, supra note 8, p.66 note 8.
(163) See p. 395 above.
(164) I.C.J. Reports 1957, p.23 (emphasis added). See H.W. Briggs, Reservations 
..., supra note 4, p.343. Comp. L. Gross, Bulgaria Invokes ..., supra note 61, 
.745.
(165) Cited supra note 65, p.419, para. 61 (emphasis added).
(166) Ibid., p.421, para. 65 (emphasis added).
(167) This is because, unlike the case in the U. S. A., the acceptance of the Court's 
jurisdiction in the other States making the reservation seems to be a 
governmental act which does not require the intervention of the legislative 
branch. See B. Maus, supra note 13, p.151.
(168) Sep. Op. in the Norwegian Loans case, I.C.J. Reports 1957, p.57.
(169) See I.C.J. Pleading, case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory 
(Portugal v. India), vol.IV, p.145. See also Section 2, Chapter 2 below.
(170) Diss. Op. of Judge Lauterpacht in the Interhandel case, I.C.J. Reports 1959, 
pp.98, 102, 117, 118.
(1 7 1 )  ibid., pp.104-105.
(172) Sep. Op. in the Norwegian Loans case, I.C.J. Reports 1957, p.63.
(173) Dis. Op. in the Interhandel case, I.C.J. Reports 1959, pp.104-105.
(1 7 4 )  Ibid.
(1 7 5 )  Ibid., p.98.
(176) Sep. Op., ibid., p.54 (emphasis added). See G Schwarzenberger, supra note 3, 
pp.503-504 ; Ch. de Visscher, supra note 54, p.420 ; F. Gerber, supra note 3, 
p.180 ; H.W. Briggs, the U. S. and the I.C.J. ..., supra note 3, .558, and R. Layton, 
supra note 6, p.335.
(177) This of course in addition to the arguments of invalidity advanced by the 
proponents of the first and the second approaches whose weight has been 
recognized even by the supporters of this approach. See e.g. D.W. Greig, supra
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note 132, pp.51, 54 and J. Crawford, supra note 8, p.64. Crawford points out 
that the object of his Article is "to examine what seems almost the settled view- 
at least among commentators- of the legal effect of the "automatic reservation"., 
ibid.
(178) See Section 1, Chapter 5 supra, at 339 seq.
(179) Ibid., p.34. See also C.H.M. Waldock, Decline ..., supra note 74, p.273 and 
R.P. Anand, Compulsory ..., supra note 78, p.215.
(180) See Section 2, Chapter 4 above pp.278-279.
(181) I.C.J. Pleadings, Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Romania, pp.277-278(emphasis added).
(1 8 2 ) Ibid., p.278.
(183) See Section 2, Chapter 2 Supra.
(184) See Section 2 Below.
(185) See e.g. the Resolution adopted by the Institut de Droit International in 1959, 
48(H) Annuaire I.D.I.(1959), pp.358-361 and the American Bar Association, 
"Association's Assembly Deplores Connally Amendment", 32 A.B.A.J.(19AS), 
p.873, at 874.
(186) The executive branch of the U.S.A. had regularly expressed its doubts over the 
consistency of this reservation with the Statute of the Court. See S. Rosenne, the 
Law..., supra note 3, p.391 note 1 and the references cited therein. It Is to be 
noted that the Senate Resolution 94, which intended to repeal the Connally 
Amendment, was introduced by Senator Herbert Humphrey with the support of 
the American Bar Association, the White House and the Departments of State and 
Justice. For this resolution see, Compulsory Jurisdiction, International Court of 
Justice, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States 
Senate, 86 Congress, 2nd. Session on S. Res. 94, a resolution to Amend S. Res. 
196, 1960.
(187) The reservation was abandoned by France (337 U.N.T.S., p.375) ; lndia(260 
ibid., p.459), and Pakistan(374 ibid., p .127). The United Kingdom also 
abandoned one reservation belonging to the same category, see Section2 below. 
However it is to be observed that the reservation was not abandoned for this 
reason only but basically, perhaps, because of the effect of reciprocity.
(1 8 8 ) See I.C.J.Y.B., 1986-87, p.41. It may be worth noting that in a survey 
conducted by Judge Lauterpacht in 1957 of more than 200 treaties he found no 
more than six treaties containing the reservation in question most of which were 
concluded by States making this reservation in their declarations of acceptance of 
the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. See his Sep. Op. in the Norwegian Loans 
case, I.C.J. Reports 1957, pp.62-63.
(189) See Section 3, Chapter 1 above, p.??
(1 9 0 ) See Military and Paramilitary Activities case, cited supra note 65, p.418, 
para.59.
(191) L. Preuss, Questions ..., supra note 73, p.661.
(192) See Section 2, Chapter 2 above, p??
(193) See C.H.M. Waldock, the Plea ..., supra note 74, p.132 and I.F.I. Shihata supra 
note 29, pp.47-52. Comp. S. Rosenne, the Law ..., supra note 3, pp.438-441
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and B. Maus, supra note 13, p.156.
(194) It is difficult to prove that the Philippines, for example, terminated its 
declaration of 1947 in order to introduce this reservation because the new 
declaration (1972) includes 4 other reservations of no less importance 
especially the multilateral treaty reservation and that concerning the law of the 
sea. See I.C.J.Y.B. , 1986-87, p.84.
(195) See D.E. Ende, "Reaccepting the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice. A Proposal for New United States Declaration ", 
61 Wash.L.R.(1986), pp. 1145-1165, at 1166. This precedent seems to 
contradict Crawford's argument that the term "domestic jurisdiction " is not used 
as a term of art in the reservation but as an escape clause, supra note 8, p.70. It 
might be argued also that the very existence of other reservations alongside with 
the subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction indicates that it is not 
intended to play the role of an absolute escape clause as that played by the 
reservations of vital interests and honour.
(196) Military and Paramilitary Activities case, cited supra note 65, p.418, 
para.60 (emphasis added).
(197) See p.35 above.
(198) I.C.J. Reports 1984, p.420, para.63.
(199) See p.45 below.
(2 0 0 ) Supra note 3, p.499
(2 0 1 )  Ibid.
(202) For the effect of reciprocity on the reserving State see A.E. Howard, supra note 
7, p.12 ; A. Larson, the facts, the Law ..., supra note 6. pp.79-85 ; A D 'Amato, 
"Modifying U.S. acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court", 
7 9  A.J.I.L.{ 1985 ), p p .3 85 -4 0 5 , at 3 9 2 -3 9 4 , and F .L. G rieves,
Supranationalism and International Adjudication, 1969, pp.98-100.
(203) See the Diss. Op. of Judge Lauterpacht in the Interhandel case, I.C.J. Reports 
1959, p.116. Professor Briggs observes that the Court might have found it 
more appropriate to leave it for the reserving State "to worry whether the
Connally reservation is not more dangerous to [the reserving State] interests
than protective thereof", Interhandel ..., supra note 54, p.559.
(204) See J.B. Elkind, supra note 3, p.147 and M. Dubisson, supra note 54, p.186.
(205) 265 U.N.T.S., p.221.
(206) See R.P. Anand, Compulsory ..., supra note 78, p.219 ; J.G. Merrills, the 
Optional Clause Today", 50 B .K B ./.L (1 9 7 9 ), pp. 87-116, at 94 ; S. 
Prasasvinitchai, supra note 20, p.106, and B. Maus, supra note13, p.162 note 
135.
(207) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol.577 (Nov. 8, 1957), 
cols.492, 494. It was also observed that the reservation constituted of a 
retrograde step and direct blow to the Court's prestige and influence, ibid., 
p.514.
(208) H.W. Briggs, Reservations ..., supra note 4, pp.302-303.
(209) R.Y. Jennings, supra note 3, p.362. See also I.F.I. Shihata, supra note 29,
p .273.
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(210) See ibid ; G Schwarzenberger, supra note 3, p.500 ; B. Maus, supra note 13, 
p.162 ; Judge Lauterpacht's Sep. Op. in the Norwegian Loans case, I.C.J. Reports 
1957, p.63 ; S. Rosenne, the Law ..., supra note 3, pp.395-396, and F. Hoging, 
"the Diminishing role of the World Court", 34 I.A. (1958), pp.184-194,at 
192.
(211) See the statement made in the House of Commons on Nov. 26, 1958, 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol.596 (Nov. 26, 1958), Written 
Answers, Col.38.
(212) 316 U.N.T.S., p.59. For discussion on the problems of interpretation of this 
proviso see E. Lauterpacht, "the Contemporary Practice of the United Kingdom in 
the Field of International Law _  Survey and Comment, VII (Settlement of 
Disputes. Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. United Kingdom 
Declaration of November 26, 1958),8 I.C.L.Q. (1959), pp.197-201, at 199- 
201. See also M.O. Hudson, "the thirty-Seventh Year of the World Court", 53 
A.J./.L .(1959), pp.319_323.
(213) For the text of the 1963 declaration see 482 U.N.T.S., p.187.
(2 1 4 ) 337 ibid., p.65.
(215) See Section 2, Chapter 5 above p.349. See also C.H. Vignes, "Observations sur 
la Nouvelle Declaration Frangaise d' Acceptation de la Juridiction Obligatoire de 
la Cour Internationale de Justice", 31 R.G.D.I.P.{1960), pp.52-74, at 69 and 
J. Feydy, "la Nouvelle Declaration Frangaise d' Acceptation de la Juridiction 
Obligatoire de la Cour Internationale de Justice", 12 A.F.D.L{1966), pp. 155- 
161, at 159.
(216) C.H. Vignes, ibid.
(217) Ibid., pp.69-70.
(218) See J.B. Elkind, supra note 3, p.123 ; C.H. Vignes, supra note 215, p.70, and 
J. Feydy, supra note 215, p.159.
(219) 565 U.N.T.S., p.21.
(220) See Ch. Rousseau, "Cronique des Faits Internationaux [Experieces Nuclaires 
dans le Pacifique (2 Juiller-5 Octobre 1966)]", 37 R .G .D .I.P .{ 1 9 6 6 ),  
pp.1032-1040 , at 1040 ; A. Cocatre-Zilgien, "Justice Internationale  
Facultative et Justice Internationale Obligatoire", 80 R.S. (1976), pp. 689- 
737, at 716, and the Diss. Op. of Judge DE Castro in the Nuclear Tests case 
(Australia v. France ), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p.253, at 376.
(221) See J Feydy, supra note 215, p.159. See also I.C.J. Pleadings, Nuclear Tests 
(New Zealand v. France), vol. 2, pp. 196, 284 seq.
(222) I.C.J. Pleadings, ibid., p.288 and Ch. Rousseau, supra note 220, p.1040.
(223) Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), cited supra note 220, and (New Zealand 
v. France), Judgement, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p.457.
(224) Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Interim Protection, Order of 22 June 
1973, I.C.J. Reports 1973, p.99,at 102, and (New Zealand v. France), ibid., 
p.135, at 137.
(2 2 5 )  Ibid.
(226) Ibid., p.102.
(227) Judges Foster and Petren disagreed with this reasoning. They thought that the 
Court should have considered at greater length the problem of jurisdiction, ibid.,
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pp.112 and 124 respectively. Judge Foster pointed out that he was very much 
afraid that the Court's Order "may have in minds of many the impression that the 
International Court of Justice henceforth considered the French reservation 
concerning its national defence, hence its security, the vital interests of the 
nation to be null and void.
(228) I.C.J. Pleadings(Australia v. France ) Vol.1,pp.306-316. See also the 
arguments of Mr. E. Lauterpacht as a Counsel for the Government of Australia, 
ibid., pp.441-470.
(229) Ibid., pp.311 -316, 443.
(2 3 0 )  Ibid., pp.306-307.
(2 3 1 ) Ibid., p.308.
(2 3 2 ) Ibid., pp.308-311, 445-450.
(2 3 3 ) Ibid., p .451.
(2 3 4 ) Ibid., p.311.
(235) Ibid., p.314. The arguments advanced by the Australian Government appeared 
to Judge De Castro sofisticated . In his view the reason behind the insertion of the 
French reservation was clear and conclusive. It was made to cover nuclear tests. 
I.C.J. Reports, 1974, p.376. G. de Lachariere describes these arguments as odd 
and astonishing , "Commentaires sur la Position de la France a I' Egard de la 
Liceite Juridique de ses Experiences Nucleaires", 19 A .F .D .I.( 1 97 3 ),pp.235- 
251, at 237-238.
(236) I.C.J. Pleadings , ibid., vol.II, pp.197-198.
(237) I.C.J. Reports 1974, pp.272, 478. For these cases see B. Bollecker- Stern, 
"I' Affaire des Essais Nucleaires Frangais devant la Cour Internationale de 
Justice", 20 A .F .D .I.(1974), pp.299-333 ; G. de Lachariere, supra note 235, 
and J. Dhommaux, "Quand la France Contest les Decisions de la Cour de la Haye", 
fl.P .P .(1975 ), pp.35-42.
(238) 1 U.N.T.S., p.9.
(239) See e.g. F.O. Wilcox, supra note 4, pp. 714-716 and L. Preuss, the I.C.J., the 
Senate ..., supra note 4, p.720.
(2 4 0 ) For the history of this proviso see esp. F. O. Wilcox, ibid.; H.W. Briggs, 
Reservations ..., supra note 4, pp.306-308 and the U. S. and the I.C.J. ..., supra 
note 3, pp.314-316 ; B. Maus, supra note 13, pp.164-165, and the Sep. Op. of 
Judge Ruda in Military and Paramilitaty Activities case (Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility ), cited supra note 65, pp.455-456.
(241) "Memorandum of John Foster Dulles Concerning Acceptance of the United 
States of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, July 
10, 1946, in Hearings ..., supra note 4, p.44.
(242) Cong. Rec. supra note 4, pp. 10618, 10621 (Aug. 1, 1946).
(243) Hudson characterized Dulles' objection as "a jumble of ideas.", World Court ..., 
supra note 87, p.836.
(244) See L. Preuss, the I.C.J., the Senate ..., supra note 4, p.720.
(245) See ibid.; A. D' Amato, "the United States Should Accept, by a new Declaration, 
the General Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court ", 80 A .J .I.L .(1986), 
pp. 331-336, at 333 ; J.G. Merrills, the Optional .... supra note 206, p .107 ; C.
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Vulcan, supra note 90, p.52, and S. Prasasvinitchai, supra note 20, pp. 146- 
147.
Q. Wright argues that the reservation was intended to clarify Article 62 and 63 of 
the Statute. It was made with the view to guarding against an arbitrary exercise 
by the Court of its discretion under these Articles to refuse intervention by a 
third State which considers itself to have an interest of a legal nature affected by 
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GENERAL CONCLUS I OISTS 
AND SUGGESTIONS
Having examined individually the different problems 
concerning reservations and conditions inserted in the 
declarations of acceptance of the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction it might be now possible to draw the follow­
ing general conclusions: there has been a general decline 
in the Optional Clause; the effect of reservations proved 
to be limited, and there seem to be some grounds for 
optimism that the existing situation can be improved.
A - DECLINE OF THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION SYSTEM
It has been shown that the Optional Clause of the 
P. C. I. J. had constituted a major breakthrough in the 
development of compulsory adjudication. The widespread 
acceptance of the Clause and the abandonment of the vague 
and comprehensive reservations of vital interests, hono­
ur, independence, etc. for new reservations limited in 
number and scope had increased the hopes and expectations 
that the Optional Clause went a long way towards the 
achievement of the goal anticipated in 1920 that it would 
constitute a first step towards general compulsory juris­
diction. These hopes and expectations were further in­
creased, especially in 1934 when adherence to the Option­
al Clause reached its high-water mark. In October that 
year, 42 out of 63 States 1 were bound by the Optional 
Clause. However since then there has been a general 
decline in the Optional Clause both ' RQT10NE- PERSQNQE and 
RQTIONE MQTER1AE .
I — Decline Ratione Personae
Table 4 on page 468 graphically illustrates the 
decline of the membership to the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the Court both quantitatively and qualitatively. By 
adding the eleven declarations which have expired, been 
withdrawn or been terminated without being subsequently 
replaced since 1951, the total number of States which
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have been bound by Article 36 (2) of the Statute of the
I. C. J. will be 57. Taking into account the Huge in­
crease of the "clientele" of the Court, this number 
compares very unfavourably with the 47 acceptances which 
had been at one time or another effective under the 
Statute of the P. C. I. J. in addition to 9 other signa-
4
tures of the Optional Clause which had not been ratified.
TABLE 4
YEAR State bound Members of the L of N Permanent members Percentage
under Article or U N and other parties of the Sec. Council
36 (2) entitled to appear
(June) 1934 42 63 3 66
1938 39 62 (2) 3 63
(July) 1953 36 62 4 58
1963 40 115 4 34
1973 46 135 3 34
1987 46 162 1 29
These figures do not, however, reflect the actual 
decline. The most significant deterioration has been in 
the scope of the objection assumed, its duration and 
variation.
II - Decline Ratione Materiae
Whereas the declaration made under the Optional 
Clause of the P. C. I. J. reflected a considerable con­
fidence in the court, some of the declarations made under 
the present Statute reflect a total lack of confidence in 
the I. C. J. New types of reservations capable of turning 
the compulsory jurisdiction system into one in which 
States decide on a case-by-case basis whether to subject 
themselves to the Court's jurisdiction have appeared. 
Thus thevsubjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
was introduced just one year after the establishment of 
the I. C. J. Other major reservations have been added 
since 1955, and the scope of some of the previous reser­
vations has been widened considerably, "fhus another 
reservation appeared excluding disputes Concerning na-
C
469
tional security or national defence both as determined by 
the declarant State or without qualification. Another 
reservation capable of reviving old treaties of arbitra­
tion containing the famous reservations of vital inter­
ests, honour, etc. has also been made. It is the reserva­
tion excluding disputes excluded from the judicial set­
tlement or arbitration by treaty, convention or any other 
instrument to which the declarant State is a party.
New subject-matter reservations such as those 
concerning the exclusion of disputes relating to some 
parts of the sea or pollution, have also appeared. Furth­
ermore, the scope of some earlier post-war reservations 
has been extended dramatically. Thus, for example another 
variant of the multilateral treaty reservation has been 
initiated. According to this formula, the Court cannot 
take cognisance of a case in which a multilateral treaty 
is invoked, unless all the parties to such treaty are 
also parties to the case before the Court, or the declar­
ant State specially agrees to jurisdiction.
An undesirable development concerning the reserva­
tions RATIONE TEMPORIS has also occurred. By using the 
date of the declaration as the exclusion date the period 
subject to the Court's jurisdiction has been reduced 
dramatically in some declarations. Thus, El Salvador's 
declaration of 1978, for example, reduced that period by 
57 years. The hope that the effect of RATIONE TEMPORIS 
reservations would diminish with time has not therefore 
been completely achieved.
The trend of creating new reservations has also 
affected the reservation RATIONE- PERSONAE. Thus, a new 
reservation was created as a solution for the "single 
shot" problem. Accordingly a large number of States 
parties to the Court's compulsory jurisdiction exclude 
disputes with new adhering States during the first 12 
months of their adherence. Although this reservation can 
be defended as a means of preventing the unscrupulous use
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of the Court, it is not a perfect solution. On the con­
trary, being made along with the reservation of the right 
to terminate or vary the acceptance at any time, this 
reservation can be used as an escape clause for achieving 
the same result against which it was originally designed. 
This could be so if the State making such a reservation 
sues the other party just after the expiry of the 12 
months period and then terminates its acceptance or 
modifies it in order to prevent being sued by the new 
adherent.
However, the most dramatic development has af­
fected time limits and variation conditions. A comparison 
between the declarations made under the Statutes of the 
two Courts (the P. C. I. J. and the I. C. J.) shows this 
drastic change. Whereas 33 out of the 56 (i.e. 58%) 
declarationsor instruments of ratification made under the 
P. C. I. J. were for a fixed period, only 10 out of the
57 (i.e. 17%) declaration£made under the Statute of the
present Court had been at one time or another made in 
this form. Seven declaration^ which were originally made 
for a fixed period, and thereafter were terminable by a 
simple notification to the Secretary-General, are now 
terminable at any time. By adding this number to the 15 
declarations which have been made terminable immediately 
by a simple notice to the Secretary-General, the total 
number of declarations in this form will be 22 out of the
46 declarations currently in force (i.e. almost 50 %).
There has been a remarkable shift, not only from a long 
to a short period, but also from a fixed period to escape 
devices. The pretence by which States purport to accept 
the compulsory jurisdiction while running very little 
risk has created a glaring inequality between the parties 
to the compulsory jurisdiction system and consists of a 
throwback to the era before the League of Nations, in 
which elastic reservations were inserted. In fact, this 
new form of termination serves the same purposes as the 
reservations of vital interests and honour with the 
difference that, unlike these reservations, the rule in
471
the NOTTEBOHN case is applicable to termination by a 
simple notice.
The second aspect of this regrettable development 
is the creation of the condition conferring on the dec­
larant State the right to vary its declaration by adding 
or withdrawing reservations or conditions inserted there­
in. If the number of States making this condition is 
added to those making their declarations terminable 
immediately, the result will be that 25 out of 46 (54%) 
contain these escape clauses. ° This number would be 26 
if all declarations containing the most sweeping reserva­
tions are discounted. Table 5 below illustrates how these 
reservations and conditions are made.
TABLE 5
States Immediate Immediate Multilateral Dom. Juris. Disputes excluded
Tersination Variation Treaty res. (Subjective) from compulsory
arbitration
Australia
Austria
Barbados
Belgium
Botswana
Canada
Democ Kampuchea
El Salvador
Gambia
Honduras
India
Japan
Kenya
Liberia
Malawi
Malta
Mauritius
Mexico
Pakistan
Philippines
Portugal
Senegal
Somalia
Sudan
Swaziland
United Kingdom
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The number of reservations and conditions in a 
single declaration may also illustrate the decline. This 
number has reached its high-water mark only since the end 
of the fifties. Thus, the British declaration of 1958 
contained 12 reservations and conditions, without count­
ing that of reciprocity. The same number figures now in 
the Indian declaration: one of those reservations con­
tains 5 paragraphs excluding a wide area of disputes.
Table 6 below which contains the number of the most 
extravagant reservations and conditions only, illustrates 
the general decline of compulsory jurisdiction.
TABLE 6
Year Domestic National Multilateral Immediate Immediate Compulsary 
Jurisdiction Security Treaty Termination Variation Arbitration 
(Subjective) or Defence or Judicial
Settlement
1953 05 — 01 10 - - —
1963 04 02 02 16 03 01
1973 05 01 05 19 10 03
1987 05 — 04 21 14 03
III — Reasons for the Decline
(i) General reasons
In their discussions in the Sixth Committee of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations concerning the 
"review of the role of the International Court of Jus­
tice" during the period from 1970 to 1974, ~ government 
representatives voiced the general reasons for their
reluctance to have their disputes settled judicially and 
hence not to accept the compulsory jurisdiction uncondi­
tionally. ‘ They had confirmed the reasons usually ar­
ticulated in the literature of international law. The 
debates indicate that the princip^^ cause behind the
different reasons for States reluctance is the present
state of the international community being a heterogene-
0
ous one. Thus while the relatively homogeneous nature
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of the international community of the League of Nations
had facilitated recourse to compulsory jurisdiction the
nearly universal society representing a mosaic of forms
of civilization, legal systems and levels of economic
development has caused States' unwillingness to use the
Court, or to reduce the scope of their declarations
9
accepting its jurisdiction. The radical change in the 
structure of the post war international community caused 
by the spread of socialism in Eastern Europe and the 
emergence of a large number of new States has widened the 
divergence of conceptions concerning both the Court 
itself and the applicable law.
a) Attitude of Socialist Countries
In their views, expressed before the Sixth Commit­
tee, the Socialist Countries maintained their well-known, 
complex and unyielding opposition to compulsory jurisdic­
tion. They opposed any attempt to enhance the role of the 
Court or even the inclusion of the item on the agenda of 
the General Assembly. U This attitude is due mainly to 
distrust and disbelief in the possibility of judicial 
impartiality in cases affecting Communist States in a 
world with a non-communist majority. The delegates of 
these countries had thus echoed Li|^inov's axiom that 
"only an angel could be unbiased in judging Russian 
affairs". 11 This attitude was well-summarised by ELVAREZ 
TABIO, the Cuban delegate in his statement that the idea 
of judicial organs capable of rendering equitable judg- 
ments is "little more than utopian".
The second reason advanced by the Socialist Countr­
ies for their refusal to submit to the Court compulsory 
jurisdiction, was the law to be applied by the Court. 
They regard traditional international law as an instru­
ment designed to serve the interests of capitalist im­
perialist powers. They consider themselves bound by such 
rules as they have recognised explicitly or implicitly. 
They refuse therefore a settlement according to the
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"doctrines of the bourgeois, imperialist legal systems."
As a third reason. Socialist Countries pointed out
that compulsory jurisdiction runs against the fundamental
14principle of a State's sovereignty.
However, in spite of their hostile attitude regard­
ing the Court, they could not deny its contribution to
the codification and progressive development of interna-
. . . .  15tional law.
b) Attitude of developing Countries
Developing Countries, unlike Socialist Countries, 
do not share the same view. However, there is no doubt 
that developing countries in general, and new States in 
particular have no comparable background or history or 
ideology directly related to the question of compulsory 
jurisdiction as such. In fact, some of the reasons ad­
vance by these States had been shared even by the Western 
States. However, although developing countries had gener­
ally supported the idea of enhancing the Court's role, 
they had articulated some reasons behind their cautious 
attitude VIS-fl-VIS the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. 
Two reasons had been shared by a large number of States 
in this group: the law to be applied by the Court, and 
its composition.
As regards the former, it was pointed out that the 
present international law is too conservative. This point
of view was taken even by certain Western Countries such
16as Finland, Australia and Spain. Many States, par­
ticularly the newly-independent ones, questioned some 
aspects of most of the current sources of international 
law as a body in whose making they played no role, and
whose output is still largely determined by Western-
\
dominated conceptions. Thus, it was said for example, 
that the customary rules which are the fruit of practices 
of a few States imposed in the past through a policy of
force, can no longer be claimed to be LEX LQTfi, and 
that some treaties have been imposed on the weak and the
rule PQCTF) SUNT SERVQNJ.10 has been invoked to sanctify
18them. On the other hand, it was suggested that Article
38 of the Statute should be amended so as to insert 
binding decisions issued by international organizations 
as a source of international law, and non-binding resolu­
tions and declarations in paragraph I (d) of the said 
Article as subsidiary means for the determination of law.
The above views should not be interpreted as a
rejection of [the] present international law as a whole,
but as an indication of dissatisfaction with some of the
rules. Thus, some satisfaction with the progress achieved
20
through codification was expressed. " These views refl­
ect therefore the fear of developing countries that the 
rules which they question could be applied by the Court, 
and their emphasis that the Court should continue to 
assist the evolution of the work undertaken by the United 
Nations, with regard to the codification and progressive 
development of international law.
The apprehension concerning the applicable law is 
reflected by the declaration of Guatemala of 1947 which 
excepted from the Court's compulsory jurisdiction the 
dispute with the United Kingdom concerning the restora­
tion of the territory of Belize. Yet Guatemala agreed to 
have the dispute decided EX 0 EBUO ET BONO. Canada also 
attributed the insertion of the reservations concerning 
living resources and pollution into the declaration of 
1970 to the apprehension that the Court might affect the 
rapid development of the law in those areas. In other 
words, Canada intended not to give the Court an oppor­
tunity to decide on its declaration concerning these 
areas and hence to stop Canada's engagement on making a 
new law through customary law. The Truman Proclamation 
contribution to the development of the rules concerning 
the continental shelf and its fate, had it been tested by 
the Court shortly after its making, might have been
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present in the minds of those who advised the insertion 
of these reservations.
Dissatisfaction with the composition of the Court 
was the second major reason invoked by developing countr­
ies. It was pointed out that the Court's composition did 
not reflect the changes which had occurred in the inter­
national community. This dissatisfaction found grounds in 
the fact that only one judge from Africa and one from 
Asia had been members of the P. C. I. J. during the whole 
life of that Court and that until 1963, only one judge
from Africa and two from Asia had been elected to the 
21present Court. Consequently, it has been stressed that
r>r7
all legal systems must be adequately represented. 
Furthermore, the view has been expressed that a criterion 
should be found whereby seats would be allocated not only 
according to the principle legal or cultural legal sys­
tems, but also on geographical or regional bases.
It is true that these two factors have influenced 
the attitude of developing countries O IS -A -O IS compulsory 
adjudication, but they proved not to be the real obstac­
le. Thus, the improvement of the composition of the Court 
(there are six judges from developing countries, includ­
ing the President and Vice-President, 3 of whom are from 
Africa) had a little effect on their attitude. Also their 
reluctance is till reflected even by codified conventions 
which contain rules they themselves have helped to shape.
However, as a corollary of the above reasons, the 
experience of newly independent States before the seven­
ties has increased their reluctance, the RIGHT OF PASSAGE 
OVER INDIAN TERRITORY, the NORTHERN CAMEROON cases; and, 
particularly the SOUTH NEST AFRICA case of 1966 have 
shaken their confidence in the Court. The first was 
brought before the Court as a result of India’s attempt 
to remove an old burden which it did not accept but
ni cr
inherited from the past colonial age. In the second
and the third, which concerned the status of the former
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British colony and a territory under international man­
date respectively, the Court avoided adjudicating the 
merits.  ^ Thus, new States did not hesitate to mention 
the last case as an evidence of the necessity of progres­
sive development of international law and attribution of
27new seats to judges from these States.
As a fourth reason many States attribute their 
reluctance to resort to the Court to the excessive at-
90
tachment to the principles of sovereignty. " This ap­
pears to be a natural attitude on the part of States that 
had acquired their independencies recently. It is not 
surprising, therefore, to find the objective reservation 
of domestic jurisdiction limited to declarations made by 
developing countries - with the exception of Canada - in 
spite of the fact that it has no more than the psycholog­
ical effect of reassuring these States that their sovere­
ignty would thereby be preserved.
Non-familiarity with compulsory adjudication seems 
to be one of the foremost reasons behind new States' 
reluctance to accept compulsory jurisdiction. This is 
illustrated by the fact that Latin American States, which 
had played a leading role in the development of compul­
sory arbitration, especially during the period between 
the end of the last century and the advent of the P. C. 
I. J., accept compulsory jurisdiction generally without 
reservations. While the majority of new States are reluc­
tant to accept it, or they accept it with a large number 
of reservations.
c) The attitude of developed Countries
The reluctance of developed countries might also be 
attributed to the uncertainty of international law and 
the composition of the Court. As the new States fear that 
they might be subjected to traditional international law, 
developed countries are beginning to hesitate to resort 
to judicial settlement through the fear of being sub-
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29jected to over-progressive rules. Thus, any decision
that increases the confidence of new States will decrease 
that of developed countries and VICE VERSA. Codification 
seems to be the effective remedy, if not the only one, 
for this dilemma.
The increase of the number of judges from new 
States, though basically at the expense of Latin America, 
had affected Western attitudes V IS -A -V IS  the Court. Thus, 
as a result of the Court's judgment in the NORTH SEA 
CONTINENTAL SHELF case in 1969, concerns were expressed, 
SOTTO VOCE , in several Western foreign ministries about 
"strangers" who had expressed their opinions. "U The 
existence of "so many judges" from States which did not 
accept the Court's jurisdiction was one of the reasons 
advanced by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs before 
the French National Assembly as a justification for 
withdrawing the French declaration accepting the Court's 
jurisdiction. The same reason figures among the jus­
tifications advanced by the United States for withdrawing 
from the MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IE S  IN  AND 
AGAINST NICARAGUA case. Furthermore, the United States 
strongly questioned the impartiality of certain judges of 
the Court. In fact its statement concerning those judges 
is tantamount to considering them as spies for their own 
countries. The statement reads:
" ... much of the evidence that would establish Nicaragu­
a’s aggression against its neighbours is of a highly sensitive 
intelligence character. We will not risk Li, S, national secur­
ity by presenting such sensitive material in public or before 
a Cou.rt_r^ that includes two judges from the Warsaw Pact na­
tions,"
However, doubts of the impartiality of the Court as 
a cause for reluctance does not seem very convincing. In 
fact, studies devoted to the voting behaviour of the 
judges of the Court and their independence and impar­
tiality refute such a conception. Thus, in his recent in 
depth study of those questions, professor Weiss has
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reached the conclusions that, "there is a high degree of 
consensus among the judges on most decisions"; that 
"there have not been persistent voting alignments which 
have significantly affected the decisions of the judge", 
and that the "review of the voting behaviour of the 
judges of the Court does not support charges that the 
Court systematically votes in a pre-determined manner to 
the detriment of particular States".
In addition to these divergent reasons, and per­
haps, as a corollary of them, the different groups of 
States had expressed their preference of other means of 
settlement. Thus, even States which have been parties to 
the compulsory jurisdiction of both the present Court and 
its predecessor - such as Great Britain and Australia- 
made it clear that the improvement of the Court's role 
does not mean the downgrading of other means of settle-
7c
ment. As has been shown, the reservation excluding
disputes in regard to which the parties have agreed or 
shall agree to resort to other means of settlement other 
than the Court is the most popular reservation. However 
it is not the case meant by States' preference of other 
means. They prefer political means - especially negotia­
tions - for the settlement of their disputes. They prefer 
to keep open as far as possible the choice of resorting 
to manoeuvres such as lobbying, propaganda, bargaining, 
exerting pressure and manipulation of votes offered by 
political means.
The special character of adjudication, being a 
zero-sum game in which one party wins and the other 
loses, has also a negative effect on States’ attitude
*7£
toward the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. The effect 
of the fear of losing a case on States' attitudes can 
easily be proved by States' behaviour after being sued 
before the Court. A large number of declarations of 
acceptance had been terminated as a result of the in­
stitution of proceedings. The most recent examples are 
the withdrawal of the United States from compulsory
480
jurisdiction as a result of the institution of proceed­
ings in the MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IE S  IN  AND 
AGAINST NICARAGUA case, and that of France as a result of 
the NUCLEAR TESTS case. This cause of termination seems 
to reflect the conflict between the desire for appearing 
as a law-abiding nation, suing others, and at the same 
time to be immune to other parties applications.
The psychological obstacle, that recourse to the 
Court might be considered as an unfriendly act, has been 
widely deplored. It is perhaps surprising that this
conception is still persistent, although it was emphasis­
ed as early as the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899 
that recourse to the Permanent Court of Arbitration "can 
only be regarded as a friendly action ( )" (Articles 3
and 37). A similar view was also embodied in the Resolu-
tion of the Institute of International Law of 1959.
Thus the General Assembly Resolution 3232 of 1974 reaf­
firmed that recourse to judicial settlement "should not
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be considered an unfriendly act between States". 
However, the reservations excluding disputes between 
certain groups of States the relations between which have 
a special character, such as the exclusion of disputes 
between the Commonwealth States, seems to have been 
inspired by this factor.
Finally, it may be worth noting that reservations
had been generally deplored by States' responses to the
Secretary-General, and in their debates in the Sixth
Committee. Socialist Countries pointed out that they were
in the same position as those which hedged their declara-
40
tions with so many reservations. ' States which accepted
41compulsory jurisdiction without reservations, or even
those which had abandoned certain subjective reservations
were proud of their attitude. Some States among those
whose declarations contained certain reservations pointed
out that they were. reviewing their declarations with a
47
view to abolishing or restricting their reservations; 
and the proposal that acceptance of the Court's compul­
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sory jurisdiction should be without reservations was made
by certain States, some of which do not accept it even
44with reservations. It is not surprising thus that the
General Assembly Resolution 3232 urged States to study
the "possibility of accepting, with as few reservations
as possible, the compulsory jurisdiction of the Interna-
45tional Court of Justice."
(ii) Special reasons
In addition to the main reasons for the decline of 
compulsory jurisdiction there are special reasons that 
have caused States to append new reservations and condi­
tions to their acceptances. The following are the major 
ones:
a) The desire not to have a determined dispute decided 
by the Court
It has been shown that almost all reservations 
even general ones, were inserted with a view to 
precluding another party to a specific dispute from 
resorting to the Court. Thus, for example, the 
complex double formula of the reservation RATIONE 
TENPORIS - as one of he first reservations to 
appear - was included by Belgium in order to prev­
ent the Netherlands from referring the dispute 
concerning Wielingen to the P. C. I. J.
b) The Court's handling of some cases
As a result of the Court's interpretation of 
some provisions of the Statute, new reservations 
have appeared. Thus the reservation excluding 
disputes with new adhering parties to the compul­
sory jurisdiction system during the first 12 months 
of their adherence, was created as a result of the 
Court's statement in the RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER 
INDIAN TERRITORY case, that a State accepting the
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compulsory jurisdiction must expect that an ap­
plication may be filed against it before the Court 
by a new declarant State on the same day on which 
that State deposits with the Secretary-General its 
declaration of acceptance. The Court's recognition 
of the validity of the Portuguese third condition 
in the same case is the cause of the wide spread of 
this condition.
c) Causes inherent in the Statute itself
As the Court admitted explicitly, the uncer­
tainty inherent in the compulsory jurisdiction 
system by extending the Court's jurisdiction as to 
cover "any question of international law", and at 
the same time allowing the possibility of using the 
compulsory jurisdiction system as a means for "hit- 
and-run" or "single shot", and hence creating 
inequality between the parties to the system, and 
between these parties on the one hand, and those 
opting out on the other, has no doubt contributed 
to the increase of reservations. However, this 
cause must not be over-emphasised because the 
provision regulating compulsory jurisdiction i.e.. 
Article 36 (2 - 5) has been almost the same since
1920, but it had not been misused during the period 
of the P. C. I. J.
d) Imitation
By inserting reservation in their declara­
tions, old and experienced States have not only 
limited the Scope of compulsory jurisdiction but 
have also provided patterns to be adopted par­
ticularly by new States which are already over­
sensitive about their hard-won independence. Thus, 
many of the reservations that have been abandoned 
by old States, including those which backfire such 
as the subjective reservations of domestic juris-
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diction, are still maintained by the new States. 
The adoption of certain reservations which were 
designed to exclude specific disputes of special 
characteristics is another example. Thus, the 
Buraimi reservation, which was designed to prevent 
any attempt by Saudi Arabia to refer the dispute 
concerning the Buraimi Arbitration, has been copied 
by other States.
e) Psychological factors
The insertion of some reservations excluding 
disputes already excluded by the Statute of the 
Court or by virtue of another reservation in the 
same declaration seems to have no explanation 
except that they are inserted for psychological
reasons. The reserving States wanted to emphasise 
the importance of those disputes. Examples of these 
reservations are to be found in the objective
reservation of domestic jurisdiction, legal dis­
putes, and the reservations of hostilities RATIONS 
TEMPORIS included in the declaration of the United 
Kingdom of June 2, 1955 and in the 1956 Israeli
declaration.
The conclusion to be drawn from the above analysis 
of the different causes of the decline of the compulsory 
jurisdiction is that reservations are not so much the 
causes but the symptoms of the disease. Whatever their 
real causes, reservations reflect States' belief that 
broad commitment would produce few practical gains in
terms of immediate national interests, while it might 
pose significant risk in an unforeseen future.
B - EFFECT OF RESERVATIONS
The difficulty, if not the impossibility, of deter­
mining the exact effect of reservations must be admitted. 
It is not possible to know the number of disputes which
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have not been brought before the Court because of the 
conviction that they fell within the scope of some reser­
vations. It is difficult to imagine a State wasting so 
much money in bringing disputes which are clearly ex­
cluded by virtue of a reservation either in the declara­
tion of that State or in the declaration of the other 
party to the dispute. However, State practice under the 
Article 36 (2) of the Statute provides many examples in 
which acceptances were terminated, and replaced by new 
ones containing new reservations designed to prevent the 
submission of certain disputes. Thus, the United Kingdom 
had used its declarations for this purpose 4 times during 
the period between June 6 , 1955 and November 26 1958. 
Australia and Canada had also used this method success­
fully for preventing the submission of their disputes 
with Japan and the United States of America respectively 
concerning Pearl Fisheries, and Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act of 1970
However, if the number of cases in which objections 
based on reservations succeeded in divesting the Court of 
jurisdiction, is used as a criterion for the evolution of 
the effect of reservations, the conclusions will be that 
reservations proved to have little effect on the opera­
tion of the compulsory jurisdiction system. Thus, al­
though in two cases only of the eleven contentious cases, 
which were filed before the P. C. I . J . on the basis of 
the Optional Clause during the 18 years if its existence, 
a final judgment was rendered and the Court's jurisdic­
tion went unchallenged, objections based on reservations 
succeeded in depriving the Court of jurisdiction in one 
case only.
Table 7 on page 485 indicates the effect of reser­
vations on all the cases filed before the both the P. C. 
I. J. and the I. C. J. on the basis of Article 36 (2) of 
the Statute.
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It is obvious that the Court can play a major role 
in controlling the effect of reservations while exercis­
ing its function of interpretation. It can therefore 
alleviate their deleterious effect. In practice, however, 
this role has not been fully played. The Court has taken 
a cautions attitude in respect of certain reservations. 
Thus, although it has been offered many opportunities to 
pronounce on the validity of the subjective reservation 
of domestic jurisdiction, it cautiously stepped aside for 
reasons of a non-legal character. Yet the positive role 
played by the Court in this respect cannot be denied. In 
fact it has played a significant role through the inter­
pretation of some reservations. It has, for example, 
limited the scope of the reservations RQTIQNE TEMP0R1S by 
applying the criterion of the "real cause", which means 
that a situation or fact in regard to which a dispute is 
said to have arisen, cannot be taken into account unless 
it is the real cause of the dispute. The Court has also 
interpreted this reservation in a positive manner as 
indicating the disputes which are covered by a declara­
tion accepting its compulsory jurisdiction rather than 
proceeding on the principle of excluding from that accep­
tance any given dispute. This approach, combined with the 
"real cause" criterion, constitutes a major element in 
limiting the scope of this reservation and hence enhanc­
ing the scope of the compulsory jurisdiction.
C - GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM
Balancing the signs of decline cited above there 
are, fortunately some grounds for optimism. The most 
important sign perhaps is that States' confidence in the 
Court seems to have been increased during the last two 
decades. The Court's docket has been fuller in the last 
few years than it had been during the previous two decad­
es. Thus in 1986 - 1987 the Court docket contained 6
46contentious cases and one request for advisory opinion.
It is true that only one case has been brought before the 
Court on the basis of Article 36 (2) since 1973. However
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what seems important is the removal of the psychological 
factor concerning the impartiality of the Court and the 
overcoming of the real obstacle, which is the political 
willingness of States not to resort to the Court. It is 
worth noting that developing countries - especially new 
States - have shown an increasing tendency to resort to 
the Court during the last few years. Four of the six 
cases referred to above are between developing countries 
and the fifth is brought also by a developing country 
(Nicaragua). Recourse to the Court by some African Stat­
es, such as Tunisia, Libya, Burkina Faso and Malawi, is a 
sign of improvement. New States seem thus to have started 
the application of the idea, usually articulated by 
themselves, that judicial settlement is to their benefit.
At least it does not involve, as the other means often 
do, "a compromise in which the physical or economic
47pressures exerted by one of the parties might dominate".
The Court is a forum in which these States are to be 
offered a virtual equality. In fact, if the SOUTH NEST 
AFRICA case of 1966 had shaken up the confidence of new 
States and the NAMIBIA case had restored it, the MILITARY  
AND PARAMILITARY A C T IV IT IE S  IN  AND AGAINST NICARAGUA 
case, having refuted their apprehensions discussed above, 
should leave no doubt that the Court constitutes perhaps 
the best means for the settlement of their disputes. 
However, there seems to be no doubt that the number of 
cases referred to the Court since 1980 constitutes a 
positive sign, especially if it is borne in mind that 
there are not thousands of millions of potential litiga­
nts before the Court - as judge Schwebel observes - but 
48only 162.
Another sign of the increase of confidence on the 
part of new States is that 12 new declarations have been 
made since 1963. It is true that this number constitutes 
a small portion of the total number of these States, but 
it must not be forgotten that most of them have emerged 
recently and might have had no time to think about ac­
cepting the compulsory jurisdiction.
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Other grounds for optimism can be found in the 
following facts:
Since 1963 the average number of reservations in
every individual declaration has decreased. Thus, while 4
49of the declarations which have been made since 1963
FiO
constitute a drawback, 9 declarations contain a small 
number of reservations, usually otiose reservations, but 
with the condition of variation or termination with im­
mediate effect. Only 3 new declarations are encumbered
ET J
with a large number of reservations. u On balance, 5
declarations are made without reservations or with un­
ci'-?
necessary reservations. Thus, 20 of the 46 declara­
tions currently in force are positive acceptance of 
compulsory jurisdiction and constitute a genuine commit­
ment to the Court.
Four States [Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom] have replaced their previous declarations 
with new ones which are much better and disclose a grea­
ter commitment. The United Kingdom, for example, has 
dropped 6 of the reservations made during the fifties.
Reservations concerning national security or na­
tional defence have disappeared without being imitated.
A new time-limit formula has been introduced by 
Switzerland and Liechtenstein. Their declarations are for 
an unlimited period, revocable after ONE YEAR'S NOTICE,
The Netherlands modified the exclusion date in its 
RATIONE TEMPORIS reservation from 1946 to 1921.
The conclusion to be drawn from these signs is that 
although thesystem of compulsory jurisdiction is ill, it 
is far from dead.
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D - SUGGESTIONS
The number of States accepting the Court's compul­
sory jurisdiction, their practice under Article 36 (2 and 
3) of the Statute and their debates in the Sixth Commit­
tee concerning the review of the Court's role, leave no 
doubt that there are no prospects at the present time nor 
in the near future that the automatic compulsory juris­
diction via the Optional Clause will be introduced. 
Socialist States, especially the U. S. S. R. have made it 
clear that they would oppose any amendment to the Statute 
aiming at that object. A proposal to accept the compul­
sory jurisdiction without reservations appears to be a 
premature move and likely to fall - as in fact it did- 
on deaf ears. Any suggestion must thus be realistic. 
Certainly reservations are not a good thing for interna­
tional law and justice, but it should not be forgotten 
that the majority of the members of the League of Na­
tions, including great powers, did not adhere to the
Optional Clause except after the Assembly's recommenda­
tion that reservations might be included in the declara­
tions of acceptance. Any suggestions for improvement 
must, thus, be made within the framework of maintaining 
reservations. The "all-or-nothing" approach should be 
abandoned. It would be more realistic and wiser to "elev­
ate our sights a little lower" perhaps "much lower" as 
professor Sohn points out. However, the existing
situation could be improved, it is believed, even within 
this framework. For, if the insertion of reservations 
reflects a State's desire not to overlook any of the
diverse and often complex elements that have to be taken
into consideration before deciding to accept compulsory 
jurisdiction, some reservations indicate a misplaced 
ingenuity or excessive caution on the part of legal 
advisors while calculating the balance of benefits and 
risks of their acceptance. Such misplaced ingenuity or 
excessive caution has led to the insertion of reserva­
tions which operate against the interests of the declar­
ant State itself. In this respect the following sugges­
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tions might be made.
Subjective reservations must be abandoned, not only 
because they are intolerable in any effective system of 
compulsory jurisdiction, but also because they proved to 
be in practice inimicable to the interests of States 
making them. Their inclusion proved that a major element 
in the balance of benefits and risks of accepting the 
Court's compulsory jurisdiction, namely, the operation of 
the principle of reciprocity, had been neglected. Lessons 
learned from the NORNEGIAN LOANS case must not be forgot­
ten. The United States statement justifying withdrawal 
from the Court's compulsory jurisdiction provides another 
proof that these reservations must be eliminated. In that 
statement, the United States admitted explicitly that it 
had "never been able to use [its] acceptance of compul­
sory jurisdiction to bring other States before the 
□4
Court". Consequently, it is greatly hoped that the
proposed reservation excluding any dispute brought before 
the Court under Article 36 (2) of the Statute unless it 
is decided by a chamber of the Court composed in accor­
dance with Article 26 of the Statute, will not be adopt­
ed. This reservation must be ruled out for the same 
reasons advanced against the subjective reservation of 
domestic jurisdiction. It is incompatible with the Rules 
of the Court, and might be used as an escape device by 
the respondent State by declining to accept any combina-
cjtr
tion of judges acceptable to the other party. It is 
vital - as a great authority observes - "to overcome the 
hesitation endemic in approaches to a Court composed of 
persons from different cultures and traditions".
The reservation of the right to terminate or vary 
an acceptance at any time proved to be more harmful than 
any other reservation, because - as shown in practice- 
it enables States parties to the compulsory jurisdiction 
system to escape their obligation when and as they wish, 
and the new comers to take the benefit, on their own 
conditions and according to their convenience. Thus, many
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suggestions have been made, such as the proposal to apply 
reciprocity to time-limits, to insert the "single-shot" 
solution reservation and the suggestion that Article 36
(4) of the Statute should be amended so as to include a 
provision providing that declarations, shall not enter 
into force until a month or so after their deposit. 
However it has been shown that the first might complicate 
the problem instead of being a cure, and the Court rejec­
ted it. The second and third could only provide a partial 
solution, because while they might solve the "single­
shot" problem, they leave a State party to the system 
free to "hit another party and run". The simple and, 
perhaps, complete solution for these problems seems to be 
the insertion jn Article 36 (2) of the Statute the provi­
so:
"Provided that the acceptance shall have effect as 
long as it has not been revoked subject to one year’s notice".
It is true that the debates before the Sixth Committee 
concerning the review of the Court's role indicate that 
many States were against the idea of amending the Statu­
te, but their opposition concerned attempts to introduce 
the system of AUTOMATIC AM1 GENERAL COMPULSORY JUR ISD IC ­
TION . There is, therefore, a good chance of having this 
minor amendment to the existing system adopted. However, 
if the time is not yet ripe for the adoption of such an 
amendment it might be considered in the future when the 
circumstances allow.
It is to be observed that the importance of this 
proviso is not limited to preventing a State from accept­
ing the Court's jurisdiction for the purpose of referring 
a single dispute to the Court, or from escaping being 
sued in respect of a determined dispute, but, it might 
also adduce States unfamiliar with the system of compul­
sory jurisdiction to accept it, since they are not re­
quired to make long term declarations.
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Reservations excluding disputes already excluded by 
the Statute should have no place in States' declarations 
of acceptance. For, while they do not provide any further 
protection to the declarant States, they might.be develo­
ped into undesirable ones. The substitution of the sub­
jective reservation of domestic jurisdiction for the 
objective one is an example.
In making subject-matter reservations, States are 
advised to refer EQ NOMINE to the dispute or category of 
disputes they wish to exclude instead of the general 
GENUS PROKIMUM. This proposal could serve both the inter­
ests of the declarant State as well as the system of 
compulsory jurisdiction. State practice provides examples 
on how general reservations can backfire. Thus, the Greek 
reservation of territorial disputes, which was designed 
to exclude a dispute with Bulgaria, prevented Greece from 
having its dispute with Turkey, concerning the Aegean Sea 
Continental Shelf, decided by the Court.
As a corollary. States are also advised to elimin­
ate reservations which have achieved their purpose. If 
the existence of these reservations is unnecessary, they 
might be imitated by other States. Thus, if the reser­
vations of the Law of the Sea were inserted as a result 
of the uncertainty of that law during the past decade, 
their retention by developing countries could prevent the 
Court from a further contribution to the development of 
that law, in which they played a great role in shaping. 
Law needs application as several representatives to the
cry
General Assembly from those countries pointed out.
In replacing their previous declarations or renew­
ing them, States are urged to pay attention to the fact 
that the retention of the proviso excluding "disputes 
arising after the present declaration" diminishes the 
period subject to the Court's jurisdiction by excluding 
the period during which the Court's jurisdiction had been 
accepted by the previous declarations.
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New States might be recommended to insert a reser­
vation excluding disputes arising prior to the date of 
their independence or subsequent date if they feel that 
they might be bound by treaties forced upon them and 
rights acquired during the period of colonization
Efforts should be made to prevent a further deteri­
oration of the present situation. Jurists should play a 
leading role in this respect. They must - as professor
rrp
Humbro points out - remember that they are not ex­
clusively servants of governments and institutions, but 
they are also servants of the international community.
Jurists should also exploit every opportunity to 
emphasise again and again that recourse to the Court is a 
normal way of settling international disputes. Every 
effort should be made to eliminate this psychological 
factor which encourages States to settle their disputes 
outside the Court.
The adoption of these suggestions might enhance the 
role of the system of the optional compulsory jurisdic­
tion as a reconcilable means with the principle of sover­
eignty in the prevailing circumstances and as the only 
available means for a progressive and general acceptance 
of compulsory jurisdiction.
On the following page is a model of a declaration 
which might be recommended for States to adopt as a means 
which serves their own interests as well as that of the 
system of compulsory jurisdiction.
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"UNDER PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE 36 OF THE STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, I DECLARE ON BEHALF
OF [THE GOVERNMENT OF STATE X] THAT [STATE X] RECOGNISES 
THE COURT’S JURISDICTION AS COMPULSORY IPSO FACTO AND 
WITHOUT SPECIAL AGREEMENT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE SAID 
PARAGRAPH.
PROVIDED, THAT THIS DECLARATION DOES NOT EXTEND TO:
(List of clearly defined and objectively determined 
subject-matter disputes)
THIS DECLARATION SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE AS LONG AS
IT HAS NOT BEEN REVOKED SUBJECT TO ONE YEAR'S NOTICE."
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NOTES
(1) This number covers only States which were parties to the L. N. (57 States) and 
those mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant (4 States ). It does not therefore 
include other States which were entitled to appear before the P.C.I.J. (10 
States), See P.C.I.J. , Series E, No.10, pp.47 seq.
(2) 55 members of the U.N., mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant and one 
(Monaco) of the 8 other States which were entitled to appear before the P.C.I.J., 
ibid., No. 14, pp.59 seq.
(3) For the list of these States see I.C.J.Y.B., 1986-87, p.59.
(4) These declarations were made by Argentina, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, 
Guatemala, Egypt, Iraq, Liberia, Poland and Turkey. See table 2, Chapter 2, 
above pp. 54-55.
(5) the Declarations of New Zealand and Norway are omitted because the right to 
vary them is limited to the special question of dispute settlement in the law of the 
sea.
(6 ) See 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 Official Records of the General Assembly 
(O.R.G.A.), Sixth Committee, Annexes, Agenda Items 96, 90, 90, 97 and 93 
respectively.
(7) It is to be noted that not all the reasons which cause States' reluctance to resort 
to the Court can be considered as causes behind the insertion of reservations. 
Thus, foe example, the conception that adjudication is expensive or a time- 
consuming procedure may discourage States to resort to the Court but not to 
accept the Court's jurisdiction with reservations.
(8) See e.g. the views expressed by Japan, France and Australia in "Views Expressed 
by Member States and States Parties to the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice in their Replies to the Questionnaire Prepared by the Secretary- 
General", U. N. Doc. A/8382, paras.49, 51 and 53 respectively. See also the 
views of the Ukranian S.S.R. [26 O .R.G.A., p .195, para.50 (U. N. Doc. 
A /C .6/SR .1280)] and Bulgaria [ibid, p.201, para. 52(U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/S.R. 
1281)]. But comp, the view expressed by Cyprus, ibid., para. 25 (U.N. Doc. 
A/C. 6/ S.R. 1280).
(9) 29 ibid., para.12(U.N. Doc.A/C. 6 /S .R .1467).
(10) See e.g. the view expressed by Poland [26 O.R.G.A., p.178, para.44 ( U.N. Doc. 
A/C. 6/S.R. 1277)] and the Ukranian S.S.R., U.N. Doc. A/8382, para.385.
(11) Quoted by O. J. Lissitzyn, the International Court of Justice, 1953, p.63.
(12) 25 O.R.G.A., p.230, para.26 (U.N. Doc. A/C/. 6/S.R. 1217).
(13) See the U.S.S.R. statement, ibid., p.200, para.11 (U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/S.R.
1212). See also the statements of Cuba [29 ibid., p.18, para.3 (U.N. Doc. A/C. 
6/S.R. 1467)] ; Byelorussian S.S.R. [ ibid., p.22, para.43] and Romania [ ibid., 
p.27para.21 (U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/S.R. 1468)].
(14) See e.g. the statements made by the delegates of Byelorussian [Ibid., p.33, 
para.44] and U.S.S.R. [ibid., p.37, para.4 (U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/S.R. 1470)].
(15) See e.g. the views expressed by the delegates of Cuba [29 ibid., p.18, para.4
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(U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/S.R. 1467)]; Hungary [ibid., p.21, para.34], and Poland [25 
ibid., p.191, para.17 (U.N. Doc.A/C. 6/S.R. 1210).
(16) See U.N. Doc. A/8382, paras. 62,66 and26 O.R.G.A., p.206, para. 21 (U.N. Doc. 
A/C. 6/S.R. 1283) respectively.
(17) See e.g. the statemens of the delegates of Ecuador[26 O.R.G.A., p.220, para.10 
(U.N. Doc.A/C. 6 /S .R .1283)] and Afghanistan [25 ibid., p.214, para.45 (U.N. 
Doc. A/C. 6/S.R. 1283)].
(18) See e.g. Mr.Alcivar's (Ecuador) statement 25 ibid., p.233, para.3 (U.N. Doc. 
A/C. 6/S.R. 1218).
(1 9 ) See e.g. the Australian proposal in U.N. Doc. A/8382, para.66 and the 
statements of the delegates of Mexico [29 O.R.G.A., p.38, para.16 (U.N. Doc. A/C. 
6/S.R. 1470)], Ethiopia [26 ibid., p.215, para.55 (U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/S.R. 
1283)3 and Ecuador 25 ibid., p.233, para.3 (U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/S.R. 1218).
(20) See e.g. the statement of the Egyptian delegate, 25 ibid., p.209, para.5 (U.N. 
Doc. A/C. 6/S.R. 1214.
(21 ) See T.O. Elias, "does the International Court of Justice, as it is Presently, 
Shaped Correspond to the Requirements which Follow from its Functions as the 
Central Judicial Body of the International Community" in H. Mosler and R. 
Bernhardt (eds.), Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, 1974, pp.19- 
23, at 23.
(22) See e.g. the responses of Laos, Argentina, Mexico, Iraq and Yugoslavia to the 
Secretary-General Questionnaire, U.N. Doc. A/8382, paras.97, 101, 104, 110 
and 112 respectively.
(23) See e.g. the responses of Laos and Yugoslavia, ibid., and the statements of the 
representatives of Ghana [25 O.R.G.A., p.230, para.32(U.N. Doc.A/C. 6/S.R. 
1217)] and Ecuador [ibid., p.234, para.5 (U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/S.R. 1218)].
(24) See Zemanec in H. Mosler and R. Bernhardt(eds.), supra note 21, p.61.
(25) For the effect of this case on the attitude of those States see Q.l. Natchaba, les 
Etats Africains et la Cour Internationale de Justice, thesis (Universite de 
Poitiers, Faculte de Droit et des Sciences Sociales), 1978, vol. 1, pp.126-128.
(26) For the effect of the Court's Judgments in the South West Africa cases see 
ibid., p.145 seq and R. Falk, Reviving the World Court, 1986, pp.25-137.
(27) See e.g. the views expressed by the delegates of Ethiopia [26 O.R.G.A., p.173, 
para.6(U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/S.R. 1277)] and United Republic of Tanzania [25 ibid., 
p.228, para.7 (U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/S R 1217)].
(28) See the View of U.R. of Tanzania [ibid., para.11] ; Ghana {Ibid., p.231, 
para.32] and Madagascar [29 ibid., p.27, para.23 (U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/S.R. 
1668)]. Comp. Kenya's view 25 ibid., p.205, para.30 (U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/S.R.
1 2 1 3 ).
(29) See e.g. U.S.A. response to the Secretary-General Questionnaire, supra note 8, 
U.N. Doc. A/8382, para.60.
(30) See E. MacWhinney, "Acceptance, and Withdrawal or Denial of World Court 
Jurisdiction : Some Recent Trends as to Jurisdiction", 20 Isr.L.R. (1 9 8 5 ), 
pp.184-166, at 151.
(31) Journal Official de la republique Frangaise, 9 March 1974, pp.1086-1087.
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(3 2 ) " Statement on the U. S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by 
Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice ", 24 I.L.M. (1985), p.246, at 
247 .
(3 3 ) Ibid., p.248.
(34) E.B. Weiss, "Judicial Independence and Impartiality : A Preliminary Inquiry", 
in L.F. Damrosch (ed.), the International Court of Justice at a Crossroads, 
1987, pp.123-154, at 132.
(35) See 25 O.R.G.A., p.217, para.1 (U.N. Doc A/C. 6/S.R. 1216) and 29 ibid., 
p.16, para.3 (U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/S.R. 1466).
(36) See e.g. the view expressed by the delegate of Guyana, 26 ibid., p.220, para.17
(U.N.Doc. A/C. 6/S .R .1284).
(37) See the statements of the delegates of Australia [29 ibid., p.16, para.9 (U.N. 
Doc. A/C. 6/ S.R. 1465)], Italy [ibid., p.20, para.20 (U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/S.R. 
1467)] and the British response to the Secretary-General Questionnaire, U.N. 
Doc. A/8382/Add.1, para.51.
(3 8 ) 48 (II) Annuaire I.D.I.( 1959), p.359.
(39 ) Resolution 3232(XXIX), "Review of the Role of the International Court of
Justice", 2280th plenary meeting , 12 November 1974.
(40) See the statement of Poland [25 O.R.G.A., P.191, para.18 (U.N. Doc.A/C. 
6/S .R . 1384)].
(41) See e.g. the Swedish view [Ibid., p.218, para.9 (U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/S.R. 1216)] 
and the Nigerian one[ Ibid., p.223, para.55].
(42) E.g. India, 25 ibid., p.214, para. 11 (U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/S.R. 1215).
(43) E.g. New Zealand (U.N. Doc. A/8382/ Add. 4) and U.S.A. [27 O.R.G.A., p.435, 
para.24 (U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/S.R. 1384)].
(44) E.g. Turkey, 26 ibid., p.216, para. 67 (U.N. Doc.A/C. 6/S.R. 1283).
(45) Supra note 39.
(46) See I.C.J.Y.B., 1986-87, p.127.
(47) See the statement made by Faruk, the delegate of Pakistan to the General
Assembly, 26 O.R.G.A., p.200, para.44 (U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/S.R. 1279).
(4 8 )  "Reflections on the Role of the International Court of Justice", 61
Wash.L.R.{ 1986), pp.1061-1071, at 1068.
(49) The declarations of El Salvador, India , Honduras and the Philippines.
(50) The Declarations of Austria, Barbados, Botswana, Canada, Gambia, Kenya, 
Senegal, Somalia and Swaziland.
(51) Malawi, Malta and Mauritius.
(52) Costa Rica, New Zealand, Nigeria, Togo and Norway.
(53) L. B. Sohn, "Step- by- Step Acceptance of the Jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice", 58 A.SJ.L. (1964), pp.131-136, at 131.
(54 ) "Statement Concerning Termination of Acceptance Of I.C.J. Compulsory 
Jurisdiction , October7, 1985 (Press Statement), 24 I.L.M. (1985), p .1743, 
at 1744.
(55) This reservation is suggested by R. N. Gardner, " U. S. Termination of the 
Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice", 24 Colum.J.T.L.
(1986), pp.421-427, at 425, 427, and M. Leigh and S.D. Ramsey, "Confidence 
in the Court : It Need not be a 'Hollow Chamber", in L. F. Damrosch (ed.), supra
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note 34, pp.106-122, at 119-122.
(56) Judge M. Lachs, " A Few Thoughts on the Independence of Judges of the 
International Court of Justice", 25 Colum.J.T.L. (1987), pp.593-600, at 594.
(57) See e.g. the views expressed by the delegates of Uruguay, 29 O.R.G.A., p.24, 
para.61(U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/S.R. 1467) and Turkey, Ibid., p.30, para.45 (U.N. 
Doc. A/C. 6/S.R. 1468).
(58) In H. Mosler and R. Bernhardt (eds.), supra note 21, p.173.
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